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Abstract 
 
Historical low and lowest-low fertility patterns have been discussed in the context of the 
individualization theory and the second demographic transition to provide empirical discussion 
on the implications in the real number of births, and as well about the cause-effect association 
between fertility, education, economic and employment stability. The fertility levels observed 
across Europe over the past century are not only the direct result from changes in the period 
fertility trends, but also the result from each individual choice conditioned by their birth cohort. 
Therefore, once that fertility rates are accounting for fertility from different real cohorts, 
disturbed by different period, it is implausible to disregard the inter-dependency between 
synthetic and real cohorts.  
With the aim to understand why Portugal is not replacing generations, based on a cross-
country comparative analysis, we explore, in this thesis, the relationship between cohort and 
period fertility postponement and the effect of this double postponement on the final period 
quantum. 
The observed transformations in the transition to parenthood can be seen as a result of the 
modernization process, in which individuals behaviours are no longer conditioned only by the 
personal background but in which variables that correspond to personal choice have more 
predictive capability. This changes renewed the input decisions in the transition to parenthood 
and how and when that would occur in the individual life history. Such transformation adjusted 
also the own individual tempo and quantum fertility dynamics to the new socioeconomic 
dynamics and to the increase female participation at the educational system and at the labour 
market.  
The increasing mean age at childbearing results from higher levels of education, later 
transitions to the labour market and consequently due to the lack of economic stability later 
family formation, and decreased the total fertility rate and changed the fertility dynamics. All 
these individual, socio-economic and demographic changes are pushing Europe towards 
accelerated aging and even that major changes in fertility occur in the short-run, possible fertility 
increases may not be enough to avoid or counterbalance this tendency.  
Thereby, this thesis addresses the most prominent features of current European fertility 
trends: permanent low fertility rates and what determines later transitions to motherhood; the 
impact of education evolution in the cohort fertility; and in the implications from the last 
economic crisis in the postponing and recuperating countries.  
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Porque não está Portugal a recuperar as suas gerações? 
Uma perspectiva de calendário e geração numa análise comparativa 
entre países europeus 
 
Resumo 
 
Os níveis históricos de baixa fecundidade têm sido analisados no contexto das teorias da 
individualização e da segunda transição demográfica, proporcionando uma discussão empírica 
sobre as suas implicações no número real de nascimentos, bem como na relação de causa-efeito 
entre fecundidade, educação e estabilidade laboral. Os níveis de fecundidade observados em toda 
a Europa durante o século passado não foram apenas resultado direto de mudanças da 
fecundidade do momento mas também condicionada pelo comportamento de fecundidade das 
coortes de origem. Em consequência torna-se necessário analisar os padrões de fecundidade do 
momento considerando a interdependência entre coortes sintéticas (do momento) e reais. 
Tendo como objetivo central compreender porque não está Portugal a substituir as 
gerações, apoiando-nos numa análise comparativa entre cinco países europeus, investigámos a 
relação entre coortes reais e sintéticas e os seus comportamentos quanto ao adiamento da 
fecundidade, bem como os efeitos desse(s) adiamento(s). 
As alterações observadas na transição para a parentalidade, parecem ser o resultado do 
processo de modernização da sociedade, no qual os indivíduos deixaram de estar principalmente 
condicionados pelo seu contexto familiar de origem, em que as características adquiridas ao longo 
da vida, preferências pessoais têm hoje um maior impacto nas decisões de formação e 
constituição da família. Tais alterações transformaram as decisões individuais ajustando não 
apenas o quantum mas também o tempo da fecundidade às novas dinâmicas socioeconómicas e ao 
aumento da participação feminina no sistema educativo e no mercado de trabalho. O aumento da 
idade média à fecundidade sendo igualmente o reflexo do aumento dos níveis de educação, da 
entrada tardia no mercado de trabalho e do consequente adiar de estabilidade económica que 
permita a formação de uma família,  agrava a redução dos níveis de fecundidade.  
Este adiamento característico de cada geração é influenciado por conjunturas críticas que 
afetam em simultâneo os comportamentos dos indivíduos pertencentes a diferentes coortes 
gerando formas de ajustamento com consequências imprevisíveis que conduzem a alterações 
significativas a nível demográfico na Europa. 
Em resumo, esta tese aborda questões fundamentais relacionadas com as atuais 
tendências da fecundidade europeia: os determinantes para uma transição tardia para a 
parentalidade, os continuados baixos níveis de fecundidade; o impacto da educação na evolução 
da fecundidade das coortes; as implicações da recente crise económica não só nos países em 
adiamento como também nos países em recuperação de fecundidade.  
 
Palavras-chave: Adiamento; Coorte; Fecundidade; Período; Portugal. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. The context of Southern European countries   
 
In 2005 the fundamental argument to Kohler and colleagues was that the emergence of 
low fertility in Europe was due to a combination of four distinct behavioural and 
demographic factors.  The first factor identified was the economic and social changes 
that made the postponement of fertility an individual and rational response. The second, 
the social interactions processes that affect the timing of fertility have changed the 
population response to these new socioeconomic circumstances substantially larger than 
the direct individual responses. The third factor, the demographic distortion of period 
fertility measures, caused by the fertility postponement and changes in parity-
composition of populations have shrink the level of period indicators below the related 
level of cohort fertility. Finally the fourth factor is the institutional settings which in 
Central, Eastern and Southern European countries that have favoured an overall low 
fertility quantum. Moreover the institutional settings caused, due to the delay of 
childbearing, large reductions in the completed fertility in lowest-low fertility countries.  
The structural and high unemployment in the south European countries have 
discouraged the young adults from entering in the labour market and as consequence the 
family formation and childbearing have been postponed.  It is widespread in the literature 
that countries with lowest-low fertility share institutional settings characterized by an 
almost nil contribution of the welfare state relatively to low quantum of fertility, e.g., the 
Southern European countries provide highly insufficient child-care support (Esping-
Adersen, 1999).  
In comparison with Western European countries, the South have the lowest levels 
of state support for families with children in terms of tax allowances or direct transfers, 
but this lack of state support is compensated in the South by the family support. 
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However, the family support until later ages have a perverse effect once the young adults 
have a high integration in the family home, thereby the union formation and fertility are 
discouraged.  
Countries with low compatibility between childbearing and female labour force 
participation are subject to large postponement effects (Rydell, 2002). These countries 
experience considerable decrease in completed fertility that is causally related to delays 
in childbearing. The low fertility and total fertility rate from the last decades in Europe, 
and particularity in Southern European countries, are an important challenge for the 
European economies due to its consequences, in terms of the population equilibrium 
level, welfare state (social security, education and health), and the sustainable growth and 
economic development in the long term.   
From all the four Southern European countries Portugal and Spain are the more 
similar in terms of recent trajectories in the political, social and economic fronts. Both 
countries exited from a dictatorial regime in the mid-1970; entered the European Union 
in 1986; have fragile welfare states and the social organization is characterized by 
relatively strong family-ties and low investment in family policies (Dominguez-Folgueras 
and Castro-Martin, 2008).  However Portugal, when compared to Spain had already in 
the 1960s a higher female participation at the labour market combined with highest 
fertility levels, and only in 2012 Portugal achieve the lowest-low fertility levels that 
Spain registered already in the 1990s.   
Even that Portugal does not fit totally to the Southern European model, the lowest 
values from the late 2000s have been reported. When the State of World Population 2011 
report was released by the United Nations, in Portugal the results were widely spread. 
This report summarized the Portuguese fertility and family context and it was then point 
out that for over a generation of family’s Portuguese fertility rates have been decreasing. 
Besides that together with Malta and Austria, in the period 2010-2015, would be the 
country with the lowest fertility levels. 1.3 children per woman was the value expected 
for these three European countries. In that same year, also OECD points out the 
Portuguese problem of sustainable fertility, in the report, Doing better for families. The 
report is explicit: Portuguese problem is not that families have no children, but rather 
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families not having more than one child. And also to improve fertility rates, Portuguese 
families need more support when caring for young children.  
 
1.2. Aim of the study and research questions  
 
The fundamental purpose of this research is the analysis of the relationship between 
cohort fertility postponement and period fertility postponement and to evaluate the 
joint and separated effects of this double postponement on the final period quantum 
in Portugal. In the context of the individualization and of the second demographic 
transition theories, we provide empirical discussion on the implications of both 
postponements effects in the real number of births as long as understand the cause-effect 
association between fertility, education, labour force participation and employment 
stability.  
The study of period and cohort fertility is fundamental to describe and discuss the 
fertility trends over the last decades. Often studied independent one from another, real 
and synthetic cohorts are deeply related. The synthetic cohort it is a cohort where the 
patterns, of a given year, are assumed to be constant though time. Reflecting fertility, 
mortality, migrations and social behaviour from different real cohorts.  
The most used indicator on fertility analysis is directly influenced by all the 
period changes. And to that fertility rate are counting for the fertility from different real 
cohorts, it is no plausible to disregard the inter-dependency between synthetic and real 
cohorts.  Therefore this work seeks to explore the relationship between cohort and period 
fertility postponement and the impact of this double effect on the final period quantum. 
For that we hypothesized as the core for the empirical analyses on real and 
synthetic cohorts that,   
 
Period and cohort fertility levels strongly affected by the double postponement. 
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We expect that the observed postponement to both period and cohort parenthood 
transition can be understood into the light of individualization theory: as a process of 
modernization in which individuals behaviour is no longer so deeply constrained by the 
so called background variables, given by birth (such as age, sex, household composition, 
social condition) and in which variables that correspond to personal choice (e.g., personal 
effort, education, labour market participation) start to have more predictive capability. 
Nowadays, with such low fertility levels and later transitions to parenthood we 
can expect that the parenthood determinants are coincident with fertility ones. In order to 
verity that relationship we arise the following hypothesis:  
 
Familiar background, social norms and individual values, influences the parenthood 
postponement, i.e., explain the late period fertility transition. 
 
The fertility postponement and quantum decline can be not only explained by the 
social transformations as a consequence of socioeconomic improvements, but also by the 
high increase in the female educational level. Thus we expect that the educational change 
and the deep relationship between period fertility and educational level, arise the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Individual’s education is a central key factor for the period and cohort fertility 
postponement.    
 
The increasing childbearing mean age as result from higher levels of education, 
later transitions to the labour market and consequently later family formation, decreased 
the total fertility rate and changed the fertility dynamics. Still the relationship between 
education, family formation and employment stability differs from country to country and 
depending on the familiar ties (Neels, 2010). Nevertheless even that employment has 
different relationships with the fertility trends, in the case of unemployment uncertainty 
its expected homogenous reactions in all countries.  
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In that context, if we consider the association between education, fertility 
postponement, employment stability and improvements in the labour market participation 
we arise the following hypothesis:   
 
The traditional influence of education level and fertility postponement changed from 
negative to positive in terms of fertility quantum, mainly at later ages.  
 
All these individual, socio-economic and demographic changes are pushing 
Europe towards aging and even that major changes in fertility occur in a short-term, that 
fertility increases it might not be enough to avoid or counterbalance this tendency. 
Considering that all the circumstances that led fertility to the current low values 
will maintain for the next ten years, and specially that fertility transition postponement 
will continue to concentrates into to latter reproductive ages, on average around age 30, 
we arise the following hypothesis:   
 
The recent observed changes in the relationship between fertility level, education and 
employment, will compress childbearing around age 30.   
 
To provide empirical discussion about our research questions we use a cross-
country analysis. Our cross-country analysis included five other European countries. 
Austria for the similar cohort and period fertility trends in the quantum decline and 
postponement effect. Hungary due to its approximation to the Portuguese trends in the 
most calendar years as well as for younger cohorts. France and Sweden as countries were 
the transition to low fertility has been exceeded or not even reached. Finally we included 
Spain for the social, economic and cultural resemblances, as well as the strong and 
continuous postponement behaviour.  
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1.3. Outline of the study  
 
This study consists of seven chapters, including the present introduction. Chapter 2 
reviews the period and cohort fertility measures, promoting a comparative analysis of 
fertility trends in Europe. We will identify that not only in the period but also in the 
cohort firstly a quantum decline, followed by strong and persistent postponement 
behaviour. Later we not only analyse the period fertility patterns but also discuss on the 
possible fertility recuperation. Such discussion and decomposition of the total fertility 
rate allow identify when the significant period changes occurred and to determine that for 
more than one decade that fertility haven’t substantially changed in the cross-country 
comparison. Finally we will elaborate about fertility patterns controlling for the tempo 
and quantum effects since 1990. 
Identified the patterns of fertility over the last decades in selected European 
countries and contextualized the Portuguese situation, we will identify in Chapter 3 
parenthood determinants in Portugal. The risk of becoming a parent will be analysed into 
the light of both individualization theory and the second demographic transition one.  
The previous analysis will provide the consistence to the empirical findings that 
individuals education as well as their mother education (grandmother or potential ones) is 
one, if not the major factor for the period and cohort fertility postponement, and allow 
elaborating the following chapter in the perspective of fertility postponement and 
educational improvements. Chapter 4 provide us an extensive literature review were 
findings for the multidimensional relation between education and period fertility will be 
the first main focus. Later in this chapter and for a group of selected countries we proceed 
to a cohort analysis of educational impact on fertility postponement.  
The traditional negative relationship between education and fertility 
postponement can, however, become positive in terms of fertility quantum, mainly at 
later ages, if we consider it in association with the employment stability and 
improvements in the labour market female participation. In Chapter 5 we further argue 
on the positive and negative relationship between low fertility and high employment and 
unemployment rates. Also empirical direct evidences on the relationship between the 
2008 economic shock and fertility decline will be reviewed.  
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Assuming that fertility determinants will not change substantially in the next 
years, as well as the education will keeping the same impact at fertility tempo and the 
economic impact shock will constrain fertility, in Chapter 6 fertility forecasting is 
presented, giving new insights on the fertility compression at age 30. The concluding 
Chapter 7 summarises the major findings and outlines major insights correlating them to 
the possible implications in the social and economical structures.  
 
1.4. Relevance and limitations of the study 
 
The work on this thesis was undertaken and founded by the Portuguese Science and 
Technology Foundation (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia – FCT), project number 
SFRH/BD/70494/2010. The goal of this project is to improve the understanding of a 
particular demographic process (fertility) in order to formulate theoretically and 
empirically informed scenarios of future developments in European countries fertility 
patterns and particularly in Portugal.  
We do not claim to be the first researcher who considered the period fertility 
quantum decline as a consequence from the cohort and period double postponement in a 
direct relationship with the social, educational and economical transformations. However, 
to our knowledge, no other study has looked into the micro and macro causalities and 
explanations to the women’s childbearing behaviour, including Portugal in a European 
comparative study.  
Thereby this study address the most prominent features of current European 
fertility trends – permanent low fertility rates and what determine later transitions to 
motherhood; the impact of education evolution in the cohort fertility; the implications 
from the 2008 economic shock in the postponement and recuperating countries. 
Whenever possible, it gives a detailed country-specific comparison of the trends under 
analysis. Additionally in Chapter 6, considering the features of current European fertility, 
it provides insights concerning possible future trends on the fertility evolution.  
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Overall the broader scope and comparative cross-country perspective are the 
strong points of this study.  Several parts of this research (e.g. Chapter 4) provide a wide-
ranging perspective on the studied issues by themselves.     
However, this study has also limitations. As in the majority of studies our 
theoretical insights are provided from the individual point of view in context of the life-
course perspective, still the empirical discussion focus mainly the fertility macro-level 
trend. Both micro and macro-level analysis allow a more complex and completed 
analysis enriching the traditional demographic analysis and the life-course approach.  
The inclusion in our work of micro-data analysis was possible in Chapters 3 and 
4, were indeed we identified most of our data limitations. In Chapter 3 we used the 
Portuguese Fertility Survey (PFS) to identify the determinants into the motherhood 
transition. Yet it is a major drawback regarding the analysis of demographic events is that 
does not provide the fertility life-course perspective to those, which are already outside 
the fertility window. Such information would provide new insights to the micro fertility 
analysis. Similar constraints have been found also in Chapter 4 due to how data was 
reconstructed – cohort data was reconstructed in the perspective of the child decreasing 
the number of variables (or characteristics) exclusive of the mother. We hope that this 
lack of information can be overcome with more complete data and future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
A RETROSPECTIVE OVERVIEW OF PERIOD AND COHORT 
FERTILITY PATTERNS:  
Evidence from six European countries 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
In Western Europe, the fall of fertility has been accompanied by a progressive 
postponement of childbearing and first marriage, a trend that has also started to 
proliferate in Eastern Europe after the fall of state socialism (Neyer and Andersson, 
2004: 2). As a result of those changes, fertility becomes one of the most complex 
components in the demographic analysis. In the analysis of it must be taken into account 
that, in opposition to the risk of death, the risk of generate a live birth is not common to 
all the females in a population. While mortality strikes all of the population in one 
moment in their lives, fertility is not biologically “available” to all the females.  
Given the complexity of fertility, it must be considered not only as a 
multidimensional process but also as a cumulative once that, the birth may be 
experienced more than once and only temporarily removes a woman from the risk of 
giving birth (Preston et al., 2001: 93). The analysis should be carried out in harmony with 
cohort information in order to allow a complete observation of the life cycle events. 
There are, however, some difficulties with cohort measurement either in fertility 
or in mortality analysis. Firstly, the cohorts do not provide information during specific 
years or short time periods, which is often what in demography we are mostly interested 
in. Secondly, the cohort measures can be calculated only for cohorts whose life cycle 
event experience is complete. And, thirdly, the calculation of cohort measures requires 
data for all years in which the life cycle events from the cohort occur (Bongaarts and 
Feeney, 2008).  Therefore, result of the lack of completed cohorts, the typical way to 
measure and analyse fertility is performing by period approaches.   
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The most widely used fertility measure, the total fertility rate, is a hypothetical 
indicator, interpreted as the average number of children that a woman would have if the 
age-specific fertility rates in a given year remain constant over her reproductive life. 
Although that this measure is not affected by changes in the age structure of the female 
population, the age-specific fertility rates are influenced by distortion in fertility timing – 
the postponement or advancement of births – and changes in the fertility schedule. The 
fact that cohorts – real or synthetic – are subjected to timing distortion is widely 
recognised among demographers, as we will demonstrate later.  
This chapter investigates the fertility evolution on selected European countries, on 
a comparative analysis where Portugal is the main focus, regarding the period and cohort 
traditional methods presenting also up-to-date measures and methods. Here, our main 
goal is to provide innumerable details about the Portuguese fertility patterns in the 
context of selected European countries. Consequently, six main objectives can be 
summarized:  
1. Elaborate an extensive literature review on period and cohort fertility 
measures; 
2. Evaluate the cohort fertility patterns as a starting point to understand the 
observed postponement; 
3. Use the period fertility patterns not only to characterize the actual fertility 
levels but also to discuss on the possible fertility recuperation; 
4. Decompose TFR into different fertility momentums by applying 
segmented linear regressions identifying when significant period changes 
occurred; 
5. Elaborate about fertility patterns controlling for the tempo and quantum 
effects since 1990; 
6. And lastly, provide new insights about period and cohort perspectives.    
 
Our analysis is centred on cohort and period fertility (total and by parity) data for 
six European countries, with different fertility patterns: Austria, France, Hungary, 
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Special attention will be given to the Portuguese fertility 
evolution. With this chapter we provide a comparative perspective of fertility and 
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motherhood transition transformations in the selected countries. Such comparison is 
partly stimulated by the different historical and cultural background in the past and their 
gradual economic and social proximity as well as demographic convergence.   
Thus, this chapter is differentiated in 5 main sections. The introduction is 
followed by a theoretical discussion and review on the period and cohort fertility 
measures and perspectives (section 2.2). Section 2.3 provides the description of data and 
methods, with four subsections, firstly regarding the used data (subsection 2.3.1); 
secondly, in subsection 2.3.2 we present conventional cohort methods, while in 
subsection 2.3.3 the period fertility indicators are the main focus; and finally, thirdly, 
subsection 2.3.4 methods to improve the use of total fertility rate are presented. Section 
2.4 corresponds to obtained results, also divided in three additional subsections. 
Subsection 2.4.1 presents the results for cohort fertility; followed by a discussion on the 
period analysis in subsection 2.4.2; complemented by a total fertility rate segmentation in 
section 2.4.3; and finally an analysis of fertility postponement and decline in Europe for 
the recent decades is presented in subsection 2.4.4. The subsequent section (2.5) 
concludes this chapter. 
Summarizing, in this chapter we simply focus our analysis on the demographic 
dimension, while the socioeconomic dimension will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
2.2. A review on period and cohort fertility measures and methods 
 
When in the 1970s and 1980s the period total fertility rate dropped bellow the 
replacement level (i.e., usually taken as 2.1) the demographic terminology adapted to new 
concepts of low fertility or below-replacement. In 2005 Kohler and his colleagues went 
further in the low fertility questions discriminating the different levels of low fertility. 
The authors introduced in the scientific community a new definition, used in the case of 
countries with a total fertility rate of 1.3 or below, and then known as lowest-low fertility 
countries. Such overwhelming fertility decline to values close to 1.0 (e.g., Spain) in the 
1990s has revealed the need of societies in explaining more than ever the fertility 
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evolution (Sobotka, 2004). Persistent sub-replacement fertility will produce inevitable 
consequences such as aging populations, declining workforce and smaller overall 
population size (Morgan and Taylor, 2006).  
Furthermore contemporary demography is greatly interested in family decision 
process, to assist in explaining why different people marry, cohabit or stay single, and 
why many couples have no children or only one, compared with the norm of two 
(Rowland, 2003: 221). The questions related to the transition to adulthood and to family 
formation emerged with the purpose to explain not only the fertility decline but also the 
postponement itself. In such context, fertility can be considered the most complex 
component of demographic analysis. Given its complexity, must be considered not only 
as a multidimensional process but also as a cumulative one. Fertility analysis should be 
always as possible, carried out in harmony with cohort information in order to allow a 
complete observation of life cycle events. In fact, the cohort approach is crucial for 
assessing the importance of the period changes on the synthetic cohorts. 
As a result of incomplete cohorts, the typical way of measuring fertility is 
performed by the period methods.  Nevertheless measures of period fertility, such as the 
total fertility rate (TFR), oscillate more than analogous cohort indicators. Such 
fluctuation materializes the result from the changes in the timing of cohort fertility that 
distorts the period measures of fertility quantum. Thereby, when the pace of cohort fertility 
is accelerating, conventional period measures of fertility quantum will be excessively high and 
when cohort tempo is decelerating, period indicators will be too low, relative to the 
corresponding measures for the cohorts affected. This is seen repeatedly in time- series of period 
and cohort fertility indices (Ní Bhrolchain, 1992: 599). Then the major issue of fertility 
analysis is to obtain information trends of fertility levels not distorted by the timing effect 
and the time series of total cohort fertility rates achieve this goal (Frejka, 2010: 5). The 
appropriate description and measurement of fertility constitutes an essential step in the 
empirical and theoretical analysis of patterns, not only in Europe, but also all over the 
countries (Kohler and Ortega, 2004). 
 Ní Bhrolchain (1992) identified that the confusion on the measure of fertility lies 
at the heart of discussions about cohort and period approaches. However we may appeal 
to Ryder (1964) when he states that, the births occurring in any year are the contribute of 
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parents who began their lives in many different years, while the births occurring to any 
group of parents identified by common cohorts are experienced over an extended span of 
years. In each year (period) the contribute to fertility is the outcome of 35 different 
cohorts (in ages 15-49 inclusive), thus the complete birth rate of a given year could 
simply be a weight sum of the complete birth rates of the cohorts represented among the 
parents years, the weights being the respective age-distributional component of each 
cohort’s fertility. 
Furthermore, the challenge for demographic analysis is not only to include the 
decomposition of heterogeneous fertility patterns into their behavioural and demographic 
determinants, but also to proceed to assessment of recent period developments in terms of 
their implications for cohort fertility (Kohler and Ortega, 2004). Ní Bhrolchain (1996: 
239) summarizes eight propositions regarding period and cohort fertility analysis, which 
seem important to emphasize and discuss: (1) Period fertility fluctuates more than 
comparable cohort indices because changes in the timing of cohort fertility distort period 
measures of the level of fertility; (2) Period measures are therefore unsatisfactory. We 
need especially to remove the tempo component from period indicators; (3) Cohort 
fertility is more “real” and period fertility more “unreal” or “transient”; (4) The true 
time-path of change is to be seen in the cohort series; (5) Cohort fertility is ultimately 
what is of interest and period fertility is but an imperfect guide to it; (6) Period fertility is 
of interest largely for pragmatic reasons, because cohort figures are out of date by the 
time cohorts have completed their childbearing; (7) Period measures are a useful way of 
establishing a population’s current reproductive performance; (8) Policy issues led to an 
interested in period fertility. 
Previous research (Myers and Gibson, 1961, Andersson et al., 2009) identify that 
the period fertility present higher fluctuation due to the timing of cohort fertility, however 
is also true that cohort behaviour could be severely influenced by an extreme situation 
(e.g. wars or economic shocks) that happens in a given period (Goldstein and Cassidy, 
2014). Nevertheless period measures are indeed unsatisfactory, especially when affected 
by the postponement. Still we cannot state that such measures are an imperfect guide to 
measure cohort fertility. Yet the completed fertility can only be measure by complete 
cohorts, and policy-makers can’t wait for a complete cohort to create family measures. 
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Consequently, following this perspective, the best way to measure and compare fertility 
patterns is by focusing in the period indicators.    
The actual debate about measuring of fertility is particularly concerned with the 
implications of childbearing postponement, which is frequently associated with the trend 
towards low and lowest-low fertility, on cohort and period fertility levels (Kohler and 
Ortega, 2004). However the postponement itself is also associated with some constrains, 
the term postponement means that what is being postponed now will take plane in the 
future (Frejka, 2010). Reality is somehow different, when women postpone fertility, later 
when it is supposed to recuperate, the final number of births may not be the same as it 
was expected without the postponement. We will not discuss further such questions, 
however it is important to keep in mind that the fertility decline at young ages is result of 
childbearing postponement, and the fertility increase at older ages correspond to 
childbearing recuperation. One may then say that postponement and recuperation are 
fundamental definitions of cohort fertility while for period tempo and quantum are 
crucial. 
Postponement is measured by cumulating absolute or relative fertility decline 
across all ages when fertility has fallen, and the recuperation is measured by cumulating 
absolute or relative fertility increases across all ages when fertility has increased 
relatively to the reference cohort (Sobotka et al., 2012). Therefore is not simple or easy to 
differentiate in a period perspective between the temporary depressing effect of shifting 
timing of childbearing (tempo effect) and the real decline of fertility (quantum effect). 
If in the measure of fertility postponement is thus insufficient, Ní Bhrolchain 
(1992: 599) states that they must be treated in one of two ways: either they should be 
deployed with extreme caution, or they should be adjusted or transformed so as to 
approximate more closely to the true, underlying level of fertility observable in the cohort 
mode. Thus period and cohort measures need to be transmuted from one to the other with 
particular need to remove the tempo component from period indicators.  
Fertility trends illustrated by period rates give a misleading description of fertility 
change throughout time, i.e., by cohort. Once again, recalling that the lack of completed 
cohorts results in the typical way of measuring fertility, performed by employing period 
analysis. In results of these methods, the period measures were created to overcome the 
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unavailability data issues. Still the period measures present shortcomings. The two most 
commonly period measures of fertility are, age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) and TFR. 
When calculating ASFR, the numerator is restricted to births occurring to women of a 
specified age interval, and the denominator is restricted to the number of person-years 
lived by women in the age interval.  
TFR is the most frequently used indicator of period fertility, corresponding simply 
to the sum of ASFRs across the childbearing ages. Thus, the TFR is an age-standardized, 
single-value, i.e., a summary measure of fertility. This measure has a powerful, yet easily 
understood, interpretation (Morgan and Hagewen, 2005). It is, however, influenced by 
tempo (timing) and quantum (level) effect. Bongaarts and Feeney (1998: 272) defined the 
quantum effect as the TFR that would be have been observed in the absence of changes in 
the timing of childbearing during the period in which the TFR is measured. While to the 
tempo effect the same authors defined as the distortion that occurs due to timing changes. 
The demographic concept of tempo effect introduced by Ryder (1964) is related to 
the idea of demographic translation from the same author.  Ryder most important finding 
was that a change in the timing of childbearing results in a divergence between the TFR 
and the cohort completed fertility rate (C!"#). With these finding Ryder proposes the 
translation formula between period and cohort, providing the exact relationship between 
cohort and period total fertility rates, as long as the age-specific rates are changing 
linearly. Since Ryder in 1964, until today many were the authors that expressed interest 
in the questions related to the timing effect in fertility, as e.g., Bongaarts and Feeney 
(1998), Kohler and Philipov (2001), Zeng and Land (2002), Rodriguez (2006), and 
Goldstein and Cassidy (2014).  To Bongaarts and Feeney (1998 and 2002), the tempo 
distortion reflects an inflation or deflation of an indicator of the life cycle, the resulting 
increase or decrease in the average age for that same event.  
Authors as Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) focused their methods in a period 
fertility perspective that provides the possibility to observe fertility change over time. 
However, the cohort perspective, which is repeatedly neglected, provides a similar 
contribution. In contrast to the period approach, the cohort approach does not need any 
recourse to statistical constructions such as a synthetic cohort (Sobotka et al, 2012: 8). 
Nevertheless the major problem of the cohort approach is the long period of ‘waiting 
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time’ until the cohort completes the reproductive history. The solution to the different 
problems presented is the ‘combination’ of cohort and period perspectives is a method 
that follows of childbearing postponement and recuperation and its reflection in total 
period fertility levels and trends in low fertility populations (Frejka, 2010: 2). These 
methods are methods enable a better understanding about the period fertility behaviour.  
Fertility, measured by the period total fertility, rose in the large majority of 
European countries from 2000 onwards. This change in the observed fertility trends 
resulted in an unexpected reversal on the historical unprecedented low levels reached by 
most countries in the 1990s and early 2000s (Bongaarts and Sobotka, 2012). Explanations 
for this phenomenon can be clarified by the demographic or socioeconomic changes 
across countries.  
 
2.3. Data and Methods 
2.3.1. Data  
 
Period and cohort analysed indicators were calculated from the vital statistics data on the 
total births and parity order, by age of mother and age at parity structure of the female 
population. The main source of these data was the Human Fertility Database (HFD), 
combined with data from EUROSTAT.  
 
2.3.2. Measuring cohort fertility   
 
Cohort fertility analysis relates the lifetime experiences with the fertility patterns, 
following real women over their reproductive lifetimes, but has a major constrain once 
for data analysis we need completed cohorts. In this chapter the cohort fertility analysis 
operates as a starting point to analyse the performance of many period fertility indicators. 
As in the period approach, in the cohort perspective the total fertility rate is one of 
the most used methods (CTFR) obtained by summing up the TFRi as result from the sum 
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of ASFRi by age, which is obtained by births occurred in a given age and time over 
female exposures at the same age and time:  
 
                        !"#$ = !"#$! =! !"#$%!,! =!,!  !!(!)!! (!,!)!,!                             2.1  
 
where a is age, i the parity order, B number of live births, !!  the female population (15-
49 years) from a given cohort and t is time (a given year).  
Both, cohort total fertility rate and cohort age-specific fertility rates allow us to 
analyse the fertility decline while the inclusion of cohort mean age at birth (by parity i) 
allows to measure the postponement, through the increasing values over the past years. 
Thus, the mean age at childbearing, is given by:  
 
                         !"#! = !!"#! =!  !"#$!,!∗!!,!!,! !"#$!,!!,!                                               2.2  
  
where a is age, i the parity order and !!,! is the middle age interval by parity. 
 As mentioned in section 2.2, if in period fertility the keywords are tempo and 
quantum, in cohort fertility the keywords are postponement and recuperation. The 
postponement is measured by cumulating absolute or relative fertility decline across all 
ages when fertility has fallen, and recuperation is measured by cumulating absolute or 
relative fertility increases across all ages when fertility has increased relatively to the 
reference cohort (Sobotka et al., 2012). A vast number of empirical results and graphs 
can be combined to analyse different characteristics of cohort fertility change by age and 
parity. 
 Lesthaeghe (2001) suggested a cohort benchmark model of cohort fertility 
postponement and recuperation, from the point of view of the start of postponing process, 
observing the way that these two factors develop across different and consecutive 
cohorts. The author proposed a relational model of cumulative cohort fertility deviations 
relative to the schedule of a benchmark cohort, using two scalars to manipulate a standard 
deviation schedule before and after the age of 30 (Sobotka et al. 2012).  
The benchmark cohort is defined as the cohort experiencing the onset of first 
postponement of births. A simplified scheme of cohort postponement and recuperation 
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(Figure 2.1) where we can observe the delineation of which part of fertility decline at 
younger ages (!!), which part has eventually been recuperated later in life (!!) and 
finally which decline turned out to be permanent. The most common procedure involves 
a careful inspection of age-specific trajectories of cumulative cohort fertility, which are 
compared with the selected ‘benchmark’ cohort. These trajectories reveal at what ages 
childbearing has been postponed (indicated by the increasing fertility ‘deficit’ among the 
more recent cohorts), at which ages the postponed fertility has been ‘made up’ 
(narrowing absolute differences), and to what extent (Freijka and Zakharov, 2012, 
Sobotka et al. 2012). 
From the indicators presented in the figure 2.1 we should do a brief explanation of 
them and introduce different indicators. Therefore, and taking into account the previous 
figure:  
  ! is the Benchmark cohort. This is the first cohort that experienced an increase in 
the mean age at first birth that continued for at least five cohorts; 
  !  is the age at which the gap between the cumulated fertility rate of the 
benchmark cohort and of the observed cohort reaches a maximum; 
  !! is the decline in cumulated cohort fertility of cohort ! compared to that of the 
benchmark cohort !. Measures the maximal difference in cumulated fertility 
between the benchmark and the observed cohort; 
 
Figure 2.1: A simplified scheme of cohort “postponement“ and “recuperation“ 
 
Source: Reproduced from Frejka and Zakharov (2012): Diagram 1, pp 3.  
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  !! is the recuperation measure or the absolute increase in cohort fertility, as 
compared to the benchmark cohort b, at the end of the reproductive period; 
  !"! is the final difference. Is the permanent difference, in fertility between the 
benchmark cohort and the cohort of interest, computed as !"!  =  !!  +  !!  =!"#$! − !"#$!. It can also be computed as a non-recuperated portion of the 
‘postponed’ fertility, using the recuperation index; 
  !"! is the recuperation index and measure the degree of recuperation relative to 
the decline at younger ages: !"! =  !! −!! . It can also be expressed as a 
percentage, ranging from 0 (no recuperation) to 100 % (full recuperation) or even 
above (“over-compensation”). 
 
2.3.3. Period fertility indicators  
 
Even though the TFR is by far the most common indicator of period fertility, in a general 
way to measure the level of fertility we can distinguish four basic approaches. The first 
indicator is the crude birth rate (!"#) that relates the total number of births in a given 
year to the total population size. However when we relate the total number of births only 
with the number of women in reproductive age (between 15 and 49) the crude birth rate is 
known as general fertility rate. The second approach to measure the period fertility is 
based on the age-specific fertility rates (!"#$) that relate the number of births among 
women in a given age group to all women in that age group. The sum of !"#$% in a 
particular year corresponds to the TFR. The third approach and the one, which constitutes 
the most accurate indicators, are based in age and parity-specific childbearing 
probabilities and intensities (known as hazard rates).  
In the case of fertility, the hazard rates (see section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3) reflect the 
probabilities of giving birth of order ! are specified only for women having !-1 children, 
in other words, the hazard rates are the parity progression ratios (!!"!). The !!"!  are 
interpreted as a probability for women who have !-1 children to have another child during 
their reproductive life. Finally we should also mention a fourth indicator suggested by 
Sobotka (2004) and related with duration, specially because the duration is an important 
variable that can influence the number of births, which is time. It is important to measure, 
e.g, the time from the marriage or time between births and to Feeney (1983: 76) the 
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parity progression schedules, which incorporate parity progression rates and birth-
interval distributions, are arguably the most natural approach to the measurement of 
fertility.  
Then TFR is obtained by summing up the !"#! as result from the sum of !"#$! 
by age, which is obtained by the birth in a given age and time over female population at 
the same age and time:  
 
                              !"# = !"#! =! !"#$!,! =!,!  !!(!)!! (!,!)!,!                          2.3  
 
where a is age, i the order, B number of live births, !!  the female population (15-49 
years) and T is time (a given year).  
Even that fertility cannot be measured trough the average age at birth, the 
evolution of such indicator give the perception about fertility postponement. Thus the 
mean age at childbearing order !, is given by:  
 
                         !"# = !"#! =!  !"#$!,!∗!!,!!,! !"#$!,!!,!                                               2.4  
  
where a is age, i the parity order and !!,! is the middle age interval. 
The changes across time in TFR can be delimited empirically, nevertheless, we do 
not know how statistically significantly those changes are. Thus, to depict those breaks 
from TFR patterns, we elaborate a piece-wise linear regression, where independent 
regression lines correspond to changes in TFR rate of increase, i.e., in the slope. By 
applying this method, we were able to identify, in all countries independently, more than 
one break. Assuming that a possible changing point i in a calendar year !!  is captured 
by: 
 
                                          !"#! = ! + !!!! + !! !! − ! !.                                      2.5  
 
Likewise in a simple linear regression model, parameter ! corresponds to the 
intercept, while !!  is the first segment slope and !!  the difference-in-slopes for the 
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second segment, parameter ! represents the calendar year breakpoint and !! − ! ! =!! − ! ∗ ! !! > !  (Muggeo, 2003). When !! > ! is satisfied, the indicator function ! .  equals one and if a breakpoint is not detected, final result corresponds to a simple 
linear regression model, i.e., ! does not exist and !! is a statistical zero. 
The measures presented in 2.3  and 2.4  are the most common in the period 
analysis of fertility, and widely disseminated mainly by the need to few data. The ideal is 
that we can obtain ASFR, TFR and MAC by parity, however the most common its to 
calculate each indicator based on the total number of births. The data availability and 
harmonization provided by HFD, allowed to avoid the search for data in numerous 
sources. With more available and accurate data, the HFD re-introduced in fertility 
analysis the concept of fertility tables with no accounting for covariates besides parity 
and women in risk by each parity order. 
Fertility tables are one way to obtain period indicators with more accuracy, yet so 
far they have been not extensively used. The fertility tables are analogous to the life 
tables or mortality tables, but their main function is not the analysis of the timing of 
births (in analogy to the life expectancy obtained from the life tables, it would be the 
waiting time to the birth of the next child), but the levels and trends of fertility rates 
across different ages or parity categories. Traditionally, fertility tables were used in the 
analysis of marital fertility, where the exposure to first birth started at the time of 
marriage (Henry, 1951; Feeney, 1983; Chiang, 1984). From a simpler analysis of period 
fertility rates of the second kind, fertility tables control for effects of parity, composition 
of female populations at reproductive age and provide also a rich set of indicators that 
enables a thorough analysis of fertility level and time.  
The period fertility tables, like the cohort fertility tables, are increment-decrement 
life tables, in which we can model the process of childbearing in synthetic or hypothetical 
cohorts of women specified by age and parity.  In the general model the period life tables 
describe the childbearing histories of synthetic cohorts of women who live their lives 
under the fertility conditions of a given year !, and where we assume the absence of 
mortality and migration. In what concerns period fertility tables and to the indicators 
derived from it, Sobotka (2004: 74) makes reference to the exposure-based indicators 
represented in is work by age-specific birth probabilities. For the author, the period 
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fertility tables are methodologically superior to incidence rates and provide considerably 
more reliable measures of first birth timing and intensity. 
To illustrate the construction of the period fertility table1, Table 2.1 provides the 
example of Portugal in 2009 in the transition to the first birth.  As the majority of life 
table’s analysis, here the main focus will be the last column (cumulative births), however 
we briefly describe all measures in the table, where !!(!) is the first birth in the year 
2009 and !!(!) is the female populations in risk of having the first birth in the year of 
2009.  
Our first indicator !!(!) the conditional age-specific fertility rates, is given by:  
 
                                                          !! ! = !!(!,!)!!!!(!,!)                                                   2.6  
 
In column four we have !!(!) the probability of having an !th birth in the age 
interval !, ! + 1), that is given by:  
 
                                                          !! ! = !!(!)!! !!!(!) ∗!!(!)                                     2.7  
 
Next we have !!(!) the table population parity ! at age ! The !!(!) have some 
particularities, we assume 10,000 for !!(!!"#) and 0 for !!(!!"#) when ! equal to 1,2,3 
and 4. Then  for: 
 
              !! ! = !! ! − 1 ∗ 1− !!!! ! − 1 , for ! = 0                               2.8  
 
    !! ! = !! ! − 1 − !!!! ! − 1 + !!!! ! − 1 ∗!!(! − 1), for ! = 1,2,3          2.9  
 
and for ! = 4 
 
                !!! ! = !!! ! − 1 + !!!! ! − 1 ∗!!(! − 1)                           2.10  
 
 
Column 6 present to us the !!(!), the table number of births of order ! in age 
interval !, ! + 1). The !!(!) is obtained by: 
 
                                                
1 See HFD Methods Protocol (2011) for complete and detailed information and methods.  
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                                        !! ! =  !!!! ! ∗!! !                                        2.11  
 
The !!(!) is the table population exposure of women of parity !  within age 
interval !, ! + 1) and in our example is presented in column 7. As in the  !!(!) also the !!(!) presents different calculations according to the birth order. 
 
For ! = 0 
                                 !! ! =  !! ! − !! ! ∗  !!!! ! ∗ 1− !(!)                        2.12  
For ! = 1,2 and 3 
 !! ! =  !! ! − !!!! ! ∗  !! ! ∗ 1− ! ! − !! ! ∗  !!!! ! ∗ 1− !(!)      2.13  
 
And for ! = 4 
           !!! ! =  !!! ! − !!!! ! ∗  !! ! ∗ 1− !(!)                              2.14  
 
Finally in column 8, we present !"!(!), the cumulative births of order ! by exact 
age !. The !"! !  is obtained by:  
 
                 !"! ! = !!(!)!!!!!!!"# for ! = 1,2,3, !" 4+                              2.15  
  
 
Table 2. 1: Portuguese illustrative example of fertility table for 2009: the transition to motherhood 
Age !!(!) !!(!) !!(!) !!(!) !!(!) !!(!) !! !  !"!(!) 
12 2 52894 0.00004 0.00004 10000 0 10000 0 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
25 2737 49961 0.05479 0.05333 7688 410 7483 2312 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
49 2 7582 0.00026 0.00026 1389 0 1389 8611 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
The period fertility tables describe fertility progression in a so-called synthetic 
cohort of women on the basis of conditional age and parity specific fertility rates 
observed in one calendar year. Parity and age adjusted total fertility rate (PATFR) is one 
the main outputs from fertility tables elaboration, as well as table mean age at 
childbearing (TMAC). 
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The PATFR it’s a measure proposed by Rallu and Toulemon (1994) based on the 
use of probabilities (transition rates) to have another child by age in fertility table2. The 
sum of these partial transition rates, by parity, gives rise to the final indicator. Thus the 
PATFR can be interpreted as final offspring of a synthetic cohort. Again, odds are 
observed at a given time and the value of PATFR does not correspond to any actual 
generation, but is the most accurate way to assess the intensity of fertility of a population 
at a given time. 
                                     !"#$% = !"!"#! =! !!(!)!!"#!!"#!",!!!                                         2.16  
 
where !!(!) is the number of births of order ! in age interval !, ! + 1). 
While TMAC is calculated employing:  
                      !"#$ = !"#$! =! !∗!!(!)!!"#!!"# !!(!)!!"#!!"#                                            2.17  
where ! is the mean age at births of order ! in age interval !, ! + 1). 
   
2.3.4. Measuring the tempo effect: complementary proposals for Total 
Fertility Rate adjustment 
 
Most researchers studying fertility trends agree that tempo effects bias contemporary TFR 
levels. Therefore, alternative ways to use TFR were motivated by the identified 
distortions. Many authors proposed alternative TFR measures, or even to “correct” the 
measure through adjustments. Among them, lets emphasize Brass (1991) that calculated 
adjusted TFR with marital data by parity order, and Ryder (1964), with its translation 
formula (between period and cohort). However our focus will be in recent measures. In 
1998 Bongaarts and Feeney presented an adjustment to TFR, the adjusted total fertility 
rate (TFR*), assuming that fertility is only influenced by age, parity, duration and period 
but not by the cohort. Underneath these conditions to the authors (1998: 275) the TFR 
that would have been observed in a given year had there no change in the timing of births 
                                                
2 PATFR as all fertility measures requires much more detailed data for its calculation than the simple TFR.  
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during that year maybe estimated by computing as a sum of order-specific total fertility 
rates (TFR*) which take order-specific changes in the mean age of fertility schedule, !!(!) as an adjustment factor: 
 
                    !"#∗ ! = !"#$%&! ! = !"#!(!)!!!!(!)                                         2.18  
 
where the !! ! = !"#! !!! !!"#!(!!!)!   and the !"#!(!) is the mean age at childbearing 
order !.  
The adjusted TFR* depends on how the age schedule of fertility rates observed at 
any time can be transformed into the schedule observed at any other time by inflating or 
deflating and/or by shifting the schedule to higher or lower ages. This is equivalent to 
assuming that fertility is determined strictly by period effects. Although TFR* can be 
applied to births of all orders combined, higher accuracy is obtained by applying the 
formula separately to each birth order component of the TFR, because the constant shape 
assumption is more valid for the fertility schedule at each order than for all orders 
combined (Bongaarts and Feeney, 1998). This adjustment measure present two main 
problems that can be summarized in two main issues, (1) the TFR* as well as the 
conventional TFR may be distorted by changes in the distribution of women by parity 
and (2) the period changes affect different cohorts in different ways, the tempo changes 
in fertility may also change the shape of the fertility schedule (Sobotka, 2003).  
In order to respond to this problem Sobotka (2004) suggested the use of a three-
year moving average of the TFR* and compute the adjustment only for birth orders up to 
3 to increase the stability in the time series of the !"#$%& which displays large annual 
fluctuations. The overall TFR** is estimated as a combination of the TFR* for birth 
orders 1 to 3 and the ordinary TFR for births orders 4+: 
 
        !"#∗∗ ! = !"#$%& ! ! + !"#$%& ! ! + !"#$%& ! ! + !"# ! !               2.19  
 
 
Later, in 2009, Goldstein et al. argued that by applying the Bongaarts and Feeney 
adjustment, we lose the last year of time series and by using a three-year moving average, 
we lose another year. To obtain more recent data for analysis of the latest fertility trends, 
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the authors developed a simple procedure that allows estimating the !"#$%& for an 
additional year. They calculate first the crude !"#$%& using !! ! =  !"#! ! + 1 −!"#!(! − 1). And to improve the last year estimate slightly, we should use a smooth, 
computing the average of the last two full observations combined with this very last 
point. 
The same authors that proposed the adjusted TFR*, later in 2004 and 2006  
(Bongaarts and Feeney) as variant of the previous method, proposed the tempo and 
parity-adjusted total fertility (TFRP*). When fertility timing presents rapid changes the 
use of fertility table could be also conditioned by the relationship between different 
parities. Bongaarts and Sobotka (2011) referred that as the main reason to obtain 
relatively PATFR poor results when adjusted to higher orders. Thus, the TFRP* avoid this 
problem by considering each event (birth) separate from the previous and the following 
ones. Such measured presents more stable trends since the late 1990s, which could mean 
that the recent upturns in the period TFR across Europe are largely explained by a decline 
in the pace of fertility postponement and the resulting reduction in tempo distortions 
(Bongaarts and Sobotka, 2012: 2). The tempo and parity-adjusted total fertility is given 
by:  
 
                       !"#!∗ ! =  !"#!∗ !, !! = 1− exp!  − ! (!,!,!)!!!(!,!)!                        2.20  
 
where ! (!, !, !) are the conditional fertility rates for each order is treated as separate non-
repeatable event. For this case the denominator of the hazard by parity equals all women 
who have not yet reached parity i. And ! !, ! = (!"# ! + 1, ! −!"#! ! − 1, ! )/2. 
The TFRP* has been used in the estimation of the tempo effect on mortality patterns, and 
therefore side-lined on the fertility analysis (Bongaarts and Feeney, 2006). The method 
itself differs from the adjustedTFR by transforming age and parity fertility rates into 
period quantum measures.  
Goldstein and Cassidy (2014), inspired by Rodriguez (2006) suggested a model 
that can be easily extended to include the variation in postponement by age within each 
cohort and also period effects on the quantum of fertility. To the authors in the adjusted 
TFR only data from the period fertility is needed, where all cohorts are truncated to the 
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available length (in case of non-completed cohorts). While Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) 
proposed a model assuming that the age shift occurs in the period, Goldstein and Cassidy 
(2014: 1799) proposed a model where the age shift is assumed to occur at the cohort 
level.  In their article, the authors presented the cohort shift model with period quantum 
effect and introduce an adjusted measure of period total fertility (…) which can be used 
to recover the total fertility that would have been observed in the absence of 
postponement. 
2.4. Results  
 
Over the past 50 years, European fertility has experienced periods of high and very low 
fertility. In fact, over the last three decades, TFR have been declined first to historical low 
levels and later to below replacement values across all European countries. These 
changes are consequence of the dramatic changes observed in Europe on fertility and 
family behaviours.  
Throughout this section the fertility evolution observed in six selected European 
countries – Austria, France, Hungary, Portugal, Spain and Sweden – will be discussed 
from the cohort to the period perspective. Whenever data availability allows, this study 
focus on completed cohorts or cohort information until age 40, and to period fertility 
trends since 1940.  
As mentioned in the introductory section, we present first the results for the 
evolution of cohort fertility through the total CTFR and total CMAC. To further discuss 
on the cohort fertility postponement and recuperation providing also an analysis by parity 
(first and second child) with the benchmark cohort model approach. This first analysis 
will give some insights on the fertility postponement, while the period analysis could 
enable new perspective on the recuperation.  
The results on period fertility are presented first by the analysis via TFR and 
MAC. As a first approach to identify the fertility postponement, the change between the 
total mean age at childbearing and mean age at the first childbearing will be presented 
and discussed. Latter the TFR will be decomposed (by a segmented regression) to 
identify when fertility patterns changed and using of ASFR, identify how and where that 
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change occurred. Finally we proceed to the analysis of several proposed methods on the 
adjustment of total fertility rate.  
2.4.1. Recent trends of low fertility cohort patterns in a comparative 
overview across Europe  
 
The on-going profound transformation of childbearing patterns in Europe is clearly 
manifested in cohort fertility trends. Figure 2.2 compares total fertility rates (a) and the 
mean age at childbearing (b) for five (out of six initially presented, due to the lack of 
cohort information for Spain) European countries. The quantum and tempo effect broadly 
used in the analysis of period fertility, it’s also observed in the cohort trends.  The 
evolution of the cohort fertility rate reveals that among older and younger cohorts, the 
differences increased particularly in Portugal. Still, in the older cohorts born from 1940 to 
1950, there is a very precise definition of fertility patterns. Sweden and Hungary had in 
that period the most stable fertility levels, even that by that time already below the 
replacement level of 2.1. Austria was also at the same fertility level, however with a 
declining trend. Similarly, for Portugal and France we also identify a declining trend. 
However, the fertility levels are slightly high when compared to the other three countries. 
By the 1950 cohort the fertility was already at the level of 2.1 in Portugal and in France.  
In this context of low cohort fertility patterns, Portugal is the country with the 
greater decline, with less 1.5 children per woman. In fact, if at the beginning of the 
analysis was the country with highest values at the end by the 1968 cohort, the 
Portuguese fertility (1.8) as well as the Austrian were the lowest (1.6 by 1966 – last 
cohort available). On the opposite direction from the Portuguese cohort fertility is 
Sweden, with the most stable level around 2.0 children per woman across all cohorts, 
only with a small decline in the younger cohorts, a decline to values from mid 1940s 
cohorts. Also for Hungary was found a stable pattern and a recuperation of fertility levels 
for cohorts of women born between 1957 and 1962, registering an average offspring of 
two children per woman. The cohort fertility of French women was gradually decreasing, 
but not so rapidly as Portugal, particularly for the cohorts after 1950. Yet, the average 
French cohort fertility remained above two children per woman.  
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Later on this chapter we will discuss on the period fertility decline and 
postponement, however, observing still figure 2.2 (a), we are able to distinguish that 
although in decline, Portugal is the country that has a higher mean age at childbearing at 
older cohorts. Portugal is also the country that for longer time saw its average age 
decrease, however from the 1956 cohort onwards, the mean age increased in parallel with 
Austrian patterns. Nevertheless, at the older cohorts Sweden and France are the countries 
with the highest average age at childbearing. If France fairly maintains the same pace of 
growth for Sweden a small bump downward was observed by the 1960 cohort. Within the 
selected countries under analysis, Hungary registered the lower mean age across all 
cohorts, with a small increase that started after 1955 cohort.  
 
Figure 2.2: Cohort total fertility rate (CTFR) and Cohort mean age at childbearing (MAC) 
evolution for selected countries 
(a) (b) 
  
Notes: 1) CTFR measured until age 44 and CMAC measured until age 403. 2) For detailed data see table A.1 in 
Appendix A.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
In opposition to the period fertility (figure 2.4) where some propensities to the 
fertility recuperation can be observe across all countries (with exception to Portugal), in 
the cohort fertility no signs of recuperations are visible, furthermore Portugal and Austria 
are in constant decline, even with the very same patterns at the mean age a birth.   
                                                
3 Traditionally cohort fertility has been analysed for those women who had reached age 50. However 
relatively small proportions of total cohort fertility occur after age 40. Thus, possible errors in estimates of the fertility 
of women in 40s are likely to be relatively small.  
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The period or cohort fertility decline is the result from the postponement into later 
ages in the transition to motherhood, but mainly in the transition to the first birth. To 
better discuss the fertility postponement our proposal is to use a benchmark cohort model. 
Using this method, the first step is to observe the increase in the mean age at childbearing 
for (at least) five consecutive cohorts4, thus the first cohort will be the benchmark cohort.  
 Figure 2.3 illustrates cross-country differences in the dynamics of cohort first and 
second birth postponement process (for the total cumulative change at birth see figure 
A.1 in Appendix A and tables A.1 to A.6). The benchmark cohort differs for each country 
and is chosen just at or before the start of the postponement: 1955 for Sweden and 1960 
for Hungary and Portugal. In Sweden, a vast portion of initial first and second birth 
decline has been “offset” by an increase at later ages.  
The pattern of first and second births has changed relatively smoothly and 
gradually, without any cohort standing out. While a more dynamic change is observed for 
Portugal and Hungary, for both countries the changes between the 1965 and the 
benchmark cohort are few, specifically in Hungary. It’s only by the 1970 cohorts that the 
change increase is higher in the first birth transition. Within the three countries, Hungary 
is the only with major changes and higher decline postponement levels, notably between 
the 1970 and 1975 cohort, in the transition to the first and second births. Still, and taking 
into account the cumulated changes from the benchmark cohort, on the fertility peak 
there is no substantial differences observed at the age patterns.  
In Portugal the evolution is slightly different, and by the 1985 cohort, compared 
to Hungary in the transition and postponement to the first or second birth, is significantly 
lower. However, in the transition to the first birth it’s possible to observe that in parallel 
to the benchmark cohort, the 1965 cohort recuperated fertility and even surpassed it after 
age 36. For Sweden, the fertility patterns previous discussed (figure 2.2), predicted small 
changes from the benchmark cohort onwards. Between 1960 and 1970 cohorts it was 
possible to identify fertility recuperation. And in the transition to the second birth was 
even possible to observe that by age 30 no changes are registered between the 1955 and 
1960 cohorts.  
                                                
4 Completed cohorts should be used. In the absence of complete cohorts the model could be elaborated with 
completed fertility by age 40.  
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative change in first and second birth progression by age and birth cohorts 
Hungary, Portugal, and Sweden  
 
Cumulative change in first birth - Hungary Cumulative change in second birth - Hungary 
  
Cumulative change in first birth - Portugal Cumulative change in second birth - Portugal 
  
Cumulative change in first birth - Sweden Cumulative change in second birth - Sweden 
  
Notes: 1) The benchmark cohort is defined as the first cohort experienced an increase in the mean age at first birth that 
continued for at least five cohorts. Thus for Hungary and Portugal the benchmark cohorts are 1960, while in Sweden 
was 1955.  2) The cumulative changes to the total births are presented in Figure A.1, and by birth order to Austria in 
Figure A.2 of the Appendix A. Complete values from Table A.1 to Table A.6. 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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 Table 2.2 summarises key indicators of the postponement transition in the 
analysed countries. There is only a variation in fertility levels among the benchmark 
cohorts, regarding the Portuguese fertility a value around 1.9 children per woman and for 
Hungary and Sweden around 2.0. The postponement indicator, Pc, shows a decline in 
early fertility for all three countries, especially Portugal (-0.4). Yet, the Recuperation 
index (RIc) suggests that Sweden has the highest recovery mainly to the second birth with 
an increase of about six percent. The higher recuperation in Sweden is confirmed by the 
final decline of only -0.06, as for Hungary was -0.18 and for Portugal -0.22.  
Still, as Sobotka et al. (2012: 64) stated the difference between the relatively high 
and stable fertility rate in Sweden and the corresponding cumulated fertility rate of the 
1967 cohort in other countries may be due to different fertility levels among the 
benchmark cohort (CTFRb), due to different levels of fertility decline at younger ages 
(Pc), or due to different levels of recuperation, as captured by the RIc. 
 
Table 2.2: Selected indicators of postponement and recuperation, in Hungary, Portugal and 
Sweden, for the 1970 cohort.  
 Hungary Portugal Sweden 
Benchmark cohort  1960 1960 1955 
Cumulative Fertility at age 40 2.01 1.88 2.01 
Observed Pc at 1970 cohort  -0.30 -0.40 -0,26 
Observed RIc Total – Cohort 1970 0.40 0.44 0.77 
Observed RIc Parity 1 – Cohort 1970 0.67 0.87 1.00 
Observed RIc Parity 2 – Cohort 1970 0.33 0.51 1.06 
Final Decline FD - 1970 cohort -0.18 -0.22 -0.06 
Note: for Hungary, order-specific results are computed using age 38 in the 1970 cohort.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
This preliminary analysis from the cohort perspective, allowed to identify 
transformations on the childbearing patterns across the countries under analysis were 
observed. In such context Portugal changes in cohort fertility trend emphasizes the 
country particularities further discuss in the following sections.  
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2.4.2. A brief retrospective overview on period fertility postponement as 
result of the late entry in the motherhood  
 
One of the most distinctive features of the European demographic change since the 1960s 
is the decline in total fertility rate escorted by the increasing on the mean age at 
childbearing. As already noted in the preceding subsection when assessing cohort 
fertility. Figure 2.4 constitutes a starting point in period fertility analysis by comparing 
the total fertility rate (a) and means age at childbearing (b) for the countries under 
analysis in the period from 1960 to 2012. The decline pattern in TFR reflects the 
transformation across Europe in the second half of the last century and the first two 
decades of the current one. 
 In the beginning of the period under analysis we can immediately identify two 
patterns until 1970. On one hand, within the six countries under analysis Sweden and 
Hungary had at that time the lowest fertility rates, in fact Hungary was already at that 
time below replacement level (2.1). On the other hand, Portugal is highlighted by the 
highest fertility rates with values of around 3.2, while for Spain, France and Austria the 
values are between 3 and 2.5. Rydell (2002) acknowledged that there was a strident 
decline in period fertility trends around 1965 in almost all of Western Europe, at the same 
time that in south of Europe the break on fertility occurred only after the mid-1970s. The 
fertility decline from the mid-1960s and 1970s was followed in the majority of the 
countries by roughly ten years of constant fertility decline.  
With the exception of the Hungarian and Swedish fertility strong fluctuating 
patterns (but also with decline patterns), across the other countries under observation, a 
constant decline was observed, mainly between the 80s and the beginning of the 21st 
century. When in 1990s, Austria, France, Portugal and Spain registered fertility levels 
below replacement, while Sweden experienced a fertility level of 2 and also in Hungary 
the signs were of a period recuperation. However, the decline scenario was still in 
progress and by the year 2000, only Sweden and France had a TFR higher than 1.5 
children per women. The remaining four countries are the reflections of the different 
European regions where the demographic expression by 2000s was the lowest-low 
fertility.  Since then, the fertility decline appeared to reverse with the evident exception of 
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Portugal and Hungary and as well for Spain, that after the first signs of recuperation 
fertility after 2008 declined once more. As all across Europe even that only temporarily, 
fertility has converged to almost identical levels. 
 
Figure 2.4: TFR and MAC evolution between 1960 and 2012 for selected countries 
(a) (b) 
  
Notes: For detailed information please see table A.14, Appendix A.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Nonetheless, is not enough to discuss on the TFR quantum without pay attention 
on the tempo effect identified in the mean age at childbirth. Until the mid-1980s, within 
the countries under analysis, e.g., Portugal and Spain had the highest fertility values, 
which were hand in glove with the highest mean age at birth (figure 2.4 b), however that 
is not the figure of contemporary fertility. Take Portugal as an example, in 1960 mean 
age at chilbearing was 25.6 and the same value reappears in 2008, while for the same 
years TFR was proximally 3.2 and 1.4. What changed within that time-period are what 
we intent to explain. 
The most recent mean age at childbearing values are the result of the fertility 
postponement, while in the 1960s was the reflection of high fertility rates. The mean age 
at childbearing has been increasing continuously after 1980 to all countries. An 
increasing trend more pronounced in Hungary and Sweden by more than three years. In 
opposition, the smaller modifications occurred in Portugal with a difference value of less 
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where the mean age increased by less than one year. When we observe the curves 
evolution, Spain and Hungary stand out as the countries across all period with the highest 
and the lowest mean age. While in the 1960s the range of the mean age from ages 26–31 
in past decade the range decreased (ages 30-32), therefore the peak of childbearing is 
shifting and the mean age at childbearing becomes more homogeneous. 
When compared the total MAC to the first birth (table 2.3), we identify for 
Hungary and Portugal differences of around three and four years within the two mean 
ages in 1960, while for the most recent data the difference diminished to around 2 years 
for both countries, as indeed was identified in Austria and Sweden.  
 
Table 2.3: Summary table for the differences between the total mean age at birth and the mean 
age at first birth, for selected years and for Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden. 
  Austria Hungary Portugal Sweden 
 MAC MAC   
1º birth 
Dif. MAC MAC 
1º birth 
Dif. MAC MAC   
1º birth 
Dif. MAC MAC 
1º birth 
Dif. 
1960 27.6 … … 25.8 22.9 -2.9 29.6 25.3 -4.3 27.5 … … 
1970 26.7 … … 25.4 22.8 -2.6 29.0 24.8 -4.2 27 24.2 -2.8 
1980 26.3 … … 24.7 22.4 -2.2 27.2 24.0 -3.2 27.6 25.2 -2.3 
1990 27.2 25.0 -2.2 25.6 23.1 -2.5 27.3 24.9 -2.4 28.6 26.3 -2.3 
2000 28.2 26.4 -1.8 27.3 25.1 -2.2 28.6 26.5 -2.1 29.9 27.9 -2.0 
Last 
avail. 
year 
29.8 28.2 -1.6 29.1 27.4 -1.7 30.2 28.6 -1.6 30.8 29,0 -1.8 
 
Notes: 1) The last year available: 2010 for Austria, 2009 for Hungary, 2012 for Portugal and 2011 for Sweden.  2) For 
the complete table see the Appendix A, Table A.15.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
The changes across time and countries point out that above all are the results from 
social and individual transformations (see chapter 3) in the context of a new demographic 
paradigm.  In general, the evolution discussed above, captures the process of fertility 
changes during the shift towards later childbearing. Overall the quantum decline and the 
tempo postponement had a stronger relationship to the to the European fertility.  
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2.4.3. Segmented fertility: evidence to the period changes across Europe 
 
Several times pointed out as an imperfect measure of period fertility patterns, TFR 
remains as the main measure used to describe and compare fertility across countries and 
regions. As a reflection of the age-specific fertility rates, TFR contains in itself the curves 
changes. However, even that changes in the TFR can be identified, only by the use of 
ASFR we can identify how that changes really occurred and how they behave by age.  
The use of piece-wise segmented regressions allowed identifying for the six countries 
under analysis TFR changes statistically significantly, creating breakpoints when this 
happens. Thus, each breakpoint also allowed identifying different associated patterns in 
the ASFR.  
Figure 2.5 plots the two indicators by each selected country between the year 
1960 and 2012 (or last available year, depending on the country under observation). The 
number of breakpoints varies between countries and time, Austria is the country with less 
breaks (five), while for France, Portugal and Sweden six breaks were identified, and 
finally breaks for Hungary and Spain are seven. Nevertheless, the same number of breaks 
does not correspond to equal fertility patterns.  
In a very broad-spectrum we verify with figure 2.5, across the different segmented 
TFRs, that the first break occurred until the middle 60s: firstly, in 1962 for Austria and 
Hungary; secondly, in 1964 for France and Spain; and finally, in 1965 for Portugal and 
Sweden. Still, such similarities do not reflect the same trends on the TFR, e.g., Austria 
and Hungary had the first break by 1962, but at that period in Austria the TFR increased 
while in Hungary was decreasing. By the end of the period the fertility patterns changed 
and for Austria and Portugal no changes in the TFR since 2000 were statistical significant 
to create new breaks, while for France since the mid 1990s that we observe such patterns. 
Also Hungary and Sweden revealed similar trends from the late 1990s. Spain is the 
exception, since 1997 until 2008 TFR presented one break and a second one from 2008 
onwards, as a reflection of the fertility decline in the most recent years.   
Austria has a long history of low fertility trends, the second demographic 
transition trends, including the postponement of marriage and childbearing, emerged in 
Austria since the 1970s (Sobotka, 2015). A rapid decrease on average number of births 
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allowed to observe for Austria before 1980 three breaks. The fertility decline could be 
thus analysed has having three paces of decline, with focus in the years between 1968 and 
1975 were significantly faster. Since 1976 until 1999 the fertility decline was a sort of 
plateau while after that period a recuperation trend can be observed. If the segmented 
TFR point out the trends in the fertility, the ASFR allows to understand that, the main 
changes between the several breaks are due to (1) the decline in the total number of 
births, (2) the change in the fertility peak to earlier ages with a simultaneous decline 
(from 1968 to 1975), (3) the starting point of fertility postponement by the late 1970s, (4) 
the stabilization of fertility trends with continuous patterns until 2012.  
As Rydell (2002: 2) states, and as will discuss later in this chapter, the south of 
Europe has a rather homogenous demographic pattern, the situation in France differs to 
a large extent and resembles the situation in the Nordic countries. E.g., in France the 
entry into partnership or cohabitation materialises at younger ages. As mentioned before 
the first TFR break was by 1965 when fertility decline continuously within two breaks 
until 1977, with a sharp decline between 1974 and 1977 with a decline of 0.25. After this 
sharp decline, from until the 1980s the fertility with a small increase in the TFR was 
followed once more by a decline for more than ten years. French TFR within the group of 
segmented countries TFR presents homogeneity in the last break, which starts by the time 
of fertility recuperation in 1995.  
The ups and downs observed in the TFR are well bounded, in the age-specific 
rates, between 1960 and the curve shape is only a reflection from the decline in fertility. 
From 1977 to 1995 the decline and postponement are visible by the changes in the peak 
age of fertility as well as a more compact shape of the curves. Still, from 1995 onwards 
(yellow curves) its visible the on-going postponement at younger ages with a 
recuperation at older ages, enabling the TFR growth since that year.  
Besides Sweden (as we will discuss later), Hungary has the higher fluctuation in 
TFR, however we can say that from 1960 to 2009, fertility basically decreased showing 
different patterns in the dissimilar periods within this epoch. Spéder and Kamarás (2008) 
emphasize that Hungary by the beginning of 1960s was with a TFR of 1.8, being one of 
the countries in the world with the lowest fertility. In fact in our segmented TFR the first 
break was exactly at that time, when fertility declined, for just after increase again, even 
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that only temporary (until 1976). From that period onwards, fertility reduced to the 
lowest value of 1.3 by 1999 when the last break was identified. Nonetheless and despite 
the oscillations observed with the TFR, there were no fundamental changes in the ASFR 
essentially until 1992. Till that year if we just observe the curves without the fluctuation 
in the TFR, we can just say that fertility declined, and that by 1980s the postponement in 
Hungarian fertility started. Beside that observation, it was indeed only by 1990s that the 
ASFR sharply declined and the fertility peak increased by almost five years. Fertility in 
Hungary changed substantially from young to older ages.  
The fertility decline across Europe reflects the family formation transformations, 
and Portugal is the perfect example to express social transformations, as well as countries 
with extreme social regimes in the past century. During this time Portugal had, in the 
1960’s, the highest emigration movement; between 1961 and 1974 the colonial war and 
high female employment rates; in 1974 the national revolution; in 1986 Portugal at the 
same time as Spain became part of EEC; and during the 80’s it was observed a rapid 
education feminisation.  As a reflection of the 1975 Revolution, the family formation and 
fertility decision changed (Mendes and Tomé, 2014a) and by the beginning of the 1990s 
second demographic paradigms were all-round in Portugal (and Spain). The Portuguese 
fertility trend was as in the other countries under analysis in decline, like it is identified in 
the first break in 1965, showing the first signs of fertility decline. 
The Portuguese fertility decline never achieved the values of the neighbour Spain, 
however, by 1995 the minimum TFR ever registered was achieved. When in 1996 TFR 
started to increase as for other European countries, the expectation was for constant 
fertility recuperation. Still from 2000 onwards started a period of fertility decline. The 
first two breaks in the Portuguese fertility are characterized by a decline observed 
immediately on the age-specific fertility rates, while in the third break the decline was 
first a change to young cohorts has the results from the high fertility at younger ages. It’s 
on the last three breaks that postponement started to be highly visible, with the change in 
the peak age at childbearing.  
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Figure 2.5: Segmented TFR and ASFR, from 1960 to 2012 for Austria, France, Hungary, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden  
 
Segmented TFR – Austria  ASFR – Austria 
  
Segmented TFR – France ASFR – France 
  
Segmented TFR – Hungary ASFR – Hungary 
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Figure 2.5: (continuing) Segmented TFR and ASFR, from 1960 to 2012 for Austria, France, 
Hungary, Portugal, Spain and Sweden 
 
Segmented TFR – Portugal ASFR – Portugal 
  
Segmented TFR – Spain ASFR – Spain 
  
Segmented TFR – Sweden ASFR – Sweden  
  
Notes: Detailed data on the age-specific fertility rates in Appendix A, from table A.7 to table A.12. 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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With similar patterns when compared to Portugal, Spain had still a very particular 
fertility evolution. We dare to say that Spain is the country in our analysis, with the 
simplest pattern of fertility characterized with a constant decline. From 1964 to 1976, 
Spanish fertility was characterized by a constant but small decline followed by steeper 
one until 1997. By that time Spain was referred in the literature as one of fertility lowest-
low European countries (e.g. Kohler et al., 2002; Kohler and Ortega, 2004). 
Spain is the exception with regard to fertility patterns in the last two decades. An 
upturn on the TFR between 1997 and 2008 create expectations on the Spanish fertility 
recuperation, failed in 2009 when fertility declined once more. Furthermore, when the 
segmented TFR is reflected in the ASFR, first a decline is observed mainly for the curves 
under the first three breaks with no changes in the age of peak fertility (which mean that 
no significant postponement was observed). It was within the last two breaks that the 
postponement effect was really visible.   
As mentioned before, apart from Hungary, Sweden had the most fluctuating TFR 
patterns, still with the highest fertility rates since the 1990s. As Portugal, also Sweden 
had the first TFR break by 1965, followed by a decline in fertility levels until 1982. The 
ups and downs observed across Swedish fertility were identified by Sobotka (2004), as 
partially induced by the extension of the period eligibility for paid parent leave for 
mothers in 1986, which accelerate the couples own decision to have more than one child. 
In one decade  (1980s to 1990s) the TFR rose to the values of late 1960s. Still, some 
years later the TFR values were in 1998 almost the same as in 1982. After 1998 the 
Swedish fertility changes are in direction, together with the postponement 
transformations, recuperation. 
Notwithstanding the oscillations observed within the TFR, there are no expressive 
changes in the age-specific fertility rates. Sweden is in fact the country in our analysis 
with fewer changes within the age-specific rates. The substantial changes are at the peak 
fertility age, which changed by more than five years between 1960 and 2012, as result of 
the massive postponement.     
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2.4.4. From the birth order contribution to the Total Fertility Rate to the 
postponement in the transition to motherhood and to the second birth 
 
The postponement previously observed in the total number of births by country is 
partially explained by the direct changes in the transition to the first birth and 
consequently to the following ones.  The fertility postponement is intrinsically related to 
the postponement of the entry into parenthood, in that the moment when the couple 
decide to become parents could influence the decision on the second and following births.  
 Furthermore the motherhood transition and the transition to the second birth have 
been widely discussed in the literature, e.g., Goldstein and Kreyenfeld (2011), Frejka and 
Sardon (2007), Kohler and Ortega (2004), Castro Martin (1992). We further identify that 
in countries as Portugal, with low fertility levels, fundamental changes in the recent 
patterns of fertility are directly related to the first and second births. Figure 2.6 plots the 
contribution of each birth order to the total fertility rate, i.e., it corresponds to the stacked 
representation of TFR by parity order (for detailed information see Appendix A, table 
A.16). The analysed time periods differ from country to country, due to data availability 
restrictions, starting in 1960 for Hungary and Portugal, in 1970 for Sweden and in 1984 
for Austria.   
Due to the shorter time period information on the Austrian fertility by parity, the 
country has the flatter trend, result from the absence of higher values from the 1960s and 
1970s. Yet, from 1984 until 2010 the contributions by parity are steady, with a small 
decline on the higher order (4+).  The Swedish and Hungarian parity fertility patterns, 
presented a constant contribution from each parity order. In both countries the first birth 
contribution increased by two percent in Sweden, and four percent in Hungary while the 
contribution from the second birth to the TFR increased less than three percent. As for the 
contribution of the highest birth order, the Swedish women declined by three percent 
while the Hungarian increased by one percent.  
The main focus of figure 2.6 is thus the Portuguese evolution. From 1960 to 2012 
the contribution of first births to total fertility rate increased by twenty-five percent. From 
1960 to 1975 the main contribution to the TFR was from parity 3 and 4+ with a 
contribution from five percent in the 1960s and thirty-four by 1975. It was by the 
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revolution time that the fertility of higher order decreased significantly its contribution to 
the overall total fertility rates. In 1976 the year after the revolution, as result from 
younger fertility, the contribution from the first and second births increased and the 
contribution from the highest order declined to less than thirty percent. 
 
Figure 2.6: Stacked TFR by parity order, in Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden 
 
Austria Hungary 
  
Portugal Sweden 
  
Notes: For Austria due to data availability the plotted information is only since 1984 and for Sweden from 1970.   
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Already identified in figure 2.4, Portugal, Austria and Hungary had by the late 
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contribution is around forty-eight percent in Portugal that contribution is ten percent 
higher. Nevertheless the difference for the total contribution is compensated in Austria 
and Hungary with contribution from higher parity orders. The Portuguese outlook 
revealed an almost null contribution form families with four or more children with a 
value of 0.025 by the year of 2012 against the value of 0.31 children per women from 
1960.   
One of the most discussed characteristics from the second demographic transition 
(more detailed information and analysis presented in the following chapter 3) is the 
family formation postponement and the consequent delay in the transition to the first 
birth.  Kohler and Ortega (2002), identify the fertility ageing effect as the result from high 
first birth postponement until such late age that ultimately the following births not occur. 
Such ageing affect gain importance with the constant postponement observed across 
Europe.    
Furthermore, due to the significant contributions from the first and second births 
to total fertility rate the transition to both parities should be discussed. Thus, we discuss 
the fertility postponement through the visualization of cumulative births and how they 
evolved over the last decades. As mentioned before, when data is available and the 
fertility table it is possible to elaborate the final calculation related to the cumulative 
births of order ! by exact age ! defined before as Sbi. 
Figure 2.7 plots the transitions to first and second birth for Austria, Hungary, 
Portugal and Sweden between the years of 1991 and 2012. The common trend for the 
four countries was already observed in the previous analysis and discussion regarding 
fertility postponement, particularly of first birth. With the exception to Hungary where no 
signs of recuperation at the first birth are visible, for Austria and mainly for Portugal and 
Sweden even with a postponement to later ages, in more recent years the number of first 
births supressed the older years, especially after age 35. If we consider the median age 
(were 50 percent of women exposed to the event of becoming a mother and to have a 
second child) significant differences between and within countries can be observed. From 
1991 to the end of the period under analysis, Sweden was the country with the smallest 
differences, at the median age. The postponement was of about three years, while in 
Austria the change was for four years, five years for Portugal and six in Hungary.  
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The postponement took place very tenuously in Austria, and on average the 
differences between the median age at first and second birth are about two years (table 
A.2 in Appendix A). A smaller recuperation was observed at later ages especially in the 
transition to the second birth.  For Hungary, the fertility changes patterns are unique, in 
the sense that, is among the four countries the one with larger transformation and a 
greater decrease in the number of births. Expressed by the difference of six years at the 
median age at first birth (from 1991 and 2009).  
 
Figure 2.7: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the first and second child (from age 15 to 
50), in Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden 
 
Austria Hungary 
  
Portugal Sweden 
  
Notes: 1) The figures present two colour palettes. The palette with the colour range from blue to red regards the 
transition to first child, while the palette with the colour range from light to dark green regards the transition to the 
second child. 2) To all countries the starting point year is 1991, yet the last year available was, 2010 for Austria, 2009 
for Hungary, 2012 for Portugal and 2011 for Sweden. 3) Detailed information in Appendix A, tables A.17 to A.24.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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In Portugal, from 1991 to 2012, and even with smaller difference when compared 
e.g. with Hungary, the median age registered a difference of five years. Yet, the changes 
in the fertility patterns at later ages (in the most recent years) seem allowed for fertility 
recuperation, or at least to mitigate the postponement effect. On the Portuguese 
cumulative second births the figure revealed a decline and strong postponement in the 
transition. Furthermore for 2012 the decline increases, on opposition to the recuperation 
observed for the first births.  Portugal is the country with the highest average difference at 
the median age from the first to the second birth (approximately four years - table A.2 in 
Appendix A).   
The Swedish fertility patterns in the transition to the first and second birth are 
homogenous over the recent years, with significant signs of fertility recuperation at older 
ages (after 30). From 1991 to 2000 on the transition to first birth, the median increased by 
three years, becoming constant until 2011 (the last available year to Sweden). The 
fertility patterns of Sweden stand out mainly by the recuperation of the second childbirths 
in the last decade.    
The transformations across the last decades in European fertility and discussed 
over this chapter by the changes in six European countries, allowed to identified that the 
fertility postponement at the total births is explained by the different parity fertility 
patterns. When presented the fertility transition by the cumulative births order, we 
identify Austria as the example where the transition to motherhood and to the second 
child presented less changes, while Hungary had higher differences. Still, if on one side 
Sweden stands out by the fertility recuperation registered at later ages in both orders, on 
the other side, the Portuguese case reflects the fertility patterns where the first births 
recuperation (mainly at letter ages) is the main contribution to the final total fertility rate. 
However we must keep in mind that the fertility recuperation observed especially in 
Portugal is insufficient to allow period fertility recuperation.   
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2.4.5. Measuring the real quantum fertility without tempo effect 
 
Although TFR is not affected by changes in the female age structure, the ASFRs are 
influenced by the distortion on the fertility timing, conditioning the final quantum in the 
fertility schedule measured by the TFR. The fertility postponement shifted the 
childbearing ages to later ages with a temporary effect of depressing the total fertility rate 
(Sobotka et al., 2012). Since 1970, fertility postponement has become one of the most 
prominent features of European fertility trends (Sobotka, 2004).  Moreover the distortions 
observed in TFR are broadly discussed in the literature (please recall sections 2.2 and 
2.3.4), and several tempo-adjusted period fertility indicators are proposed to improve 
period fertility measure.  
In this subsection we analyse differences between the selected countries in their 
period levels from 1990 to 2012 accounting for the tempo effect. With the purpose to 
remove tempo distortions caused by the changes in the timing of childbearing, several 
indicators considered “adjusted” variants of the conventional period TFR are presented 
and discussed. Figure 2.8 summarizes the evolution since 1990 and across the past three 
decades measured by the traditional TFR, the adjusted TFR* and TFR**. Furthermore we 
also control for the parity composition of the female population with the PATFR (not 
adjusted) and TFRp* (detailed information table A.25, Appendix A).   
Commonly, all the adjusted indicators present higher values than their non-
adjusted counterparts indicating fertility tempo effect due to the postponement. Thus, the 
differences observed across Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden are transversal, 
where the adjusted indicators are higher than the observed TFR. Across all countries the 
TFRp* suggests a stable fertility rate with fewer fluctuations, than the other tempo 
adjustment methods. E.g., for Austria and Portugal, the TFRp* suggests a stable fertility 
rate, with smaller impact from the ups and downs in the observed TFR. The adjusted 
indicator reflects the upturn in the observed TFR. Also pointed out by Bongaarts and 
Sobotka (2011), while TFRp* suggests a stagnation in the fertility quantum, the other 
adjusted measures indicate a slight increase. Measures can differ widely in specific time 
periods, especially during the times of rapid fertility changes and trend reversals, 
therefore indicators as TFR* and TFR** react more to effective TFR changes.  
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Besides the fact that the adjusted TFRs present higher fertility rates, the ones 
registered in Austria, Hungary and Portugal are a reflection of their lower TFRs. For 
those countries, the adjusted TFRs present values from 1.5 to 2 children per woman, 
while for Sweden the values are around 2 or higher all over the period.  
 
Figure 2.8: TFR, PATFR and Adjusted TFRs, in Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden 
 
Austria  Hungary  
  
Portugal  Sweden  
  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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allows obtaining fertility tables we can consider the analysis of TFR controlled for period 
and age. For all four countries the PATFR is superior to the TFR. Yet, within our 
analysis, only Hungary and Portugal presented higher, but still no significant differences 
between the TFR and the PATFR. For Sweden, since 1995 to 2005 TFR decreased, 
resulting in higher differences between both indicators, while for Austria, the patterns and 
fertility levels are the same. 
Like it was discussed earlier, tempo adjustment measures provide a framework 
that enables to estimate the tempo and quantum effect, answering to the fundamental 
question: What would be the level of period fertility in the absence of postponement? 
Table 2.4 provides a summary of fertility on the last decade, controlled by tempo and 
parity (PATFR) and without the tempo effect (TFR*, TFR** and TFRp*). 
In the absence of tempo effect, the higher effect on the fertility quantum would be 
in Hungary with a recuperation of more than 0.38 births, yet from the TFR* to the TFRp* 
there are significant differences. While for Sweden if we consider TFRp* (the indicator 
with less fluctuation) the changes in the final TFR would be 0.12. For Austria and 
Portugal the differences in the fertility from the original indicator and without the tempo 
effect are more homogenous even when controlled by parity (TFRp*).  
 
Table 2.4: Summary table for the TFR, PATFR and Adjusted TFRs, on the past decade in 
Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden. 
    Austria Hungary Portugal Sweden 
    (2000-10) (2000-09) (2001-12) (2000-11) 
  
  
  
  
  
TFR  1.39 1.31 1.39 1.80 
PATFR 1.41 1.38 1.47 1.84 
TFR* 1.65 1.71 1.64 1.98 
TFR** 1.65 1.69 1.64 1.97 
TFRp* 1.62 1.55 1.63 1.92 
Quantum effect 
TFR* -0.26 -0.39 -0.25 -0.18 
TFR** -0.25 -0.38 -0.25 -0.17 
TFRp* -0.23 -0.24 -0.24  0.12 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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For all four countries, the fertility trend indicates over all proposed adjusted 
TFRs, fertility never lowers than 1.5 children per women.  In sum, adjusted indicators do 
seem to provide optimistic (higher) fertility patterns. Furthermore, when controlled by 
tempo effect and birth order the fertility trends seem more stable and accurate.  
 
2.5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
2.5.1. Discussion  
 
This chapter has described and discussed the cohort and period fertility patterns across 
six selected European countries, form 1960 to 2012 (widest available range). Such period 
was characterized across all Europe by a fundamental change in the fertility figures, the 
shift of fertility to a later childbearing age (postponement) and the consequent fertility 
decreasing level (quantum). Changes in the total fertility rates (by cohort or period) 
postulate a vivid impression of European fertility trends also identified by previous 
researchers (e.g., Soboka 2004, Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004). The postponement and 
recuperation, as well as the tempo and quantum effect are visible not only in period 
fertility but as well in the cohort perspective. From the older to the younger cohorts it was 
possible to observe the intense transformation from high to low fertility levels.   
Without exception, fertility postponement has taken place in all countries under 
analysis. Portuguese women presented the lowest level of period fertility (1.2 in 2012), 
and besides Austria, also registered the lowest cohort fertility (1.8 in the 1968 cohort). 
Yet, such low fertility patterns are not directly related to the higher mean age at 
childbearing, in that perspective the Spanish and Swedish women had the higher period 
and cohort mean ages. If by the 1960s Portugal had the major difference (-4.3 years) 
between the total mean age at childbirth and the mean at the first child, by 2012 the 
difference declined to the average differences experienced by Austria, Hungary and 
Sweden (-1.7 years). Cross-countries differences allow confirming, with the use of 
segmented regression, that even with several differences under the fertility patterns, all 
countries presented identical trends. 
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As mentioned before, Rydel (2002: 12) states that there was a sharp break in 
fertility trends around 1965 in almost all Western Europe, followed by 10 years of rapid 
decline in fertility until historically unprecedented low levels were reached. As we can 
observe in all countries the first breakpoint on the TFR occurred by the mid 1960s, 
Austria and Hungary, however, within that same period experienced more than one 
significant break. The fertility postponement was indeed a constant characteristic since 
1960 but, with the exception of Portugal (since 2000) and Spain (since 2008), in the last 
identified fertility break, all countries presented signs of fertility recuperation.  
The second demographic transition theory pointed out relevant demographic 
paradigms such as the family formation postponement and the consequent delay in the 
transition to the first birth (van de Kaa, 2002; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004; Kohler et 
al., 2002). The ageing effect as result from the constant postponement until later ages 
reduced the timeline for the following births can occur (discussed further in chapter 6). 
Furthermore, the relationship between the total fertility and the correspondent 
parity contribution revealed between countries, allowed to identify the fundamental 
changes occurred in the fertility patterns. A strong negative impact can be clearly 
identified while women continue to postpone their first child and remain with one child. 
Beside the severe postponement observed at later ages, Portugal, as well as Sweden, 
demonstrate signs of fertility recuperation at later ages.  
Detailed analysis of tempo-adjusted measures in the past three decades enable a 
perspective of period fertility trends without any tempo effect. In all countries the TFR 
was negatively influenced from the shift on the fertility patterns to later ages. The fertility 
tendency indicates that, for all countries possible to calculate adjusted TFRs, no value 
lower than 1.5 children per women is achieved. Like suggested by Sobotka in 2004 (pp 
172) we can interpret such results as an indication that lowest-low fertility in Europe is a 
result of increasing age at motherhood and, therefore, a temporary phenomenon that will 
fade once the postponement of childbearing stops.  
In the last decade Hungary experienced the highest tempo effect at the final 
quantum fertility and Sweden the lowest. The identified outcomes are result of the social, 
cultural and economic context from each country individually (Beck and Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002). And even when period fertility was measured by a more accurate 
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measure (PATFR), controlling the tempo and parity composition of the female 
population, the average difference between the obtained PATFRs and TFRs is marginal.    
 It would be naïve to assume that the changes on the fertility patterns from the six 
countries under analysis occurred by themselves without the influence of social and 
economic transmutations. The observed low period fertility rates are associated with the 
on-going delay of childbearing occurred in the period and cohort fertility quantum. 
Consequently, the intrinsically relation between tempo and quantum effects resulted in 
the gradual decline both in the period and cohort values. The trends of low fertility 
countries could be explained by the difference in the factors motivating fertility 
recuperation across other European countries such as France or Sweden. Thus, the social 
or economic measures implemented in some countries could explain the fertility increase 
in the last decade (e.g., Neyer and Andersson, 2004). The following chapters will discuss 
those transformations with special attention to the Portuguese fertility patterns and trends.  
 
2.5.2. Concluding remarks 
 
The final period and cohort fertility levels decreased across the past decades over all 
countries under analysis, and mainly for Portugal there seem to exist a direct relationship 
between period and cohort fertility trends. The observed period fertility quantum is the 
direct result from the postponement contribution from several cohorts across the same 
period. The cohort analysis has been fundamental to describe the period fertility trends 
and the low levels in both real and synthetic cohorts are correlated. Until 1982 
Portuguese women decline intensively their quantum, and since that year the number of 
births haven’t allowed over the past decades to replace the Portuguese population, not 
reaching the demographic needed 2.1 children per women, which is the level at which a 
couple had only enough children to replace themselves5. It was also after that year that 
the postponement effect increased.  
The total fertility rate is an age-standardized, single-value, i.e., a summary 
measure of fertility, a measure with a powerful and easily understood, interpretation. Yet 
                                                
5 The replacement level of 2.1 children per women, assumes that it is expected that (1) every woman has a 
children with (2) no changes in mortality rate and (3) on the absence of migration.   
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such measure when obtained in the period perspective is extremely influenced by the 
tempo and quantum effect. When measuring the fertility through the PTFR, as through the 
CTFR the postponement observed in both indicators causes an effect that deflates the 
age-specific fertility rates. Thus the purely demographic analyses throughout this chapter 
allowed identify for Portugal a double fertility postponement, in both period and cohort 
measures, regardless the postponement effect.  
Without the period postponement effect fertility levels could increase, yet never to 
levels of population replacement. And also the differences between younger and older 
cohorts through the benchmark cohort method allowed identify that the low levels of 
period fertility are also noted in the cohorts level.  
Furthermore in the Portuguese context, previous analysis allow to conclude that 
(1) from a period or cohort perspective, the fertility recuperation at later ages do not 
compensates the postponed from younger ones; (2) Portuguese women continue to 
postpone their first child and, on average, stops there, having no more children; (3) Even 
that Portugal presents such low fertility trends, is not a country exclusive situation, once 
that Austria (particularly) is side by side with the Portuguese trend; Yet compared to the 
Iberian neighbour – Spain – Portugal, by the year of 2012, was for the first time at the 
lowest-low fertility level with 1.28 children per women and the difference between the 
mean age at childbearing and at birth of the first child was less than two years. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PARENTHOOD TRANSITION: FROM INDIVIDUALIZATION TO 
FAMILY FORMATION 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The individualization theory has as main characteristic the emancipation of individuals 
from traditional social norms that resulted from the industrial society, characterized by 
the freedom from social classes, status, family or gender. Relations between early 
experiences in the family and transition behaviours are now well established. Over the 
past years and across several cohorts, the links between educational level and 
occupational status has been weakened and at the same time that family has reached new 
levels of instability, cultural representations of love and work emphasize flexibility, 
choice and impermanence. 
Individualization is defined as a process of modernization in which individuals’ 
behaviour is no longer conditioned by variables given by birth (e.g., sex, family, origin, 
or age) but variables that correspond to personal choice (e.g., personal effort and 
education) start to have more predictive capability (Gaspar, 2013). In such perspective 
and in the transition to parenthood we can so identify two main dimensions: 1) family 
background characteristics that born with the individual and that can also be acquired 
over the life course; 2) individual values and social norms established from each cultural 
and social context. To Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) depending on family 
background, education, occupation, personal relationships and biographical features 
women will pursue various strategies in their own individual quest. Influenced by socio-
economic context changes and by the increased level of education, the family formation 
and consequently, the transition to parenthood play today a central role in the definition 
of life trajectory.  
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Furthermore, in the context of the individualization theory, the values of 
individuals have changed, and not only the importance of family but also the female 
autonomy and the desire for smaller families have increasing importance in the society. 
In the process to measure social individualization, not only birth covariates but also 
covariates that correspond to personal choices provide more predictive capability. Thus, 
several questions could be raised. Nowadays, the individual characteristics continue to be 
decisive? Contemporary society is evolving towards a society in which the individual 
contexts characteristics may be gaining explanatory power in predicting fertility 
behaviour? What is the impact from the individualization process within a framework of 
low fertility?  
Thus, this chapter investigates the transition to parenthood within two theoretical 
dimensions: 1) into the light of individualization theory, 2) with the family-background 
and either social or individual values. Those two theoretical dimensions are seen as 
predictive in order that can contribute with faithful insights to explain fertility 
postponement.    
The main goals of this chapter are the following:  
1. To discuss specific issues related with the individualization theory; 
2. Evaluate the sociological and demographic paradigm of fertility decision 
and postponement; 
3. To describe how the familial background, the social norms and individual 
values contribute to the fertility tempo; 
4. And, to illustrate a potential explanation for the individual behaviours in 
the time of fertility decisions.   
 
The analysis is based on period data corresponding to the 2013 Portuguese 
Fertility Survey (PFS), for men (aged 18 - 54) and women (aged 18 - 49) living in 
Portugal, with or without children.  
Thus, this chapter is divided in 5 sections. The introduction is followed by a 
theoretical discussion on the individualization theory, driven by an evolutionary 
perspective from sociology to demography (section 3.2). Section 3.3 provides the 
description of data and methods. In section 3.4 the results are presented, but divided in 
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three additional subsections. Subsection 3.4.1 presents the results for the fertility 
transition and explores how the familial background can influence it, while subsection 
3.4.2 presents the influence of social norms and individual values on the transition to first 
birth, and finally in subsection 3.4.3 the results of several event history analysis models 
are presented. The subsequent section discusses and concludes this chapter.  
 
3.2.  Theory of individualization – from a sociological to a demographic 
perspective  
 
Societies continuously change and evolve over time, and with them the attitudes, norms 
and values orientations that individuals assume. Going through civil wars, foreign 
dominations, scientific progress, industrialization and religious revolutions, societies 
mature, and accumulate cultural heritage that is at the basis of social and demographic 
progress. The path towards modernity is a long and slow process that extends over time. 
However, looking to the extent to which European societies have adopted modern post-
materialist value orientations and behaviours, we observe significant cross-country 
variation. While some countries, such the Scandinavian ones, are well ahead in 
embracing post-materialist attitudes, other such as the Mediterranean ones, appear to be 
having a hard time in leaving them behind(Aassve, Sironi and Bassi, 2011: 316). 
To Beck (1992) and Giddens (1992) we are at the late contemporary era of 
modernization and individualization. Societies moved from imposed constrains, moral 
codes and traditional customs towards less rigid ones where major changes were 
stimulated by the economic prosperity, education and a more egalitarian welfare state. 
The social structures of class, gender, religion and family are withering away so that 
people no longer have pre-given life trajectories but compelled instead to make their own 
reflexive choices and hence create their own biographies (Duncan and Smith, 2006). A 
dimension of diversity within developed societies that was drawn in the beginning of the 
century is the phenomenon of individualization, for which the emphasis is placed at the 
individual level (Billari and Wilson, 2001). In few decades, the traditional and well know 
social aims have been replaced by the project of self. The long-term changes are the result 
of timing and sequencing of transition markers caught up by the historical time, reflecting 
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also the short-term instabilities between and within cohorts. The modernization of 
societies is often considered the underlying process driving long-term trends that 
differentiate successive cohorts, but short-term economic changes and historical events 
have difficult these trends (Shanahan, 2000: 668).  
Modernization of societies has coincided with the standardization and 
individualization of life course. Standardization is intimately related to the compression 
form at school ages, marriage, parenthood, and labour market, whereas individualization 
is found in increasingly diverse consequences of these markers. However, modernization 
and individualization trends have been complex not only by the short-term economic 
fluctuations and by the historical events, but also, within cohorts, by social inequalities 
such as gender, race and socioeconomic status (Shanahan, 2000). Buchmann in 1989 (in 
Shanahan, 2000: 671) stated that the highly standardized trajectories of school, work and 
family have been shattere by several structural and cultural developments since the 
1960s, leading to new levels and forms of individualization. 
To Gaspar (2013: 708) the modernization comprehends a process of 
individualization, and for that the author pointed out two main assumptions. On the first 
one, the process of individualization indicates the phenomenon by which, as a society 
advances in the process of modernization the factors or variables given by birth (age, 
sex, family origin) tend to exercise less influence on individuals behaviour, attitudes, and 
perceptions while other factors that depend on personal effort tend to play a larger role 
in determining their behaviour, attitudes and perceptions. In contrast, traditional 
societies generate specific expectations about its members behaviour based in their sex, 
age and family origin. The second hypothesis leads us to assume that, as a society 
advances in the process of modernization, it moves toward the decrease in or even 
disappearance of gender inequality.   
In the context of individualization theory evolution, families are crucial in the 
perspective were the social ties of kinship and marriage that are weakened. It is no longer 
expected that we have to get engaged and marry in adulthood and then have “four” 
children, or stay in the same marriage for life (Duncan and Smith 2006). Different family 
involvements, related with variations in family structures and economic resources, lead to 
different pathways to adulthood (Shanahan 2000). Then it is no coincidence that the 
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emergence of the public scientific debate on childlessness paralleled the onset of dynamic 
changes in fertility, family patterns, and living arrangements, and a concomitant value 
shift towards individualization and personal self-fulfilment (…). Indeed, social 
legitimisation of voluntary childlessness and rising levels of final childlessness are 
associated with this transition (Sobotka 2004: 126).   
In the demographic context, individualization is a term that can be used as an 
instrument for developing different perspectives in the subject and to detect different life 
trajectories. To Ehmer et al. (2011) individualization is primarily a framework concept 
that needs to be defined more specifically, translated from the macro to the micro level, 
and combined with further theories. To the authors and regarding the fertility theories, so 
far the individualization perspective had focus in three main concepts, 1) autonomy and 
freedom of choice; 2) human dignity; and 3) individual self-fulfilment. The first concept is 
linked to the possibility that whether the fertility decline was the expression of a new and 
modern era, enabling couples to make their own reproductive and family planning 
choices. The second one is related to the right to live in equal ways independent of 
origins or other characteristics, such as religion or gender. The human dignity concept is 
related to the societal and individual investment in the up-coming generations, depending 
on the historical context. Finally, the individual self-fulfilment concept is related to the 
freedom of choice that is itself not unconditional, but yet based on education and on the 
possibility of societal participation (mainly female empowerment).    
Many say that women are the most benefited from the process of 
individualization, which directly or indirectly affects the family dynamics (Ehmer et al., 
2011; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Gustafsson, 2001). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
(2002: 54) state that when the present generation of women is compared with earlier 
ones, the danger is that continuing material and social inequalities between men and 
women will be pushed out of the picture by an image of ever advancing progress. In a 
century, rapid changes have taken place in the context of women’s lives, which implies 
complex and contradictory process. Women were increasingly released from direct 
family ties and the female demographic and social biography experienced an 
individualization boost. Nevertheless women still bear many more responsibilities than 
men within the family and are much less protected in the labour market. These conditions 
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generate numerous contradictions in women’s lives, among others, the high level of 
work-family conflict its always there (Gaspar, 2013: 713). 
In such context, the values of individuals have changed, and not only the 
importance of family but also the female autonomy and the desire for smaller families 
have become more important in the society. Influenced by socio-economic context 
changes and by the increased level of education, the family formation and consequently, 
the transition to parenthood plays today, a central role in the definition of life trajectories. 
Family and parenthood dynamics are gradually changing as result of historical evolution, 
the progressive decline of social traditional norms and changes towards individualization 
has made itself. The individual negotiation and life planning replaced the traditional 
social rules and models.  Parenthood has become a matter of choice, an agreement 
between partners about “being ready” to have a children. Family norms, social concepts 
and attitudes have not disappeared, but rather transformed (Sobotka, 2004). Whereas 
family always used to occupy the whole field of vision, now men and women are 
becoming visible separated individuals, each linked to the family through different 
expectations and interests, each experiencing different opportunities and burdens. In 
short, the contours of distinctively men and distinctively women lives are now becoming 
apparent within the family (…) (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 90)  
Changes in individuals related not only to attitudes, values and family 
organization, but also in the labour market sphere, are largely consistent with the 
demographic behaviour developed in tandem with a new demographic pattern (Giddens, 
1991; Beck, 1992; Aassve, Sironi and Bassi, 2011). Such social and demographic 
transformation was increasing, and nowadays is well known as the Second Demographic 
Transition (SDT), which is characterized essentially by new forms of living 
arrangements, family formation and fertility postponement (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 
1986).  In fact theories focusing on the individualization process have an important 
contribution to demographic theories in general and to the explanation of family and 
fertility dynamics in particular. Individualization is a multidimensional term, which, in 
terms of fertility analysis can refer to the family, as well as to institutional areas  (from 
education to labour market and welfare state).  
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To Van de Kaa (1987) the idea is that in many European countries, spearheaded 
by the Scandinavian ones, the importance of the family declined and was replaced by 
widespread support for more liberal demographic behaviours, such as divorce, 
cohabitation and out-of-wedlock childbearing. However some argue that, the 
demographic transition was not a consequence of a change in the attitudes towards the 
family; rather it was the result of an adaption of traditional values to new environmental 
settings, as an adjustment to the individualized societies (Aassve, Sironi and Bassi 2011: 
316). The demographic transition had, besides the distinct decrease in mortality 
correlated with the improvement of living conditions, other demographic direct 
consequence: the fertility decline. It was no longer necessary larger offspring to generate 
even larger offspring as a way to guarantee old age support, and due to the new 
production technology the demand for cheap labour by children declined. Once that 
social, individual attitudes and value orientations are a major protagonist in explaining 
demographic behaviour, is then argued that couples adjusted to the new environmental 
settings, suppressing their desired and effective fertility (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 
1986).  
Modern attitudes and values were willingly embraced, and the low-fertility rates 
arising in modern societies are exactly the expression of a new set of attitudes, children 
lost their centrality and family and institutions loses the importance that characterized it 
before. This has probably been the most influential model of contemporary demographic 
change in Europe since its formulation in the mid 1980s. The concept of second 
demographic transition refers to important changes in family behaviour, such as an 
increase in unmarried cohabitation, the postponement of marriage and parenthood and an 
increase in childlessness. Second demographic transition theory can essentially be seen as 
one dimension of a wider individualization theory, with a similar expectation of 
convergence to diversity (Billari and Wilson, 2001). 
To sum up, once that this is a question broadly discussed in the literature (Kane, 
2013; Kertzer et al., 2009; Philipov and Jasilioniene, 2009; Sobotka, 2004 and 2008; Van 
de Kaa, 2002; Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa, 1986), we can quote Surkyn and Lesthaghe 
(2004: 47): the demographic changes are linked to (i) the accentuation of individual 
autonomy and ethical, moral and political spheres; (ii) to the concomitant rejection of all 
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forms of institutional controls and authority; and (iii) to the rise of expressive values 
connected to the so called higher order needs of self-actualization. There is considerable 
disagreement about whether the last decade’s changes in the demographic behaviour 
represent a transition in the same spirit as the demographic transition from the industrial 
revolution. Those who consider the cultural evolution approach, argue that the 
differences in today’s modern attitudes are a natural consequence and continuation of the 
societal transformation set in motion by the industrial revolution, driven by the economic 
development follow a continuous diachronic path (Aassve, Sironi and Bassi, 2011). The 
core of the second demographic transition concept lies in the connection of demographic 
shifts and value transformations, namely growing individualization, a decrease in 
normative control and a shift in individual preferences (Kantorová, 2004: 247).  
It was after 1970 that the second demographic transition was identified all over 
Europe, however it is not accurately established when does the changes in family 
formation spread. Surkyn and Lesthaghe (2004) state that by the end of 1980s, several 
features of this demographic transition seem to stop at the Alps and Pyrenees. The South 
European countries (Italy, Portugal and Spain) had started the postponement phase with 
respect to marriage and fertility, but features such as cohabitation and births outside 
wedlock, had either failed (Italy) or were just beginning to spread (Portugal and Spain). 
After 1990 this framework changed rapidly, and in the Iberian Peninsula, the proportion 
of births outside marriage rose rapidly, as a result of informal cohabitation and 
procreation, which was spreading.  
In West Germany as well as in France e.g., as a sign of a rise of individualization 
and equality between men and women, the cohabiting unions increased, more sceptically 
to the Germans than to the Frenchs. Family dynamic changes was seen as a process of 
individualization, as part of the polarization in the progression of emancipation. Later in 
Italy, Kertzer et al. (2009: 93) identified consistent empirical evidence that egalitarian 
gender norms, spousal (female) autonomy, premarital cohabitation rates and divorce rate 
are stronger in the North of the country. The same authors state that attitudinal indicators 
that tap individualization vary regionally, declining as one moves from the most 
secularized northwest to the traditional South. In Poland, Mynarska (2009) identified an 
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impact from the changes in the ideological process, were liberalization of norms, and 
individualization, gained significance with time, keeping fertility levels low. 
There is no single recipe in the modernization evolution explained into the light of 
sociology (individualization theory) or demography (second demographic transition 
theory), however, it is nonetheless expected that countries will lead themselves towards 
the acceptance of modern demographic attitudes. Although the second demographic 
transition theory does not offer an explicit explanation for ideational changes, it suggests 
that not only the economic development is positively correlated with higher acceptance of 
modern attitudes and behavioural norms, as well as the educational attainment can be 
used as an indicator of these changes. Education is found to be associated with more 
liberal attitudes regarding the sphere of family ties, but also in the diffusion of ideas such 
as gender equality and women’s empowerment.  
Several conceptual distinctions have emerged to describe the diversity of family 
experiences through time, and together they represent a fundamental re-orientation from 
viewing families’ snapshots to viewing families as longitudinal complexities. We can 
then say that individualization, second demographic transition and all changes in the 
individuals’ contexts are a transversal relationship, or in a more accurate way, 
multidimensional. With the evolution of societies, social norms have lost their weight and 
families, as well as their dynamics have changed, leading to a process of 
individualization. The "negotiation" between the couple replaced the traditional social 
norms and rules. Within the last decades of European fertility analysis had as main 
characteristic the postponement of family formation and the consequent decrease of the 
family size dimension. Today many couples wish at the beginning of their reproductive 
life to have an offspring of two, however many have only the first (Frejka, 2010; Kohler 
and Ortega, 2002; Kohler et al., 2005; Sobotka, 2004).  
As mentioned before, parenthood becomes a matter of choice, a determined 
strategy between the couple when they feel is “time be a parent”. In such context several 
issues are relevant. Nowadays, the individual characteristics continue to be decisive? 
Contemporary society is evolving towards a society in which the individual contexts 
characteristics may be gaining explanatory power in predicting fertility behaviour? What 
is the impact from the individualization process within a framework of low fertility? 
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3.3. Data and Methods  
3.3.1. Data description 
 
The 2013 Portuguese Fertility Survey (PFS) provides data that is used for computing 
transition rates. The survey represents women in their childbearing age living in Portugal 
(18 to 49 years old), and men also living in Portugal, with ages varying between 18 and 
54 years old. The major advantage of the PFS is that is a highly reliable and 
representative data set, providing authentic information6.  
Before discuss the selection of the dataset, it is important to draw attention to 
some shortcomings of the PFS. Its major drawback regarding the analysis of 
demographic events is that does not provide the fertility history to all individuals living in 
Portugal. The questionnaire application was restricted to those who are in the fertile age 
window, then cohort approaches are limited, and unfortunately we cannot compare 
considerable different cohort patterns. Also, the age time at childbearing can only be 
inferred from the parity order and age of the children. The survey hasn’t held on the 
country regions, excluding the possibility to search for regional differences. Other 
limitation is related with age, once that after age 40 few observations were registered in 
some categories from the variables. For this reason, we restrict our data analysis up to age 
40. Also the marriage or cohabitation age (with the actual partner), is not available, being 
the only possibility to consider a variable which gives the information about the age at 
first cohabitation, which does not mean that is the age of first marriage (or the marriage 
that originate a birth).  Furthermore, we omit from our analysis those who do not want to 
have a child. In the end, this leaves us with the 1324 males and 3143 females (unweight 
sample) aged 18 to 40 and residents in Portugal in 2013.  
The dependent variable used here was the age at birth of first child, controlled for 
several variables. Instead of key independent variables, we considered two dimensions, 
where the covariates are presented with the final clusters of its categories. In the first 
dimension covariates regarding the familial background are presented:   
                                                
6 The Portuguese Fertility Survey is the result of a complex sample. For each individual it was provided a 
weight identified, as has the number of individuals in the total population with the same characteristics. Such weight is 
used to obtain estimates on the total, means and population proportions. Furthermore to obtain standard deviation and 
standard error also the sample design is included in the analysis.  All calculation was preformed with the Survey 
package with R software.  
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• Sex. Not many often fertility datasets include information on both sexes, 
however in our sample we have the possibility to describe men and women 
fertility transition patterns; 
• Nationality. Used here to compare fertility dynamics in the perspective of 
Portuguese and non Portuguese individuals, without specifying the country of 
origin; 
• Birth cohort. To identify the possible impact of individualization theory 
instead of individual’s age we used birth cohort. Two cohorts are presented7,  
(1) before April 25th and (2) after April 25th; 
• Educational level. Once that no differences were find in previous analysis in 
the educational levels until upper secondary level (inclusive) we set two 
categories: (1) until upper secondary education, and (2) higher education8; 
• Parent’s education (Father educational level and Mother educational level). 
In the case of the parent’s education previous research on the data revealed 
that they differ only in two main categories, (1) lower than secondary 
education, and (2) upper secondary and higher level; 
• Number of siblings. In this covariate the significant categories are two, (1) 
until one brother and (2) two or more; 
• Parent’s divorce. Here we took into account four categories, (1) Never (2) 
Divorced (3) Never lived together, and (4) Other (including those who never 
lived with the parents or lived institutionalized); 
• Age of leaving parental household. For this covariate, three categories were 
measured, (1) Until age 21 (2) After age 21, and (3) Never leaved the parental 
house; 
• Age at first cohabitation. Previous research on the data pointed out two 
categories,  (1) Not before the first birth (which mean that the individuals has 
no experience of cohabitation before the first child) or before age 22, and (2) 
After age 22;  
• Age at first job. In this case, we assumed that the behaviour for those that 
started to work later might differ from those who had a first job at earlier ages 
or haven’t even worked. Then the categories under analysis are (1) After age 
18, and (2) Before age 18/Never worked/Not working at the survey time. 
 
                                                
7 The break point was between the two groups of cohorts was the 1974 National Revolution. For further 
information see chapter 2.  
8 Include individuals with at least one level of high educational level, the minimum educational levels is an 
individual with a bachelor or equivalent.   
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In the second dimension regarding the social norms, individual values and fertility 
postponement, the selected variables were:  
• Desired number of offspring. Taking into account presented a review of the 
literature, we point out two categories for the desired number of child, (1) 
Until two, and (2) Two or more; 
• Ideal number of children in a family that not your. As in the previous 
covariate, in this case the approach was exactly the same, and two categories 
are considered relevant in the analysis, (1) Until two, and (2) Two or more; 
• Maternal conciliation between family and work. When asked about the 
opinion regarding conciliation between family and work of the mother 
individual’s answer in two main ways, (1) Not working, and (2) Working; 
• Parental conciliation between family and work. In a different direction from 
the previous covariate, the individuals when asked about their opinion on the 
relationship of family and work for the case of parents gave two main reasons, 
(1) Not working and working at part-time job or from home, and  (2) full time 
job out of home; 
• Maternal and parental presence. Individuals were asked about their opinion 
if: It is harmful to a child at age school that the mother works outside home? 
and It is harmful to a child at age school that the father works outside home?. 
The answer to both questions was (1) Agree, and (2) Disagrees; 
• Personal fulfilment. This covariate measures the perception that one have 
regarding the need of a men or a women to have a children to feel fulfilled. 
Thus the categories of this covariate are (1) Entirely agree, and (2) partially 
disagree; 
• Family significance. The family significance was measured by (1) Agree or 
(2) Disagree, that a children need a mother and a father to grow balanced; 
• Female autonomy.  Measured by the perception that individuals had on 
questions as, Mothers who work outside home can have such a good 
relationship with their children as mothers who work at home? and A women 
can raise a child alone without wanting to have a stable relationship? For this 
covariate the categories of measure are (1) Entirely agree, and (2) partially 
disagree  
• Postponement. The fertility postponement was measured by the combination 
of two of the survey questions (The desire for a career and personal and 
social life active leads women to not have a child? and Women postpone the 
birth of children and end up quitting to have children because of their age?). 
In this covariate the answer categories are, (1) Entirely agree, and (2) partially 
disagree; 
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• Offspring balance. The last covariate considered in our analysis asked to 
individuals if they (1) Agree or (2) Disagree that, It is preferable to have only 
one child with more opportunities and fewer restrictions than having more 
children. 
 
In the search for a result that accurately explains the transitions to parenthood, 
several approaches were considered, mainly the known survival analysis or event-history 
analysis. Event-history analysis is the instrument of choice for a detailed analysis, but for 
a general overview of the pattern of consensual and marital fertility it has the 
disadvantage that it easily involves the analyst in an unnecessarily complex description of 
partnership transitions (Hoem and Jalovaara, 2013). 
   
3.3.2. Methods description 
 
To examine fertility transition with a set of variables to evaluate the impact of 
individualization theory we use event-history techniques. Survival and event-history 
analysis is an umbrella term for a collection of statistical methods that focus on question 
related to timing and duration until the occurrence of an event (Mills, 2011: 23). And an 
event can take many forms, such as a birth, marriage, political revolution or death. 
Moreover when survival and death are in the same sentence we immediately link it to a 
life table and in fact that is the main ideal behind survival and event history analysis. 
Sobotka (2014) identifies four main approaches’ to measure and analyse fertility (see 
Chapter 2, subsection 2.3.2). The approach that provides more accurate indicators is 
based in age and parity-specific childbearing probabilities and intensities (known as 
hazard rates).  
Rodriguez (2006) identified hazard rates as the best approach in analysing parity-
specific fertility events. The logic of using hazard rates (as consequence of using hazard 
models) regarding the birth order is straightforward. From the demographic perspective 
Yavuz (2008, 244) states and exemplified in the best way possible the hazard models: at 
each duration, t, measured from a previous kth birth (or if we study first birth, from first 
marriage or from a certain age indicating onset of exposure), a woman is under risk of 
having her (k+1)th birth. This risk, denoted µ(t), gives the intensity of experiencing an 
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event at time t. Thereby, µ(t) is the risk or hazard that a woman who had kth order birth t 
months ago (and who had not had another birth since then) will have (k+1)th birth in 
month t. In a standard life table analysis all women are assumed to have the same risk at 
any time segment. Hazard models instead assume that hazard rate, the dependent 
variable, is dependent on time duration since the start event and on a set of independent 
variables (x). In other words, hazard models assume that among women the hazard rate 
varies depending upon their individual characteristics. Despite that this clear example 
recalls time measured as months, we can make the same association if dealing with, e.g., 
days, weeks or years. 
The hazard rate also often labelled transition rate, intensity, failure time or risk 
function in the context of demographic analysis is intrinsically related to the life table 
method, event-history analysis and to survival techniques. The main characteristic of 
event-history analysis and survival data it’s that they measure dynamic events, where 
individuals are followed over time, and events occurs over that same time (Brostrom, 
2012).  If the transition rates are calculated with the required accuracy, the results also 
reflect accurate estimates. However, since the information relating to life trajectories is 
often incomplete, not reflecting thus complete cohorts, combining information from 
several individuals makes the calculation of transition probabilities more comprehensive 
and realistic. Thus, how they are calculated is critical to obtaining accurate results (Aalen 
et al., 2008; Willekens, 2006 and 2014). 
Life event-history and survival techniques analysis could be, non-parametric, 
semi-parametric and parametric. In this chapter we will make use of non-parametric and 
parametric models to investigate the parenthood transition and the factors to such 
transition. The usual life table method as well as the Kaplan-Meier (KM) Estimates is 
included in the non-parametric group, and there is no assumption about the shape of the 
hazard function. Mills (2011: 32) states that both methods are excellent preliminary 
descriptive techniques to use at the beginning of data analysis. Thus we will use the KM 
models to describe and analysis for a group of variables (described in the previous 
subsection) the transition rates to first birth considering the individualization theory. Such 
analysis was drawn as in previous fertility transition studies (Mayer and Schulze, 2013; 
Eryurt and Koc, 2012; Baschieri and Hinde, 2007; Kreyenfeld, 2004; Kantorová, 2004), 
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giving us a more precise and accurate knowledge of the events. In the category of semi-
parametric models, the Cox Regression is the most known and used by the scientific 
community (e.g., Okun, 2013; Kertzer et al., 2009; Martin, 2006; Van Bavel and Kok, 
2004). Semi-parametric models are particularly flexible once they do not require 
assumptions on the hazard shape, and no particular probability distribution need to be 
chosen in advance. Also such methods are considered “robust” fitting generally well to 
the data regardless of which parametric model is appropriate (Mills, 2011). Parametric 
models are models where the survival time is assumed to follow a particular distribution.  
Parametric models require more restrictive hypotheses in the form of function, with the 
Weibull, Gompertz, lognormal and generalized gamma as the most common forms of 
function distribution. These models provide the possibility of modelling the effects of 
various characteristics on the occurrence of the event under study and thus of dealing 
with the heterogeneity of a population (Kantorová, 2004).  
For our investigation we assume a proportional hazard model with a baseline 
Weibull distribution (parametric model). Under this framework the baseline hazard is 
characterized as monotonic (constantly increasing or decreasing). The traditional fertility 
analysis takes into account the fertile window (15-49 years), however in our case and has 
mentioned before the analysis is truncated at age 40, when the ASFR curve is already 
decreasing and thus the use of a hazard Weibull distribution fits better than other 
distributions such as the piece-wise (pch) or the Gompertz (results in appendix B figure 
1). As in other proportional hazard models, the Weibull shape needs to be assumed. 
When the shape is higher than one (monotonically increasing), it shall be understood as 
increasing over time, and lower than one is decreasing when time increases 
(monotonically decreasing). In the case that hazard is exactly one, i.e. the hazard is 
constant, we have an exponential model (Mills, 2011).  
In such model, the coefficient covariates shift the baseline hazard proportionality 
without change its shape. The proportionality assumption can be partially relaxed by 
including interactions between the baseline function and the covariates. A general 
representation of the hazard function could be presented has (Tesching, 2012):  
 
                          ln !! ! = ! ! +  !!!!" +! !!!!"(!)!                                    3.1  
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where ln !! !  is the logarithm of the occurrence risk of the event for individual i at the 
time t, ! !  is the baseline hazard duration dependence, !!"  the time-constant 
categorical covariates, !!"  time-varying categorical covariates, and ! and !  the 
regression parameters.    
On the theoretical part of this chapter, we argued on the relationship between 
individualization theory and fertility postponement trough the perspective of individual 
dimensions (familial dimension and values and social norms). Also, we pointed out the 
implications of individualization theory on fertility postponement.  In order to construct 
the model that explain the fertility determinants we first control for the familial 
background covariates identifying the significant covariates. Later the social norms and 
individual values covariates set was added to the initial model. The final process was to 
account for possible interaction models (e.g., Kreyenfeld, 2002 and 2010; Tesching, 
2012).  
Whereas survival analysis measures the time until the occurrence of any event of 
interest, and features such as level of education, age at first job or the number of siblings, 
can change when a follow study it is considered, when this does not happen, as is the 
current study, the approach is necessarily different. As in previous studies (e.g. Eryurt 
and Koc, 2012; Baschieri and Hinde, 2007; Kantorová, V., 2004) the current one is based 
on a survey, for that reason it was considered that the characteristics indicated by 
individuals at the survey time (2013) were the same at birth of first child. Consider for 
example, the individual Z was unemployed at the time of the survey, it was assumed to 
survival analysis that this characteristic was present at the birth of the first child. On the 
other hand, the question the same individual Z on the age at first job, it said never 
throughout their life have had a paid job, but already had two children (in 2013 the time 
of the survey), then took along the analysis that this individual did not work before first 
child. 
We performed the KM analysis and the event history analysis with the survival 
and eha (event history analysis) package, in R software.  
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3.4. Results  
 
In this section we present the results in three subsections. Subsection 3.4.1 presents the 
results for the fertility transition and explores how the familial background can influence 
it, while subsection 3.4.2 presents the influence of social norms and individual values on 
the first birth, and finally in subsection 3.4.3 a coherent model combining the previous 
variables and with the propose to identify the fertility determinants from individualization 
era is presented. 
 
3.4.1. Fertility transition and familial background 
 
Meanwhile men and women are becoming visible separated individuals, each linked to 
the family through different expectations and interests, each experiencing different 
opportunities and burdens (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 90), its important to 
identify if the transition patterns are the same for either men or women. In the context of 
demographic and sociological analysis of individual behaviour, education and the social 
context of individuals are mentioned in the literature as the main characteristics related to 
the postponement of fertility at the individual level. The educational evolutionary factor 
and increasing the opportunities in the labour market intensified the impact that 
increasing the level of education has in the decision to enter the parenting (Bhrolcháin 
and Beaujouan, 2012). The entry into adulthood and the family formation paradigm have 
been changed in recent decades, identified as one of the main outcome of a new society 
characterized by the phenomenon of individualization, where the free choice at the 
individual level is key feature. The current families are the result of increasingly 
heterogeneous different behaviours reflected individual values (Billari and Wilson, 
2001), although the social moral standards imposed to condition the household and 
individual behaviours (Micheli and Bernardi, 2012). 
Figure 3.1 presents the transition rates for first birth to the variables, sex (a), 
nationality (b), cohort (c) and educational level (d). In the transition to first birth, figure 
3.1a reports that women are more likely to have the first child at younger ages, with a 
median age of 28, while for men the median is 31. That difference in median ages can 
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give the support to the common sense that typically women marry older men. Also the 
teenager risk it is almost null and the period with higher transition risk stops at ages 
36/37.  
Over the last decades in Portugal the emigrant fertility represented approximately 
five percent of the total births in the country (Magalhães, 2013). However that five 
percent of foreign contributing to the country fertility had different evolutionary patterns. 
Nevertheless at the present moment, and taking figure 3.1b into account, it is almost 
impossible to identify differences between Portuguese and foreign in the transitions rates 
to the first birth. The transition risk is very similar over the KM curves. Still the risk to 
the natives is higher between ages 20 and 29.  
All demographic analysis is centred on ages or cohorts perspectives, in the 
particular case of Portugal, as result of the social changes registered after 1974 with the 
revolution (see chapter 2) and from the pronounced fertility decline after 1981, we 
consider important to establish a comparison between those born before and after the 
revolution. It was expected to observe differences between those two cohort groups, 
however in figure 3.1c we observe that at the beginning of their reproductive life the risk 
is equal, and after age 24 until age 35 the risk increases to those born at older cohorts, 
also for this group the median age was 28. Still the differences between the median age 
for the two cohorts born before and after the revolution are only two years.  
The educational characteristic is distinguished in the literature as one of the main 
(if not the main) factor on the transition to parenthood as well as for fertility 
postponement and decline (Billari and Philipov, 2004; Bratti, 2003; Kreyenfeld, 2002; 
Lappegard and Ronsen, 2005). It is proposition stated that women with higher education 
levels postpone longer their fertility as a result of later needed entry into the labour 
market and to the first cohabitation (or first marriage).  
The increase in schooling levels resulted in the consequent postponement of 
women entry into the labour market. Thus, are the individuals with education up to 
secondary education that enter first in the parenthood arena, with a median age of 28 
years, while for individuals with a higher level of education the median age is 33 years. 
Also for this last group the risk of becoming a parent is more pronounced after age 25.   
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Figure 3.1: Transition to first birth by sex (a), nationality (b), cohort (c) and educational level (d) 
(a) (b) 
  
(c) (d) 
  
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration.  
 
Not only the individual level of education, cohort, nationality or sex, should be 
considered as decisive factors to the fertility decision and transition. The level of 
education of their parents can and should also be taken into account especially in the 
perspective of their social context (Shanahan 2000). Besides that also the number of 
siblings may influence the transition risks, as well, the possible parents divorce, also can 
be determinants in the fertility tempo and quantum. Figure 3.2 illustrates the transition 
risk to first birth by father (a), and mother education level (b), number of siblings (c) and 
parents divorce (d).  
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Between parents educational level (figure 3.2a and 3.2b) there is no significant 
differences, mainly to those who their parents had a secondary our lower educational 
level, for this category the median age was 29 years. Yet, for those whose parents have an 
upper secondary or higher educational levels the risk is different from the father to the 
mother, with median ages of 32 and 33 years. Without any statistical evidence we can 
however state that the educational level of the potential grandparents is relatively lower 
than the effect from the potential grandmothers in the risk of transition to the first child.  
 
Figure 3.2: Transition to first birth by father educational level (a), mother education level (b), 
number of siblings (c) and parents divorce (d) 
(a) (b) 
  
 
(c) (d) 
  
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration.  
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The number of brothers and sisters could also limit the fertility decisions and 
transitions, thus figure 3.2c reveals that for those without siblings or at least with one, the 
transition rates are higher and to this category by the age of 31 half of the individuals 
have already the first child. Meanwhile, to the other category the median age was 28. 
These differences in the median ages of four years reflect a negative effect of small 
family sizes in the postponement of fertility.  
And if it happens the parents divorce? Can that influence the transition rates and 
the risk of becoming a parent? Figure 3.2d reveals that no. For individual that their 
parents had never ben divorced or that divorced at least one time, the transition rate are 
roughly the same and the median age for both categories is 30 years. With lower risk to 
become a parent and lower median age (28 years) are those that never lived with the 
parents (category other) or that parents never lived together. 
The desire and the need for economic stability by the young couples, steered them 
to the family formation postponement and consequently to the fertility postponement and 
decline. For the young’s of today the age to leave the parents home is being postponed to 
later and later ages therefore increasing the age at first cohabitation9. In the last decades it 
has been observed a delay also at the entry to the labour market either for women and 
men, due to the extension of the educational background (Billari and Kohler, 2002).   
Figure 3.3 plots the transition to first birth, by age, of leaving parents home (a), 
age at first cohabitation (b) and age at first job (c). As noted above the age that the each 
individual leave parents home is dependent of the age that they are able to support 
financially their needs, so it is in fact expected that those who leave their parents home 
earlier in life will transit earlier to parenthood. Therefore in figure 3.3a we can observe 
that half of those who leave their first household until age 21 by age 25 had already the 
first child, while for those that moved after that age the median was 30. Often, couples 
leave the family household to live with a partner, as a complement for the previous 
information, it is also important to analyse the age at first cohabitation (figure 3.3b). The 
figure gives the information that those who haven’t lived with a partner or did it before 
age 22 register a median age of 28 years while for those that for the first time lived with a 
                                                
9 Here age at first cohabitation refers to individuals in the first legal or non-legal relationships were the 
couple lived together.   
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partner after age 22 have a median age of 31 years. The median ages are not expressively 
different. 
If the young leave household of origin later in life and that happens has a result of 
late transition to the labour market is then expected to find evidences that later ages at 
first job will postpone fertility. Figure 3.3c plots the transition rates by the age at first job 
by two categories, where it is in fact possible to observe that postponement is higher to 
those that started to work after age 18 (median age of 32 years), compared to those who 
started to work earlier in life (before age 18), never work or was not working by the time 
of first birth (median age of 28). 
 
Figure 3.3: Transition to first birth by age of leaving parents home (a), age at first cohabitation (b) 
and age at first job (c)  
(a) (b) 
  
 (c) 
 
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration.  
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3.4.2. Fertility, social norms, individual values and postponement  
 
The actual societies moved from imposed restrictions moral codes and traditional 
customs, toward other less rigid, where the main changes were stimulated by economic 
prosperity, education and a more egalitarian social status. The social structures, religion 
and family weakened. Men and women no longer have their pre-set choices, and began to 
reflect on their decisions, including the family formation timing, creating their own 
biographies and adapting itself the moral and societal values. Individual and social values 
and perspectives had change trough the last decades. Men and women role in the family 
context had changed and with that also the desired family size.    
Figure 3.4 presents the transition rates to first birth considering the individuals 
opinion on maternal conciliation (a), paternal conciliation (b), maternal presence (c) and 
paternal presence (d). The conciliation of family and employment presents different 
perspectives to men and women, even at the covariates categories (figure 3.4a and b). 
The early transition to the first child occurs for those who have the opinion that is better 
to a child at scholar age to have a non-working mother (figure 3.4a) and a father working 
in full time (figure 3.4b), with median ages of 28 and 29. On the other side to those who 
have the opinion that a working mother and a father not working, working at part-time or 
from home have the first child later with a median age of 31 years.  
When questioned about the maternal and paternal presence and the risk to have 
the first child, in the case of the opinion on the parental presence (figure 3.4d) the 
transition risk are the same and median age to each category is 30 years. For the question 
on the maternal presence (figure 3.4c) we can highlight that the ones that disagree that is 
harmful that a mother work outside home whom have the first child later in life with 
median age of 30 years.  
The free self-determination is one of the main characteristics in the contemporary 
societies as a result from the individualization phenomenon. Therefore new social and 
individual issues have developed, such as the importance and the family role in the 
societies, the desired number of children, and the individual fulfilment. Figure 3.5 plots 
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transition rates to the desired number of children (a), ideal number of children in a family 
(b), family significance (c) and personal fulfilment (d).  
 
Figure 3.4: Transition to first birth by maternal conciliation (a), paternal conciliation (b), maternal 
presence (c) and paternal presence (d)  
(a) (b) 
  
 
(c) (d) 
  
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration.  
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who the ideal size of a family is in maximum also two children share the same median 
age of 30 years.   
The family importance (figure 5c) and the personal fulfilment (figure 5d) are 
directly related to the new definitions of family as well as the new family role in the 
social context. Those who disagree that a child needs to live with parents to grow 
balanced (figure 5c) along with those who somehow disagree that a woman or a man 
need a child to feel accomplished (figure 5d), are those who postpone for longer time the 
decision to have the first child, with median age of 31 years.  
 
Figure 3.5: Transition to first birth by desired number of children (a), ideal number of children in 
a family (b), family significance (c) and personal fulfilment (d)  
(a) (b) 
  
 
(c) (d) 
  
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration. 
 
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
15 20 25 30 35 40
Time (ages)
S(
t) 
es
tim
at
es
More than 2
Max. of 2
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
15 20 25 30 35 40
Time (ages)
S(
t) 
es
tim
at
es
More than 2
Max. of 2
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
15 20 25 30 35 40
Time (ages)
S(
t) 
es
tim
at
es
Agree
Disagree
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
15 20 25 30 35 40
Time (ages)
S(
t) 
es
tim
at
es
Partially disagree
Entirely agree
 80 
In figure 3.6 we can see the transition rates to first birth through the perspective of 
female autonomy (a), postponement (b) and the offspring balance (c). For those who 
entirely agree that women commitments in conciliating work and family life in a 
balanced way, and can educate a child alone (figure 3.6a) the transition to the first child 
happens later in their life trajectories with a median age of 30 years. Regarding the co-
variable postponement (figure 3.6b) no difference are identifiable between the categories 
and to both the median age is 30.  
 
Figure 3.6: Transition to first birth by female autonomy (a), postponement (b), and offspring 
balance (c)  
(a) (b) 
  
(c) 
 
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration.  
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Finally we can focus our attention in question of offspring balance (figure 4.6c), 
at this figure is possible to observe that the median ages to those who agree or disagree 
that it is preferable to have only one child with more opportunities and fewer restrictions 
than having more children, only differs by one year (30 and 29 respectively).  
The motivation for the previous analysis was to describe the parenthood transition 
risks. We summarized the obtained results in the Kaplan-Meier curves to allow for better 
understanding of patterns and identify the median ages by each covariate. By excluding 
the influence of other covariates, it was possible to identify distinctive patterns. 
Nevertheless the constrain from the data should be considered, once that each one of the 
variables it was defined taking into account the answers at the time of the survey and not 
when each individual had their children.    
Given these constraints and to sum up, we can state that, from the background 
characteristics the individual’s whit higher risk of becoming a parent are, women’s; with 
Portuguese nationality; from older cohorts (previous to the Revolution); with lower 
educational levels (until upper secondary), with two or more siblings; those who never 
left the family of origin; those that leave the parents home earlier in life; also those that 
experienced the first cohabitation after age 22; and those that never worked or have done 
it before age 18.  
It was additionally possible to identify that from a group of characteristics 
recognized as social norms and individual values, that the risk is also higher to those with 
the desire of two or more children; those who have the opinion that the best for a child is 
that the mother doesn’t work and father work out of home; those believing that a child to 
be balanced need booth father and mother; and those that entirely agree that a men or a 
women need a child to be totally fulfilled.  
The influenced relationship between the above mentioned characteristics and 
fertility evolution go beyond the transition to the first child. These findings are consistent 
with those of other studies which, using varying fertility outcomes and analytical 
methods, report differences in fertility transitions when adjustment for family-
background factors such as the number of siblings, parents’ education, and age of leaving 
parents home (e.g., Billari and Kohler, 2002; Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012; Liefbroer 
 82 
and Corijn 1999; Lappegard and Ronsen 2005; Kravdal 2007; Kravdal and Rindfuss 
2008; Tavares 2010). 
Nonetheless, each one of the previous covariates and dimensions described above 
should be analysed taking into account the influence of other covariates. For that in the 
subsequent section we present the results of tree models where the time until the first bird 
was controlled for family-background and by social norms and individual values. 
 
3.4.3. Transition to parenthood determinants in Portugal 
 
Table 3.1 presents models for the prediction of parenthood transition from age 18 to 40. 
Coefficients are presented in relative risk format, and hence indicate the proportional 
shift in the baseline hazard due to a unit change in that variable. Counting only to 
significant covariates three models are presented, the first controlled for the family-
background characteristics (Model 1). A second model that besides family-background 
characteristics control also for the social norms and individual values (Model 2), and the 
final model including significant interactions (Model 3). In the models elaborations all 
variables analysed in the previous sections were considered, however fixing a p-value ≥0.25, several were the variables without statistical significance (see table B.1, Appendix 
B). In the case of the covariates within the family-background characteristics they are: the 
educational level of the father, nationality, age of leaving parental household and parent’s 
divorce. While for the case of covariates within the social norms and individual values, 
the non-significant are: ideal number of children for a family; paternal conciliation 
between family and labour market; maternal presence; female autonomy and the 
covariate postponement.  
When evaluated the family-background characteristics (Model 1) it is possible to 
identify that compared to men, women’s risk to become a parent is higher by eight 
percent. Controlling the parenthood transition by educational level we identify that those 
whose maximum level of instruction was upper secondary or higher, the relative risk is 
almost sixty seven percent lower than those with higher educational levels. While 
regarding the effect of individual’s cohort, we find a negative time trend. Compared to 
the situation before 1974 (before April 25th), there was a clear drop in the first birth 
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transition to the young cohorts. The relative risk to become a parent is lower by 15 
percent to younger cohorts (Model 1). Mothers’ educational level was also included in 
the models and compared with those that their mothers had lower educational levels, to 
the ones with upper educational risk of becoming a parent diminished by twenty tree 
percent. Still in the model only with the family-background (Model 1) characteristics we 
identified higher risks of becoming a parent to those with two or more siblings. Also 
those who start working before age 18, never worked or weren’t working at the time that 
the first child was born, the risk of becoming a parent was more fifty percent compared to 
those that started to working later (after age 18). Finally, age at first cohabitation was 
included, and for those that haven’t ever experienced cohabitation, or have done it before 
age 22, the risk to have a first child is forty four percent higher than for those with a first 
cohabitation after age 22.  
The inclusion of social norms and individual values characteristics (Model 2) 
does not change significantly the result. Nevertheless the covariate cohort has no longer 
statistical significant. With the inclusion of social norms and individual values, we 
identify that when individuals have a desire for bigger family sizes, the risk of becoming 
a parent is twenty five percent higher when compared to those who desired families until 
one child. In the transition to the first birth there is a positive effect to persons which 
believe that the best is that a mother doesn’t work to take care of a child (maternal 
conciliation), and the father should work outside home (paternal presence). It is also 
possible to identify a positive effect to those who disagree that a child needs a mother and 
a father to grow balanced (family significance), while for those who partiality disagree 
that men and women need children to be fulfilled the effect is negative. 
With the increasing years spent in the educational system it is expected a 
relationship between the educational level and the age at the first cohabitation and 
understand how that combination can influence the transition to parenthood. It is 
furthermore expected that women and men present dissimilarities when analysed from 
the point of view of age at first job. In order to exemplify these aspects, and besides 
controlling for familiar-background and for social norms and individual values, 
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Table 3.1: Results from event history model, relative risks of the transition to first birth 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Sex    
Male 1 1 1 
Female 1.788 *** 1.871 *** 1.389 *** 
Educational Level    
Higher Education 1 1 1 
Until Upper Secondary level 1.664 *** 1.685 *** 1.148 *** 
Mother Educational Level    
Lower than Sec. Educ. 1 1 1 
Upper Sec. & Higher Education 0.773 *** 0.778 *** 0.774 *** 
Cohort     
Before April 25th 1 1 1 
After April 25th 0.851 ** 1.038 1.043 
Age at first job    
After age 18 1 1 1 
Not working/Never work/ Before age 18 1.534 *** 1.515 *** 1.086 
Age at first cohabitation    
After age 22 1 1 1 
Before age 22/Never Coabited  1.437 *** 1.559 *** 0.525 *** 
Siblings     
Until 1 1 1 1 
2 or more 1.369*** 1.249 *** 1.219 *** 
Desired number of children    
Max of 2  1 1 
More than 2  1.432 *** 1.423 *** 
Opinion on Maternal Conciliation    
Working   1 1 
Not working  1.182 ** 1.185 *** 
Opinion on Paternal Presence    
Agree  1 1 
Disagree  1.191 ** 1.215 *** 
Opinion on Family significance    
Agree  1 1 
Disagree  0.798 *** 0.810 *** 
Opinion on Personal fulfilment    
Entirely agree  1 1 
Partially disagree  0.799 *** 0.793 *** 
Opinion on Offspring balance    
Agree  1 1 
Disagree  1.337 *** 1.338 *** 
Sex: Age at first job    
Female: Not working/Never work/ Before age 18   1,509 *** 
Educ. Level: Age at first cohabitation    
Until Upper Secondary level: Not before age 22/ Never Coabited   3,801 *** 
    
log(scale) 3.657 3.701 3.617 
log(shape) 1.770 1.797 1.809 
Notes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
Model 1: family-background characteristics.  
Model 2: family-background characteristics + social norms and individual values. 
Model 3: family-background characteristics + social norms and individual values + significant interactions. 
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 85 
We this included in Model 3 two possible interactions: the interactions (1) 
between sex and the age at first at first job, and (2) between the educational level and the 
age at first cohabitation. In the relationship between sex and age at first job, we identify 
that for the a woman not working at the time of first birth, that never worked or started to 
work before age 18 the first birth risk is more than fifty percent when compared to a 
woman that started to work after age 18.  Table 3.1 finally reports an interaction between 
educational level and age at the first cohabitation were we identify a expressively positive 
relation between lower educational level (until upper secondary) and those who 
experienced the first cohabitation before age 22 or that haven’t experienced before first 
birth.  
 
3.5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
3.5.1.  Discussion  
 
This chapter has analysed the parenthood transition on the perspective from 
individualization theory to family formation. Entry into parenthood is the result of several 
combined covariates, which analysed separately allowed to understand how each of them 
potentiates or not the fertility transition. However the best way of knowing in fact the 
determinants for this transition and subsequent behaviour is through joint models, where 
the relationships and interactions between the different variables will be taken into 
account. Thus, first we described through the Kaplan-Meir curves the transition rates to 
first births without considering the relationship between covariates. Latter on, we 
controlled the transition to first birth by two dimensions mentioned in the literature as the 
fundamental to fertility postponement into the light of individualization theory the family 
background and the social norms and individual values (Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Gaspar, 
2013). 
Long-term fertility research in demography has essentially focused on the fertility 
dynamics. An important reason for this focus was the direct link between women and 
their children. When family and parenthood were lifelong stable institutions, the analysis 
of female fertility patterns provided an almost complete picture of fertility dynamics. Yet, 
today’s family and parenthood are more dynamic and diversified. In recent decades, new 
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family forms, such as single parents families, social parenthood, and patchwork families, 
have increased in modern societies (Alich, 2009). The 2013 Portuguese Fertility Survey 
allowed to carry out an analysis taking into account both men and women. The analysis 
throughout this chapter corroborates the results advocated by Zhang (2008), which 
identified a higher men median age in the transition to parenthood, on average two to 
three years higher than for women’s. However, although men and women have different 
patterns in the transition to the first birth, those not mean that the fertility determinants to 
there fertility is substantially significant. In fact, throughout this chapter the main 
difference within sex was identified only in the correlation to the age at first job.   
Family background influenced the association between family formation and 
fertility, a deep relationship that goes beyond the first child. The results of each 
individual background reinforced this interpretation. Consistent with the general pattern 
of the second demographic transition, the youngest cohorts display a significantly lower 
likelihood in the transition to parenthood as also identified by Domínguez-Folgueras and 
Castro-Martin (2008). 
In the context of demographic and sociological analysis of individual behaviour, 
education and the social context of individuals emerge in the literature as the main 
characteristics related to the fertility postponement (Billari and Kohler, 2002; Bhrolcháin 
and Beaujouan, 2012; Liefbroer and Corijn 1999; Lappegard and Ronsen 2005; Kravdal 
and Rindfuss 2008; Tavares 2010). The educational evolutionary factor and the 
increasing opportunities in the labour market strengthened the impact of education on 
transition to first birth (Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012). In fact, over this chapter we 
identify a postponement for those with higher educational levels in an analogous result to 
different studies on the fertility transition and postponement. In the same context 
Kreyenfeld (2004), studying motivations and decisions for transition into parenthood, 
concluded that more than economic factors, education is key factor in the postponement 
of fertility. 
Bettio and Villa (1998) and later Billari and Kohler (2002), definite that the 
fertility postponement is the consequent result from the constant postponement on the age 
that each individual leaves the family household as a consequence from the lack of steady 
economic stability in the absence of labour market participation.  In our analysis was not 
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only possible to identify this trend, observing a delay in the transition to first birth for 
those who later left the parents household, but as well for those that later started to 
participate in the labour market. It was also possible to identify that the late entry into 
cohabitation increases the waiting time for the birth of a child.   
The family background should be considered part of the social framework, and 
covariates such as age or the number of siblings need to be used as part of the fertility 
postponement comprehension. As for Castro-Martin (1992), we acknowledged that 
individuals from smaller families become parents later in life. As well as a relationship 
between the number of siblings and the number of desired offspring as point out as 
Cramer (1980) and Sobotka and Beaujouan (2014) stated before.  
The entry into adulthood and the timing of family formation have been changed in 
last decades, as the main outcome of a new society characterized by the phenomenon of 
individualization, where the free choice at the individual level is a key feature. The 
contemporary families are the result of increasingly heterogeneous different behaviours 
that reflect individual values, although the social moral standards imposed to condition 
the household and individual behaviours (Billari and Wilson, 2001; Micheli and 
Bernardi, 2012). 
Throughout our analysis it was possible to identify the existence of heterogeneous 
individual behaviours that contribute to a more homogeneous parenthood transition, 
which stands out for example that individuals who disagree that a child needs to live with 
his father and mother to grow balanced; also that consider important that a woman can 
reconcile work and family life; or who believe that a woman can be autonomous and 
raise their children alone are generally those who later become a parent. 
Even that society does not expect that each individual get married and have four 
children as Duncan and Smith (2006) states, still men and women with stronger social 
norms and individual values have higher rates in the transition to the first birth. As in the 
past, in contemporary societies, the individual background is still significant in the 
decision of family formation, as well as the personal desire to have a family as an 
individual desired and not as society norm. However the risk of becoming a parent earlier 
in life is still related to strong social norms and values, as well as with low educational 
levels.  
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3.5.2. Concluding remarks 
 
The fertility postponement identified and discussed in the previous chapter as a double 
postponement (cohort and period postponement) had a direct impact in the final fertility 
quantum. Portuguese women decreased their quantum until 1982, but it was after that 
year that the postponement effect was deeper. Thus, by the year of 2012, Portugal was for 
the first time at the lowest-low fertility level with 1.28 children per women and the 
difference between the mean age at birth and at the first child was less than two years.  
 Within such scenario of low fertility and decreasing differences between the mean 
ages at first birth and all the births, we can assume that in this chapter when we identified 
the motherhood transition determinants they are in fact the fertility determinants. In 
Portugal questions as, What determines Fertility? And What determines the transition to 
motherhood? – can be consider as only one.  
The Portuguese homogenous later transition to motherhood is mainly explained 
by the higher educational level (from the individuals and from their mothers); the late 
transition to first cohabitation; the lower number of siblings (maximum of one); the 
desired number of two children (maximum); the possibility of maternal conciliation 
between family and labour market; the perspective that a child doesn’t need both mother 
and father to grow balanced; as well as no need to have a child as personal fulfilment; 
and finally the idea that it is preferable to have only a child with more economic and 
social stability.  
In Portugal transition to parenthood become a matter of choice, and time to 
become a parent in a given synthetic cohort is the result from the individual real cohort 
changes in the values and family organization, but also in the labour market sphere, 
largely consistent with the demographic changes.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE IMPACT OF WOMEN’S EDUCATION IN THE TRANSITION 
TO MOTHERHOOD: A COHORT PERSPECTIVE  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The changes in education are a crucial foundation for a process of consciousness raising 
that enables women to deal actively with their own situation. Their explosive force comes 
from the fact that they do not take place in isolation, but historically coincide with major 
changes in what is considered a normal female biography (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002: 58). Such educational development has a direct implication not only at the women 
society role but also a negative influence at the fertility tempo and quantum.  The actual 
time in education is commonly perceived as mismatched with family formation. 
Therefore European countries with low fertility often show relative strong education 
differentials in family size, characterized by low fertility levels and high childlessness 
among the women with higher education (Sobotka, 2015: 17).  
Then the direct multidimensional effect of education and fertility postponement 
appears to be the essential factor promoting fertility shift to later ages. In the sense that 
low fertility rates in Europe are leading to important changes in age structure and to 
slowing or suppressing population growth.  The immediate impact of low fertility is the 
reduction of the number of children in the total population and increases the share of 
population concentrated in the working ages, raising support ratio and correspondingly 
raising the income per capita. Afterwards, as the smaller cohorts of children reach the 
working ages, the share of working age population declines, the share of older adult’s 
increases and the total population ages. So, in a general way the support ratio falls, 
reducing the income per capita. The shifts of population in age distribution have 
significant macroeconomic consequences that feature prominently in the debate of the 
economic attitude in Europe. In countries as Portugal, with the conjugation of low 
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fertility and economical crises, no significant changes are expected in the near future 
(Tomé et al., 2014).   
Therefore, this chapter examines the relationship between education and cohort-
completed fertility within four European countries, in two selected cohorts (due to data 
availability for completed cohorts), characterized by the starting point changes for the 
fertility cohort age shift.  
The main goals of this chapter are the following:  
1. To review and discuss the multi-dimensional relationship education and 
fertility; 
2. Evaluate the arguments on the relationship between period fertility and 
education, illustrating observed changes for the Portuguese case; 
3. Describe how the changes on the tempo fertility conditioned by the 
educational level influenced the final quantum; 
4. And, to describe fertility trends by marital and employment characteristics 
quantifying the effect of women educational expansion on cohort fertility.   
 
Our analysis is centred on the 1950 and 1960 cohort data corresponding to the 
1991 and 2001 IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series) samples, from where we 
extracted and reconstructed information for Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain, for 
women in the transition to the first child. Thus, this chapter is divided in 6 sections. The 
introduction is followed by a theoretical discussion on the relationship between education 
and fertility postponement, supported by an extensive literature review (section 4.2). In 
section 4.3 a review on the Portuguese specific educational system is presented, 
following the evidence of period fertility postponement due to educational levels 
registered in the lexis diagram (figure 4.1). The following section (4.4) presents the data 
selection and methods. Section 4.5 contains the main results of our investigation, namely 
the empirical relationship between education and completed cohort fertility. This section 
is dived in three other sections. Subsection 4.5.1 describes the transition to motherhood in 
the 1950 and 1960 cohorts with a comparative perspective between Austria, Hungary, 
Portugal and Spain. The following subsection (4.5.2) presented the results regarding the 
cohort on the TFR evolution by educational level, as well as the transition process. 
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Finally in subsection 4.5.3 we presented the estimated influence from education on the 
fertility patterns in two main characteristics: the marital and the employment status. The 
subsequent section (4.6) concludes this chapter.  
4.2. Theoretical framework on education and fertility postponement 
 
In 1984 Lídia was born somewhere in Portugal, and in that year was registered an 
average of 1.9 children born per woman. Portugal was still two years far from the 
European Economic Community (EEC – the European Union of today), 18 years far from 
the EURO, and in the European context, was still one of the poorest countries. Lídia’s 
mother, the youngest of seven brothers and sisters, was born in 1965, ten years before the 
end of the dictatorial regime. She belongs to a cohort of women with low educational 
attainment, and in fact her educational level is less than the complete secondary school, 
being with the age of 15 already at the labour market. Later in 1989 when Lídia arrived 
to the primary school were in her classroom 25 students. From that group only five of 
them, including her, had and remain today (2015) without any siblings. Also from these 
25 students in the classroom and born in the cohort of 1984, 10 have a university degree 
but only 3 have today at least one child.   
The narrative outlined above is not exclusive from the Portuguese society, rather 
a transversal dynamic to all European countries.  After the Second World War not only 
the South of Europe but also all western societies witnessed profound changes in the 
educational context and childbearing of the young women. In the European societies we 
assist to a considerable improvement in the educational system and in the requalification 
of the labour market as result of higher educational levels. In the meantime, there has 
been a pronounced postponement of entry into motherhood, due to the simultaneous 
increase of female participation in higher educational levels and the increase female role 
in the labour markets.  
The massive postponement and recuperation of childbearing in low-fertility 
societies have presented important sociological and demographic developments during 
the past half-century (Frejka, 2010). After the pronounced decline of fertility (during the 
1990s), between 2000 and 2012, fertility rose in the large majority of European countries.  
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This trend represents an unexpected reversal from fertility rates below 1.3 in most 
countries during the 1990s or in some cases in early 2000s. The number of countries with 
a TFR below 1.3 declined from 16 in 2002 to just one in 2008 (Goldstein et al., 2009).  
Although the significant impact of economy and labour market in the societies, 
education is the factor distinguished as the most important aspect influencing the timing 
of childbearing and fertility outcomes of women (Spéder and Kamarás, 2008). In fact 
most of the studies examining the association between educational attainment and 
fertility focus on the level of education and its impact on fertility, while at the same time, 
educational attainment is perceived as an individual attribute and is used as a proxy for 
a person’s human, economic, cultural and to some extent biological capital (Bagavos, 
2010: 53). 
If in one hand being enrolled in education is increasingly perceived as 
incompatible with childbearing and, thus, results in postponement of family formation 
and childbearing. On the other hand, women with higher educational attainments are 
more likely to follow a professional career and consequently differ in the process of 
family formation and dimension. Women with higher formation tend to form smaller 
families and remain childless more frequently. Thus, the relationship between educational 
attainment and the transition to motherhood has been an important topic of discussion in 
the literature (e.g. Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012; Tesching, 2012; Bagavos, 2010; 
Spéder and Kamarás, 2008; Hoem et al., 2006; Martín-García and Baizán, 2006; 
Lappegård and Rønsen, 2005).  
Traditionally, the study of this relationship is in the perspective of how a woman’s 
education affects her childbearing behaviour. Most researchers who study the association 
between educational attainment and fertility focus on two dimensions of education: First, 
they concentrate solely on the level of education and its impact on fertility. Second, they 
perceive educational attainment primarily as an individual attribute and use it as a proxy 
for a person’s human, economic, cultural, and to some extent biological capital (Hoem et 
al., 2006: 332). Also Tesching (2012) states that empirical investigations have focused 
not only on the impact of female education on the level of childlessness or the ultimate 
number of children, but also on educational differentials in the timing and spacing of 
births. Less attention has been given to two other possibilities, first is that not just the 
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education of a woman influences her childbearing behaviour, the birth of a child might 
also lead to changes in her educational career; second, and although researchers have 
frequently argued that the relationship between fertility and education is extremely 
complex, little attention has been also given to the possibility that the connections in the 
period and cohort have different dynamics.  
The development of higher education across European countries, particularly 
among women, has been the major factor behind the postponement of parenthood. In low 
fertility countries, where massive expansion of high education has taken place and the 
education process has extended well into the fecund years, the causality question has 
become murkier and the education-fertility association has become more varied (Basten 
el al., 2013: 42). Influenced by the social and economic contexts and transformations, the 
educational level and the motherhood timing, play a central role in shaping the life 
courses trajectory (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). In countries, such Portugal or 
Spain, the massification in the access to education in the 1960’s and the explosion of 
female higher education seems to result in the significant postponement and decline of 
fertility. Portugal e.g., similarly to the other Southern European countries, experienced a 
drastic and rapid decline in live births. Castro-Martin (1992: 236) highlight that 
increasing educational level is connected to less traditional gender role models and to 
aspirations that compete with childbearing, furthermore fertility preferences are 
considered to be better implemented by educated women through effective use of birth 
control. 
Throughout the 20th century, among women, higher education has been associated 
with lower fertility and with a negative educational gradient in fertility (Van Bavel, 2006) 
pronounced in countries institutionally supporting long withdrawal of mothers from the 
labour market, where highly educated women face difficulties combining their work and 
family life, including Austria, Germany and Switzerland (Sobotka, 2012: 284).  In the last 
three decades fertility analysis for the European regions shows that birth decline and 
postponement are fundamental characteristics in fertility trends (Frejka, 2010; Frejka and 
Sardon, 2004; Kohler and Ortega, 2002; Kohler et al., 2005; Sobotka, 2004). Birth 
postponement has been the subject of comparative analyses in different European 
countries, resulting in the idea that higher levels of educational attainment and the 
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extension in the duration of schooling are key factors in explaining birth postponement. 
Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan (2012) identified from the early 1980s to the late 1990s in 
Britain and in France that the rise in educational enrolment has been a substantial 
contributor to the trend to later childbearing. In their study, the authors adopt a period 
approach measuring explicitly, net of period differences in level.  
However the relationship between educational attainment and completed fertility 
is little studied.  Still, previous studies on the cohort perspective demonstrated a clear 
association at the micro-level between education and the transitions to adulthood, 
marriage and first birth. The link between aggregate change in education and birth timing 
have relied for evidence on the net effects of period or cohort in micro-level models of the 
occurrence of first birth (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012: 312). Prskawetz and her 
colleagues (2008: 309) identified that in Austria a substantial portion of postponed family 
formation can be explained by prolonged education and the later graduation age of 
students. Also and although older cohorts of academy-educated women had levels of 
childlessness and completed fertility similar to those of university-educated women, 
partly due to the importance of religious schools in the education system in the past 
younger cohorts born after 1950 have lower childlessness and higher fertility (pp 307). 
Andersson et al. (2009: 313) identified within the Nordic countries childbearing 
median ages higher for the older cohorts (1960-64 vs 1950-54), as well as a similar 
patterns of recuperation can be observed for highly educated women compared to women 
with less education, resulting in small differences in completed fertility across 
educational group. Additionally, the same authors also identified a positive relationship 
between educational level and the final number of children when women who become 
mothers at similar ages are compared. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
4.3. From low to high education, what changed since 1960 and how that 
modified the Portuguese fertility and family trends 
 
The role of education in the evolution of individualization is wide spread.  Only at the 
end of nineteenth century educational opportunities with access to women began to 
emerge. The number of uneducated young women fell as the proportion of women in 
upper levels of education increased to a degree that exceeded all expectations (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). As Hoem, Neyer and Andersson (2006: 335) stated some 
educational systems (e.g.: those of the Nordic countries) avoid early track differentiation 
and remain highly permeable. They allow pupils and students to change their educational 
tracks, to alter their main field of education (within wide bounds) at all levels, and even 
more importantly to exit from post-compulsory education and to re-enter it at all stages 
in their lives. (…) Flexible educational systems offer a person better opportunities to 
adjust her education to the development of her interests and talents, to changes in the 
life-course, and to changes in her plans for her future life. 
In part, the persistence of low levels of educational provision in Portugal can be 
seen as the legacy from the past. In 1950, around 46% of the Portuguese population aged 
15 years and over were unschooled. Only 20% completed primary education (Pereira and 
Lains, 2012). Some progress was made and by late 1960s, universal primary schooling 
was finally attained (Amaral, 2003), some decades after the European core. Even though, 
by the end of the Estado Novo (1974)10, one third of all the Portuguese were illiterate, one 
third of those aged 15 or older had full primary education, 3 percent had completed 
secondary education and a residual 0.6 percent had undergone university education 
(Neave and Amaral, 2012). Between 1974 and 2000, public expenditure on education 
rose from 1.8 percent of GDP to about 3.7 in 1980 and to 6.9 of GDP in 1999.  The 
average years spent in school steadily rose, almost doubling from 4.7 years in 1974 to 
8.26 years in 2010. The number of those reaching upper secondary and tertiary education 
grew substantially since the return of democracy and tripled since 1975, even that the 
school dropout rate remains very high, greater than that of other OECD countries, with 
the exception of Mexico and Turkey (Pereira and Lains, 2012). 
                                                
10 “Estado novo” is the name of the political regime prevailed in Portugal for 41 years without interruption 
since 1933 until 1974, when it was overthrown by the Revolution of April 25 (See Chapters 2 and 3). 
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Overall, in Portugal higher education today supplies for ten times more students 
than it did 30 years ago, in truth an educational explosion. This fast catching up with 
traditionally more educated countries unveils a very rapid drive onwards towards higher 
training, which took place within the length of one generation. From the year 2000 
onwards, however, the numbers of new students entering directly from secondary schools 
have dropped, as have birth rates (Almeida and Vieira, 2012). The explosion in higher 
education is inseparable from the massification of access to education at basic and 
secondary levels and the outcome of strong and effective investment via the public sector 
in democratising the school system since 1974. 
This situation was also a result of a new and intense demand for education by 
families in their daily quest to improve their children’s educational attainment. The 
vertiginous drop in the Portuguese birth rate since the second half of the 1970s is a 
pointer to this watershed, which went hand in glove with a new notion of childhood and 
infancy, and their relationship to schooling. The idea of the child as a small adult, 
working for the family since early age, and thus, quite literally, just passing through 
school, has not entirely vanished. 
Another specificity of Portuguese high education level is its early feminisation. It 
was in the course of the 1960s that the drive of women into higher education became 
unstoppable. In 10 years, female participation grew from 29.5 percent in 1960 to 44.4 
percent by the end of the decade. During the 1980s, the ‘turning point’, i.e., when the 
number of women students exceeded the number of male students in Portugal, was 
reached. Against a broader European backdrop, Portugal, together with France, were the 
first countries to achieve this point. Iceland, Sweden and Norway reached it in 1985 and 
with a few years delay, countries such as Denmark, Spain, Italy, Finland and more 
recently, Ireland, Luxemburg and the UK attained this condition (Almeida and Vieira, 
2012). 
Although that the education levels in Portugal had experienced remarkable 
changes that may directly affect the evolution of fertility, few studies were conduced in 
the country with the aim to observe the impact of education in fertility postponement and 
decline. Almeida et al. (2002) after quantifying fertility in its intensity and diversity, 
claimed that the decline of fertility in Portugal is mainly explained by the increasing 
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access and use of medical contraception after 1974; and by the new personal values about 
the sexuality, conjugality, childbearing and the role of the child in the modern family 
context. Nonetheless, the authors consider that the instruction level introduces a clear 
diversity among Portuguese women (mothers). 
Cunha (2005) denotes education it is a decisive role as one of the principal 
component in explanatory studies related with procreative behaviours and representations 
in the field of fertility. Moreover, Oliveira (2009) identified a nonlinear relation between 
education and fertility in the specific case of Portugal, and a reduction in the fertility of 
lower educated groups along with the inverse tendency in the most educated people. 
Conventional demographic wisdom holds that fertility levels among women have 
a negative relationship to educational attainment (Basten et al., 2013). On average 
Europeans spend 18 years of their life at the educational system. In the perspective of the 
most recent data on the countries under analysis the OECD identifies Austria as the 
country with the lower average time at educational system, with 16.92 years while 
Portugal has the highest average time with nearly 18 years (the only country above the 
OECD average of 17.7 years), slightly higher than for Spain (17.6) and for Hungary 
(17.5). 
The 2014 OECD Life Index describes Austria as one of the countries where 
student’s academics accomplishments are most affected by their family’s socioeconomic 
background. For Hungary, the same report suggests the school system does not provide 
equal access to high-quality education. The evolution of Portuguese education is 
characterized by a still high share of students leaving the education system too early 
(between ages 14-16) and, consequently, with low skills (Wood et al., 2014). Spain, on 
the other hand, was identified as the country with school system relatively equal access to 
high-quality education.  
An empirical example is given by figure 4.1, where the transition to first births in 
Portugal by mother’s age and year of childbirth is plotted. Already mentioned in chapter 
3, main differences in terms of educational perspective in Portugal occurred within two 
groups. The increase of mandatory school age to 18 years (in 201211), creates in the 
present a homogenous pattern that differentiate education in (1) until upper secondary, 
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and (2) universitary completed. Figure 4.1 allows to evaluate the fertility postponement 
evolution, considering the mother age and year of their first child controlled by the 
education. With the Lexis diagram is fairly easy to observe the postponement to the 
mothers with tertiary educational level.  
 
Figure 4.1: Transition to first birth in Portugal by educational level, and by the mother age and 
the year of childbirth (measured in 2013)  
 
Source: 2013 Portuguese Fertility Survey (for further information on the Data-base, see Chapter 3). Own elaboration.  
 
 The period fertility postponement observed across Europe and identified by 
previous studies as a causal response to the improvements in the women participation at 
the educational system, resulted in shift of fertility to later ages, independently of 
educational gradient. Thus it’s possible to verify a higher birth incidence after age 25 that 
is mainly associated to women with an academic complete degree, but also characterized 
by low numbers of births until age 20. Also, the vast majority become a mother after 
leaving education thus at later ages (Billari and Philipov, 2004).   
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4.4. Data and Methods 
4.4.1. Data description and sample selection 
 
Our analysis is based on the IPUMS individual Census samples in the years of 1991 and 
2001 for Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain from where we reconstruct the data for the 
1950 and 1960 cohorts. For Portugal, Hungary and Spain the sample represents five-
percent from the census data and ten-percent to Austria. Each one of the mentioned 
samples, covers standard socio-demographic characteristics such as individuals age, 
nationality, educational attainment, region of residence, household composition, etc. Each 
resident in the sample has a unique personal code that allows identifying its complete 
household composition. That allowed reconstructing the information to the individual’s 
mothers including the childbearing history controlled by educational levels. 
Before we discuss the selection of the data set, it is important to draw our 
attention to a particular shortcoming in the IPUMS samples. The fact that IPUMS does 
not provide the fertility history of the respondents is a major drawback from the samples 
in regards to the analysis of demographic events. For our analysis of education and 
fertility, we have linked children individual data to reconstruct the mother individual 
childbearing and educational histories.  
However, for old mother’s cohorts, it is possible to identify two scenarios. On the 
first scenario, we have the children who are still at the parental home; and on the second 
scenario, we can identify the children old enough to take care of their parents and in this 
case is possible that the household head is the descendant and not the parents. For this 
reason, we restrict our analysis to the birth cohorts born later than 1950; furthermore we 
restrict to birth cohorts between 1950-1960, combining from the samples, mothers aged 
41 at the census time in 1991 and in 2001. All this constrains provide us homogenous 
samples and allow elaborate a small reconstruction of cohort fertility (table 4.1).  
Already identified in previous research, by reconstructing the longitudinal 
information on education, we can avoid the problems that commonly arise when 
researchers seek to explain fertility behaviour at a certain age by the educational level 
reported, and possibly attained at a later stage (Andersson et al., 2009: 317). Thus, we 
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analyse how the transition to motherhood and the total fertility rate are associated with 
women’s level of education in the 1950 and 1960 cohorts, who had their children 
between 1965 and 2001. 
Similarly to Andersson et al. (pp 315) the chosen 1950 and 1960 cohorts 
represented women entered their reproductive life at different calendar years and with 
different social and cultural surroundings, including different political contexts 
concerning family policy, educational schemes, and gender equality (2009). Moreover 
the changes observed through the benchmark cohort in chapter 2 allowed distinguish the 
1960 cohort as the more consensual one. This was the first cohort when the average age 
at fertility began to increase and kept growing for five consecutive years. For that motive 
we chose the 1960 cohort to evaluate the changes in the educational impact to the fertility 
postponement in comparison to the 1950 cohort.  
 
Table 4. 1: Sample size for the cohorts in analysis, representing the women aged 41 in 1991 and 
2011 by selected countries  
 Cohort 1950 Cohort 1960 
Austria 4761 5872 
Hungary  3721 3204 
Portugal  3001 3415 
Spain 11091 14116 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
4.4.2. Methods  
 
Our analysis is essentially descriptive with the use of fertility tables and an in-depth 
analysis of fertility transition rates (probabilities) to the first child by mother’s 
educational level. Andersson et al. (2009: 315) identified that previous research reveals 
that reported associations between education and childbearing depend very much on how 
and when educational characteristics and fertility are measured. Nevertheless, our 
approached, similarly to the one from the cited authors, results from the cumulated 
number of births from a given cohort. 
The main focus is the educational categories:  
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(1) No educational level; 
(2) Primary; 
(3) Upper secondary; 
(4) University completed. 
 
To each category, fertility tables were elaborated and calculated indicators as the 
total fertility rate, the mean age at childbearing and the mean age at first child. 
Furthermore, and by reconstructing the mother information through children information, 
few are the covariates available to describe mothers under analysis. Besides educational 
level and cohort of births, our analysis will focus at the marital and employment status. In 
section 4.5.3 we correlate the educational level to the average number of births by marital 
and employment status in the 1950 and 1960 cohorts.  
The main focus across this chapter is the fertility throughout the reproductive 
lives of mothers, thus, the use of fertility tables allowed to reconstruct transitions between 
age 15 and 41 giving at the end the total fertility rate of a given cohort. Yet, we made use 
of one of the most popular indicators and used in graphical form in demographic analysis, 
the so-called survival curve (from the life tables) to plot the transition rates (or survival 
probabilities) at each age. Although this study aims fundamentally to investigate the 
changes in the fertility timing, we also intent to analyse the quantum as an effect derived 
from the tempo. 
Previously in chapter 2 (section 2.3.3) we address to the use of fertility tables. 
Yet, in this chapter instead of using the methods proposed by the Human Fertility 
Database, the fertility tables presented are slightly different, we adapted to the cohort, the 
period fertility table analysis proposed by Sobotka (2004, Chapter 3 – section 3.3.2). The 
main difference between this approach and the previous one is the inclusion in the 
analysis of a proportion of childless women by age (the proportion of those who survived 
to the event of having a first child).  
The table is constructed for ages 15-41, where the first two columns are the data 
input for the calculation of first birth probabilities. Thus, !!(!) is the first birth across 
ages in the 1960 cohort, and !!(!) is the 1960 cohort women population in risk of having 
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the first birth throughout their lifetime. These first indicators are obtained by IPUMS 
cohort reconstruction.  
Next, we have the first birth probabilities defined as !!(!), and calculated by 
applying !! !, ! = !!(!, !)/!! !, !  , where t denotes time and x the age.  From column 
4 to 7 by age we presented (4) the table population childless denoted as !!(!), and 
obtained by !! ! = !! ! − 1 − !!(! − 1), represented as a survival curve at first age 
the set value is 100 000; (5) the table number of first births given by !! ! = !!(!)* !!(!); (6) the average number of childless women, given by !!(!); and finally (7) !!(!), the cumulative proportion of first births.  
All the mentioned indicators were calculated to the 1950 and 1960 cohorts for 
Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain with the aim to provide new insights about the age 
patterns in the transition to motherhood.  In the next section, results are presented where 
one of the main focuses is the proportion of childless women into the scope analysis of 
estimated transition rates or survival probabilities.  
 
Table 4. 2: Fertility table for the first birth for the 1960 cohort in Portugal  
 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 8 3415 0.002 100000 234 99883 0.002 
16 16 3407 0.005 99766 469 99531 0.007 
17 32 3391 0.009 99297 937 98829 0.016 
18 87 3359 0.026 98360 2548 97086 0.042 
19 125 3272 0.038 95813 3660 93982 0.078 
20 170 3147 0.054 92152 4978 89663 0.128 
21 254 2977 0.085 87174 7438 83455 0.203 
22 296 2723 0.109 79736 8668 75403 0.289 
23 285 2427 0.117 71069 8346 66896 0.373 
24 287 2142 0.134 62723 8404 58521 0.457 
25 237 1855 0.128 54319 6940 50849 0.526 
26 184 1618 0.114 47379 5388 44685 0.580 
27 176 1434 0.123 41991 5154 39414 0.632 
28 165 1258 0.131 36837 4832 34422 0.680 
29 139 1093 0.127 32006 4070 29971 0.721 
30 112 954 0.117 27936 3280 26296 0.753 
31 85 842 0.101 24656 2489 23411 0.778 
32 64 757 0.085 22167 1874 21230 0.797 
33 69 693 0.100 20293 2020 19283 0.817 
34 56 624 0.090 18272 1640 17452 0.834 
35 52 568 0.092 16633 1523 15871 0.849 
36 45 516 0.087 15110 1318 14451 0.862 
37 40 471 0.085 13792 1171 13206 0.874 
38 32 431 0.074 12621 937 12152 0.883 
39 34 399 0.085 11684 996 11186 0.893 
40 15 365 0.041 10688 439 10469 0.898 
41 6 350 0.017 10249 176 10249 0.899 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUM. 
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Besides the traditional indicators capturing the general shift towards later 
childbearing, such as mean and median ages. As in previous research we made use of the 
interquartile range IQR= Q3-Q1, where Q1 and Q3, reflect the age when 25% and 75% 
of women already transited to motherhood. The median was obtained considering the !!(!) (population childless).  
Such differences represent the population heterogeneity in first birth timing 
during a given period also as Sobotka discussed (2004: 43), these indicators are 
particularly useful means for adding another dimension to the usual analysis of central 
tendency. To measure the heterogeneity within the two cohorts under analysis, we used 
the IQR method, which considers the timing of a given transition only among people who 
would eventually experience this transition, given the fertility schedule of a given cohort. 
 
4.5. Results 
 
Low fertility has become a structural characteristic of the demographic regime in Austria, 
Hungary, Portugal and Spain. Thus, in the next sections empirical discussion on the 
relationship between education and fertility postponement will be presented and analysis 
with the aim to identify similar patterns to the ones already discussed about the period 
fertility. Latter, and to better understand the educational influence in the transition to 
motherhood, a brief discussion on fertility by marital and employment status controlled 
by the educational gradient will be presented.   
 
4.5.1. Fertility transition in the 1950 and 1960 cohorts   
 
The low cohort fertility trends discussed in Chapter 2 are the result from the socio-
demographic transformations. The changes in the cultural and social norms that defined 
the suitable time for childbearing, as a response to the shift ages of other life events, such 
as marriage, increasing women’s education and labour force participation, allowing for a 
more accurate control over women life course (Castro-Martin, 1992). Indeed, if we 
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consider the Portuguese case, between the two cohorts under analysis, several changes 
occurred, not only in the educational system, as mentioned in section 4.3, but also at the 
social level. When the Portuguese revolution occurred in 1974, at that time the women 
from 1950 cohort were 24 years (already in the fertility window) while women from 1960 
cohort were only 14 yeas old, thus more liable to assimilate the cultural and social 
changes.   
 Before (chapter 2), the 1960 cohort was pointed out as a benchmark cohort to 
discuss fertility decline and postponement. Thus, in this section we focus our attention in 
the 1960 cohort comparing its fertility trends with the ones observed in the 1950 cohort. 
Figure 4.2 considering for that the survivorship curve (l0(x)) which can also be defined 
for the propose of our analysis as a cumulative probability to become a mother. 
In the 1950 cohort, Austria and Hungary are the countries with the faster 
transition to motherhood until age 25, thus with lower median age at birth. However, 
after age 25 for Austria the estimated probability transition had patterns of postponement. 
And also by 1960 cohort Austria had the highest postponement trend as well as Spain, 
still at later ages Austria had the highest signs of fertility delay.  
 
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Transition rates to motherhood by selected countries to 1950 (a) and 1960 
(b) cohorts 
 
(a) Transition rates to motherhood to the 1950 
cohort 
(b) Transition rates to motherhood to the 1960 
cohort 
  
Notes: For detailed information see Appendix C, Tables C.1 to C.7.   
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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Nonetheless Austria is not a particular case, in the sense that all countries under 
analysis had their own peculiarities in the motherhood transition. Spanish and Portuguese 
mothers, e.g., from the 1950 cohort had the highest transition rates after age 25. In fact 
from the four countries Spain had the lowest transition rates at later ages, as a result from 
the highest total fertility rate (see table 4.3). 
Nevertheless, ten cohorts later fertility patterns across countries are somehow 
different namely with lower transition rates especially to Spain and Austria and stated 
above. Portugal and Hungary mix the fertility transition trends; still between the two 
cohorts the total fertility rate decline by 0.3 children per women while Hungary is from 
the four countries the only with no differences between fertility levels. Postponement was 
thus in progress, not only for the Portuguese mothers but transversely top entire Europe.   
Frequently, to measure fertility timing, the mean age at childbearing (MAC) and 
mean age at first child are the most used measures. Table 4.3 summarises indicators 
capturing the fertility tempo and quantum. From 1950 to 1960 cohort, the average 
number of childbearing decreased to Portuguese, Spanish and Austrian mothers, while for 
Hungary no changes were observed. Between the two cohorts, only the Spanish women 
increased the mean age by 0.3 years, while for Austria and Hungary the mean age 
decreased by 0.1 years and 0.3 in Portugal. Yet, and like was observed in Chapter 2, a 
steady evolution of the total mean age at childbirth does not reflects directly the age at 
first birth. For our sample case, we observe an increase of less than one year across all 
countries with the exception to Spain that increase the mean age at first child by two 
years (25.3 to 27.3).  
The highest changes in the median age are registered in Austria with a difference 
of almost five years between 1950 and 1960 cohorts. Still, the median ages of 25.2 and 
27.7 are low when compared to the Spanish values of 25.2 and 28.4. While the median 
age increased by five years in Austria and three to Spain, in Hungary the increase was 
lower than half a year and for Portugal we observe a decline at the median age. 
Regarding the interquartile range, Portugal presented the highest differences with an 
increase of 2.3 years, even that with the lowest IQR in both cohorts (6.0 vs. 8.3).  
Thereafter Austria registers a difference of 1.6 years and is for this country that 
the IQR ranges are higher (10.4 and 12.1 for the 1950 and 1960 cohorts). Followed 
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closely by Spain with high IQR, still is the only country with a negative change (-0.6) 
from the 1950 to the 1960 cohort. On the other hand, Hungary presents similar values to 
Portugal with an increase of 1.1 years in the interquartile range. As an indicator of 
population heterogeneity the interquartile range indicates that the highest fertility 
heterogeneity was observed in Austria and Spain, as already observed in figure 4.2. Yet 
within the four countries only Spain saw the heterogeneity decreasing from the 1950 to 
the 1960 cohort.   
 
Table 4.3: Cohort measures of fertility patterns and the estimated changes for the selected 
countries in 1950 and 1960 cohorts (to women aged 41 in the 1991 and 2001 census) 
 1950 Cohort 
(1) 
1960 Cohort 
(2) 
Changes 1950-1960 
(3=2-1) 
Austria    
   CTFR 1.8 1.7 -0.1 
   CMAC 26.2 26.1 -0.1 
   CMAC 1º  24.3 26.1 1.8 
   Median Age 25.2 27.7 2.5 
   IQR 10.4 12.1 1.6 
Hungary    
   CTFR 1.6 1.6 0.0 
   CMAC 26.2 26.1 -0.1 
   CMAC 1º  24.5 25.2 0.7 
   Median Age 25.2 25.4 0.2 
   IQR 7.0 8.2 1.1 
Portugal    
   CTFR 1.8 1.7 -0.2 
   CMAC 27.1 26.8 -0.3 
   CMAC 1º  25.2 25.4 0.2 
   Median Age 25.7 25.5 -0.2 
   IQR 6 8.3 2.3 
Spain    
   CTFR 2.0 1.7 -0.3 
   CMAC 27.6 27.9 0.3 
   CMAC 1º  25.3 27.3 2.0 
   Median Age 25.2 28.4 3.2 
   IQR 10.4 9.9 -0-6 
Notes: CTFR – Cohort total fertility rate; CMAC – Cohort mean age at childbearing; CMAC 1º – Cohort mean age at 
the first childbearing; IQR – Interquartile range (Q3-Q1). 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
This preliminary analysis in the transition to motherhood by country and cohorts 
allowed identifying a postponement trend across the four countries with higher intensity 
in Spain, but followed closely by Austria. From 1950 to 1960 the main difference 
distinguished at the moment is exactly the postponement, while the fertility quantum did 
not change substantially. The following subsection provides empirical results by 
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educational gradient with the aim to describe the educational contribution to the total 
fertility rate as well as for the fertility postponement.  
 
4.5.2. Four countries and two cohorts: the relationship between increasing 
education and decreasing fertility   
 
The previous section allowed understanding, in a very broad perspective, how in the 1950 
and 1960 cohorts, the transition to motherhood across countries took place.  In this 
section we address our analysis to the transition patterns to motherhood in the 1950 and 
1060 cohorts and identify the difference within cohorts and countries. Yet, and before we 
can compare the differences between transition moments into motherhood, in figure 4.3 
we can observe the differences between educational gradient within cohorts and 
countries, regarding the proportion of females exposed to the event. Such differences are 
the result of social and economic transformations distinctive for each cohort and country.   
In comparison to the other countries, if we focus our attention in the Portuguese 
case, it is possible to identify a massif representation of females unschooled, with special 
consideration to the 1950 cohort, where this group represent around 70 percent of the 
sample. However and like it was mentioned in section 4.3, Portugal had a massive 
educational evolution reflected already in the 1960 cohort as we can observe, with a 
decrease to values lower than 40 percent. Besides Portugal, Spain had the highest 
percentage of women with lower educational levels, still with values lower than 20 
percent in the 1950 cohort and five percent by 1960. In opposite position we have Austria 
and Hungary with a high number of women with upper secondary education. The main 
cross-country characteristic is the educational improvement with the small increase at 
high educational levels and the significant decreasing patterns at the lower ones.  
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Figure 4.3: Sample distribution of women exposed to transition to motherhood by educational 
level, in the selected countries in 1950 and 1960 cohorts 
 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Spain  
 1950 1960 1950 1960 1950 1960 1950 1960  
 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
The fertility patterns observed across countries are influenced by the size sample 
of each educational level described above. The educational distribution of the country 
samples by cohort indicates expected meaningful differences in terms of TFR values and 
the way women for a certain level of education carried over to motherhood, particularly 
in the countries with higher unschooled mothers (Portugal and Spain). Before we 
evaluate and discuss on the effects of education on the timing of entry into motherhood, 
we discuss with figure 4.4 the differentials on fertility quantum by country and cohorts. 
Within the two cohorts, mothers with no education compared to other levels of 
education had significant higher fertility levels. Our first remark corresponds to the 
analysis within countries and cohorts, where mothers with no educational levels had the 
highest fertility rates, followed by those with primary level. Our second remark refers to 
the highest and lowest values observed that occurs in the 1950 cohort in Hungary, with 
1.48 to the upper secondary level and 2.39 at mothers with less than primary education. 
Our third highlight is related to the Austrian fertility, with the lowest global level and 
with fewer differences with the country fertility from one cohort to another, and to 
Spanish patterns with the higher values among all educational levels in the 1950 cohort 
(as stated by Sobotka in 2015). 
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In the 1960 cohort, Portugal had among all educational levels the lowest fertility 
rates, yet the values are in equilibrium with the still high proportion of mothers with no 
educational levels and an average birth number of 1.75 children per woman. Finally, 
figure 4.4 also allows distinguishing a pragmatic characteristic. With the exception of 
Austrian and Spanish mothers born in the 1950 cohort, within both cohorts for 
Hungarian, Portuguese and Spanish mothers from the 1960, the average number of 
children is higher to mothers with a university degree when compared with those with 
upper secondary education.  
 
Figure 4.4: Cohort total fertility rate (CTFR) by educational level in the 1950 and 1960 cohort, 
for the selected countries  
 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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and quantum. Furthermore, figure 4.5 presents the estimated probabilities of transition to 
motherhood, decomposed by educational level, where stand out from the outset that those 
who later on their life course become a mother has higher educational levels (namely an 
university degree), while are women with low levels of education (or without any level) 
that sooner became a mother. Thus, in Austria there is a visible significant later transition 
to those with higher education. In both cohorts the transition patterns are quite similar, 
women with upper secondary education and primary had the same trends, but those with 
the lowest educational level had the higher risk of become a mother until age 30.     
 
Figure 4.5: Cumulative transition rates to first birth by age and educational level, for Austria, 
Hungary, Portugal and Spain in the 1950 and 1960 cohorts  
 
Transition Rates to the 1950 cohort – Austria  Transition Rates to the 1960 cohort – Austria  
  
Transition Rates to the 1950 cohort – Hungary Transition Rates to the 1960 cohort – Hungary 
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Figure 4.5: (continued) Cumulative transition rates to first birth by age and educational level, for 
Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain in the 1950 and 1960 cohorts 
 
Transition rates to the 1950 cohort - Portugal Transition rates to the 1960 cohort - Portugal 
  
Transition rates to the 1950 cohort - Spain Transition rates to the 1960 cohort - Spain 
  
Notes: Estimated probabilities detailed in Appendix C, tables C.8 and C.9.  
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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the 1960 cohort the change in the educational evolution created a change in the fertility 
patterns, and no differences could be found between mothers with no education or 
primary one. In Spain women born in 1950 presented two main pattern shapes in the 
transition to motherhood, one with higher probabilities to those with no education or 
primary and a second for those with higher educational levels, where the postponement 
can be observed. Still, for each one of the educational levels, the higher risk of becoming 
a mother occurs until age 30.  Nevertheless, when we focus our attention at the younger 
cohort, the postponement is remarkably higher for those with a university degree. Spain 
had been already identified the country with the greatest increase in the mean age at 
childbearing and even higher at the first children (see table 4.3), followed closely by a 
decline at the average number of children.  
Prskawetz and her colleagues (2008) identified to the period fertility that as result 
from the changes in the educational relationship between education and family formation 
and fertility, the mean age at childbearing increased to later ages into the thirties. Also the 
transition from lower to higher levels of education is associated to the fertility 
postponement leading to lower levels of period fertility (Basten et al., 2013). Table 4.4 
summarises the mean age at first birth by educational level, country and cohorts, as well 
as the estimated differences between cohorts. Only Hungary and Portugal presented a 
decline at the mean age at some educational levels. 
From 1950 to 1960 Hungary presented a decline in the higher educational levels, 
with a small decrease to mother with upper secondary education and a decline of about 
1.2 years to mother with at least a university level completed. In Portugal, the decline 
occurs at the lower educational levels (as described with figure 4.5). Mothers with no 
educational level decreased their mean age by 0.3 years, and a decline of 1.2 years to 
those with primary educational level. From the older to the younger cohort, for Austria 
and Spain across all educational levels the mean age increased, remarkably at the 
university completed with an increase of 2.2 years in Austria and around 4 years to the 
Spanish women.  
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Table 4.4: Mean age at childbearing by educational level and the estimated changes for the 
selected countries in 1950 and 1960 cohorts (to women age 41 in the 1991 and 2001 census) 
 
1950 Cohort 
(1) 
1960 Cohort 
(2) 
Change 1950-1960 
(3=2-1) 
Austria       Less than primary - - - 
   Primary 23.5 25.1 1.6 
   Upper Secondary 24.7 26.1 1.4 
   University Completed 28.6 30.9 2.3 
Hungary       Less than primary 23.6 24.8 1.2 
   Primary 23.7 23.9 0.2 
   Upper Secondary 25.0 24.6 -0.4 
   University Completed 27.9 26.7 -1.2 
Portugal       Less than primary 24.8 24.5 -0.3 
   Primary 26.0 24.8 -1.2 
   Upper Secondary 26.1 27.0 0.9 
   University Completed 27.3 29.3 2.0 
Spain       Less than primary 24.2 25.4 1.2 
   Primary 25.2 26.3 1.1 
   Upper Secondary 26.5 28.7 2.2 
   University Completed 27.6 31.4 3.8 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
The discussed changes across the two selected cohorts provide us more detailed 
information that the one discussed on the cohort fertility evolution at Chapter 2. 
Furthermore the observed changes are the result not only from the social transformations, 
but also at the micro levels (see Chapter 3). The systematic period and cohort fertility 
postponement is closely related to the quantum decline. Once more, lets use Portugal as 
an example. The social changes directly affect these two generations, yet at different 
moments of their lives. 
When the democratic paradigm changed at the dictatorship end, women born in 
1950 were 24 years old and those born at 1960 only 14 years. Even that in terms of age 
the difference was not significant, at that time for the country itself and for the population 
all the changes were massive. For those born in 1960 by the time that they had their first 
child, and if we consider the mean age as a benchmark point, by 1985 a high portion for 
first birth had born already and the socioeconomic changes were at the top. It was 
identified changes in the increasing importance of a woman career, in their economic 
independence, as well as their massive presence at the university.  Not exclusively from 
Portugal, such differences arise from social transformations across time that could help to 
 114 
understand the intrinsic relationship between cohort fertility and period as some authors 
already identified in previous research (e.g., Goldstein and Cassidy, 2014).     
 
4.5.3. Cohort fertility controlled by educational level, marital status, labour 
market participation and country  
 
Most studies found not only inverse relationship between educational attainment and the 
timing of first birth (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012: 312), but also find a strong 
relationship between education, labour market participation and the occurrence of first 
birth (e.g., Rindfuss et al. 1980). The growth in the educational attainment is advocated 
having resulted in later fertility tempo via opportunity costs for a set of motivations. Also 
Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan (2012) identified that higher-educated women experience 
greater opportunity costs from leaving the labour force around the time of childbearing. 
With the increase of educational levels and the mean age at childbearing we 
considered important to characterize our sample through other socio-demographic 
characteristics such as the marital and employment status. Table 4.5 summarizes the 
proportions of mothers by marital and employment status in the 1950 and 1960 cohorts. 
In the two cohorts across all countries, between 84 and 94 percent of mothers in our 
sample are married or live in union, yet at the same the proportion of mother divorced 
increased from the older to the younger cohort. Thus with the exception of Hungary the 
proportion of married mother declined between 6.5 percent in Austria and 3.3 percent in 
Portugal.  At the same time in Portugal and Spain the proportion of single mothers 
increased by more that 1 percent. The social transformations reflected directly at the ages 
that the life course events occur.  
From Austria to Portugal for the 1950 cohort, a high proportion of mothers were 
already at the labour market, with values higher than 50 percent. While for Spain in the 
same cohort the proportion of employed mothers was only 27 percent. Yet with the 
exception to Hungary, the observed countries increased even more the proportion of 
employed mothers. 
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The extremely high proportion of those who are homemakers can explain the low 
proportion of employed Spanish mothers. The low 27 percent employed mothers are 
compensated by the 65 percent of homemaker’s. Yet at the younger cohort, the 
proportion of employed mother increased to 45 percent still lower than for the other three 
countries. Across other characteristics the neighbour countries Portugal and Spain 
dissimilarities are not so visible, yet already Bettio and Villa (1998) argue that with the 
exception to Portugal, the Southern family model inhibits female labour force 
participation. Such model is point out as the “root cause” to the low female employment 
rates in Spain, Greece and Italy.   
 
Table 4.5:  Proportion of mothers by marital and employment status the selected countries in 
1950 and 1960 cohorts (to women aged 41 in the 1991 and 2001 census) 
 Austria Hungary Portugal  Spain 
 1950 
Cohort  
1960 
Cohort  
1950 
Cohort  
1960 
Cohort  
1950 
Cohort  
1960 
Cohort  
1950 
Cohort  
1960 
Cohort  
Marital Status         
  Single/never mar. 1,4 1,6 0,8 1,2 0,6 2,0 0,9 2,0 
  Married/in union 86,0 79,5 84,5 93,3 92,6 89,1 94,2 88,2 
  Separated/divorced 9,9 15,2 10,1 4,1 4,4 6,8 3,0 7,7 
  Widowed 2,7 3,7 4,5 1,4 2,4 2,0 1,9 2,0 
Employment Status         
  Employed 57,0 73,2 86,4 69,3 55,1 68,1 27,0 45,3 
  Unemployed 2,6 3,1 0,8 6,1 2,9 4,3 5,1 7,7 
  Homemakers 38,1 22,1 - - 33,2 21,6 64,6 38,2 
  Others 2,3 1,6 12,8 24,6 8,8 5,9 3,3 8,8 
Notes: 1) For the 1950 Cohort, it was considered women age 41 year old at the 1991 census, as for the 1960 cohort 
women age 41 years old at the 2001 census. 2)The Hungarian data had no information to the employment category 
Homemakers. 3) At the covariate employment status the category Others include students, pension or capital income 
recipients and unemployed that never worked before.  
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
 We have demonstrated that, in each country, mean and median age increased 
across the studied cohorts and also the fertility quantum is not equal across educational 
levels. With the highest fertility for Spain, is then expected that by marital or employment 
status the highest fertility quantum for Spanish mothers. Table 4.6 which illustrate the 
average number of children by marital and employment status controlled by the 
educational level, adding slightly more complexity to the analysis on the education 
influence at the fertility cohort. Across different marital status controlled by the 
educational levels, Spain has the highest average number of children per women, with the 
exception to Hungarian single mothers from the 1960 cohort with primary educational, 
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and to married mothers with no educational level from the 1950 cohort. When controlled 
by the educational and marital status the lowest observed fertility levels were registered 
at the 1950 Portuguese single mothers with upper secondary education, as well as for 
Spanish and Hungarian single mothers with university completed.    
 
Table 4.6: Average childbearing by marital status and educational level for the selected countries 
in 1950 and 1960 cohorts (to women aged 41 in the 1991 and 2001 census) 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Spain 
 1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
Less than Primary         
Single/never married - - 1.5 1.25 1.6 1.6 2.7 2.0 
Married/in union - - 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.0 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed - - 2.3 2.4 1.9 1.8 2.4 1.8 
Primary         
Single/never married 1.6 1.5 1.8 2.2 1.3 1.9 1.6 1.5 
Married/in union 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.7 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 
Upper Secondary          
Single/never married 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.25 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 
Married/in union 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.6 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.5 
University completed         
Single/never married 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.1  1.4 1.0 1.0 
Married/in union 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7 2.1 
Notes: 1) For the 1950 Cohort, it was considered women age 41 year old at the 1991 census, as for the 1960 cohort 
women age 41 years old at the 2001 census.  2) For Austria there is no data for the educational level less than primary 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
Also well defined are the differences on the average number of children 
controlled by the employment status and educational level.  Side by side to Austria, 
Portugal had the lowest fertility rate by educational level, and when to educational 
characteristics we added the employment status, Portugal presents the lowest values, 
especially to mother from 1960 cohorts. On the opposite position we identify Spain with 
the highest values across all educational levels and employment status particularly at 
1950 cohort. The small proportion of women with a university level completed from the 
1950 cohort could explained the high average number of children observed in Austria, 
Portugal and Spain to the homemakers mothers.  
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Table 4.7:  Average childbearing by employment status and educational level for the selected 
countries in 1950 and 1960 cohorts (to women aged 41 in the 1991 and 2001 census) 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Spain 
 1950  
Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
1950  
Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
1950 
 Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
1950  
Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
Less than Primary         
Employed - - 2.5 1.7 1.8 1.6 2.1 1.9 
Unemployed - - - 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.3 1.8 
Homemakers - - - - 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.1 
Others - - 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.5 2.0 
Primary         
Employed 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 
Unemployed 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.2 1. 6 1.8 1.6 
Homemakers 2.0 2.0 - - 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.7 
Others 1.8 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.6 
Upper Secondary          
Employed 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.5 
Unemployed 1.6 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 
Homemakers 1.9 1.9 - - 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.6 
Others 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.6 
University Completed         
Employed 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.6 
Unemployed 1.8 1.3 - 1.3 - 1.3 1.6 1.7 
Homemakers 2.1 1.8 - - 2.2 1.5 2.0 1.7 
Others 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.9 1.0 1.4 2.1 1.6 
Notes: 1) For the 1950 Cohort, it was considered women age 41 year old at the 1991 census, as for the 1960 cohort 
women age 41 years old at the 2001 census.  2)For Austria there is no data for the educational level less than primary. 
3) The Hungarian data had no information to the employment category Homemakers. 4) At the covariate employment 
status the category Others include students, pension or capital income recipients and unemployed that never worked 
before.  
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
Generally, for Austria, Hungary and Portugal the lowest quantum was observed to 
unemployed mothers with university completed (1.3 children per women) born at the 
1960 cohort. While for Spain the estimated lowest value of 1.5 correspond to employed 
mothers with upper secondary education. Yet, for both cohorts the lowest value of 1.2 
children per women concerns to Portuguese mothers with primary education and 
unemployed. The high fertility rates observed especially in Spain correspond to mothers 
at the higher educational levels, while for Austria the high fertility was observed for 
homemaker’s mothers. For Spain no changes in differences at the 1960 cohort are 
observed between unemployed and homemaker mothers.   
The changes on the female social position and participation; the increasing 
importance of a women career; the economic independence via higher participation at the 
labour market and the individualized or post-materialist values, changed the fertility 
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trends within the two cohorts under analysis. Furthermore the observed differences 
provide us more detailed information on the motherhood transition.  
4.6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
4.6.1. Discussion 
 
This chapter has described and discussed the cohort transition to motherhood by 
educational level of mothers born on the 1950 and 1960 cohorts, across four European 
countries. Identified previously in Chapter 2 such cohorts were characterized by 
fundamental changes in the fertility tempo (postponement) and in the consequent 
decreasing fertility level (quantum). Similarly to the analysis of mortality, using 
probabilities or survival curves allow us to observe the actual behaviour of a given 
population in a given year. In this case the use of such descriptive approach allowed 
identify changes across countries and cohorts.  
 Basten et al. (2013) identified a strong association between family size, low 
fertility patterns and high childlessness among women with higher education. 
Additionally Sobotka (2015: 19) acknowledged that Austrian women born in the late 
1950s show a negative education-fertility gradient with respect to their completed 
fertility and a positive education gradient in childlessness. Our analysis in the transition 
to motherhood by country and cohorts, allowed, identify the postponement trend across 
the four countries. We identified higher propensity in the transition to motherhood for 
Spain and Austria.  
For the four countries under analysis, the fertility quantum declined from the 
older to the younger cohort. Spain, besides the higher mean median age the country, had, 
apart from Austria, the highest heterogeneous fertility trends across ages, and when 
fertility patterns tend to be more homogenous, Spain registered and increase from 1950 to 
the 1960 cohort.     
Within the two cohorts, the highest probabilities of becoming a mother were 
related to those with no education or just primary level. Lower educational levels are 
often linked to unstable family transitions and to single parenthood (Sobotka, 2015). 
Moreover a lower rate of childbearing among more highly educated women is in part 
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attributed to their longer stay in education (Hoem et al., 2006). Additionally changes on 
the social sphere and changes on the individual values, suggests that the association 
between enrolment and a slower transition to adulthood remains strong, net of family 
background and parents’ characteristics (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012: 322). 
Some authors defend that there is a strong relationship between the social 
contexts, the educational level and the number of children, as a result from least 
developed family and employment institutional support (Basten et al., 2013). Unstable 
economic conditions and low social family support may encourage young adults to 
postpone family formation and childbearing, until rational stability is achieved (Castro-
Martin, 1992). In our sample no significant differences were identified between 
unemployed mothers and employed ones, yet higher fertility levels were registered 
among homemakers mothers.  
In modern societies, transition to motherhood and the increase of women 
educational levels are evolving very alike. The new social paradigms spread around 
Europe in recent past give the possibility for women to decide their fertility level and 
timing. Still it was the contraceptive revolution, namely the pill use that gave the 
possibility to women to control their own fertility (Almeida and Lalanda, 2002; Cunha, 
2002; Rallu and Toulemon, 1994; Ní Bhrolchain, 1992). In response to that structural 
society changes and women control of their fertility quantum and tempo the definition of 
an appropriated time for childbearing has vanished (Castro-Martin, 1992).   
The educational transformations across time influenced directly simultaneous 
cohorts. The relationship between education and cohort fertility has in itself the direct 
influence from the period strong social transformations, e.g. the end of Portuguese and 
Spanish dictatorships in 1974 and 1976, respectively; the Hungarian Revolution in 1955 
and later the communism collapse by 1989; or the Austria geopolitical reference post-
second world war, are some of the social significant changes across the selected countries 
that directly or indirectly influenced the fertility transition and patterns.  
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4.6.2. Concluding remarks  
 
Traditionally, the demographic analysis is undertaken to the momentum perspective, yet 
in this chapter and due to the cohort postponement direct effect in the period fertility 
postponement and quantum, we considered the cohort analysis. This cohort relationship 
between education and transition to motherhood is also related to the importance of the 
individual’s mother education level, identified in the previous chapter as one of the 
fertility determinants in the Portuguese context.  
 On this work our main focus were the reason for the non-fertility replacement for 
the Portuguese mothers based on a cross-sectional comparison. Thus, this chapter 
contributed to our analysis by contextualize the motherhood transition controlled by the 
educational level and in comparison to other European fertility patterns. Therefore, if we 
focus our attention in the Portuguese transition to motherhood, in comparison to the other 
countries, it is possible to identify an extraordinary proportion of unschooled mothers, 
mainly for mothers born in 1950. From the older cohort to the most recent one of 1960, 
there was, in Portugal, a significant decrease in women without any education level, 
keeping still, higher values than all other countries.  
With the educational improvements, the Portuguese fertility quantum declined 
between cohorts. At the same time the mean age increased, as well as the interquartile 
range, resulting from more heterogeneous behaviours. Such heterogeneity can be 
interpreted as the result of social and economic changes and as well as new demographic 
paradigms that arrived to Portugal after the revolution and haven’t affect so directly the 
older cohort. Nonetheless it is expected that the heterogeneous postponement transition 
trends understood through of larger inter-quartile range, at the different educational 
levels, expected to be more homogenous at younger cohorts. We found that 
postponement recuperation will be higher at older ages, were mothers with higher 
educational levels are expected to have more children.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE INTERPLAY OF EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC 
INSTABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON FERTILITY DECLINE 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between fertility, economic conditions and women participation in the 
labour market is one of the most classic research discussions about family occurring into 
the light of demography and sociology. Since Malthus that much of the empirical 
literature on the determinants of fertility dynamics has been motivated by the idea that 
economic hardship and labour market uncertain will cause the couples fertility 
postponement (Goldstein et al., 2013: 86).  
Today more women than ever are participating and competing with men at the 
labour market; the majority of couples use contraception what facilitates then the 
postponement of their childbearing; the welfare systems are getting increasingly more 
and more dependent of the social security and health costs related to the rapidly 
increasing number of elderly.  
In many European countries the actual crisis coincide with pension system 
reforms which in fact increase the age of retirement, implying that fewer older workers 
are leaving the labour market and the younger have to compete for less jobs and accept 
inferior earnings (Sobotka et al. 2011).    
Rydel (2002: 3) defined Portugal and Spain as countries with strong traditional 
families, but also as countries with high levels of income inequality, poverty and class 
inequality, but low levels of generational inequality (…). In the southern European 
context, Portugal is not a conventional familiastic model country. The country traditional 
low employment rates aren’t typical in the Portuguese context and Tavora (2012) 
identified no negative relationship between motherhood and women’s high employment 
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rates. Still, as well as Spain, Portugal dramatically experienced the 2008 economical 
crisis shock.  
Therefore, this chapter examines, since 1960, and with special interest in the years 
after the new economic crises (2008 onwards), the relationship between the economical 
crises, the female labour force, unemployment and fertility tempo and quantum.  
The main goals of this chapter are the following:  
1. To review and discuss the relationship between economical changes and 
fertility; 
2. Evaluate the arguments on the relationship between labour market 
participation, un/employment and fertility postponement, making use of 
Portugal as an example; 
3. Describe and discuss the fertility and GDP trends from since 1960 with 
special attention to the expected impact from the 2008 economical crises; 
4. Give a comprehensive overview of the expected main driving factors 
behind specific fertility trends and the current situation in the labour 
market participation. 
 
As in the previous chapters our analysis is centred on fertility trends for Austria, 
Hungary, France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Thus, this chapter is divided into six 
sections. The introduction is followed by a theoretical discussion on the relationship 
between economical trends and fertility reactions to the economic shock (section 5.2). In 
section 5.3 a review on the relationship between labour market participation and 
employment is extensively discussed. Here, we make use of Portuguese as an atypical 
example in the context of the southern European countries. The following section (5.4) 
presents the data selection and methodological considerations, while section 5.5 presents 
the main results of our investigation. Subsequently, this section is divided in two other 
sections. Section 5.5.1 describes the fertility and economical evolution since 1960 with a 
special focus between 2008 and 2012. The following subsection (5.5.2) discusses 
empirically about the relationship between women employment uncertainty and 
instability and the impact on fertility trends. The subsequent section (5.6) concludes this 
chapter.  
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5.2. Previous empirical findings on the relationship between fertility decline 
and economic recession 
 
Becker in 1993 interpreted the fertility reduction as a rational behaviour of individuals by 
explaining that the impact of an increase in individual income on fertility is subject to a 
quality-quantity trade-off. The low level of fertility in Europe is leading to important 
changes in age structure and is slowing or even repressing population growth. In fact, it is 
also known that fertility strongly affects population growth and the age structure of the 
population in general (e.g., Tomé et al., 2014). The evolution of fertility in the nearest 
future has extensive consequences on the economic development, productivity growth 
and several aspects of the welfare systems (Prskawetz et al., 2008). Fertility responses to 
economic development are not always the same, and many factors shape the relation 
behind and above the economic (Lesthaeghe and Surykin, 1988).  
A qualitative change in the context of economic growth changes the environment 
of its influences on fertility rates. These changes occur because economic development 
and fertility are linked in a two-way relationship. In one hand, changes in population 
composition caused by the fertility variations, affect the level of investments in 
education, and in the long run the economic growth. On the other hand, the economic 
growth affects the fertility behaviour itself (Luci and Thévenon, 2010).  
The immediate impact of low fertility is the reduction of the number of children in 
the total population and the increase in the share of population concentrated at working 
ages, raising the support ratio and raising, consequently, the per capita income (Tomé et 
al., 2014). This phenomenon is identified as the first demographic dividend. Afterwards, 
as the smaller cohorts of children reach the working ages, the share of working age 
population declines, the share of older adults increases and the total population ages. So, 
in a general way the support ratio falls, reducing the per capita income.  
Shifts on the population age distribution have significant macroeconomic 
consequences that feature prominently in the debate of the economic attitude in Europe. 
In the conventional literature, low fertility leads to higher capital consumption, because 
lower labour force growth leads to capital deepening. However, a lower population 
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growth may reduce welfare because the workers have to support a larger number of 
elderly (Lee and Mason, 2010).  
Nevertheless, the research on economic recessions shows that the economic crisis 
can affect the dynamics of migrations, mortality and fertility, and provides the support to 
the idea that fertility reacts negatively to the downturns of the economic cycle, existing a 
“pro-cyclical relation” between fertility and economic growth. The negative relationship 
between fertility and economic crises has also been observed in historical studies related 
to the 19th and beginning of the 20th century (e.g., Lee 1990; Bengtsson et al., 2004).  
The idea that fertility reacts positively to economic prosperity and falls in times of 
crisis has been followed for centuries. Adam Smith linked the economic development 
growth with the multiplication of the species (…). Furthermore Becker (1960: 231) 
compares children to durable goods demands for which would increase with a rise in 
family income with a decline in their price. Easternin (1976) emphasizes the role of 
income relative to economic aspirations of the couple/family. In this perspective the 
fertility varies with the relative affluence of the younger cohort, which is gauged against 
their childhood experiences from their parents’ household. In contrast Butz and Ward 
(1979a and 1979b) suggested that with rising employment of women, fertility trends are 
likely to become counter-cyclical. For women, children would be most expensive to rise 
during times of economic prosperity, and such periods would therefore be associated 
with low fertility rates (Sobotka et al., 2011: 271).    
The actual economic crisis is in many ways different from previous ones. This 
economic recession raises interest on the effect of such variations in the economic 
context in demographic behaviour. As result of the recession, the economic growth 
slowed down and the unemployment levels have risen steeply. So, in a period of adverse 
economic conditions, it is plausible that the families put the decision to have a(nother) 
child in hold (Neels, 2010). 
The institutional and cultural context in the developed countries is significantly 
different than at the time of precedent crises. More women than ever are participating and 
competing with men at the labour market; the majority of couples use contraception and 
that facilitates childbearing postponement; the welfare systems are getting increasingly 
more and more dependent of social security and health costs are now allied to the rapidly 
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increasing number of elderly. In many European countries, the actual crisis coincides 
with pension system reforms, which in fact increases the age of retirement, implying that 
fewer older workers are leaving the labour market and younger have to compete for fewer 
jobs and accept mediocre earnings. Every one of these factors affects the reproductive 
decisions, potentially enhancing the negative effects of the recession on fertility.  
Although most studies find that fertility tend to be pro-cyclical and react on the 
ups and downs of economic movements, the evidences are not unanimous. The fertility 
trends often show correlation with the gross domestic product (GDP) growth. The 
relationship for low-fertility countries after 1980 reveals that periods of economic 
recession or stagnation were frequently followed, within one or two years, by a turn down 
in period fertility rates. Nevertheless, the measures of unemployment and consumer 
reaction appear to be suitable indicators that reflect directly the impact of the crisis on 
individuals and that were repeatedly found related to fertility fluctuations (Sobotka et al., 
2009). New patterns of fertility are marked by the end of postponement of childbearing, 
by new economic and social dimension, and by modern norms and attitudes towards the 
family, female education, and gender roles.  GDP is often the indicator employed to analyse the economic decline, and is 
frequently associated with a subsequent fall in fertility rate.  In a study about 26 countries 
with low-fertility levels, Sobotka et al. (2011) identified that, on average, period TFR 
decline is more often registered than the increasing. However, this association dispersed 
in a multivariate model, when other indicators, capture better the pathway trough which 
economic recession affects fertility. Different from the changes in the GDP , the 
unemployment growth constitutes a more concrete indicator of the impact from economic 
crisis in the behaviour from women and men on their reproductive ages.  
Persistent and high unemployment among young adults has become one of the 
most significant explanations for the low and delayed partnership and family formation in 
Southern Europe (Billari and Kohler, 2002). The rising unemployment contributes to the 
delay in partnership and marriage, which indirectly influences the decline of fertility 
rates. Delayed partnership formation has most salient effect on birth trend in countries 
where the traditional tie between marriage and childbearing remains strong. If until recent 
years this pattern was typical of Southern Europe, where the marriage was commonly 
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seen as a precondition to childbearing (Castro-Martin, 1992) in recent years outside 
Europe, countries of East and South-Asia has experienced a remarkable postponement 
and decline in marriages, which explain the decline of fertility in the last decades 
(Kaneko at al., 2008). 
In a relatively recent study (Luci and Thévenon, 2010) about the economic 
development and fertility in the OECD countries, the authors followed an econometric 
strategy, with linear, exponential and quadratic models. The aim of the proposed models 
was to observe the relationship between total fertility rate (TFR) and the GDP per capita 
(GDPpc). In a generic way, this study makes easy to understand that the influence of 
economic development in fertility changed radically in the last few years. In highest 
developed countries, economic evolutions and setbacks go hand in hand with rebound in 
fertility. The current recession is likely to have some depressive effect on the 
childbearing and period fertility rate that are already deemed too low to values even 
lower in the near future. In many countries where the TFR increased after 2000, the 2008 
recession may lead to stronger declines in terms of fertility quantum. Nevertheless, the 
recession effects will not be universal, once that the institutional factors and policies will 
interfere in the relationship between economic depression and fertility behaviour.    
The life event of unemployment and its timing (not only the moment, but also the 
duration) are determinants in the fertility quantum. If unemployment is high and 
persistent, young women (with less labour market experience on average) may fear that 
time spent in childbearing (including any maternity leave they might be eligible to take) 
may harm their likelihood of re-employment or increase their risk of future 
unemployment, and, as a result, hurt their lifetime wage-growth and benefits (Adsera, 
2011: 518). Thus women choose many times to postpone maternity in order to secure 
their current employment situation.  
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5.3. The relationship between fertility and female participation at the 
labour market: Portugal as an example  
 
When opportunities in education become more equal, inequalities in the job market lose 
their legitimacy, so that the expansion of female education has a politicizing effect in the 
employment system and career hierarchies (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002: 59). For 
the better educated women are, the greater chance they have to find an intrinsically 
satisfying activity from which the can earn their own living; whereas uneducated women 
trapped at the lower end of the labour market hierarchy often see family formation as the 
only possible escape from monotonous and wretchedly paid work. 
Not only the current economic crises but other factor as the extraordinary increase 
of gender equity in individual-oriented institutions increased the women’s roles as wives 
and mothers due to continuing low levels of equity in the family sphere (Prskawetz et al., 
2009). In a recent work, Gaspar (2013) acknowledged that women’s participation in the 
labour market and the amount of time they dedicate to their work are closely linked to the 
number and ages of their children. The author identified that the employment rate is 
higher among women ages 29-49 without children under age 6, while for males in the 
same age group and with children under age 6 the employment rate is higher. 
Even that the economic context, labour market participation and educational 
levels, play major role in the evolution of fertility, the family context is also important. 
The central role of family in the organization of labour market and welfare is considered 
one of the key traits of a hypothetical Southern European model between and within 
countries.  
Bettio and Villa (1998) argue that the Southern family model inhibits female 
labour force participation since most care services are performed within the family by 
women, instead of being externalised thereby both relieving women of excess work in the 
family and creating job opportunities. Such family model is presented as the “root cause” 
to the low female employment rates in Spain, Greece and Italy. Yet, Portugal is the 
exception with high rates of female employment, revealing an apparent inconsistencies 
of such rates with the familialistic features that are said to characterize the organization of 
welfare and employment in the four countries (Caldwell, 1980; Kohler et al., 2005; 
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Tavora, 2012; Oliveira, 2009). Besides those differences, Rydell (2002) also highlights 
the difference between Portugal and the neighbour countries in public childcare facilities 
along with more public aid to families with young children.  
We can then argue that the erosion of the familialistic tradition in Portugal ended 
when in the 60's and 70's the female labour force participation increased and the female 
employment rates exceeded the ones registered in Span, Italy and Greece. This rapid and 
marked growth, results from a high male migration that is consequence of strong 
emigration to Europe and military recruitment of young men to the colonial war (1961-
1974), which created severe labour shortages in a period of strong industrial development 
(Mendes and Rego, 2006). The weakness of wages in Portugal and the demand for better 
living conditions have long led the Portuguese women to abandon the concept of 
housewives or homemakers (see chapter 4). 
The traditional low rate of female employment is not conventional for the 
Portuguese women, and even the erosion of familiastic model in a first moment showed 
no negative impact of motherhood on women's employment, implying that mothers of 
young children are even more likely to be employed than non-mothers (Tavora, 2012: 
67). If Portugal had already in the 60’s and 70’s a extraordinary female employment rates 
and at that time fertility was still considerably high, it is expected that changes in fertility 
trends are due to other factors that not the increase participation in the labour market. 
Within this framework, Portugal is an attention-grabbing case for analysis, since 
in one hand the country has a high percentage of working women (i.e., working mothers) 
and this element constitutes a distinctive and long-established feature of the Portuguese 
society. On the other hand, the general educational levels of population are considerably 
lower than in most European countries. Portugal is still subject to significant 
shortcomings in its education when set against other OECD countries (additional 
discussion in chapter 4). 
Analyses on aggregate data from different countries show a negative association 
between fertility and women’s employment until the 1980s and the change of this 
relationship since the mid-1980s, when the correlation becomes positive. In other words, 
at the present it is in those countries with greater female participation in the labour force 
that fertility tends to be higher (Oliveira, 2009). The high rates of employment of 
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Portuguese women, which are rooted in the 1960 and 1970s when emigration and 
military recruitment of young men to the colonial wars created severe labour shortages in 
a period of strong industrial development led to an erosion of the familiastic tradition in 
this country. 
Also, the increase in education could explain observed changes in women labour 
market participation. In the sense that educational attainment is intimately related to 
opportunities and positions on the labour market, individuals with different levels of 
education are likely to be differentially affected by variations in economic context (Neels, 
2010). Furthermore, higher educated women have more to lose by staying at home to 
provide childcare (Basten et al., 2013). Still women bear many more responsibilities than 
men within the family and are much less protected in the labour market. These conditions 
generate numerous contradictions in women’s lives, among others, the high level of 
work-family conflict its always there (Gaspar, 2013). 
 
5.4. Data and Methodological considerations    
5.4.1. Data  
 
The period indicators were calculated or obtained directly from several data sources. The 
considered age groups are the ones traditionally used in the demographic fertility analysis 
related to the fertility window (20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44).  
Human Fertility Database and EUROSTAT provided data on fertility evolution as 
total fertility rate, age-specific rates and mean age at childbearing, and later-on computed 
by us. GDP and GDP growth (%) indicators were provided by the World Bank database. 
Information about women labour market participation, unemployment rates by age and 
age groups, and education was provided by the OECD online database. 
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5.4.2. Methodological considerations    
 
With the aim to describe trends in fertility and their relationship to the economic dynamic 
changes, we focus our attentions in two main fertility demographic indicators and four 
economic measures.  
From the demographic perspective and widely discussed in the literature, besides 
its constraints, TFR (total fertility rate) is still the most common measure to analyse 
period fertility. Previously in Chapter 2 (in equation 2.3) we presented such measure as 
the result of the sum of age-specific fertility rates (that relate the number of births among 
women from a given age group to all women in that same age group). The total fertility 
rate is simply obtained by the sum of all age-specific fertility rates in a given year.  
The second demographic measure used in this chapter, the mean age at 
childbearing, was also presented in Chapter 2 (in equation 2.4). However let us remember 
what we are discussing about. The mean age at childbearing (MAC), give us the 
perception on the fertility postponement and in some cases reflects better than TFR the 
direct effect of some individual characteristics. This measure is simply the mean age of 
mothers at the childbearing of their children.  
To measure the economic growth, the gross domestic product is the most used 
method. By the OECD definition, we can say that the Gross domestic product is an 
aggregate measure of production equal to the sum of the gross values added of all 
resident institutional units engaged in production (plus any taxes, and minus any 
subsidies, on products not included in the value of their outputs). The sum of the final 
uses of goods and services (all uses except intermediate consumption) measured in 
purchasers' prices, less the value of imports of goods and services, or the sum of primary 
incomes distributed by resident producer units (2002). 
If we assume that gross domestic product (GDP) can be considered as an 
aggregate measure of total economic production for a given country, we thus should 
consider other variables. Consequently, we included in our analysis the women labour 
force and as well as the employment rate by age groups and also by educational level.  
Labour force participation corresponds to the population aged 15 and older that 
are economically active, i.e. all people who supply the labour system for the production 
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of services in a given period.  OECD also includes the information that the total labour 
force equals the civilian labour force plus the members of the armed forces (2002). 
Unemployment rates were included in our analysis, not only to established 
comparisons between the countries under observation but also to understand the 
evolution across ages within each of the selected countries. Making use of the OECD 
definition at the online employment database (2015), we can defining employment as all 
persons above a specified age, who during the reference period were: i) without work, 
i.e. were not in paid employment or self-employment during the reference period; ii) 
currently available for work, i.e. were available for paid employment or self-employment 
during the reference period; iii) seeking work, i.e. had taken specific steps in a specified 
recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment.  
For the employment designation, OECD (2015) define it as persons in civilian 
employment include all those employed above a specified age who during a specified 
brief period, either one week or one day, were in the following categories: i) paid 
employment; ii) employers and self-employed; iii) unpaid family workers; unpaid family 
workers at work should be considered as being self-employed irrespective of the number 
of hours worked during the reference period. For operational purposes, the notion of 
some work may be interpreted as work for at least one hour. Total employment is defined 
as the sum of civilian employment and members of the armed forces. We focus our 
attention in the harmonised OECD unemployed and employment rates.   
 
5.5. Results 
 
We do not aim to identify the precise relationship between a particular measure of 
recession and a specific indicator of fertility. Rather, we sketch a general picture of how 
the recession, broadly defined, affects fertility. For this purpose we subdivide our 
analysis in two main perspectives:  
(1) The analysis about the evolution of fertility and GDP growth from 1960 until 
2013, giving particular attention to developments that occurred in those two indicators 
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since 2008, the year identified as the starting point for most recent economic crisis in 
Europe (Billingsley, 2011; Reher, 2011).  
(2) Latter on, we focus our analysis at the individual-level responses to the 
economical constrains measured by the female labour market participation, the 
unemployment rate by age groups, and employment rates by age groups and education, as 
well as the long duration (one year and over) unemployment rate between ages 25-54.  
 
5.5.1. The fertility reaction to the economical crises  
 
As previously discussed in chapter 2, one of the main distinctive characteristics from the 
demographic evolution across Europe since the 1960s, is the fertility decline.  Figure 5.1 
plots the average total fertility rate by decade (a); and as well, the change in the total 
fertility rate between decades (b).  
The highest fertility levels measured by the TFR are observed in the 1960s and in 
the 1970s in Portugal - 3.2 and 2.7 children per woman, respectively - closely followed 
by Spain - 2.9 and 2.8 children per woman, respectively. Both countries experienced 
extreme high and low fertility compared to the other European countries. Yet, during the 
last decade, with the exception of France and Sweden, the average fertility levelled down 
varying nowadays from 1.4 for Austria and Portugal to 1.3 in Hungary and Spain.  
Furthermore, when we compare the changes in the TFR between decades (figure 
5.1b), it’s possible to identify straightforward that for Austria, France and Sweden the 
main changes on the fertility quantum occurred from 1960s to the 1970s. This decline 
was around 30 percent in Austria, 24 in France and 21 percent in Sweden.  Focusing 
again our attention in Portugal and Spain, the highest lost in terms of fertility quantum 
was from the 1970s to the 1980s. From those two, Spain was the country with the highest 
decline, registering a 37 percent decline. 
In Hungary the difference between the TFR from the 1960s and 1970s was 
positive, nevertheless, the increase was less than 10 percent. Still, Hungary presented a 
different pattern evolution, once that is the only country that goes from increasing fertility 
between the first decades to become the, in the last decade, the country with the highest 
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lost. On the other hand, Sweden also registered a different trend when compared with the 
other countries under analysis. The Swedish particular case allows recognizing that a 
small increase in the TFR between 1980s and 1990s, as a reflection from faster 
recuperation at the fertility levels. Furthermore from 1990s to 2000s no relevant changes 
in the TFR were observed.   
It was only between the last decades that some recuperation trends are observed 
across some European countries (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2009). In our analysis with the 
exception already observed for Hungary and Sweden, such possible recuperation, or 
increase in the TFR, was observed in France and Spain, while Portugal and Austria the 
tendency is a decline (less pronounced when compared to the previous ones but still is a 
decline trend). Yet, the recuperation change in the fertility trends was not even expected 
by some researchers, especially under an atmosphere of economic crisis (e.g., Billingsley, 
2011; Sobotka et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 5.1: Average total fertility rates by decades (a) and the change in the total fertility rate 
between decades (b), in the selected countries   
(a)  (b)  
  
Notes: 1) The 2000s decade includes data for different periods that depends on the data availability. Hungary – until 
2009; Austria – until 2010; Sweden – until 2011; and France Portugal and Spain – until 2012. 2) Detailed information 
in Appendix D, tables D.1 and D.2.  
Source: Own elaboration; Human Fertility Database and Eurostat  
 
 
The gross domestic product (GDP) can be considered as an aggregate measure of 
total economic production for a given country. It represents the market value of all 
services produced by a country economy during the period measured. Due to the 
identified correlation between fertility trends and GDP growth in the literature (e.g. 
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Billingsley, 2011; Reher, 2011; Sobotka et al., 2011), it is our intention to analyse briefly 
the GDP evolution since 1960 onwards to contextualize further the observed fertility 
patterns. 
Figure 5.2 provides graphical illustration for the GDP evolution since 1960, 
where a constant growth can be observed even with some small fluctuations. From 1960 
to 2013, it is possible to observe that across all countries under analysis, some trends are 
quite similar. The GDP increased to all countries from 1960 to 1980, but stagnating 
afterwards until 1984, followed by a decrease until around 1993.  From there until the 
year 2000, GDP barely increased in all countries, even registering some fluctuations, but 
in the beginning of the new century a pronounced increase was observed with higher 
intensity in France and Spain, but repeated in all countries. Nevertheless, from 2008/2009 
onwards, i.e. since the economic crisis begging perturbed European economic stability, a 
higher fluctuation and significant decrease was also registered. 
 
Figure 5.2: Evolution of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1960 to 2013, to the selected 
countries   
 
Source: World Data Bank (2015).  
 
 
 We summarise in table 5.1 the annual GDP growth (%) between 2000 and 2013 
to elaborate more accurately on the possible, direct or indirect, impact from the 
economical crises on fertility trends. Before 2008, only Portugal registered in 2003 a 
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negative growth, in the same year that Austria and Hungary recorded their lowest growth 
(lower than one percent). 
 In the year of 2009, the annual GDP growth was negative across all countries. 
The observed changes in the years 2008 and 2009 values of GDP identified above in 
figure 5.2 are less pronounced to the French growth. While the higher impact was 
observed in Hungary and Sweden, on average the countries recorded a decline of about 
2.9 percent on the GDP overall growth. Yet, in 2013 the greatest positive increase was 
observed for both countries. 
Portugal and Spain are distinguishable under this analysis, not only for the 
negative growth registered in 2009, but also because within the countries under analysis, 
only the Southern European countries kept the negative GDP growth tendency since the 
beginning of the economic crisis in 2008. Mentioned several times in the literature (e.g., 
Billari and Kohler, 2004; Bettio and Villa, 1998) Portugal and Spain as well as the other 
Southern European countries – Italy and Greece – register across their evolution less 
economical stabilities.  
 
Table 5.1: Annual GDP growth (%), between 2000 and 2013, to the selected countries 
 
 Austria France Hungary Portugal Spain Sweden 
2000 3.4 3.9 4.2 3.8 5.3 4.7 
2001 1.4 2.0 3.7 1.9 4.0 1.6 
2002 1.7 1.1 4.5 0.8 2.9 2.1 
2003 0.8 0.8 3.8 -0.9 3.2 2.4 
2004 2.7 2.8 4.8 1.8 3.2 4.3 
2005 2.1 1.6 4.3 0.8 3.7 2.8 
2006 3,4 2.4 4.0 1.6 4.2 4.7 
2007 3.6 2.4 0.5 2.5 3.8 3.4 
2008 1.5 0.2 0.9 0.2 1.1 -0.6 
2009 -3.8 -2.9 -6.6 -3.0 -3.6 -5.2 
2010 1.9 2.0 0.8 1.9 0.0 6.0 
2011 3.1 2.1 1.8 -1.8 -0.6 2.7 
2012 0.9 0.3 -1.5 -3.3 -2.1 -0.3 
2013 0.2 0.3 1.5 -1.4 -1.2 1.5 
Source: World Data Bank  (2015).  
 
 
 An economic recession may affect fertility because for many individuals it implies 
a bad economic situation, lower income, increased job demands, and related symptoms 
(Sobotka et al., 2011: 269). In that sense we include once more in our analysis the 
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evolution the total fertility trend already discussed in chapter 2 and as well the mean age 
at childbearing (figure 5.3) from year 2000 onwards.  
Let first focus our attention into the changes in the mean age at childbearing 
(figure 5.3b). The overall observed tendency indicates an increase in the mean age at 
childbearing with no direct impact from the economical crises directly observed. Yet, 
focusing further on the Austrian mean age at childbearing, it can be seen that 
immediately after the economic shock in 2008, subsequently to some light stabilization, 
the mean age increased continually. 
Nevertheless, when we focus our analysis on the evolution of total fertility rate, it 
is for Portugal and Spain that the economical crises seem to have major impact. In both 
countries it seems to exist a negative relationship between fertility and negative growth 
rate. Already Tomé et al. (2014) identified that the economic collapse in Portugal had 
negative influence in the already low number of observed births as well as in the aging 
country problem. Also Sobotka et al. (2011: 288) suggested that Spain was among the 
countries that have experienced a sharp reversal in fertility rates, with the period TFR 
falling from 1.46 to 1.40 between 2008 and 2009.  
 
Figure 5.3: Total fertility rates (a) and mean age at childbearing since 2000 (b), in the selected 
countries   
(a)  (b)  
  
Notes: For detailed data see Chapter 2, section 2.4.2 and table A.14 in Appendix A.  
Source: Own elaboration; Human Fertility Database 
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If we zoom out the fertility evolution between 2008 and 2012, within that period 
we can observe more accurately the registered changes between years. For that, in figure 
5.412 we use, in terms of comparison, Portugal as a benchmark country (grey bars in the 
plot). We definitely verify that besides Portugal, Spain registers the highest lost on the 
fertility quantum. While France and Sweden had higher lost between ages 18 and 23, for 
Portugal and Spain it is only after age 30 that the negative values are less significant. 
Also, it can be seen that for both southern European countries the recuperation on the 
fertility was only taking place after age 35, whereas for France and Sweden that positive 
evolution was observed already after age 30 and 33, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Change in the fertility rate by age between 2008 and 2012, in Portugal (as benchmark 
country), France, Spain and Sweden  
 
Notes: 1) For this propose we excluded Austria and Hungary due to the short availability of data since 2008. 2) 
Detailed data in Appendix D, table D.3. 
Source: Own elaboration; Human Fertility Database 
 
The idea that a secure economic basis is a prerequisite for having children was 
severely challenged by the demographic developments in the context of the social and 
demographic evolution, when industrialization and economic growth was accompanied 
by rapid fertility decline and by changes in women’s society role (Kreyenfeld et al., 
2012).  
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If we consider the positive growth of GDP and the high fertility levels in France 
and Sweden there seems to be a positive relationship between economic growth and 
higher family sizes. Still, for both countries between 2008 and 2012 there are positive 
trends for higher ages, where in figure 5.4 were possible to observe a recuperation growth 
of lost fertility at younger ages. Portugal and Spain had a deep negative relationship with 
the GDP growth, particularly after 2008. From that year onwards the GDP growth 
reflected a negative trend accompanied by a decreasing on the total fertility rate.  
GDP as a macro level variable could have impact at the individual perspective, 
yet individual level variables such as unemployment, labour market participation or 
employment by educational level could better explained the fertility changes and the 
couple decisions.  By decomposing the GDP into other social economical measures of 
familiar stability we can find higher relation to the fertility evolution across the recent 
decades.    
 
5.5.2. Employment uncertain and the impact on fertility trends 
 
In a broad perspective, the GDP growth is the most common measurement related to the 
need of define technically the economy evolution but also the economical recession. 
However, the GDP growth point out that in terms of household responses to economic 
conditions such fluctuations in GDP are not necessarily the best variables to employ 
(Testa and Basten, 2014; Sobotka et al., 2011). This led to several studies in relationship 
between unemployment, consumer confidence or even women labour market 
participation in the perspective to postpone or anticipate fertility (e.g. Fokkema et al., 
2008).  
Rindfuss et al. (2010) identified a reversal association between women’s labour 
market participation and fertility levels from a negative to a positive correlation. And 
such change that initially produced disbelief. Women labour force participation side by 
side with the educational evolution lies on the heart of most explanations of fertility and 
family formation. Still, the effect of women employment or unemployment on fertility 
depends on the country circumstances. Still, in some countries the employment stability 
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may be a prerequisite in the transition to parenthood (e.g., Ellingsæter and Pedersen, 
2012; Kreyenfeld, 2010; Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000). 
 
Figure 5.5:Women labour force participation rate by the age groups, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 
and 40-44 to the selected countries    
 
Austria France 
  
Hungary Portugal 
  
Spain Sweden 
  
Notes: Due to data availability, the staring point analysis is different to all countries: 1994 to Austria; 1983 to France; 
1992 to Hungary; 1974 to Portugal; 1972 to Spain; 1963 to Sweden.    
Source: OECD (2015).  
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Figure 5.5 plots women labour force participation rate by age groups and 
countries. The first information that we highlight from the graphical representation is that 
for all countries except Portugal (in the last years) and Sweden (since the 1980s), in all 
countries the women participation in the labour market does not present in any of the 
other countries values in the order of 90 percent.  
Across all countries as reflect from the increasing scholar age (Luci and 
Thévenon, 2010; Neels, 2010), the youngest age group (20-24) presented the lowest 
fertility rates. Yet, Spain had a particular evolution with constant values between 50 and 
65 percent. It is also noteworthy that for Portugal, between 1974 and 1980 it was for this 
age group that the Portuguese women registered higher participation rates in the labour 
market. 
A common trend observed to Austria, France, Hungary and Sweden was the high 
participation rates for the older age group (40-44). In Austria and France it was from the 
2000s onwards that this group increased relatively to the younger ones. Still, in Hungary 
the values were already high by the 1990s, but for Sweden since 1969 this age group 
reflects the highest women participation rates. For Portugal and Spain the situation is 
some how different and for that reason we will focus now in both countries.  
While for the other countries under analysis it was the oldest age group with the 
highest female participation at the labour market, for the southern countries the situation 
is the inverse. In both countries women at the age group 40-44 have, since the 1970s, the 
lowest labour participation (with the exception of the age group 20-24). 
The Iberian countries had other similarities as e.g., the trend patterns across ages, 
already in the 1970s Spain had lower values than Portugal (identified also by Bettio and 
Villa, 1998), by that period of time the Spanish participation rates were between 20 and 
40 percent, while already in Portugal were registered values between 40 and 70 percent 
(at the same level of Sweden).     
Rydel (2002: 8) identified that the increasing risks of unemployment and 
flexibilisation are concentrated on young people and women, not only because they are 
the new entrants in the labour market, but mainly because of their weaker position in the 
household organisation/social policy link. As we have seen, this has the consequence of 
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delaying the transition to adulthood. Figure 5.6 allows understanding better this 
economic dynamic. As in the previous analysis on the women labour market 
participation, also for the employment rates, Austria, France, Hungary and Sweden had 
similar trends in the rate evolution.  
Within the six countries, Austria stands out for their low unemployment (lower 
than 10 percent), whereas for France, Hungary and Sweden the unemployment rates are 
higher. Still across all countries the highest rates are observed in the age group 20-24 (the 
one with less labour market participation). In fact about France Rydel (2002: 3) states 
that unemployment is lower and more women are economically independent, the family 
has transferred many of its obligations to society, and the family is now more de-
institutionalised than in the south.  
So once more we focus our attention to the Iberian countries. Beside the 
differences observed in the previous analysis also in terms of unemployment rates the 
countries are some how different. If fact in terms of unemployment evolution, Portugal 
trends are similar to the ones experienced in France. Portugal fewer times used as an 
example from the Southern Europe patterns, was already point out as an outlier from the 
southern cluster with higher female employment as well as lower unemployment risk 
(Domínguez-Folgueras and Castro Martin, 2008; Rydel, 2002; Bettio and Villa, 1998).  
In Spain the unemployment erratic growth is the result from increase participation 
at the labour market. Until 1997 the unemployment increased specially to the youngest 
age groups, 20-24 and 25-29.  For 10 years that rate decreased and with such trend it was 
expected a continuum decline. Yet, by the year of 2008, more than for other countries 
rates, the Spanish unemployment regardless of age group, increased. Such increase is 
visible in the 2012 values. By that year the unemployment rate at the youngest age group 
was almost 50 percent. 
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Figure 5.6:Women unemployment rate by the age groups, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39 and 40-44 
to the selected countries    
 
Austria France 
  
  
Hungary Portugal 
  
Spain Sweden 
  
Notes: Due to data availability, the staring point analysis is different to all countries. 1994 to Austria; 1983 to France; 
1992 to Hungary; 1974 to Portugal; 1972 to Spain; 1963 to Sweden.    
Source: OECD 
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The long-term unemployment was identified in the literature as having a strong 
and negative effect for men and women, but affecting negatively women in the absence 
of strong welfare regimes and also depending of the labour market context (Adsera, 2011; 
Sobotka et al., 2011). In that context we considered vital in our analysis to discuss its 
impact on the family formation. Thus, we consider here women unemployment rates with 
the duration of one year and over.  
Table 5.2 features the evolution since 1986 for France, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden and later on for Austria (1994) and Hungary (1992). Our attention should be first 
focused in Austria and especially in Sweden, once that both countries register low levels 
of long-term unemployment rates. The highest values in both countries were observed by 
the mid 1990s, yet in 2013 their long-term unemployment was less than 25 percent in 
Austria and even less in Sweden (18.9 percent).     
Already by 1986 France, Portugal and Spain had the highest unemployment rates, 
especially if compared to Sweden. More than 66 percent of Spanish unemployed women 
were in that condition for one year or more. Lower was the Portuguese level with a value 
of 62 percent, while in France the long-term female unemployment was less than 53%.  
Even with different values, Portugal and France (Portugal had always higher long-
term unemployment) presented the same evolution trend while for Spain the values and 
the evolution trend observed was different. From 1986 to 2006 the long-term 
unemployment decreased in Spain for about 40 percent, while in the same period France 
and Portugal decreased between 7 and 9 percent.  In the beginning of the 21th century the 
lowest long-term unemployment rates within the Iberian Peninsula were registered in 
Spain, while for Portugal the values increase to more than 55 percent.    
Most crucial decision about family formation and childbearing are made between 
ages 20 and 30, overlapping the rapid educational demand and the persistent young 
unemployment. Thus, we can expect to observe a rapid change in the family and 
reproductive evolution (Rydel, 2002; Adsera, 2011).  
Previously, in chapter 4 we identified the relationship between fertility 
postponement and the increase at the educational level. Also the employment or 
unemployment effect can be different when controlled by the educational level (Sobotka 
et al., 2009).  
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Table 5.2: Women Unemployment rate with duration of 1 year and over (age 25 to 54), between 
1986 and 2013, to the selected countries  
 Austria France Hungary Portugal Spain Sweden 
1986 - 52.7 - 61.1 66.2 4.4 
1987 - 52.9 - 60.6 68.7 17.2 
1988 - 53.5 - 56.9 67.4 11.8 
1989 - 51.2 - 55.0 65.4 10.7 
1990 - 48.4 - 55.5 61.2 8.8 
1991 - 45.9 - 45.9 60.9 10.2 
1992 - 39.9 22.3 43.4 58.0 12.4 
1993 - 38.9 40.1 52.1 60.9 13.8 
1994 21.6 41.9 42.9 48.0 63.8 22.6 
1995 35.7 45.3 51.8 58.6 64.6 24.1 
1996 30.8 43.9 54.5 60.5 64.3 26.6 
1997 31.7 44.5 51.8 65.4 62.2 32.8 
1998 33.2 45.6 54.3 51.9 59.2 33.5 
1999 33.8 43.4 52.9 47.7 56.1 27.0 
2000 23.5 43.6 50.1 48.0 51.3 22.1 
2001 22.4 39.8 47.0 49.5 46.0 19.6 
2002 23.8 37.4 45.0 38.4 40.9 17.3 
2003 27.9 41.9 44.5 41.0 40.1 15.7 
2004 28.9 44.2 44.8 48.1 37.1 17.6 
2005 27.0 46.0 46.5 51.7 30.5 - 
2006 27.6 45.2 46.5 52.8 25.4 - 
2007 30.8 44.0 50.1 49.1 24.0 14.0 
2008 25.0 38.6 49.1 50.1 23.2 14.0 
2009 23.5 37.5 45.1 49.5 27.4 15.3 
2010 23.4 40.4 52.4 55.8 38.2 19.6 
2011 25.9 42.7 50.6 52.1 43.7 19.8 
2012 25.5 41.0 47.5 51.3 46.4 20.0 
2013 24.6 41.3 51.4 57.6 51.4 18.9 
Source: OECD. 
 
In that perspective figure 5.7 plots the (smoothed) women employment rates by 
age groups and educational level since 1992.  Generally speaking, Austria, France and 
Sweden do not present any particular trend, therefore we focus our analysis in Portugal 
and Spain, but also in Hungary.   
Between the women with less education, the Portuguese are the ones with higher 
employment rates between the ages 20 to 34, while Hungary had the lowest employment 
rates. Hungary side by side with Spain had across all age groups and educational levels 
employment quite similar trends.  
Further analysis allows observing that the Spanish trends are the direct reflex 
from the economic recession. Lets take, as an example the ISCED level 3-4, across all 
ages it is possible to identify an increasing trend on the employment rates until 2008.  
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Figure 5.7:Women employment rate by educational level and age groups, for the selected 
countries, between 1992 and 2013    
 
Age group 20-24 Age group 25-29 
  
Age group 30-34 Age group 35-39 
  
Age group 40-44  
 
 
Notes: 1) The ISCED educational levels 0-2 refer to “Less than primary, primary and lower secondary education”; 
ISCED levels 3-4 refer to “Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education”; and ISCED levels 5-6 refer 
to “Tertiary education”. 2) Detailed data from table D.4 to D.8 in Appendix D.   
Source: Eurostat 
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From that year and until the most recent data (2013) the Spanish tendency is to 
decline as a consequence of the unemployment rate discussed above.  
In the upper part from the each one of the plots across all ages we can find 
Portugal with the highest employment rates in contraposition to Spain at the bottom part. 
And even at the oldest age group (40-44) presented in figure 5.5 as the countries with the 
lowest labour market participation, Portugal present similar employment rates to all other 
countries with the exception to Spain. 
 
5.6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
5.6.1. Discussion  
 
In this chapter we described and discussed the interplay of employment and 
economic instability and its impact on fertility decline. Our analysis across the six 
selected European countries allowed first to contextualize the fertility trends evolutions 
and second to focus our attention on the recent period of economic crises (since 2008). 
Since 1960 that fertility trends point out in the direction to postponement and decline, as 
result from the social transformations discussed through chapter 3.  
Even that most researcher use gross domestic product as a valid reference to 
measure the living standards of a country, this variable has experienced a cyclical 
evolution in the Iberian countries. Such variation had significant increases during periods 
of economic expansion and sharp decreases during economic recessions (Royo, 2010).  
In our analysis Portugal and Spain stand out from the group of countries under 
analysis as the ones that at the context of TFR react negatively to the decline in GDP 
growth.  However in the light of recent reversal in fertility quantum, here exemplified by 
France, the relationship between GDP growth and fertility seems to be positive from a 
certain threshold level of economic development on. 
Under the assumption that childrearing and employment were incompatible 
activities, not long time ago, female employment was considered in the literature as an 
obstacle to family formation. The increase of female education, increasing income and 
employment had as consequently lower fertility.  
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Across all European countries under analysis the increase on female labour 
market participation was also observed by the 1960s and 1970s, when fertility started to 
decline. The relation between fertility decline and the increase female labour market 
participation and high female employment rates, raised the hypothesis of the negative 
effect between such life course events become stronger  (Anderson et al., 2014; Brewster 
and Rindfuss, 2000; Becker, 1993).   
Yet, several studies showed that, since the late 1980s, countries with lower rates 
of female employment also experienced lower rates of fertility (Ozcan et al., 2010; 
Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1999). In fact, in our analysis Spain 
seem to be the perfect example for that case, where the increasing female participation at 
the labour market since the mid 1970s led to the decline in total fertility rates, followed 
by the increased in the unemployment rates at the mid 1990s.  
On the other hand when women continue to enter the labour force and 
participation rates across Europe slowly converge to high levels, work and family can be 
compatible. Still, it is expected to be observed only in those countries where labour 
market systems are able to reduce the uncertainties connected with childbearing and 
allow couples to better decide on their family formation (Adsera, 2010).  
More than the changes at the GDP growth are the labour market conditions, which 
are crucial for the economic risks, associated with parenthood (Ellingsæter and Pedersen, 
2012). Also, the positive cross-country correlation between fertility and female labour 
force participation was often attributed to extended durations of high unemployment 
(Ozcan et al., 2010: 808).   
Long-term unemployment is one of the main factors in the household formation 
postponement, in countries such as Spain were the values have been extremely high 
(Adsera, 2011). Upton our analysis the long-term unemployment has been particularly 
high not only in Spain but also in Portugal. Thus, if unemployment is high and persistent, 
young women may fear that time spend in childbearing may increase their likelihood of 
become unemployed. The persistent unemployment may adjust the childbearing timing 
and as consequence change the final fertility quantum.   
Besides the economic influence on the fertility growth, directly measured by the 
own GDP growth observed particularly in Portugal and Spain, we observed across this 
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chapter, mainly for these two countries the important relationship between fertility 
changes and economic stability. In Portugal, as for Spain and Sweden e.g., the 
educational system expanded rapidly and the number of young people enrolled at the 
universities increased by the time of economic instability in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Tesching, 2012; Sobotka et al., 2011; Hoem et al., 2006; Martín-García and Baizán, 
2006).  
In the relationship between education and employment González and Jurado-
Guerrero (2006) identified a negative effect at all educational levels. The negative 
relationship between education and employment rates observed in Spain can explained 
the late transition to motherhood as a consequence from lower women autonomy and 
later transition to a new family (Dominguez-Folgueras and Castro-Martin, 2008).   
For Portugal, the relationship between education, employment rates and fertility 
levels seems to be also negative, yet that relationship could be explained taking 
advantage from the older cohorts information. In the literature several are the references 
to the particular high Portuguese participation of women at the labour market already by 
1960s (e.g., Billari and Kohler, 2004; Rydel, 2002). Yet, the increase at the educational 
levels changes the Portuguese employment structure. Figure 5.7 allowed verify that 
among all countries under analysis, Portugal had the highest female employment rates by 
educational level, especially between ages 30 to 39.  
 
5.6.2. Concluding remarks 
 
The labour market participation seems to increase the postponement effect, which 
indicates the quantum decline as result from the non-recuperation of older cohorts 
postponement. Still focusing our attention to the Portuguese relationship between labour 
market and fertility levels since the 1990s, we observe that at the same time that 
employment stabilities increases, the effect is positive in the fertility quantum. Even in 
the economic crises the Portuguese case has a positive relationship, as reflex from the 
previous consistent labour market participation.  
In fact, it seems to exist a positive relationship between age, education and 
employment, increasing the fertility quantum when labour market participation stabilizes 
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at older ages. Such positive effect increases the probabilities of a more educated woman 
recuperate the postponed childbearing earlier in their cohort.  The 2008 economical shock 
seem to have a higher effect to women in the younger age group 20 to 29, the ones with 
the highest postponement effect.  
More educated women and with a labour market stable participation have more 
capability to effectively materialize their quantum desired (Fahlén, 2013).   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PROSPECTIVE TOTAL FERTILITY RATES: A ROBUST 
FORECAST OF PAST TENDENCIES 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The demographic transition paradigm or the individualization theory (already discussed 
in Chapter 3) has been predominant in the elaboration about fertility patterns. By the end 
of the 1960 decade, fertility had started to drop in 47 of 141 developing countries, 
although in many instances these changes were modest and unconfirmed for years. In the 
1970s, another 32 countries and in the 1980s another 25 countries began to experience 
declines in childbearing, leaving a residue of 23 countries with no evidence of change 
prior to 1995 (Bongaarts and Bulatao, 2000: 54). Thereby, Basten et al. (2013: 72) stated 
that fertility decline from high and stable levels to low. And also this transition was 
considered to be irreversible, so once a low enough level of fertility was achieved it 
would never increase. 
The observed decline in the period and cohort fertility (analysed in Chapter 2) to 
austere low values never observed before, changed fertility dynamics and the expected 
population changes. The fertility levels observed across the last decades are characterized 
essentially by low and lowest-low fertility levels, by a continuous postponement in the 
family formation and consequently at the age of the first child. Also, the tremendous 
educational changes (from 1960 onwards) transformed the fertility trends configurations, 
giving to women the possibility for a stable professional career, and therefore to 
postponement other life-events.  
Still, the improvements in individuals life course were dramatically affected by 
the economic crisis. By the year of 2008 Europe economic stable trends were interrupted 
abruptly by a new economical crises. And countries such as Portugal or Spain were 
specially affected, shifting even later the fertility timing and decreasing the fertility 
quantum. All these social, economical and demographic changes are pushing modern 
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civilizations towards aging and even that major changes in fertility occur in a short-term, 
i.e., major fertility increases, it might not be enough to avoid or counterbalance this 
tendency. Still and once societies adapt to this new reality by, for instance, promoting 
gender equality and developing policies, institutions, and norms that allow easier 
combination of work and childrearing for couples, fertility rates may recover (Basten et 
al., 2013: 72). 
In this chapter, we evaluate possible future short-term fertility tendencies and 
elaborate on what can be expected in the absence of new family policies and government 
intervention. Therefore, we first contextualize the fertility trends across the countries 
under analysis (as a sort of a refresh summary of Chapter 2) and with the last total 
fertility break as baseline (identified in Chapter 2), we precede to the fertility forecast.  
The main goals of this chapter are the following:  
1. Based on period data, we elaborate robust short-term forecasts (no longer 
that the horizon of 2020); 
2. Extrapolate recent fertility tendencies to the future, in order to predict if 
those are likely to be stretched; 
3. Identify which countries are in better position (and worst) to attain again 
the replacing generation fertility levels; 
4. Evaluate the rate of fertility recuperation (if it is the case); 
5. Discuss the absence of family policies and how the reverse of this 
situation can help future parents to anticipate and increase the fertility 
tempo and quantum.  
 
Similarly to previous chapters, our analysis is centred on fertility trends 
correspondent to Austria, Hungary, France, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Thus, this 
chapter is divided in six sections. The introduction is followed by a theoretical discussion 
on the methodological overview on previous findings and also on the demographic 
approach to the fertility forecasting  (section 6.2). The following section (6.3) presents 
the data selection and methods, subdivided in three main lines, the functional approach 
for robust forecast of fertility rates (6.3.2), followed by the question on the smoothing 
effect (6.3.3.), and finally 6.3.4 were the forecasting proceed is presented. Section 6.4 
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contains our research main results, namely the total fertility rate evolution in the lexis 
triangles perspective (6.4.1); the extrapolation into the future of the age-specific fertility 
trends (6.4.2); followed by a short range perspective on the possible trends for the total 
fertility rate (6.4.3). Furthermore we briefly discuss on the possible family/social policies 
that could change the future fertility trends, especially in a case as Portugal (section 6.5). 
Finally the subsequent section (6.6) concludes this chapter.  
 
6.2. Evaluating prospective fertility tendencies: methodological overview 
 
Demographers typically refer to information about the future as projection or forecast. If 
the outcome refers about a set of assumptions regarding future trends without referring to 
the most likely future development, we are in presence of a projection. On the other hand, 
a forecast refers to the most probable tendency to provide an accurate prediction of future 
patterns. Therefore, in agreement with Goldstein et al. (2011), if observed trends are 
assumed to continue, De Beer (2011) states that time-series models can be used to 
estimate the trend and to extrapolate the trend it into the future. 
George at al. (2004) sustains that all forecasts are projections but not all 
projections are forecasts, what means that the term projection is more complete than 
forecasting. However, both are widely used in prospective analysis. Thus, in a broad 
sense, projections can be classified as: (1) the trend extrapolations that are based on the 
observable historical trends; (2) the cohort-component methods that divides the 
population into age, sex groups or birth cohorts, and accounts for the behavioural fertility, 
mortality or migrations in each cohort; and (3) the structural models that rely on observed 
relationship between demographic and the other variables. 
 In fertility forecasting many issues are raised. In opposition with mortality, where 
death is not a repeatable event, childbearing is, on the most part of times, optional and 
repeatable, being easily distinguishable: mortality rates change predictably in one 
direction over time, while fertility rates fluctuate (Schmertmann et al., 2014). Despite this 
additional difficulty in forecasting fertility trends, many studies were undertaken with this 
topic as main goal (see e.g. Hyndman and Ullah, 2007; Goldstein, 2008; Hyndman and 
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Booth, 2008; Sobotka et al., 2012; Goldstein et al., 2011; Myrskylä et al., 2013; or 
Schmertmann et al., 2014). Nevertheless, independently of the applied methodology, the 
use of age-specific fertility rates is essential to achieve accurate outcomes and depending 
on the forecast extent, input data should differ (De Beer, 1992).  
Thus, following De Beer (1992), in order to preserve forecasts accuracy, if period 
data are used, the choice should fell on short-term forecasts, but in presence of cohort 
information, medium and long-term forecasts may be computed. Additionally, the simple 
extrapolation of total fertility rate patterns to the future is not considered the best 
approach once that changes in the fertility timing are temporary, being more useful to 
focus on age-specific patterns rather than in TFR levels (De Beer, 2011). 
 Likewise in fertility studies, there is a growing literature about forecasting 
mortality. However, societies influence strongly the aim of these distinct (but 
complementary) approaches. If in what concerns mortality, entire societies seek better 
health and wider lifespan, contributing together for the same goal, in fertility it is not easy 
to define a common objective. Thus, while in mortality the question is not whether 
mortality will improve but rather how quickly this will happen (Goldstein et al., 2011: 
663), fertility prospective trends ensure many different possibilities. Most of the literature 
about mortality forecast derived from the work published by Lee and Carter in 1992. 
Since then, many variants were suggested with the intention of providing some model 
improvements (see e.g., Lee and Miller, 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Hyndman and Ullah, 
2007).  
 Nevertheless, Lee also introduced the Lee-Carter method in fertility in 1993, and 
influenced others as e.g. Hyndman and Ullah (2007) to develop a generalization of the 
original methodology in means of a functional data approach to forecast both mortality 
and fertility patterns. Similarly to the Lee-Carter approach, the method involves using the 
first principal component of log-patterns and makes use of time-series models to forecast 
into the future, what is in agreement with De Beer (2011: 213): time-series models seem 
the most appropriate instrument to calculate projections once that they identify past 
trends and show the effects of continuation of this trends in the future. 
Goldstein et al. (2011: 663) stated that demographers failed to predict the baby 
boom, and also failed to predict the baby bust. No one saw the onset of postponement and 
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the dramatic effect it would have on period fertility. Although some predicted that 
postponement would slow someday, no one knew when. Yet, predictions, forecasts and 
projections are needed to improve the responsiveness of family policies systems.  
Given the review on the fertility forecasting methods, our aim by using this 
approach is to estimate how fertility will evolve in the near future. And this will depend 
on a different number of factors, such as the country determinants and developments 
identified in the previous chapters. In overall, with the countries under analysis across 
this thesis, we can say that from the late 1990s and beginning 2000s fertility had fewer 
changes and for the majority of them an increase was observed.  
Basten et al. (2013: 73) stated that there are general arguments and mechanisms 
that explain why fertility may rise, including long-term fertility cycles, changes in 
population composition through migration or fertility differentials and the concept of 
homeostasis, which suggests that ‘demographic systems’ tend to converge in the long run 
towards an equilibrium that assures their maintenance and survival. Yet our previous 
analysis allows speculating that in a near future e.g. Portugal could be a country where 
fertility will maintain the quantum decline.  
The low fertility values discussed in Chapter 2 are the evidence that for countries 
as Portugal fertility recuperation is still far, and for even for those as Spain with signs of 
recuperation a specific event as the 2008 economic crises could invert the tendency. 
Across the last decades the observed fertility trends were characterized by low and 
lowest-low values, hand in hand with the consecutive postponement.  
The process in the transition to motherhood is, among other factors, the result 
from the social and individual values and norms changes (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
2002), from the educational intrinsically relationship to fertility postponement 
(Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 2012; Tesching, 2012) as well as the deep impact from 
economic shocks and employment instability identified in Chapter 5 (Gaspar, 2013; 
Tavora, 2012; Neels, 2010). Therefore, low fertility rates may be seen as a transitory 
stage during which society adjusts to the host of factors associated with the 
individualization theory or to the second demographic transition (Basten et al., 2013).  
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6.3. Data and Methods 
 
In the previous subsection, we provided a short but substantiated overview about fertility 
forecasts. Consequently, from this theoretical framework, our choice fell on the 
reproduction of the functional data approach developed by Hyndman and Ullah (2007), 
once that not only gathers together the necessary requirements to elaborate accurate 
forecasts, but also fits perfectly to our data and the goals identified in the introductory 
section.  
6.3.1. Data  
 
Data source for the calculation of the age-specific fertility rates, basis information 
required for the implementation of the methodological procedure explained in the 
subsequent subsection, comes from the vital statistics data on the total of births by 
mother’s age and female population exposures to the risk of becoming a mother (also by 
age) available on the Human Fertility Database (HFD). From HFD we selected data 
available since 1960 to the most recent available year, depending on the study country. 
Additionally, in order to avoid characteristic fluctuations in the number of births across 
time associated to younger and older ages, we focus on the age range 15-49. 
 Selected countries, in order to acknowledge a comparison with the results 
obtained in previous chapters, correspond to Austria, France, Hungary, Portugal, Spain 
and Sweden. 
 
6.3.2. A functional approach for robust forecast of fertility rates 
 
The need to provide coherent and robust information for government policy and planning 
resulted in the development of different approaches to forecast demographic trends. One 
of the most widely used method concerns the one developed by Lee and Carter in 1992 
originally used to forecast mortality patterns over age and over time but not rarely used to 
forecast fertility patterns (see e.g. Lee, 1993). Intending to extrapolate for the future 
previous fertility patterns and to evaluate what will happen in the absence changes in 
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public intervention, our choice fell on the functional data approach developed by 
Hyndman and Ullah (2007). Despite that this method may be applied to fertility and 
mortality in our study it is applied to forecast fertility trends. This approach is a 
generalization of the Lee-Carter model and combines ideas from functional data analysis, 
nonparametric smoothing and robust statistics (Hyndman and Ullah, 2007: 4942). 
Similarly to the Lee-Carter approach, the method involves using the first principal 
component of log-fertility.  
 Additionally, this methodology also follows the methods proposed by Bozik and 
Bell (1987) and Bell and Monsell (1991), but following Hyndman and Ullah (2007), two 
main points of distinction can be enumerated: a) the Ramsay and Silverman (2005) 
functional paradigm is included, leading therefore, to the use of non-parametric 
smoothing that not only reduces data fluctuation and possible problems connected with 
data grouped into age intervals; and b) it is used a robust version in what concerns to 
principal components. 
 Generally speaking, functional data analysis may be defined as the study of 
information that varies over a continuum (Ramsay and Silverman, 2005). Therefore, once 
that we are dealing with discrete values (fertility rates over age) we need to convert these 
values into a function by smoothing them. Nevertheless, not all data subject to a 
functional data analysis are themselves functional (Ramsay and Silverman, 2005: 5), but 
consequently nothing much of improvement is gained when compared to a multivariate 
approach. Once that data cannot be directly considered of functional nature, an 
underlying smooth function !! !  is used, adding to the observed discrete points of ! a 
certain amount of error. Letting !! !  correspond to the log-fertility rate registered at age ! in year ! we have: 
                    !! ! = !! ! + !! ! !!,!,                                              6.1  
 
where !! !  corresponds to the amount of noise that varies with ! and !!,!  is an iid 
standard normal random variable (Hyndman and Ullah, 2007). Generally, the approach 
can be summarized as follow: 
i. Data is smoothed by applying a non-parametric smoothing procedure; 
ii. The fitted curves are decomposed by applying a function expansion: 
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 !! ! =  ! ! !!,!!!!! !! ! + !! ! ,                                              6.2  
 
iii. where ! !  is the location measure of !! ! , !! !  is a set of orthonormal basis 
functions and !! ! ~! 0, ! ! ; 
iv. Univariate time series models are fitted to each of !!,!; 
v. !!,! coefficients are forecasted using the fitted time series models for ! = ! +1,… ,! + ℎ; 
vi. Forecasting !! ! for ! = ! + 1,… ,! + ℎ making use of the forecasted 
coefficients; 
vii. And, use the estimated variance of the error terms to compute the forecast 
associated confidence intervals. 
 
6.3.3. The smoothing effect 
 
Data overdispersion is considered characteristic of countries with relatively poor data or 
with distinctive historical data trends and is generally caused by the tendency to round 
counts or measurements to pleasant digits (Camarda, 2008). Smoothing is the most used 
procedure to stabilize the high variance observed. On the other hand, as it was explained 
in the preceding subsection, it can also be used to transform discrete into functional data. 
 Let !! !  denote the observed fertility rate at age ! in year ! per thousand women 
and !! !  the female population exposures by age ! in year !, we have the variance of !! ! = log !! !  given by (Hyndman and Ullah, 2007): 
 !!! ! ≈ 1000− !! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! .                                              6.3  
 
 In order to obtain better results for !! ! , highly affected in presence of larger 
variance !! ! , for fertility, data it is qualitatively constrained fitted curves to be 
concave. 
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 Exemplifying what has just exposed, Figure 6.1 presents the smoothing effect in 
the age-specific fertility curves, i.e., the transformation of discrete age-specific fertility 
rates into functional data. We do not present the obtained results to all countries but 
instead the specific example for Portugal.  As it can be observed, smoothed (a) and non-
smoothed (b) data by age are very similar, the main difference corresponds to the wrinkle 
elimination, consequence of transforming discrete data into functional. 
 
Figure 6.1: Age-specific fertility rates smoothed (a) and non-smoothed (b) from 1960 to 2012 in 
Portugal 
(a) (b) 
  
Notes: Lighter green and yellow lines correspond to ancient years while brown lines reflect more recent patterns. 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
6.3.4. Forecasting procedure 
 
In opposition with the approaches followed by Lee and Carter (1992) or Hyndman and 
Ullah (2007), where the entire available year range in the study was included in the 
forecasting procedure, in our approach, and once that we intend to realize a short-term 
extrapolation of recent trends, we decided to depart from the last identified and 
statistically significant break for each country (Figure 6.2) acknowledged in Chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, Spain is an exception. The last and most recent statistically identified 
segment break solely corresponds to four years: 2009-2012, being an extremely short 
period for any plausible extrapolation. Consequently, the period taken into account for 
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Spain corresponds to the last two breaks that proved to be statistically sensitive to 
changes on the total fertility rate. 
 Thus, with the intention of evaluating, which are in a short range the future 
fertility tendencies if recent patterns are simply extrapolated for a near future, with no 
influence of new possible government policies and stimulant planning, we elaborate 
fertility forecasts till 2020, independently of the time segment size and starting year. 
 
Figure 6.2: Years in the last statistically significant segment identified by country  
 
Notes: 1) Due to the short size of the last segment identified in Spain, we present here, instead the last, the two last 
segments. 2) For more detailed information, see chapter 2, section 2.4.3.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
6.4. Results 
 
In the following subsections we will present first a brief overview from the six European 
countries under analysis related to their fertility trends using for that the lexis surface, not 
often used in the study of fertility patterns. Followed by the evolution of age-specific 
fertility rates since 1960, where we include the forecasted patterns to all countries until 
2020. Here the fertility patterns will reflect the trends without any significant changes on 
the quantum level.  
Latter we discuses the age-specific fertility rates by age groups and later on we 
decompose them by each age group to focus on the Portuguese example in order to 
identify the ages that contributes more to the total fertility rate. Finally, we present the 
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possible TFR in the absence of significant structural and social or political changes that 
could influence new fertility patterns. 
 
6.4.1. Evolutionary fertility trends from a Lexis triangles perspective 
 
In previous chapters, fertility trends were fully explained and exhaustively analysed. 
Nevertheless, in order to understand the prospective fertility trends extrapolated until 
2020, it is imperative to go through a mind refresh about those fertility patterns. 
 Normally, fertility patterns are analysed by focusing on the age-specific fertility 
patterns (single or aggregated age groups) or by presenting complementary but dissimilar 
summary indicators as, e.g., the total fertility rate or the mean age at childbearing (e. g., 
Kohler and Ortega, 2004; Sobotka, 2004). 
In Chapter 2 the discussion on fertility trends was already made with the use of 
the traditional methods mentioned above. However, in this chapter we made use of the 
Lexis diagram and we present the age-specific fertility rates by Lexis triangles, what can 
result in a more intuitive perspective. Vital statistics often provide a decomposition of 
births according to age and a number of characteristics including birth order or 
education. A connected choice is what kind of rate to calculate within the Lexis diagram: 
age-period, age-cohort, or cohort-period (Ortega and Kohler, 2002: 5). However not all 
countries provide the Lexis diagram triangles information (age-cohort-period) in their 
vital statistics, so this is not always a matter of choice.  
A quick research in the literature allowed identifying few research studies with 
direct reference to the use of lexis diagram triangles or age-cohort-period analysis, e.g., 
Zeng et al., (1985) made use of lexis triangles to the analysis of marriage and fertility in 
China, Campbell and Robards (2014) compared the changing age-specific fertility across 
the UK, and also to the fertility forecasting by Schmertmann et al., (2014) used Bayesian 
methods to extrapolate trends with the age-cohort-period component.  
If plotting the age-specific fertility rate curves is very revealing, when those same 
rates are presented in a surface plot, the analysis becomes even more straightforward.  
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From the figure 6.3 we can then depict a very generalist perspective about the evolution 
of fertility patterns since the 1960s for the countries under analysis.  
 Previous analysis and discussion on the fertility trends indicates that for all 
countries 1960s fertility quantum started to decline, featuring later on in 1970s and 1980s 
an even sharper decline with a change in the fertility tempo and quantum (Frejka and 
Zakharov, 2012; Andersson et al., 2009; Sobotka, 2004). Such trend can be simplified by 
using the Lexis diagram, and Austria is a good example to understand the usefulness of 
age-cohort-period approach to describe fertility trends.  
Austria is a country with fundamental changes in the fertility quantum that 
occurred by the 1960s with an intensive decline (observed in the lexis surface with the 
darker colours). By the 1970s, as for Portugal and Spain, in Austrian fertility patterns we 
observe a slight increase in fertility registered at younger ages (around age 20). In all 
period under analysis, France and Sweden present the highest fertility values.  For 
Sweden, in 1960 the age range corresponding to more expressive values varies between 
ages 19 and 34, but in the most recent available year (2011) the range is now 23 - 37 
(approximately), resulting from a shift in opposition with a fertility compression. 
With less intensive colours, mainly at the last years under analysis, Austria, 
Hungary, Portugal, Spain present tighter age range in which women effectively use their 
fertility window to become a mother. Yet, such range allowed identifying stronger shifts 
at the childbearing age for Spain. 
Broadly, fertility rates are decreasing with time and the (new) high values 
registered in more recent years are now experienced at older ages than in older cohorts. 
From here it can also be described that fertility is not only shifting towards older ages, 
but becoming concentrated in a shorter age range in almost all countries. Nowadays, from 
the six countries, France and Sweden present not only the highest rates of fertility, but 
also a wider distribution of those rates by age, i.e., fertility in those countries is less 
concentrated in a shorter age range than it is observed on the other four. 
Summarizing, with the exception of Sweden and France, fertility is not only 
shifting and therefore becoming concentrated at older ages, but it is also decreasing with 
time. In the absence of new encouragements, it is very difficult to individuals change 
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their fertility behaviours, but what can we expect if recent patterns keep constant for the 
next years? We’ll answer that in the following subsection. 
 
Figure 6.3: Age-specific fertility rates by Lexis triangles for study countries 
Austria France 
  
Hungary Portugal 
  
Spain Sweden 
  
Source: Human Fertility Database. 
 
 
6.4.2. Extrapolating future age-specific fertility trends 
 
As it as previously said, plotting the age-specific fertility rates against age presents a 
complementary perspective not only about the evolution of fertility with age, but in a 
presence of a matrix surface (with multiple years), also the evolution of across different 
years. Figure 6.6 is one example, where in grey we can have an overall perception about 
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the evolution of fertility patterns over age and over time (described with more detail in 
chapter 2, section 2.4.3). 
 Similarly to what can be seen observing figure 6.5, in figure 6.6, a strong decline 
in fertility rates can be observed across almost all countries over time accompanied by a 
shift to the right, i.e., a shift in the maximum values to older ages. Sweden is the only 
exception in this group, once that it seems that the fertility rates, despite some perceptible 
fluctuation, are nowadays very close (across age) to the patterns registered in 1960 (for 
further discussion on this patterns see Chapter 2). 
 Forecasted trends over age were also included in figure 6.4 with the intention of 
creating a continuum effect and to provide a more accurate prospective analysis. The 
forecasts correspond to the coloured curves in the plots (figure 6.4) where dark blue 
corresponds to the beginning of forecasted period and red to the end. From the 
extrapolated trends we can realize that, if past tendencies keep throughout the future, the 
shift tendency will also becoming more expressive (Alkema et al., 2011).  
France and Sweden seemed to present very unexpected trends. If nothing changes 
in the French fertility patterns the model expect a small increase in the fertility rates 
around age 30 consequence of a slight dislocation to the older ages of those higher values 
(Booth et al., 2009). Nevertheless, it seems that the overall contribution to the TFR will 
be minor.  
The model also predicted for the Swedish case, that if the fertility tendency 
identified in the last time segment (Chapter 2) continues, the shift will be higher than the 
one identified for France and the increase in the fertility rates will be also more 
distinctive. Likewise the French case, it seems that Swedish fertility will be mainly 
concentrated around age 30 (Lesthaeghe and Willems, 1999). 
 Analysing the other four countries, one can realize that it is expectable the shift to 
the right continues but accompanied by a correspondent increase in the same ages. From 
here we can realize that on those specific cases it seems that increases are at least 
compensating the decreases in some specific ages (Bermúdez et al., 2012).  
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Figure 6.4: Observed and forecasted age-specific fertility rates by study country  
Austria France 
  
Hungary Portugal 
  
Spain Sweden 
  
Notes: 1) Grey curves depict previously observed values while in colours, from dark blue to red as time advances, 
correspond to forecasted patterns. 2) Despite that we focused on less observed information for forecasting, we present 
entire time range to provide a better perspective. For a recall on the used timeline for forecasting procedure, please see 
figure 6.2. 3) Detailed information in Appendix E, tables E.1 to E.6.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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The tendency of fertility increase around age 20 in Spain is also corroborated by 
the forecasted trends: it is also expected to increase. Nevertheless, in what concerns to the 
other Iberian country, Portugal, it appears that the shift is not expected to counterbalance 
the decline in fertility rates at younger ages (before age 30). This situation may 
negatively influence overall fertility levels for Portugal (Tomé et al., 2014; Mendes and 
Tomé, 2014b).  
Aggregating data in five-year age groups results in Figure 6.5. This figure, 
presents again, a different perspective about the obtained results across the study 
countries (observed and forecasted). Within the observed countries, since the beginning 
of the analysed period we can summarize five main ideas: 
(1) In a first phase of the overall timeline, in Austria, France and Hungary, higher 
fertility rates where an outcome of fertility patterns registered in the age group 20 
- 24; 
(2) In a second phase, for those same countries it was registered a shift in high values 
to the next age group (25 - 29); 
(3) In Portugal, Spain and Sweden, higher fertility rates are associated to the age 
group 25 - 29 in almost the entire observed period; 
(4) Roughly since middle 1990s fertility associated with the age group 30 - 34 
surpassed the values associated with ages between 20 and 24; 
(5) Lastly, it appears very likely that fertility will become concentrated between ages 
30 - 34 in a near future, accompanied by an increase in the values associated with 
the age groups 35 - 39 and 40 - 44. 
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Figure 6.5: Observed and forecasted fertility rates for age groups by study country  
Austria France 
  
Hungary Portugal 
  
Spain Sweden 
  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Additionally, if in Sweden and France fertility declines in some age groups appear 
to be compensated (or even surpassed) by increases on others, in Austria, Hungary, Spain 
and Portugal, we are not so certain about that. Consequently a better perspective is 
presented in the subsequent subsection (tables 6.1 and 6.2). 
 In Portugal, between 1960 and 1970 have been observed high fertility rates across 
all ages, in such time period the highest values were observed for the age group 25-29 
with almost one child, as in fact was also observed to France and Spain. In the Portuguese 
case immediately after the 1974 revolution the young fertility (from 15 to 24) increased 
to very high values.  
 It was after the revolution, with the new social context, that Portuguese fertility 
values started to change to the European standard trends. The more extreme change in the 
Portuguese context occurred at the age group 20-24 with the supreme lost in terms of 
age-specify fertility rates (as observed in other countries under analysis). At the same 
time that this age group lost the important contribution to the total fertility rate, the older 
ages increased the fertility rates as a consequence for the postponement. Yet we should 
keep in mind that the restrictions related to the later age at the first child.  
With the aim to understand why Portugal is not recuperating generations, i.e., why 
Portugal, as other European countries is registering fertility levels lower than 2.1 children 
per women, we established across all chapters a comparative analysis across six 
European countries since the 1960s. In the most recent decades Portugal increased 
substantially the mean age at childbearing, but nowadays the difference between the total 
mean age at childbearing and at the mean age at first child is minimal.  
For that reasons we consider extremely useful to provide a deeper knowledge on 
the age-specific fertility trends, and within each age group understand with age presents 
the highest contribute. Figure 6.6 plots the age-specific fertility rates by single ages 
within each age group focusing our attention since 1990.   
With a past of high teenager fertility, we considerer still in this analysis the age 
group 15-19, where we observe that the highest contribution to the fertility rates within 
this group corresponds to the older age (19 years). Yet, outlined already before, the 
young fertility contribution is under decline and it is expected to keep like that until 2020. 
In the age group 20-24 no significant differences are observed among all ages 
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contributions, yet the decline in the rate are higher as higher is the age. This means that 
are those with 20 years who have more children.   
 
Figure 6.6: Observed and forecasted fertility rates by single ages for Portugal 
 
Age group 15-19 Age group 20-24 
  
Age group 25-29 Age group 30-34 
  
Age group 35-39 Age group 40-44 
  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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As in the previous age groups, also for ages 25-29 we can observe a decrease in 
the fertility rates. We identify a postponement until age 29, the age that less contributed 
for the fertility rates since the beginning of 1990s. Yet, in 2012 and further in 2020 this is 
the age with leading contribution to the fertility rates of this age group. 
If the first three age groups present a trend of fertility towards decline and 
postponement, fertility recuperation seems to be occurring only after age 30. Still, in the 
context of all age groups particularly this one (30-34) registers, since year 2000, a more 
stable trend (figure 6.8), which expected to be still in the future. Within this group we can 
observe a postponement from 30 to 31 and 32 years, being the ages with highest fertility 
rates.  
Since 1990, is the age group 35-39 that presents higher improvements in the 
contribution to the overall fertility rates. With an increasing tendency, in this age group 
the age 35 is the one with higher positively contributes to the overall age group fertility 
rates. Following the trends observed for the other countries in figure 6.7, this age group 
seems to be pointed out for most women’s choice to effectively become a mother. On the 
other hand, the effect from the age group 40-44 is residual, yet within that group those 
with 40 years register higher fertility rates than the others and seems that will keep the 
trend in the future.   
 
6.4.3. Total fertility rates for a short-term range 
 
Exclusively by themselves, changes in the age-specific fertility rates may not produce a 
necessary negative impact on the total fertility rate, i.e., if at the same time that the high 
fertility rates are sifting to older ages were complemented by an increase, at this stage, 
one could observe a fertility recuperation.  
Table 6.1 presents the TFRs observed in the last segment statistically identified 
and the forecasted years until 2020. Our graduation colours directs us to two main trends, 
with green colour we have countries will higher fertility rates and less fertility problems, 
while, as a sign of social alert, the orange and read pallet reflects lower average 
childbearing per women.    
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Nevertheless, despite the forecasted TFR increase, only France and Sweden are 
expected to attain values that allow generations to be replaced (2.1) in a very near future. 
In 2020, if past fertility tendencies keep being registered in the future, the average 
number of children per woman might attain 2.20 in France and 2.30 in Sweden. On the 
other hand, it is expected that the forecasted fertility recuperation in Austria, Hungary 
and Spain, do not attain values high enough to replace previous generations. 
Thus from the graduation colours, we identify straightaway that in all analysed 
countries but Portugal (and partially Spain) presented recuperation trends until the 
beginning of the forecasted years. Additionally, the overall picture from the obtained 
results indicates that in our short-term forecast is very likely that only Portugal keeps 
registering a TFR declining in the next years.  
 
Table 6.1: Observed and forecasted total fertility rate by study country  
Year Austria France Hungary Portugal Spain Sweden 
1995 — 1.71 — — — — 
1996 — 1.73 — — — — 
1997 — 1.73 — — 1.17 — 
1998 — 1.76 — — 1.15 1.52 
1999 — 1.79 1.28 — 1.19 1.51 
2000 1.36 1.87 1.32 1.55 1.23 1.56 
2001 1.33 1.88 1.31 1.45 1.24 1.58 
2002 1.39 1.86 1.30 1.46 1.25 1.66 
2003 1.38 1.87 1.27 1.44 1.30 1.73 
2004 1.42 1.90 1.27 1.40 1.31 1.77 
2005 1.41 1.92 1.30 1.41 1.33 1.79 
2006 1.40 1.98 1.34 1.37 1.36 1.87 
2007 1.38 1.96 1.31 1.35 1.38 1.89 
2008 1.41 1.99 1.35 1.39 1.44 1.92 
2009 1.39 1.99 1.32 1.34 1.38 1.94 
2010 1.44 2.01 1.34 1.39 1.37 1.99 
2011 1.44 2.00 1.35 1.35 1.34 1.90 
2012 1.45 2.00 1.36 1.28 1.32 1.97 
2013 1.46 2.03 1.37 1.29 1.35 2.01 
2014 1.48 2.05 1.38 1.28 1.39 2.05 
2015 1.49 2.08 1.39 1.27 1.44 2.09 
2016 1.51 2.11 1.41 1.26 1.48 2.13 
2017 1.52 2.13 1.43 1.25 1.50 2.17 
2018 1.54 2.15 1.44 1.24 1.52 2.22 
2019 1.56 2.18 1.46 1.23 1.53 2.26 
2020 1.58 2.20 1.48 1.22 1.55 2.30 
 
Notes: bold values correspond to forecasted years; green colours depict higher values while red ones match lower TFRs 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
The Portuguese fertility trends highlighted through all our analysis as a country 
without low fertility levels, with relevant postponement trend an incident birth rate 
 172 
significantly dependent from the first childbearing. If the negative relationship between 
education, labour market and mean age at birth counties to increase, Portugal will in the 
next years decline even more their fertility. More than numbers our forecasting results 
allows us to ponder on the fertility decline trend and how that can be reversed. For that in 
Chapter 7 a discussion on political measures will be provided.  
 As referred in subsection 6.2.3 smoothing previously the input data not only 
stabilizes the observed variance, but also transforms discrete data into functional. 
Consequently, obtained estimates are also themselves more stable. With the analysis of 
the Table 6.2, where one can found the estimated TFRs and associated 95% confidence 
intervals, it can be identified what it has been said. The obtained confidence intervals are 
not extremely wide, as would happen in presence of higher turbulence. 
 Therefore, and despite that future observed TFRs do not exactly correspond to our 
extrapolation, stable results like the ones the were here obtained indicate that the overall 
estimated patterns seem highly accurate in the case of any policy or outside factors that 
strongly affect fertility decisions. 
 
Table 6.2: Forecasted total fertility rates by study country and correspondent 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Low — 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.51 1.53 1.55 
Austria — 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.48 1.49 1.51 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 
High — 1.47 1.48 1.49 1.51 1.52 1.53 1.55 1.56 1.59 1.60 
Low — — — 2.00 2.02 2.05 2.07 2.09 2.12 2.13 2.16 
France — — — 2.03 2.05 2.08 2.11 2.13 2.15 2.18 2.20 
High — — — 2.05 2.09 2.11 2.14 2.17 2.20 2.22 2.25 
Low 1.28 1.28 1.30 1.29 1.32 1.32 1.33 1.35 1.36 1.38 1.39 
Hungary 1.34 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.41 1.43 1.44 1.46 1.48 
High 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.52 1.54 
Low — — — 1.26 1.25 1.23 1.23 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.19 
Portugal — — — 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.26 1.25 1.24 1.23 1.22 
High — — — 1.33 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.26 
Low — — — 1.32 1.35 1.38 1.41 1.42 1.44 1.46 1.47 
Spain — — — 1.35 1.39 1.44 1.48 1.50 1.52 1.53 1.55 
High — — — 1.38 1.44 1.50 1.55 1.57 1.60 1.61 1.63 
Low — — 1.92 1.95 1.98 2.01 2.06 2.09 2.12 2.14 2.19 
Sweden — — 1.97 2.01 2.05 2.09 2.13 2.17 2.22 2.26 2.30 
High — — 2.01 2.06 2.12 2.17 2.22 2.27 2.33 2.38 2.43 
Notes: Due to the short size of the last segment identified in Spain, we present here instead the last two segments.  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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6.5. The government as parents little helper 
 
 
Until now, with the analysed information on previous chapters, it was identified the 
double postponement as a main reason to explain the low fertility levels and the persistent 
non-population replacement (2.1 children per women). Thus, it is imperative to develop 
efficient policies that contribute for the fertility quantum increase. With the obtained 
results we are in position to provide useful and contributory insights to delineate new 
social policies. Nevertheless, it is also critical that those policies do not strictly focus on 
the quantum itself, but rather on the reasons that contribute for its reduction, as e.g., 
postponement. Next, we briefly discuss on different family policies and their aims to 
enlighten possible approaches for the welfare systems encourage women from older 
cohorts to fulfil their desired fertility. 
 The public policies have undeniable effects on the societies and families. In a 
general way, policies regulate the conditions of employment, define the dimensions of 
welfare benefits, provide education and health services and define the rights and 
responsibilities of parents. Yet, in some cases public policies have been claimed to have a 
perverse effect on families. The relation between public policies and demographic 
behaviour, are however, especially complex. Its relation depends on the type of policies, 
the level of benefits, conditions of eligibility, and the income and opportunity sets to 
individuals (Gauthier, 2007). 
 The population policy includes measures that are designed to have a positive 
impact on population structure, of which the fertility rate is the most relevant indicator. 
The term “family policies” is used to emphasize that government policies frequently do 
not aim specific goals in terms of the population size and structure, but are only 
concerned with family wellbeing and resultant activities that are directed towards 
families with children. Nevertheless, in the majority of the countries, family policies 
usually do not constitute a distinct policy area. 
Once that family policy is a fundamental part of welfare-state policies, it is useful 
to draw, on the European context, an appropriated classification to each type of society. 
This classification has been identified by Esping-Andersen (1999) and defends that the 
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European countries can be clustered into four different regimes according to their social 
policies: (1) the Nordic countries, the called universalistic welfare states; (2) the 
Continental European countries where the prevalence was to conservative welfare states; 
(3) the Anglo-Saxon countries, typically liberal welfare states; and (4) the Mediterranean 
countries, identified as the Southern European welfare states.  
The universalistic welfare states are characterized by welfare-states policies that 
are targeted at individual independence and social equality between all the individuals. 
The conservative welfare states direct their policies in the direction of status preservation 
and the protection of traditional family forms, and they often rely heavily on the family as 
a provider of welfare.  The liberal welfare states encourage market-based individualism 
trough minimal social benefits and trough subsidizing private, but where the social 
benefits are frequently related with poverty.  On the other hand, the Southern European 
welfare states are often considered as part of the conservative regime, but because of their 
stronger familial merits they are viewed as a separated welfare-state regime. 
This classification of the family policies reflects on the number of births that have 
occurred over the past decades in European countries. The Nordic countries with their 
social security systems tend to have a universal relatively high fertility in contrast to 
Southern Europe where the welfare regimes are associated with very low fertility values, 
and in-between are the West European countries with a moderately high fertility. 
Even though that family policy is part of the welfare state, they are spread in a 
different number of political fields and one of them characterized by a different historical 
and development path.  This enormous diversity has made hard for researchers the task to 
arrive at a common definition. Among the different attempts to conceptualize family 
policies, Neyer and Andersson (2008) highlighted three contributions that seem to be the 
most relevant in demographic research: 
(1) Kamerman and Kahn (1978) defined family policies as all the actions that the 
government does to and for the family (e.g., day care, child welfare, tax benefits). They 
interpreted the family policies as the sum of all state activities directed to the family 
core..  (2) On the other side Bourdieu (1996) indicates that if family policies are directed 
to the family, in the end they also construct the family. He considers family policies as 
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state measures to assemble and institutionalize a particular form of family as the 
established form of private relationships in a society.  
However fertility effects can be frail or insignificant if policies do not correspond 
to the social life that the majority of the people in a country want to lead or if the family 
policies oppose the norms that conduct most people’s lives. In these context Neyer and 
Andersson (2008: 703) present an example about Germany and Austria, where both 
countries have been among the countries with the lowest total fertility rate, yet the 
highest expenditures on family policies in Europe may be attributed to discrepancies 
between social developments and the orientation of the policies on one hand and the 
perception of the family policies on the other.  
(3) Finally the feminist welfare-state researchers and following the ideas of 
Esping-Andersen (1990) add two additional aspects. First, they give emphasis to that 
family policies constitute a central part of the welfare-state context in a country. They 
focus their attention in family policies by taking into account the effects that family 
policies have on gender, class, race, and other social, economic, and private affiliation in 
society. Second, these researchers underline the need to decompose the family concept. 
These feminist welfare-state approaches stress that family policies my not necessarily 
influence directly the fertility, can be an effect mediated through other social institutions.  
One of the most defended family policies are the maternity and parental-leave, 
however this regulation seems to be accepted across all the European countries as a 
measure to regulate the female labour participation and as a resource to organize 
employment and care along gender lines. The Nordic countries policies have been 
oriented to support women’s employment, however many continental European countries 
purpose the opposite goal, and many of those enclose indirect restrictions on father’s 
absorption of parental leave (e.g., low benefit levels or impractical rules regarding parent-
leave). 
In many countries, the family policies differentiate between social groups, 
between public and private sector (e.g., Portugal), married and non-married, or national 
and foreigners. To the demographic research these examples illustrate that whichever 
analysis of policy effects should be based on careful study of policy system, of their 
range, and their potential impact on family, social and economic relationships.  
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Demeny (1986: 476) argue that fertility behaviour was a legitimate object of 
attention for collective and, in particular, governmental action. On the other hand, to 
Chesnais (1996) the gap between the ideal and the reality (in terms of number of 
children) demonstrates that public policies have failed to remove the obstacles to 
realization of fertility desires. Although leadership come inevitably from governments, 
the ideal arrangement should be a partnership between families, governments and 
employers promoting the existence of friendly family policies. 
Generous social policies could create a socioeconomic environment that provides 
increased incentives for having children, including child-care provision, better access to 
labour markets for women with children, and government transfers for families with 
children. Due to the relatively low levels of childlessness, these policies in lowest-low 
fertility countries should be targeted in particular towards the realization of delayed first 
births at higher ages and the progression from the first to the second child (Kohler et al. 
2002).  
McDonald (2000: 16) suggests five financial incentives to help increasing 
fertility, (1) periodic cash payments; (2) lump sum payment or loan; (3) taxes rebates, 
credits or reductions; (4) free or subsided services or goods for children; (5) housing 
subsidies. The author suggests also measures related to work and family initiatives, and 
broad social change supportive for children and parenting. With respect to the suggestion 
about strategies related to the work and family initiatives, is easy to identify the 
universalistic welfare states from the Nordic European countries, where we observe the 
maternity and paternity leave; a higher support in child care; the flexible working hours 
and short-term leave for family purposes; or the anti discrimination legislation and gender 
equity in employment. 
On the other hand and with respect to the broad social change supportive of 
children and parenting, we identify the Southern European countries where exists 
employment initiatives or marriage and relationship supports. In Spain, e.g., in 2007 to 
encourage families having more children the government created new measures that 
included 2,500€ for each new-born (Goldstein et al. 2009). The “supposed” effect was 
felt in 2008 with an increased value of 5 percent in total fertility rate. 
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The total fertility rate is sensitive to the birth timing, so if a woman decides to 
postpone childbearing to a later time in their life, then it decreases regardless of changes 
in family policies or unemployment. In this perspective the higher pressure to respond 
with policy changes to the low fertility exist in the Southern European and conservative 
welfare regimes. In this context, Grant et al. (2004) proposed: (1) reformer's policies that 
aimed to accommodating and improving the consequences of low fertility, population 
decline and population aging; (2) preventive policies, which can be direct such as 
migration policies, family support, reproductive health and family-friendly employment 
policies, or indirect, such as economic, gender and educational policies.    
In contemporary Europe, the explicit pro-natalistic policies have met pronounced 
public resistance. Family policies in the European context tend to be based on an equal-
opportunity rationale and aim to help women combining childbearing with employment 
opportunities. What public policies could help stop the increase in the mean age at 
childbearing or even lead to a decrease in the near term? (Lutz and Skirbekk, 2005: 
709).  
 All the studies produced in the last decade suggest some levels of success for a 
particular policy measure in a particular country and year. It’s difficult from the point of 
view of the literature review to present an accurate political measure and an adequate 
model to the impact of the policies in the fertility behaviour. The measurement of policies 
success is the major challenge in all studies, which tend to be restricted to only one type 
of policies (Neyer and Andersson, 2008). 
 
6.6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
6.6.1. Discussion 
 
The total fertility rate is not the only key component in the analysis of period fertility and 
the interest in understanding age-specific fertility curves is always present. Among other 
reasons, the age-specific fertility curves as well as the total fertility in the context of 
population projections, are crucial for government planning activities (Bermúdez et al., 
2012; Alkema et al., 2011; De Beer, 2011).  
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Even that actual low fertility patterns provide future low fertility levels estimates, 
we believe that they will not continue for the next years or decades and need to be 
accurately measured. Thus, demographers keep seeking for period and cohort measures 
that more accurately as possible predict future trends (e.g., Schmertmann et al., 2014; 
Myrskylä et al., 2013; Goldstein et al., 2011; Sobotka et al., 2011; Goldstein, 2008; Bell 
and Monsell, 1991).  
Instead of improving techniques to extrapolate age specific fertility rates, 
demographers should include other factors affecting fertility in the analysis (Goldstein et 
al., 2011). Yet, we consider that in all fertility trends it is implicit the direct impact from 
the external constrains and enhancers on the tempo and quantum components. 
Consequently, our choice to forecast future fertility trends fell on the functional data 
forecasting methodology developed by Hyndman and Ullah (2007). 
By using this approach it was our aim to estimate how fertility will evolve in the 
near future by extrapolating past tendencies, evaluating simultaneously, what can be 
expected for countries as Portugal and Spain where the economical crises is a dominant 
characteristic as well as the lack of family support (e.g., Guerreiro, 2014; Wall, 2004). 
Despite that an analysis focused on the total fertility rate may provide important 
information, new insights and deep knowledge arrives from the identification of possible 
changes in the age-specific fertility rates across time. Nevertheless, while period 
observations can be distorted by the changes in the timing of fertility, for a given total 
fertility rate in a specific year, it is included the contribution from different cohorts. 
Therefore, age-specific rates provide us a new perspective on the fertility growth. 
Across all countries we observed a generalized increase in fertility postponement, 
with a significant decline in the contribution to the total fertility rate from the age group 
20-24. Yet, it is with the age group 25-29 that Portugal and Spain started to differentiate 
their fertility patterns from other countries, showing a high decline in the fertility rates for 
this group of women. Such decline was less pronounced for Austria and Hungary. For 
France and Sweden the fertility trends kept stable or with a slight increase, however the 
model results to both countries are somehow extremely different and they assume a 
complete change in the fertility evolution of such countries. 
In the age group 30-34 fertility rates increased in almost all countries with 
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exception to Portugal and Spain, in which since the year 2000, fertility at that ages almost 
stagnated. It is only at age group 35-39 that the contributions are similar across all 
countries, with an increase in the most recent years and that is expected to maintain until 
2020. Finally, in age group 40-44, after the decline for Portuguese and Spanish fertility 
trends in the 1960s, most recently and to all countries, the fertility rates at this age are 
increasing and expected to continue.  
In the particular case of the Iberian countries, the expected changes in their 
women’s fertility behavior, like it was identified in past chapters, can be explained by the 
negative impact from the 2008 economic crises, as well as the increasing unemployment 
rate or the changes in the social and individual patterns. Also, in the aging scenario that 
most European countries are facing nowadays, despite not enough to produce major 
changes in a short term, fertility increase/recuperation becomes imperative. Portugal, like 
Spain, is still dealing with an economic crisis that pushes young individuals in the labour 
ages to search for better living conditions abroad and that later on will leave their parents 
household (Tomé et al., 2014; Bettio and Villa, 1998).  
Still, Basten and colleagues (2013) pointed out some arguments suggesting that 
fertility rates may eventually increase in countries with low fertility rates (e.g., Austria, 
Portugal and Spain): (1) Period fertility rate decline was due to the large extent on the 
postponement of childbearing to higher ages. Still such postponement will eventualy 
come to an end or eventually recuperates as already observed in many European 
countries. (2) Cohort fertility will never decline to such low levels as the ones observed in 
the period. (3) Desired family size across Europe “remains remarkably stable at or 
slightly above two children”. 
The obtained results from our estimates indicate that all countries but Portugal 
will present some TFR positive improvements. The model also predicted that the lowest 
TFR value observed in 2020 would be, as expected, registered in Portugal, attaining the 
1.22 average children per woman. Nevertheless, recently, Statistics Portugal indicated 
that in 2013 the total fertility rate observed was 1.21. This value is even lower than the 
one predicted for the end of the forecasting period, what can indicate that migration, i.e., 
out migration flows are having a new high negative impact in Portuguese fertility. 
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6.6.2. Concluding remarks 
 
From the analysis undergone in this chapter, we can conclude that from the six countries 
under analysis, Portugal is the one with lower chances to present any kind of fertility 
recuperation in the near future. As pointed out several times across this thesis, TFR 
values under 1.3 are designated as lowest-low fertility, and if nothing changes till 2020, 
Portugal might become the only country among the ones under study, that can be labelled 
by this designation. 
 Again, likewise it was identified throughout the entire research, is the cohort 
postponement that influences the most period fertility rates, despite these might be 
influenced by different shocks registered in a period basis. Thus, it is imperative to the 
government and decision-makers to elaborate new and innovative polices that help 
possible parents to entry in parenthood. 
 Lastly, it was also identified that, more than mortality, emigration flows are 
influencing very negatively fertility outcomes. Thus, despite these urgent changes needed 
at the individual level, it is also urgent that the country (Portugal) becomes attractive 
again, in order to at least, bring back its own emigrants. 
Despite all previous presented and discussed results further research in terms of 
fertility trends need to be improved including in such models the cohort effect in terms of 
postponement, and we identify also the need to include the double postponement effect as 
a result from the period shocks identified in chapter 2 and 5.     
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CHAPTER 7 
WHY PORTUGAL IS NOT REPLACING GENERATIONS? – 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
  
7.1. Introduction  
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between cohort and period 
fertility postponement and the effect of this double postponement on the final period 
quantum. Across Europe the transition into family formation and to parenthood has been 
taking place over the past decades in older ages. Becoming a parent is no longer a social 
duty but a personal postponed decision. Both processes of postponement and free choice 
in terms of tempo and quantum have important consequences not only in the period 
fertility trends, but also in the cohort fertility levels.  
Additionally, the deep impact from the period and cohort postponement has a 
societal impact, conditioned by the social conditions and the economic and labour market 
instability. The negative recipe between these ingredients can, in the future, result in even 
higher negative reactions from the individual perspective.  
 
7.2. Period fertility patterns and the double postponement  
 
Firstly we identify as one of our goals to improve the understanding of a particular 
demographic process – fertility – in order to formulate theoretical and empirical informed 
scenarios of future developments in European countries, particularly in Portugal. We 
provided an extensive analysis from the demographic perspective on the transition to 
motherhood through the empirical demographic results to test our first hypothesis: if 
there is the period and cohort fertility level strongly affected by the double postponement. 
The most used indicator on fertility analysis – the TFR – is directly influenced by 
period changes, yet, the contribution from each real cohort to the period fertility should 
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be considered as an inter-dependency between synthetic and real cohorts. Furthermore 
such relationships between real and synthetic cohorts allowed identify a double effect on 
the period fertility trends. The decline observed in both period and cohort fertility trends, 
was followed by a continuous postponement that increased substantially the mean ages at 
childbearing.  
In the context of the six countries under analysis, Portugal highlighted with the 
smaller difference between the mean ages at birth (for total births and first child) in the 
most recent decades, as result from the extreme high contribution to the total number of 
births absorbed by the first child; consequently, lower period total fertility rates were 
observed specially since the mid 2000s; but also a recuperation at older ages in the recent 
years has been registered.  
However, when we focus our analysis in the cohort perspective, we observe that 
already by the 1952 cohort, Portuguese mothers were not replacing generations. Still and 
among the six countries under analysis was Portugal that later stopped to replace cohorts. 
Nonetheless, between the 1960 and 1970 cohorts, within Hungary and Sweden, Portugal 
had the highest lost in terms of final fertility decline (table 2.2). Indeed, the highest 
postponement and decline was observed in Portugal, and particularly for the Portuguese 
transition to motherhood the double postponement seemed to have a strong effect in the 
final period fertility level.   
 
7.3. Parenthood and fertility determinants, are they the same?  
 
The postponement in both period and cohort fertility has been discussed into the light of 
the individualization theory. We intended to identify if - into the light of the 
individualization theory can the familiar background, the social norms and individual 
values, explain the strong parenthood postponement, i.e., explain the late fertility 
transition. 
 The analysis regarding Portuguese individuals in their transition to parenthood 
give new empirical perspectives were the family formation decision is influenced by the 
background variables given by birth (age, sex, family, social condition) and in which a 
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strong influence correspond to personal choice variables (personal effort, education) with 
more predictive capability.  
 The heterogeneous individual path but homogenous in the latte transition to 
parenthood is particularly explained via the higher educational level (from the individuals 
and from their mothers); the late transition to first cohabitation; the lower number of 
siblings (maximum of one); the desired number of two children (maximum); the 
possibility of maternal conciliation between family and labour market; the perspective 
that a child doesn’t need the presence both mother and father to grow balanced; as well as 
no need to have a child as personal fulfilment; and finally the idea that it is preferable to 
have only a child with more economic and social stability.  
 Within the lowest-low fertility Portuguese, values observed since 2012 (1.28) 
question as, – “What determines Fertility? And What determines the transition to 
motherhood?” – can be consider as only one. If we consider the fundamental contribution 
from the first births identified across our research to the total fertility rates we can indeed 
assume that parenthood transition and fertility transition are nowadays explained by the 
same factors.  
 
7.4. Consequences from the increasing education level and the fertility 
postponement 
 
The heterogeneous individual decisions lead to homogenous patterns across countries, 
where low fertility levels are the main characteristic as well as the constant 
postponement. Those countries homogenous trends are explained by the social 
transformations, particularly by the strong female participation at the educational system. 
The literature review identified a positive and a negative relationship between fertility 
and the female educational level. Such deep relationship identified between education 
and fertility trends, as well as the importance of the individual’s mother education level, 
lead us to hypothesize that, individual’s education as well as their mother education be 
understood as “the key” factor for the period and cohort fertility postponement.    
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Our research contributed with new insights in the contextualization of 
motherhood transition from the cohort perspective in the relationship to the educational 
level. The Portuguese educational improvements follow the fertility decline between 
older and younger cohorts. The fertility decline in the first moment was followed by the 
rise in the mean age at childbearing increasing the individual heterogeneous decisions. 
The social, economical and educational transformations haven’t affected so directly the 
older cohort, but younger cohorts reflected new behaviour paradigms. 
The relationship between fertility and educational increasing levels had a direct 
effect on the fertility quantum decline followed by an effect on the timing decisions. Still, 
the postponement recuperation at older ages, where mothers with higher educational 
levels are expected to have more children, can be understood as the fertility shift into 
later ages.  
 
7.5. The positive relationship between high education, employment and 
fertility levels 
 
The relationship between education, family formation and labour market participation 
stability, is different between countries. The later transition to parenthood is the result 
from higher levels of education, later transitions into the labour market and consequently 
later family formation. Such fertility shifts into later ages have as main consequence the 
decrease in the total fertility rate and major changes in the fertility dynamics. 
 The social dynamic between family and labour market participations presented a 
positive relationship for Portugal while, e.g., for Spain the relationship seems to be 
negative.  Still, even that employment has different relationships with the fertility trends, 
in the case of employment uncertainty we could expect a homogenous reaction in all 
countries.  
Due to the strong relationship between fertility, education and female labour 
market participation we thus hypothesize that the traditional relationship between 
education and fertility postponement can, change from negative to positive in terms of 
fertility quantum, mainly at later ages. 
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Considering Portugal as our main focus, the labour market participation increased 
the fertility postponement effect, but still, the relationship between employment and 
fertility was positive in terms of quantum. In the most recent year as a reflected reaction 
to the cohort changes the quantum decline indicates as result the non-recuperation of 
older cohorts fertility postponement.  
Nevertheless, in a global perspective, for Portugal the positive relationship was 
preserved even with the 2008 strong economic shock. We identified a positive 
relationship between age, education and employment. Such positive effect increases the 
probabilities of more educated and older women recuperate the postponed childbearing 
earlier in their cohort. 
 
7.6. The fertility compression at age 30 and the changes between fertility, 
education level and employment 
 
Government action planning in terms of family policies need to be informed by the 
evolution of demographic trends. The social care supplies should be in concordance with 
the population necessities and in that context the better way to provide efficient answers 
to the population need is to proceed to demographic projection or forecasts. In terms of 
fertility analysis and population projections, are crucial for government planning 
activities the analysis of period fertility rates as well as the age-specific fertility rates. 
 From the analysis undergone across this research, we can conclude that Portugal 
is one of the countries in Europe, with lower chances to present any signs of fertility 
recuperation in the near future.  
 Furthermore, even with a positive relationship between education, high 
employment rates and fertility trends, the recuperation levels at older ages are not 
compensating the extraordinary postponement and decline at younger ages. Still, it is at 
older ages that the mentioned relationship between education level, fertility and 
employment is more positive, and by that time women that with higher educational levels 
increased the number of births.  
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 We proposed to test if, with all the changes observed in the relationship between 
fertility level, education and employment, will childbearing compress around age 30. The 
forecasting proposed model identified, indeed, that the positive relationship between 
education, employment rates and fertility trends compressed the mean age at childbearing 
between ages 29 to 35. Furthermore, it’s expected in the future a higher compression 
around age 30.    
  It was identified throughout our research, that it is the cohort postponement that 
influences the most period fertility rates, but this might be influenced by different shocks 
registered in the period basis. The recent economic crisis/shock (2008) can be considered 
the perfect example to this situation and beside the low fertility levels observed by that 
time in Portugal or in Spain the economical instability was immediately reflected in terms 
of fertility tempo and quantum. Our work allowed not only to predict the decline trends 
on the Portuguese fertility levels, but also to give some highlights to policy makers in 
particular for the Portuguese context.  
 
7.7. Concluding remarks  
The fertility shift to later ages and the compression around age 30 of the majority of 
births are the result from the relationship between cohort fertility postponement and 
period fertility postponement, as well as, from the joint and separated effects of this 
double postponement on the final period quantum in Portugal.  
If in one side no reversals into younger ages are expected, on the other side it’s 
expected that the educational levels improvements and the employment stability improve 
the recuperations index at later ages. Still, the recuperation at older ages will not be 
enough to overcome the losses in the younger ages. 
 The postponement effect on the fertility decline over the past years can be 
understood as a direct consequence from each individual decision in terms of their 
effective fertility desire. The double effect from period and cohort postponement has 
been identified across this research as main explanation to the fertility decline. Such 
double postponement effect it is heightened in the Portuguese case, by a high first-birth 
rates observed in the recent years (figure 2.6). 
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Appendix A   
 
To Chapter 2 - A retrospective overview of period and cohort fertility patterns:  
Evidence of six European countries 
 
Table A.1: Cohort total fertility rate (CTFR) and Cohort mean age at childbearing (MAC) 
evolution for selected countries 
 Austria France Hungary Portugal  Sweden 
 CTFR CMAC CTFR CMAC CTFR CMAC CTFR CMAC CTFR CMAC 
1940 2.13 25.85 2.42 26.28 1.92 25.26 2.66 27.52 2.05 26.23 
1941 2.07 25.68 2.37 26.05 1.93 25.28 2.61 27.32 2.03 26.19 
1942 2.04 25.58 2.31 25.93 1.90 25.31 2.55 27.15 2.00 26.21 
1943 1.98 25.37 2.29 25.83 1.92 25.31 2.53 27.04 1.99 26.18 
1944 1.95 25.19 2.27 25.79 1.92 25.25 2.50 26.93 1.99 26.17 
1945 1.94 25.07 2.23 25.76 1.91 25.23 2.41 26.84 1.97 26.18 
1946 1.99 24.95 2.17 25.80 1.91 25.18 2.35 26.75 1.99 26.25 
1947 1.93 24.95 2.14 25.93 1.93 25.07 2.26 26.59 2.00 26.36 
1948 1.92 25.00 2.12 26.04 1.95 24.97 2.20 26.60 1.99 26.48 
1949 1.91 25.09 2.11 26.11 1.97 24.90 2.13 26.53 2.00 26.66 
1950 1.86 25.20 2.12 26.27 1.96 24.84 2.09 26.51 2.01 26.86 
1951 1.84 25.25 2.11 26.35 1.97 24.82 2.07 26.44 2.00 27.05 
1952 1.81 25.42 2.12 26.48 1.96 24.83 2.06 26.35 2.01 27.22 
1953 1.82 25.48 2.12 26.59 1.93 24.88 2.04 26.20 2.03 27.41 
1954 1.78 25.55 2.12 26.70 1.94 24.82 2.03 26.05 2.02 27.57 
1955 1.77 25.68 2.13 26.77 1.95 24.81 2.04 25.91 2.04 27.72 
1956 1.75 25.78 2.14 26.87 1.97 24.80 2.03 25.86 2.04 27.87 
1957 1.73 25.96 2.14 26.98 2.02 24.80 1.99 25.81 2.05 28.07 
1958 1.71 26.13 2.14 27.10 2.02 24.85 1.99 25.91 2.06 28.18 
1959 1.71 26.23 2.12 27.26 2.03 24.86 1.95 26.04 2.05 28.31 
1960 1.70 26.32 2.12 27.39 2.02 24.90 1.91 26.22 2.06 28.32 
1961 1.68 26.46 2.09 27.56 2.04 24.99 1.88 26.45 2.03 28.38 
1962 1.68 26.55 2.08 27.72 2.04 25.06 1.90 26.59 2.04 28.40 
1963 1.67 26.73 2.07 27.94 2.02 25.12 1.85 26.81 2.03 28.41 
1964 1.65 26.90 2.05 28.14 2.00 25.20 1.84 26.91 2.01 28.47 
1965 1.65 27.13 2.04 28.34 1.99 25.31 1.84 27.13 2.01 28.51 
1966 1.64 27.27 2.02 28.52 - 25.43 1.82 27.24 2.00 28.63 
1967 - 27.48 2.01 28.68 - 25.56 1.80 27.44 1.99 28.68 
1968 - 27.62 2.01 28.81 - 25.72 1.75 27.63 - 28.86 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Figure A.1: Cumulative change total birth progression by age, birth cohorts, in Austria, 
France, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden. 
Austria France 
  
Hungary Portugal 
  
Sweden  
 
 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Figure A.2: Cumulative change in first (a) and second (b) birth progression by age, birth 
cohorts 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 in Austria (benchmark cohort 1970) 
(a) (b) 
  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table A.2: Cumulative change in total childbearing progression by age, birth cohorts 1955, 
1960, 1965, 1970, 1975,1980 and 1985 in Austria (benchmark cohort 1955) 
Age 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 
15 0.00238 0.00024 -0.00019 -0.00063 -0.00110 -0.00133 
16 0.01137 0.00150 -0.00110 -0.00412 -0.00626 -0.00684 
17 0.03572 0.00693 -0.00600 -0.01535 -0.02198 -0.02382 
18 0.08749 0.01239 -0.02010 -0.04186 -0.05580 -0.06102 
19 0.17784 0.00737 -0.04620 -0.08885 -0.11454 -0.12650 
20 0.30912 -0.02075 -0.08953 -0.16046 -0.20095 -0.22380 
21 0.46747 -0.05894 -0.13909 -0.24184 -0.30034 -0.33718 
22 0.64073 -0.09558 -0.18769 -0.32124 -0.40382 -0.45344 
23 0.80599 -0.11634 -0.21787 -0.37630 -0.48633 -0.54648 
24 0.96345 -0.11688 -0.22804 -0.40847 -0.54373 -0.61111 
25 1.10647 -0.09812 -0.21745 -0.41396 -0.56836 -0.64007 
26 1.24363 -0.08103 -0.20287 -0.40758 -0.57422 -0.64849 
27 1.37156 -0.07080 -0.18584 -0.39735 -0.56115 -0.63521 
28 1.48655 -0.06388 -0.16556 -0.37913 -0.53172 -0.60394 
29 1.59420 -0.05960 -0.14854 -0.35646 -0.49358 -0.56260 
30 1.69188 -0.05487 -0.13357 -0.32933 -0.45256 -0.51441 
31 1.77490 -0.04840 -0.11864 -0.30012 -0.40982 -0.45966 
32 1.84170 -0.03733 -0.10203 -0.26755 -0.36502 -0.40101 
33 1.89577 -0.02385 -0.08478 -0.23359 -0.32084 -0.34422 
34 1.94347 -0.01288 -0.06933 -0.20219 -0.28094 -0.29298 
35 1.98412 -0.00393 -0.05421 -0.17462 -0.24418 -0.24636 
36 2.01787 0.00196 -0.04149 -0.15228 -0.21215 -0.20813 
37 2.04534 0.00583 -0.03129 -0.13409 -0.18659 — 
38 2.06731 0.00785 -0.02281 -0.12023 -0.16603 — 
39 2.08420 0.00988 -0.01529 -0.10832 -0.14918 — 
40 2.09650 0.01169 -0.00969 -0.09854 -0.13634 — 
41 2.10480 0.01298 -0.00557 -0.09164 -0.12719 — 
42 2.11011 0.01379 -0.00300 -0.08728 — — 
43 2.11312 0.01446 -0.00115 -0.08435 — — 
44 2.11477 0.01484 -0.00012 -0.08274 — — 
45 2.11571 0.01482 0.00028 -0.08200 — — 
 IV 
Table A.3: Cumulative change in total, first  and second birth progression by age, birth cohorts 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 in Austria (benchmark cohort 
1970) 
 Total 1º Child 2º Child 
Age 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 1970 1975 1980 1985 
15 0.00149 0.00038 -0.00036 -0.00010 0.00138 0.00040 -0.00030 -0.00002 0.00011 -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00009 
16 0.00730 0.00161 -0.00169 -0.00084 0.00700 0.00123 -0.00172 -0.00066 0.00029 0.00034 0.00001 -0.00018 
17 0.02203 0.00441 -0.00567 -0.00534 0.02089 0.00327 -0.00551 -0.00486 0.00107 0.00105 -0.00019 -0.00042 
18 0.05096 0.00457 -0.01496 -0.01515 0.04732 0.00268 -0.01417 -0.01413 0.00352 0.00145 -0.00090 -0.00097 
19 0.09797 -0.00010 -0.02902 -0.03208 0.08800 -0.00186 -0.02591 -0.02917 0.00943 0.00115 -0.00298 -0.00275 
20 0.16138 -0.00929 -0.04889 -0.05583 0.13891 -0.01075 -0.04128 -0.04807 0.02081 0.00097 -0.00722 -0.00751 
21 0.23768 -0.02210 -0.07323 -0.08759 0.19531 -0.02198 -0.05964 -0.07200 0.03859 -0.00045 -0.01270 -0.01483 
22 0.32717 -0.04161 -0.10319 -0.12843 0.25323 -0.03481 -0.07717 -0.09748 0.06574 -0.00621 -0.02356 -0.02807 
23 0.42196 -0.05884 -0.13155 -0.16564 0.30976 -0.04408 -0.09247 -0.11788 0.09801 -0.01342 -0.03484 -0.04265 
24 0.52147 -0.07208 -0.15520 -0.20090 0.36412 -0.05045 -0.10296 -0.13454 0.13507 -0.01975 -0.04654 -0.05832 
25 0.62502 -0.08664 -0.17701 — 0.41714 -0.05582 -0.11067 — 0.17555 -0.02788 -0.05847 — 
26 0.73081 -0.09862 -0.19788 — 0.46961 -0.06077 -0.11833 — 0.21615 -0.03438 -0.06964 — 
27 0.83326 -0.10134 -0.21034 — 0.51712 -0.05917 -0.12070 — 0.25778 -0.03906 -0.07735 — 
28 0.92905 -0.09723 -0.21164 — 0.55815 -0.05587 -0.11478 — 0.29758 -0.03914 -0.08294 — 
29 1.02315 -0.09116 -0.20520 — 0.59713 -0.05148 -0.10711 — 0.33561 -0.03803 -0.08315 — 
30 1.11054 -0.08258 — — 0.63045 -0.04404 — — 0.37207 -0.03766 — — 
31 1.19209 -0.07122 — — 0.65998 -0.03549 — — 0.40639 -0.03570 — — 
32 1.26841 -0.06314 — — 0.68666 -0.03104 — — 0.43733 -0.03236 — — 
33 1.33165 -0.04821 — — 0.70699 -0.02379 — — 0.46310 -0.02638 — — 
34 1.39126 -0.03672 — — 0.72520 -0.01865 — — 0.48728 -0.02086 — — 
35 1.44357 — — — 0.74140 — — — 0.50685 — — — 
36 1.48721 — — — 0.75469 — — — 0.52279 — — — 
37 1.52457 — — — 0.76545 — — — 0.53636 — — — 
38 1.55416 — — — 0.77359 — — — 0.54673 — — — 
39 1.57638 — — — 0.78034 — — — 0.55464 — — — 
40 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
41 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
42 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
43 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
44 — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.4: Cumulative change in total, first  and second birth progression by age, birth cohorts 1960, 1965, 1970,1975, 1980 and 1985 in Hungary 
(benchmark cohort 1960) 
 Total 1º Child 2º Child 
Age 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
15 0.00953 -0.00065 -0.00034 -0.00279 -0.00349 -0.00432 0.00903 -0.00072 -0.00042 -0.00265 -0.00349 -0.00415 0.00050 0.00006 0.00007 -0.00016 -0.00003 -0.00016 
16 0.03727 -0.00259 -0.00744 -0.01503 -0.01725 -0.01978 0.03410 -0.00221 -0.00688 -0.01360 -0.01611 -0.01844 0.00302 -0.00040 -0.00050 -0.00132 -0.00121 -0.00125 
17 0.10096 -0.01662 -0.03311 -0.05074 -0.05887 -0.06389 0.08941 -0.01411 -0.02942 -0.04494 -0.05340 -0.05761 0.01091 -0.00265 -0.00359 -0.00555 -0.00553 -0.00594 
18 0.20578 -0.04061 -0.07833 -0.10973 -0.13090 -0.14146 0.17532 -0.03297 -0.06587 -0.09293 -0.11396 -0.12387 0.02758 -0.00719 -0.01143 -0.01542 -0.01590 -0.01625 
19 0.34720 -0.06964 -0.12693 -0.18744 -0.22970 -0.24821 0.28260 -0.05280 -0.09882 -0.15039 -0.19045 -0.20691 0.05745 -0.01549 -0.02579 -0.03413 -0.03686 -0.03834 
20 0.50352 -0.09087 -0.16039 -0.26721 -0.33812 -0.36601 0.38835 -0.05975 -0.11278 -0.20071 -0.26469 -0.28921 0.10033 -0.02788 -0.04280 -0.06056 -0.06817 -0.07106 
21 0.66062 -0.09760 -0.18334 -0.34285 -0.44252 -0.48372 0.48431 -0.05590 -0.11922 -0.24309 -0.32740 -0.36231 0.15088 -0.03622 -0.05671 -0.09025 -0.10634 -0.11116 
22 0.81391 -0.09327 -0.20165 -0.41421 -0.53921 -0.59103 0.56957 -0.04977 -0.12533 -0.27904 -0.37926 -0.42180 0.20576 -0.03709 -0.06693 -0.12082 -0.14588 -0.15397 
23 0.96525 -0.08577 -0.21922 -0.48049 -0.63335 -0.69428 0.64532 -0.04350 -0.13466 -0.30761 -0.42167 -0.47082 0.26683 -0.03642 -0.07752 -0.15470 -0.19202 -0.20220 
24 1.11144 -0.07519 -0.24161 -0.53741 -0.71416 — 0.71187 -0.04291 -0.14671 -0.32584 -0.45022 — 0.32990 -0.02974 -0.09073 -0.18966 -0.23761 — 
25 1.25284 -0.06553 -0.26227 -0.58530 -0.78538 — 0.76461 -0.03899 -0.14881 -0.32989 -0.46258 — 0.39758 -0.02624 -0.10835 -0.22722 -0.28619 — 
26 1.37789 -0.05932 -0.28065 -0.61680 -0.83068 — 0.80275 -0.03441 -0.14495 -0.32065 -0.45556 — 0.46185 -0.02663 -0.12897 -0.26044 -0.32726 — 
27 1.49048 -0.05720 -0.29558 -0.63515 -0.85700 — 0.83209 -0.03248 -0.13858 -0.30491 -0.43589 — 0.52077 -0.02945 -0.14666 -0.28591 -0.36070 — 
28 1.58753 -0.05692 -0.30449 -0.63807 -0.86229 — 0.85389 -0.03096 -0.12908 -0.28142 -0.40826 — 0.56920 -0.03247 -0.15886 -0.30100 -0.37992 — 
29 1.66812 -0.05698 -0.30355 -0.62487 — — 0.86908 -0.02850 -0.11675 -0.25390 — — 0.60848 -0.03705 -0.16479 -0.30595 — — 
30 1.73791 -0.05627 -0.29644 -0.60227 — — 0.88131 -0.02573 -0.10563 -0.22680 — — 0.63969 -0.03877 -0.16523 -0.30089 — — 
31 1.79481 -0.05745 -0.28554 -0.56999 — — 0.89008 -0.02332 -0.09456 -0.20123 — — 0.66346 -0.04075 -0.16159 -0.28765 — — 
32 1.84064 -0.05647 -0.27132 -0.53559 — — 0.89693 -0.02084 -0.08593 -0.17891 — — 0.68025 -0.04051 -0.15404 -0.27129 — — 
33 1.88062 -0.05788 -0.25772 -0.50461 — — 0.90289 -0.01901 -0.07798 -0.16117 — — 0.69246 -0.03985 -0.14585 -0.25360 — — 
34 1.91360 -0.05798 -0.24101 — — — 0.90749 -0.01787 -0.07013 — — — 0.70216 -0.03840 -0.13642 — — — 
35 1.94011 -0.05267 -0.22569 — — — 0.91122 -0.01642 -0.06338 — — — 0.70942 -0.03581 -0.12906 — — — 
36 1.96123 -0.04833 -0.20923 — — — 0.91451 -0.01604 -0.05764 — — — 0.71494 -0.03413 -0.12133 — — — 
37 1.97721 -0.04304 -0.19505 — — — 0.91668 -0.01441 -0.05291 — — — 0.71869 -0.03194 -0.11511 — — — 
38 1.99026 -0.03915 -0.18381 — — — 0.91858 -0.01303 -0.04951 — — — 0.72168 -0.03058 -0.11005 — — — 
39 1.99998 -0.03562 — — — — 0.92003 -0.01218 — — — — 0.72338 -0.02922 — — — — 
40 2.00790 -0.03309 — — — — 0.92110 -0.01140 — — — — 0.72511 -0.02871 — — — — 
41 2.01349 -0.03217 — — — — 0.92181 -0.01123 — — — — 0.72606 -0.02813 — — — — 
42 2.01717 -0.03103 — — — — 0.92238 -0.01100 — — — — 0.72655 -0.02759 — — — — 
43 2.01912 -0.03033 — — — — 0.92260 -0.01071 — — — — 0.72682 -0.02724 — — — — 
44 2.02015 — — — — — 0.92270 — — — — — 0.72703 — — — — — 
45 2.02070 — — — — — 0.92274 — — — — — 0.72709 — — — — — 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.5: Cumulative change in total, first  and second birth progression by age, birth cohorts 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 in Portugal 
(benchmark cohort 1960) 
 Total 1º Child 2º Child 
Age 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
15 0.00614 -0.00044 -0.00153 -0.00192 -0.00201 -0.00162 0.00594 -0.00047 -0.00152 -0.00187 -0.00197 -0.00152 0.00019 0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00004 -0.00002 -0.00009 
16 0.02699 -0.00544 -0.01082 -0.01281 -0.01306 -0.01129 0.02547 -0.00491 -0.01007 -0.01192 -0.01221 -0.01040 0.00145 -0.00054 -0.00070 -0.00084 -0.00077 -0.00084 
17 0.06903 -0.01336 -0.02897 -0.03411 -0.03575 -0.03357 0.06337 -0.01170 -0.02593 -0.03023 -0.03206 -0.02993 0.00528 -0.00145 -0.00285 -0.00360 -0.00338 -0.00333 
18 0.13569 -0.02565 -0.05672 -0.07048 -0.07364 -0.07376 0.11991 -0.02065 -0.04791 -0.05963 -0.06266 -0.06282 0.01447 -0.00455 -0.00809 -0.00987 -0.00998 -0.00983 
19 0.22794 -0.04317 -0.09598 -0.12469 -0.12740 -0.13274 0.19357 -0.03322 -0.07601 -0.10047 -0.10280 -0.10843 0.03088 -0.00893 -0.01800 -0.02165 -0.02208 -0.02163 
20 0.34260 -0.06970 -0.14902 -0.19313 -0.19863 -0.21022 0.27973 -0.04993 -0.11147 -0.14801 -0.15363 -0.16479 0.05440 -0.01714 -0.03221 -0.03864 -0.03872 -0.03885 
21 0.46866 -0.09813 -0.20435 -0.26387 -0.27567 -0.29501 0.36654 -0.06464 -0.14247 -0.19103 -0.20225 -0.22034 0.08584 -0.02802 -0.05163 -0.06032 -0.06097 -0.06196 
22 0.60618 -0.13375 -0.26218 -0.34025 -0.36138 -0.38593 0.45544 -0.08254 -0.17194 -0.23311 -0.25245 -0.27474 0.12315 -0.04092 -0.07252 -0.08630 -0.08779 -0.08925 
23 0.73983 -0.15996 -0.31283 -0.40612 -0.44032 -0.46839 0.53486 -0.09065 -0.19188 -0.26255 -0.29297 -0.31781 0.16344 -0.05381 -0.09449 -0.11210 -0.11574 -0.11738 
24 0.86777 -0.17849 -0.35440 -0.45499 -0.50859 -0.54016 0.60291 -0.08959 -0.20067 -0.27402 -0.31945 -0.34797 0.20618 -0.06605 -0.11601 -0.13677 -0.14417 -0.14609 
25 0.98594 -0.18433 -0.38138 -0.48917 -0.56099 -0.59859 0.66126 -0.08148 -0.19967 -0.27550 -0.33299 -0.36724 0.24853 -0.07299 -0.13310 -0.15756 -0.16990 -0.17240 
26 1.10023 -0.18359 -0.39679 -0.51777 -0.60355 -0.64941 0.71211 -0.06846 -0.18848 -0.27015 -0.33729 -0.37623 0.29342 -0.07869 -0.14928 -0.17924 -0.19474 -0.20062 
27 1.20637 -0.17683 -0.40129 -0.52813 -0.63198 — 0.75620 -0.05473 -0.17395 -0.25329 -0.33100 — 0.33667 -0.07953 -0.15894 -0.19489 -0.21659 — 
28 1.30726 -0.17282 -0.39697 -0.53488 -0.64653 — 0.79521 -0.04345 -0.15527 -0.23537 -0.31534 — 0.37992 -0.08142 -0.16457 -0.20814 -0.23493 — 
29 1.40221 -0.17071 -0.38785 -0.53149 -0.65249 — 0.82883 -0.03599 -0.13554 -0.21205 -0.29306 — 0.42252 -0.08224 -0.16665 -0.21816 -0.25151 — 
30 1.48744 -0.16195 -0.36932 -0.51627 -0.64158 — 0.85555 -0.02721 -0.11352 -0.18459 -0.26286 — 0.46277 -0.07938 -0.16298 -0.22137 -0.26055 — 
31 1.56250 -0.15186 -0.35328 -0.49986 -0.62669 — 0.87661 -0.02043 -0.09581 -0.16024 -0.23347 — 0.49834 -0.07327 -0.15793 -0.22011 -0.26408 — 
32 1.62929 -0.14406 -0.33408 -0.48250 — — 0.89419 -0.01632 -0.07979 -0.14098 — — 0.53062 -0.06744 -0.15027 -0.21496 — — 
33 1.68385 -0.13020 -0.31312 -0.45716 — — 0.90834 -0.01155 -0.06796 -0.12269 — — 0.55564 -0.05843 -0.13862 -0.20253 — — 
34 1.73034 -0.11487 -0.29026 -0.43387 — — 0.91899 -0.00607 -0.05583 -0.10673 — — 0.57654 -0.04820 -0.12521 -0.19029 — — 
35 1.76983 -0.10039 -0.27069 -0.40646 — — 0.92808 -0.00119 -0.04709 -0.09286 — — 0.59300 -0.03804 -0.11242 -0.17389 — — 
36 1.80479 -0.09237 -0.25795 -0.38746 — — 0.93525 0.00273 -0.04044 -0.08175 — — 0.60800 -0.03305 -0.10366 -0.16283 — — 
37 1.83208 -0.08490 -0.24647 — — — 0.94045 0.00567 -0.03545 — — — 0.61957 -0.02896 -0.09666 — — — 
38 1.85367 -0.07995 -0.23658 — — — 0.94499 0.00726 -0.03123 — — — 0.62759 -0.02569 -0.09025 — — — 
39 1.87176 -0.07725 -0.23047 — — — 0.94921 0.00805 -0.02892 — — — 0.63381 -0.02381 -0.08541 — — — 
40 1.88489 -0.07465 -0.22422 — — — 0.95220 0.00902 -0.02690 — — — 0.63843 -0.02264 -0.08168 — — — 
41 1.89355 -0.07247 -0.22126 — — — 0.95400 0.00979 -0.02548 — — — 0.64135 -0.02168 -0.08008 — — — 
42 1.89932 -0.07251 — — — — 0.95540 0.00962 — — — — 0.64301 -0.02136 — — — — 
43 1.90317 -0.07229 — — — — 0.95614 0.00986 — — — — 0.64426 -0.02127 — — — — 
44 1.90553 -0.07227 — — — — 0.95671 0.00996 — — — — 0.64489 -0.02106 — — — — 
45 1.90677 -0.07229 — — — — 0.95697 0.01003 — — — — 0.64524 -0.02097 — — — — 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.6: Cumulative change in total, first  and second birth progression by age, birth cohorts 1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985 in Sweden 
(benchmark cohort 1955) 
 Total 1º Child 2º Child 
Age 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
15 0.00244 -0.00089 -0.00148 -0.00192 -0.00160 -0.00178 -0.00176 0.00242 -0.00087 -0.00149 -0.00190 -0.00160 -0.00176 -0.00176 0.00002 -0.00002 0.00001 -0.00002 0.00000 -0.00002 0.00000 
16 0.01465 -0.00714 -0.01098 -0.01164 -0.01113 -0.01193 -0.01176 0.01443 -0.00709 -0.01084 -0.01146 -0.01105 -0.01177 -0.01164 0.00023 -0.00007 -0.00015 -0.00019 -0.00010 -0.00017 -0.00013 
17 0.04272 -0.02142 -0.03127 -0.03270 -0.03276 -0.03522 -0.03420 0.04158 -0.02090 -0.03045 -0.03189 -0.03197 -0.03438 -0.03333 0.00116 -0.00057 -0.00086 -0.00084 -0.00084 -0.00086 -0.00089 
18 0.09025 -0.04118 -0.06385 -0.06405 -0.06714 -0.07259 -0.07339 0.08525 -0.03887 -0.06023 -0.06079 -0.06362 -0.06870 -0.06951 0.00495 -0.00239 -0.00364 -0.00329 -0.00357 -0.00392 -0.00387 
19 0.16091 -0.06683 -0.10446 -0.09709 -0.11404 -0.12485 -0.12729 0.14631 -0.06037 -0.09430 -0.08798 -0.10395 -0.11333 -0.11566 0.01411 -0.00639 -0.00991 -0.00901 -0.00983 -0.01130 -0.01124 
20 0.24338 -0.08703 -0.13798 -0.12275 -0.16283 -0.18074 -0.18291 0.21137 -0.07485 -0.11831 -0.10647 -0.14143 -0.15584 -0.15841 0.03076 -0.01191 -0.01919 -0.01615 -0.02073 -0.02431 -0.02385 
21 0.33672 -0.10499 -0.16433 -0.14517 -0.21302 -0.23647 -0.23788 0.27569 -0.08488 -0.13170 -0.11923 -0.17347 -0.19061 -0.19287 0.05787 -0.01957 -0.03157 -0.02542 -0.03795 -0.04396 -0.04319 
22 0.44063 -0.12234 -0.17796 -0.16511 -0.26461 -0.29225 -0.29020 0.33738 -0.09049 -0.13071 -0.12733 -0.19902 -0.21820 -0.21795 0.09606 -0.03047 -0.04533 -0.03723 -0.06195 -0.07006 -0.06838 
23 0.55244 -0.13612 -0.17840 -0.18026 -0.31609 -0.34970 -0.34052 0.39804 -0.09479 -0.12255 -0.13359 -0.22275 -0.24321 -0.23787 0.14033 -0.03949 -0.05366 -0.04558 -0.08635 -0.09842 -0.09510 
24 0.67702 -0.14285 -0.16754 -0.20268 -0.36992 -0.40505 -0.38778 0.46368 -0.09836 -0.11257 -0.14663 -0.24628 -0.26684 -0.25680 0.18874 -0.04302 -0.05276 -0.05348 -0.11193 -0.12426 -0.11817 
25 0.80306 -0.13759 -0.14412 -0.21973 -0.41041 -0.44704 -0.42587 0.52363 -0.09330 -0.09741 -0.15093 -0.25639 -0.27705 -0.26468 0.24076 -0.04432 -0.04809 -0.06398 -0.13545 -0.14860 -0.14177 
26 0.93003 -0.12347 -0.11688 -0.23865 -0.43965 -0.47596 — 0.57778 -0.08130 -0.08301 -0.15254 -0.25703 -0.27476 — 0.29488 -0.04429 -0.04029 -0.07626 -0.15465 -0.17074 — 
27 1.05192 -0.09745 -0.08749 -0.25034 -0.44851 -0.48280 — 0.62556 -0.06852 -0.06893 -0.14888 -0.24473 -0.25893 — 0.34815 -0.03695 -0.03142 -0.08623 -0.16786 -0.18510 — 
28 1.17557 -0.06837 -0.06418 -0.25736 -0.44428 -0.47682 — 0.66890 -0.05481 -0.05804 -0.14180 -0.22193 -0.23284 — 0.40332 -0.02950 -0.02546 -0.09306 -0.17718 -0.19547 — 
29 1.29652 -0.03853 -0.05385 -0.25882 -0.42955 -0.45517 — 0.70777 -0.04232 -0.05169 -0.13032 -0.19390 -0.19892 — 0.45456 -0.01922 -0.01992 -0.09651 -0.17711 -0.19601 — 
30 1.41250 -0.01348 -0.05271 -0.25370 -0.40118 -0.42599 — 0.74175 -0.03175 -0.04672 -0.11392 -0.16029 -0.16633 — 0.50269 -0.01152 -0.01884 -0.09718 -0.16999 -0.18753 — 
31 1.51994 0.00897 -0.05787 -0.23894 -0.36360 — — 0.76874 -0.02339 -0.04096 -0.09248 -0.12613 — — 0.54733 -0.00365 -0.01990 -0.09319 -0.15478 — — 
32 1.61863 0.02226 -0.06495 -0.21919 -0.32419 — — 0.79037 -0.01768 -0.03563 -0.07142 -0.09717 — — 0.58638 0.00160 -0.02032 -0.08389 -0.13342 — — 
33 1.70569 0.02706 -0.07033 -0.19538 -0.28806 — — 0.80868 -0.01436 -0.03124 -0.05320 -0.07655 — — 0.62051 0.00213 -0.02113 -0.07112 -0.11162 — — 
34 1.78080 0.02861 -0.07112 -0.17013 -0.24592 — — 0.82366 -0.01266 -0.02625 -0.04047 -0.05736 — — 0.64663 0.00346 -0.01878 -0.05380 -0.08461 — — 
35 1.84705 0.02336 -0.06982 -0.14921 -0.21339 — — 0.83726 -0.01222 -0.02272 -0.03077 -0.04375 — — 0.66737 0.00381 -0.01428 -0.03729 -0.06414 — — 
36 1.90115 0.01759 -0.06739 -0.12705 — — — 0.84734 -0.01161 -0.01962 -0.02098 — — — 0.68426 0.00421 -0.01002 -0.02514 — — — 
37 1.94235 0.01513 -0.05998 -0.10690 — — — 0.85505 -0.01105 -0.01599 -0.01377 — — — 0.69649 0.00524 -0.00443 -0.01427 — — — 
38 1.97424 0.01290 -0.05320 -0.08905 — — — 0.86105 -0.01060 -0.01338 -0.00846 — — — 0.70615 0.00515 -0.00121 -0.00572 — — — 
39 1.99642 0.01401 -0.04476 -0.07245 — — — 0.86519 -0.01003 -0.01034 -0.00337 — — — 0.71274 0.00570 0.00175 0.00128 — — — 
40 2.01107 0.01534 -0.03805 -0.05919 — — — 0.86780 -0.00904 -0.00808 0.00045 — — — 0.71721 0.00595 0.00380 0.00592 — — — 
41 2.02095 0.01844 -0.03213 — — — — 0.86982 -0.00829 -0.00658 — — — — 0.72016 0.00661 0.00545 — — — — 
42 2.02681 0.02019 -0.02740 — — — — 0.87084 -0.00768 -0.00553 — — — — 0.72151 0.00744 0.00752 — — — — 
43 2.03079 0.02102 -0.02526 — — — — 0.87151 -0.00745 -0.00498 — — — — 0.72244 0.00769 0.00849 — — — — 
44 2.03273 0.02194 -0.02329 — — — — 0.87184 -0.00720 -0.00445 — — — — 0.72292 0.00777 0.00895 — — — — 
45 2.03354 0.02257 -0.02233 — — — — 0.87200 -0.00701 -0.00418 — — — — 0.72311 0.00795 0.00915 — — — — 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VIII 
Table A.7: Age Specific fertility rates between ages 15 to 30, in years 1960 to 2012, for Austria 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1960 0.00321 0.01353 0.03749 0.06714 0.10243 0.13236 0.15199 0.16985 0.17894 0.18035 0.17634 0.17272 0.16146 0.15244 0.13477 0.12184 
1961 0.00432 0.01712 0.04137 0.07549 0.10720 0.13549 0.15674 0.17162 0.18556 0.18768 0.18379 0.17543 0.16422 0.15690 0.13907 0.13030 
1962 0.00408 0.01839 0.04684 0.08003 0.11121 0.13835 0.15625 0.17107 0.18123 0.18599 0.18433 0.17699 0.16513 0.15454 0.14203 0.13303 
1963 0.00422 0.01840 0.04927 0.08746 0.11839 0.14264 0.15726 0.16988 0.17598 0.17970 0.18701 0.17673 0.16639 0.15823 0.14200 0.13133 
1964 0.00460 0.01796 0.05124 0.09510 0.12269 0.14499 0.15477 0.16839 0.17367 0.17301 0.17351 0.17676 0.16294 0.15222 0.14419 0.12934 
1965 0.00337 0.01745 0.04929 0.09405 0.13396 0.14362 0.15666 0.16629 0.16798 0.16992 0.16760 0.15795 0.15611 0.14596 0.13452 0.12619 
1966 0.00310 0.01706 0.05111 0.09616 0.13577 0.15995 0.15986 0.16568 0.17035 0.16439 0.16001 0.15391 0.14529 0.14270 0.12935 0.11891 
1967 0.00335 0.01764 0.04981 0.09628 0.13619 0.16584 0.17095 0.16515 0.16735 0.16344 0.15606 0.15177 0.14008 0.13276 0.12745 0.11549 
1968 0.00276 0.01475 0.05300 0.09740 0.13973 0.17016 0.17757 0.17475 0.16244 0.16135 0.15327 0.14612 0.13666 0.12659 0.11715 0.11078 
1969 0.00281 0.01512 0.05028 0.10075 0.14007 0.16448 0.17170 0.17341 0.16734 0.15010 0.14221 0.13891 0.12827 0.12088 0.10803 0.10090 
1970 0.00335 0.01648 0.04899 0.09116 0.13264 0.15291 0.16213 0.16536 0.15218 0.14129 0.13135 0.12515 0.11618 0.10868 0.09884 0.08967 
1971 0.00317 0.01710 0.04989 0.08946 0.12566 0.14500 0.15582 0.15488 0.14863 0.13852 0.12927 0.11687 0.11113 0.10291 0.09392 0.08736 
1972 0.00371 0.01874 0.05184 0.09023 0.12065 0.13789 0.14692 0.14567 0.14055 0.13628 0.12522 0.11424 0.10418 0.09688 0.08616 0.07925 
1973 0.00477 0.02014 0.05155 0.08421 0.11529 0.13014 0.13519 0.13622 0.13506 0.12580 0.11560 0.10778 0.09693 0.08564 0.07927 0.07185 
1974 0.00415 0.01853 0.04874 0.08379 0.10998 0.13048 0.13758 0.13554 0.13499 0.12844 0.11972 0.11018 0.09716 0.08829 0.07619 0.06704 
1975 0.00320 0.01549 0.04214 0.07470 0.10465 0.12027 0.13208 0.13445 0.13349 0.12753 0.11966 0.10933 0.09850 0.08917 0.07689 0.06776 
1976 0.00250 0.01333 0.03743 0.06375 0.09282 0.10720 0.12161 0.12577 0.12532 0.12162 0.11494 0.10915 0.09460 0.08630 0.07383 0.06298 
1977 0.00241 0.01149 0.03259 0.05690 0.08462 0.10386 0.11595 0.12258 0.12418 0.12284 0.11417 0.10428 0.09662 0.08487 0.07298 0.06273 
1978 0.00228 0.01024 0.02954 0.05420 0.08244 0.09830 0.11210 0.11922 0.12254 0.12140 0.11902 0.10956 0.09661 0.08677 0.07539 0.06321 
1979 0.00199 0.00977 0.02863 0.05260 0.07971 0.09912 0.11173 0.11641 0.12268 0.12135 0.11764 0.10784 0.09824 0.08744 0.07770 0.06628 
1980 0.00206 0.01008 0.02751 0.05185 0.08169 0.10157 0.11538 0.12105 0.12492 0.12709 0.12186 0.11446 0.10213 0.09213 0.07897 0.06996 
1981 0.00212 0.00962 0.02597 0.05159 0.07950 0.10229 0.11763 0.12273 0.12741 0.12644 0.12096 0.11213 0.10573 0.09490 0.08479 0.07220 
1982 0.00149 0.00914 0.02560 0.04978 0.07802 0.09844 0.11258 0.12420 0.12863 0.12571 0.12102 0.11687 0.10451 0.09405 0.08258 0.07556 
1983 0.00159 0.00785 0.02076 0.04348 0.07041 0.09153 0.10375 0.11156 0.11739 0.11934 0.11520 0.10873 0.10201 0.09310 0.08226 0.06902 
1984 0.00159 0.00654 0.01983 0.03829 0.06373 0.08606 0.09886 0.11179 0.11494 0.11652 0.11701 0.10800 0.09981 0.08961 0.08198 0.06966 
1985 0.00138 0.00648 0.01749 0.03527 0.05848 0.07929 0.09297 0.10150 0.10867 0.11680 0.11222 0.10655 0.10026 0.09137 0.07829 0.06912 
1986 0.00151 0.00625 0.01701 0.03261 0.05586 0.07405 0.08677 0.10078 0.10981 0.11207 0.11004 0.10685 0.09947 0.09013 0.07968 0.07066 
1987 0.00166 0.00644 0.01620 0.03138 0.04954 0.06747 0.08645 0.09372 0.10664 0.11169 0.11070 0.10423 0.10273 0.09033 0.08003 0.06996 
1988 0.00184 0.00616 0.01521 0.03044 0.05081 0.06688 0.08326 0.09601 0.10516 0.11095 0.11210 0.10804 0.10408 0.09120 0.08423 0.07417 
1989 0.00175 0.00703 0.01630 0.02825 0.04828 0.06512 0.07778 0.09163 0.10067 0.11141 0.11353 0.10895 0.10371 0.09416 0.08426 0.07560 
1990 0.00159 0.00718 0.01715 0.03005 0.04477 0.06322 0.07711 0.08605 0.09875 0.10709 0.11397 0.10943 0.10581 0.09698 0.08695 0.07758 
1991 0.00213 0.00684 0.01837 0.03200 0.04903 0.06548 0.07616 0.08761 0.09828 0.11283 0.11627 0.11516 0.10981 0.10136 0.08866 0.07919 
1992 0.00202 0.00713 0.01826 0.03133 0.05123 0.06404 0.07801 0.08812 0.09787 0.10569 0.11420 0.11272 0.10843 0.10243 0.09052 0.08050 
1993 0.00149 0.00704 0.01659 0.03066 0.05110 0.06444 0.07583 0.08819 0.09663 0.10492 0.11170 0.11101 0.11065 0.10249 0.09343 0.08143 
1994 0.00138 0.00581 0.01390 0.02732 0.04262 0.06147 0.07280 0.08142 0.09402 0.10182 0.10616 0.10953 0.10929 0.10350 0.09307 0.08349 
1995 0.00167 0.00500 0.01383 0.02360 0.04189 0.05368 0.06680 0.07701 0.08705 0.09542 0.10475 0.10757 0.10507 0.10032 0.09470 0.08478 
1996 0.00097 0.00480 0.01194 0.02244 0.03890 0.05254 0.06400 0.07781 0.08659 0.09891 0.10422 0.10758 0.10814 0.10184 0.09605 0.08812 
1997 0.00099 0.00416 0.01099 0.02192 0.03750 0.05007 0.06041 0.07234 0.08230 0.09023 0.10093 0.10285 0.10306 0.09741 0.09163 0.08467 
1998 0.00105 0.00382 0.01041 0.02133 0.03548 0.04707 0.05911 0.06818 0.07975 0.08783 0.09597 0.10148 0.10228 0.09834 0.09213 0.08645 
1999 0.00112 0.00353 0.01051 0.01879 0.03240 0.04693 0.05646 0.06632 0.07469 0.08853 0.09144 0.09645 0.09749 0.09588 0.09173 0.08285 
2000 0.00138 0.00401 0.01044 0.01891 0.03291 0.04493 0.05648 0.06629 0.07434 0.08576 0.09275 0.09721 0.10138 0.09712 0.09525 0.08689 
2001 0.00180 0.00491 0.01111 0.01982 0.02956 0.04290 0.05181 0.06187 0.06938 0.07796 0.08540 0.09442 0.09601 0.09504 0.09157 0.08684 
2002 0.00166 0.00549 0.01081 0.01939 0.03053 0.04214 0.05127 0.06139 0.07118 0.07918 0.08921 0.09241 0.09901 0.10052 0.09938 0.09202 
2003 0.00148 0.00507 0.01013 0.01909 0.02927 0.03861 0.04835 0.05733 0.06454 0.07765 0.08565 0.09162 0.09630 0.09963 0.09743 0.09383 
2004 0.00165 0.00484 0.01075 0.01889 0.03172 0.03932 0.04855 0.05796 0.06668 0.07782 0.08600 0.09070 0.09927 0.09970 0.10111 0.09789 
 IX 
2005 0.00134 0.00410 0.00961 0.01929 0.02970 0.03766 0.04564 0.05261 0.06473 0.07337 0.08496 0.09065 0.09458 0.09841 0.10063 0.09451 
2006 0.00142 0.00440 0.00886 0.01608 0.02893 0.03795 0.04516 0.05153 0.06090 0.07003 0.07816 0.08550 0.09598 0.10001 0.09814 0.09792 
2007 0.00131 0.00392 0.00852 0.01577 0.02633 0.03480 0.04250 0.05077 0.05976 0.06553 0.07537 0.08576 0.08969 0.09402 0.09676 0.09584 
2008 0.00142 0.00390 0.00889 0.01628 0.02552 0.03638 0.04326 0.04877 0.05883 0.06633 0.07543 0.08489 0.09023 0.09923 0.09755 0.09582 
2009 0.00105 0.00381 0.00769 0.01438 0.02446 0.03281 0.04039 0.04759 0.05676 0.06500 0.07230 0.08018 0.08575 0.09250 0.09886 0.09867 
2010 0.00125 0.00359 0.00850 0.01254 0.02390 0.03170 0.04039 0.04788 0.05629 0.06449 0.07388 0.08280 0.08575 0.09752 0.10161 0.09947 
2011 0.00313 0.00662 0.01171 0.01679 0.02598 0.02975 0.03573 0.04121 0.04586 0.04987 0.05717 0.06600 0.07425 0.08429 0.09018 0.09371 
2012 0.00269 0.00646 0.01043 0.01606 0.02334 0.02797 0.03205 0.03706 0.04262 0.04818 0.05404 0.06340 0.07177 0.07793 0.08630 0.09090 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table A.7. (Continued)Age Specific fertility rates between ages 31 to 49, in years 1960 to 2012, for Austria 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
1960 0.00256 0.00932 0.02347 0.04922 0.08500 0.11939 0.15666 0.18861 0.20289 0.20667 0.19851 0.18593 0.17182 0.15513 0.14201 0.12710 0.00256 0.00932 0.02347 
1961 0.00247 0.01002 0.02532 0.05061 0.08780 0.12886 0.16286 0.19418 0.20816 0.21293 0.20494 0.19262 0.17769 0.16133 0.14533 0.13044 0.00247 0.01002 0.02532 
1962 0.00237 0.00933 0.02528 0.05187 0.08688 0.12742 0.16572 0.19272 0.20745 0.21080 0.20378 0.19205 0.17630 0.15997 0.14494 0.12877 0.00237 0.00933 0.02528 
1963 0.00224 0.00944 0.02537 0.05555 0.09519 0.13806 0.17438 0.20526 0.21298 0.21647 0.20784 0.19811 0.18137 0.16558 0.14874 0.13312 0.00224 0.00944 0.02537 
1964 0.00246 0.00963 0.02583 0.05623 0.10134 0.14567 0.18312 0.20606 0.21405 0.21462 0.20831 0.19532 0.18031 0.16464 0.14865 0.13206 0.00246 0.00963 0.02583 
1965 0.00288 0.01023 0.02682 0.05614 0.10023 0.14695 0.18276 0.20290 0.20863 0.20799 0.20104 0.19031 0.17687 0.16023 0.14476 0.12977 0.00288 0.01023 0.02682 
1966 0.00243 0.00936 0.02536 0.05483 0.09758 0.14337 0.18111 0.20220 0.20456 0.20436 0.19403 0.18556 0.17420 0.15852 0.14067 0.12852 0.00243 0.00936 0.02536 
1967 0.00227 0.00892 0.02450 0.05201 0.09258 0.13482 0.16844 0.19260 0.19907 0.19442 0.18566 0.17707 0.16596 0.15197 0.13746 0.12276 0.00227 0.00892 0.02450 
1968 0.00218 0.00906 0.02458 0.05230 0.09001 0.13097 0.16440 0.18459 0.19284 0.19093 0.17994 0.16934 0.15886 0.14619 0.13448 0.11908 0.00218 0.00906 0.02458 
1969 0.00234 0.00911 0.02524 0.05242 0.09034 0.12913 0.15957 0.18085 0.18694 0.18669 0.17716 0.16635 0.15482 0.14143 0.13018 0.11769 0.00234 0.00911 0.02524 
1970 0.00231 0.00893 0.02578 0.05395 0.09191 0.12925 0.15865 0.17952 0.18513 0.18401 0.17525 0.16494 0.15001 0.13600 0.12603 0.11223 0.00231 0.00893 0.02578 
1971 0.00273 0.00995 0.02700 0.05625 0.09566 0.13246 0.16104 0.17915 0.18745 0.18532 0.17637 0.16604 0.15180 0.13815 0.12250 0.11102 0.00273 0.00995 0.02700 
1972 0.00265 0.01072 0.02914 0.05874 0.09771 0.13130 0.15927 0.17580 0.18059 0.18240 0.17148 0.15983 0.14600 0.13256 0.11612 0.10447 0.00265 0.01072 0.02914 
1973 0.00278 0.01047 0.02967 0.05972 0.09537 0.12864 0.15353 0.16904 0.17325 0.17340 0.16414 0.15305 0.14051 0.12582 0.11111 0.09813 0.00278 0.01047 0.02967 
1974 0.00271 0.01027 0.02767 0.05647 0.08881 0.11795 0.13819 0.15326 0.15929 0.16144 0.15345 0.14377 0.13122 0.11630 0.10251 0.09039 0.00271 0.01027 0.02767 
1975 0.00256 0.00938 0.02515 0.05116 0.08223 0.10657 0.12546 0.13930 0.14815 0.15070 0.14555 0.13466 0.12271 0.10915 0.09471 0.08146 0.00256 0.00938 0.02515 
1976 0.00203 0.00858 0.02193 0.04659 0.07683 0.10127 0.11927 0.13306 0.14266 0.14515 0.14302 0.13398 0.12062 0.10705 0.09342 0.08003 0.00203 0.00858 0.02193 
1977 0.00209 0.00776 0.02087 0.04437 0.07516 0.10046 0.12117 0.13771 0.14702 0.15089 0.14937 0.13972 0.12652 0.11141 0.09694 0.08279 0.00209 0.00776 0.02087 
1978 0.00180 0.00701 0.01844 0.04014 0.06823 0.09390 0.11515 0.13417 0.14484 0.14968 0.14667 0.14062 0.12743 0.11242 0.09755 0.08368 0.00180 0.00701 0.01844 
1979 0.00178 0.00613 0.01664 0.03596 0.06461 0.09030 0.11382 0.13277 0.14708 0.15318 0.15205 0.14611 0.13379 0.11791 0.10356 0.08737 0.00178 0.00613 0.01664 
1980 0.00176 0.00646 0.01615 0.03567 0.06312 0.08945 0.11527 0.13656 0.15195 0.16053 0.16124 0.15370 0.14217 0.12605 0.11099 0.09572 0.00176 0.00646 0.01615 
1981 0.00167 0.00586 0.01498 0.03232 0.05855 0.08431 0.11029 0.13250 0.14961 0.15816 0.16121 0.15495 0.14338 0.12906 0.11350 0.09895 0.00167 0.00586 0.01498 
1982 0.00155 0.00551 0.01406 0.02966 0.05502 0.08065 0.10573 0.12878 0.14591 0.15657 0.15820 0.15364 0.14157 0.12811 0.11381 0.09864 0.00155 0.00551 0.01406 
1983 0.00149 0.00500 0.01246 0.02654 0.04834 0.07258 0.09702 0.11934 0.13602 0.14483 0.14993 0.14335 0.13418 0.12100 0.10765 0.09250 0.00149 0.00500 0.01246 
1984 0.00151 0.00484 0.01169 0.02428 0.04575 0.06828 0.09230 0.11608 0.13374 0.14748 0.15141 0.14802 0.13775 0.12549 0.10990 0.09601 0.00151 0.00484 0.01169 
1985 0.00136 0.00435 0.01034 0.02211 0.04066 0.06189 0.08580 0.11100 0.13150 0.14472 0.15371 0.14992 0.14198 0.12948 0.11397 0.10001 0.00136 0.00435 0.01034 
1986 0.00129 0.00404 0.00966 0.02117 0.03874 0.05815 0.08093 0.10451 0.12721 0.14343 0.15243 0.15329 0.14547 0.13315 0.11875 0.10466 0.00129 0.00404 0.00966 
1987 0.00117 0.00378 0.00894 0.01955 0.03551 0.05281 0.07310 0.09656 0.11856 0.13681 0.14886 0.14877 0.14548 0.13438 0.12053 0.10573 0.00117 0.00378 0.00894 
1988 0.00104 0.00350 0.00832 0.01818 0.03461 0.05086 0.06903 0.09167 0.11329 0.13238 0.14652 0.14956 0.14482 0.13633 0.12253 0.10961 0.00104 0.00350 0.00832 
1989 0.00104 0.00339 0.00798 0.01738 0.03226 0.04792 0.06695 0.08672 0.10762 0.12788 0.14099 0.14677 0.14452 0.13522 0.12398 0.11044 0.00104 0.00339 0.00798 
1990 0.00103 0.00351 0.00778 0.01689 0.03130 0.04580 0.06348 0.08342 0.10291 0.12228 0.13905 0.14431 0.14339 0.13694 0.12494 0.11276 0.00103 0.00351 0.00778 
1991 0.00106 0.00346 0.00784 0.01681 0.03055 0.04379 0.06090 0.07985 0.10011 0.11927 0.13643 0.14471 0.14393 0.13657 0.12562 0.11294 0.00106 0.00346 0.00784 
1992 0.00107 0.00341 0.00768 0.01620 0.02847 0.04086 0.05576 0.07381 0.09383 0.11380 0.13026 0.13981 0.14125 0.13688 0.12545 0.11342 0.00107 0.00341 0.00768 
 X 
1993 0.00099 0.00310 0.00740 0.01522 0.02694 0.03702 0.05075 0.06609 0.08540 0.10561 0.12215 0.13315 0.13604 0.13253 0.12387 0.11151 0.00099 0.00310 0.00740 
1994 0.00096 0.00275 0.00693 0.01402 0.02527 0.03531 0.04717 0.06286 0.08021 0.10096 0.11917 0.13278 0.13778 0.13482 0.12712 0.11541 0.00096 0.00275 0.00693 
1995 0.00094 0.00263 0.00663 0.01368 0.02463 0.03401 0.04645 0.06007 0.07783 0.09884 0.11883 0.13444 0.14286 0.14086 0.13342 0.12254 0.00094 0.00263 0.00663 
1996 0.00087 0.00288 0.00674 0.01352 0.02424 0.03447 0.04485 0.05935 0.07421 0.09484 0.11625 0.13303 0.14219 0.14340 0.13692 0.12659 0.00087 0.00288 0.00674 
1997 0.00096 0.00298 0.00644 0.01358 0.02386 0.03320 0.04440 0.05724 0.07358 0.09202 0.11216 0.12941 0.13977 0.14099 0.13796 0.12691 0.00096 0.00298 0.00644 
1998 0.00090 0.00282 0.00660 0.01345 0.02386 0.03330 0.04440 0.05676 0.07184 0.09128 0.11189 0.12832 0.14142 0.14478 0.14121 0.13077 0.00090 0.00282 0.00660 
1999 0.00097 0.00297 0.00682 0.01431 0.02505 0.03405 0.04584 0.05794 0.07339 0.09050 0.11123 0.12870 0.14068 0.14381 0.14144 0.13189 0.00097 0.00297 0.00682 
2000 0.00103 0.00329 0.00733 0.01542 0.02701 0.03747 0.04800 0.06017 0.07460 0.09507 0.11433 0.13254 0.14415 0.14937 0.14812 0.13996 0.00103 0.00329 0.00733 
2001 0.00108 0.00358 0.00795 0.01596 0.02816 0.03911 0.04947 0.06216 0.07583 0.09244 0.11264 0.12991 0.14163 0.14681 0.14545 0.13789 0.00108 0.00358 0.00795 
2002 0.00104 0.00320 0.00733 0.01574 0.02734 0.03764 0.04819 0.06035 0.07439 0.09059 0.11030 0.12708 0.14010 0.14723 0.14463 0.13833 0.00104 0.00320 0.00733 
2003 0.00099 0.00298 0.00716 0.01480 0.02703 0.03653 0.04756 0.05948 0.07265 0.09047 0.10887 0.12588 0.14038 0.14721 0.14686 0.13920 0.00099 0.00298 0.00716 
2004 0.00093 0.00296 0.00736 0.01487 0.02627 0.03741 0.04741 0.05952 0.07421 0.09073 0.10995 0.12634 0.13877 0.14638 0.14817 0.14134 0.00093 0.00296 0.00736 
2005 0.00083 0.00289 0.00683 0.01464 0.02576 0.03633 0.04729 0.05911 0.07380 0.08915 0.10838 0.12511 0.13938 0.14643 0.14860 0.14399 0.00083 0.00289 0.00683 
2006 0.00094 0.00281 0.00683 0.01414 0.02603 0.03651 0.04792 0.06068 0.07475 0.09214 0.11028 0.12705 0.14209 0.15042 0.15201 0.14830 0.00094 0.00281 0.00683 
2007 0.00092 0.00295 0.00680 0.01404 0.02511 0.03591 0.04670 0.05914 0.07339 0.08830 0.10859 0.12374 0.13910 0.14806 0.15011 0.14553 0.00092 0.00295 0.00680 
2008 0.00092 0.00295 0.00674 0.01423 0.02513 0.03577 0.04818 0.06022 0.07457 0.08996 0.10816 0.12528 0.13866 0.14876 0.15127 0.14785 0.00092 0.00295 0.00674 
2009 0.00104 0.00292 0.00655 0.01348 0.02448 0.03512 0.04632 0.05913 0.07287 0.08992 0.10896 0.12354 0.13733 0.14648 0.15049 0.14778 0.00104 0.00292 0.00655 
2010 0.00104 0.00296 0.00678 0.01320 0.02407 0.03426 0.04567 0.05861 0.07393 0.08938 0.10783 0.12432 0.13847 0.14706 0.15110 0.15034 0.00104 0.00296 0.00678 
2011 0.00101 0.00303 0.00641 0.01286 0.02344 0.03321 0.04353 0.05677 0.07170 0.08903 0.10666 0.12233 0.13686 0.14551 0.14879 0.14586 0.00101 0.00303 0.00641 
2012 0.00105 0.00319 0.00665 0.01280 0.02313 0.03293 0.04329 0.05618 0.07011 0.08792 0.10627 0.12073 0.13458 0.14477 0.14903 0.14760 0.00105 0.00319 0.00665 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table A.8: Age Specific fertility rates between ages 15 to 30, in years 1960 to 2012 for France 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1960 0.00321 0.01353 0.03749 0.06714 0.10243 0.13236 0.15199 0.16985 0.17894 0.18035 0.17634 0.17272 0.16146 0.15244 0.13477 0.12184 
1961 0.00432 0.01712 0.04137 0.07549 0.10720 0.13549 0.15674 0.17162 0.18556 0.18768 0.18379 0.17543 0.16422 0.15690 0.13907 0.13030 
1962 0.00408 0.01839 0.04684 0.08003 0.11121 0.13835 0.15625 0.17107 0.18123 0.18599 0.18433 0.17699 0.16513 0.15454 0.14203 0.13303 
1963 0.00422 0.01840 0.04927 0.08746 0.11839 0.14264 0.15726 0.16988 0.17598 0.17970 0.18701 0.17673 0.16639 0.15823 0.14200 0.13133 
1964 0.00460 0.01796 0.05124 0.09510 0.12269 0.14499 0.15477 0.16839 0.17367 0.17301 0.17351 0.17676 0.16294 0.15222 0.14419 0.12934 
1965 0.00337 0.01745 0.04929 0.09405 0.13396 0.14362 0.15666 0.16629 0.16798 0.16992 0.16760 0.15795 0.15611 0.14596 0.13452 0.12619 
1966 0.00310 0.01706 0.05111 0.09616 0.13577 0.15995 0.15986 0.16568 0.17035 0.16439 0.16001 0.15391 0.14529 0.14270 0.12935 0.11891 
1967 0.00335 0.01764 0.04981 0.09628 0.13619 0.16584 0.17095 0.16515 0.16735 0.16344 0.15606 0.15177 0.14008 0.13276 0.12745 0.11549 
1968 0.00276 0.01475 0.05300 0.09740 0.13973 0.17016 0.17757 0.17475 0.16244 0.16135 0.15327 0.14612 0.13666 0.12659 0.11715 0.11078 
1969 0.00281 0.01512 0.05028 0.10075 0.14007 0.16448 0.17170 0.17341 0.16734 0.15010 0.14221 0.13891 0.12827 0.12088 0.10803 0.10090 
1970 0.00335 0.01648 0.04899 0.09116 0.13264 0.15291 0.16213 0.16536 0.15218 0.14129 0.13135 0.12515 0.11618 0.10868 0.09884 0.08967 
1971 0.00317 0.01710 0.04989 0.08946 0.12566 0.14500 0.15582 0.15488 0.14863 0.13852 0.12927 0.11687 0.11113 0.10291 0.09392 0.08736 
1972 0.00371 0.01874 0.05184 0.09023 0.12065 0.13789 0.14692 0.14567 0.14055 0.13628 0.12522 0.11424 0.10418 0.09688 0.08616 0.07925 
1973 0.00477 0.02014 0.05155 0.08421 0.11529 0.13014 0.13519 0.13622 0.13506 0.12580 0.11560 0.10778 0.09693 0.08564 0.07927 0.07185 
1974 0.00415 0.01853 0.04874 0.08379 0.10998 0.13048 0.13758 0.13554 0.13499 0.12844 0.11972 0.11018 0.09716 0.08829 0.07619 0.06704 
1975 0.00320 0.01549 0.04214 0.07470 0.10465 0.12027 0.13208 0.13445 0.13349 0.12753 0.11966 0.10933 0.09850 0.08917 0.07689 0.06776 
1976 0.00250 0.01333 0.03743 0.06375 0.09282 0.10720 0.12161 0.12577 0.12532 0.12162 0.11494 0.10915 0.09460 0.08630 0.07383 0.06298 
1977 0.00241 0.01149 0.03259 0.05690 0.08462 0.10386 0.11595 0.12258 0.12418 0.12284 0.11417 0.10428 0.09662 0.08487 0.07298 0.06273 
1978 0.00228 0.01024 0.02954 0.05420 0.08244 0.09830 0.11210 0.11922 0.12254 0.12140 0.11902 0.10956 0.09661 0.08677 0.07539 0.06321 
1979 0.00199 0.00977 0.02863 0.05260 0.07971 0.09912 0.11173 0.11641 0.12268 0.12135 0.11764 0.10784 0.09824 0.08744 0.07770 0.06628 
1980 0.00206 0.01008 0.02751 0.05185 0.08169 0.10157 0.11538 0.12105 0.12492 0.12709 0.12186 0.11446 0.10213 0.09213 0.07897 0.06996 
1981 0.00212 0.00962 0.02597 0.05159 0.07950 0.10229 0.11763 0.12273 0.12741 0.12644 0.12096 0.11213 0.10573 0.09490 0.08479 0.07220 
 XI 
1982 0.00149 0.00914 0.02560 0.04978 0.07802 0.09844 0.11258 0.12420 0.12863 0.12571 0.12102 0.11687 0.10451 0.09405 0.08258 0.07556 
1983 0.00159 0.00785 0.02076 0.04348 0.07041 0.09153 0.10375 0.11156 0.11739 0.11934 0.11520 0.10873 0.10201 0.09310 0.08226 0.06902 
1984 0.00159 0.00654 0.01983 0.03829 0.06373 0.08606 0.09886 0.11179 0.11494 0.11652 0.11701 0.10800 0.09981 0.08961 0.08198 0.06966 
1985 0.00138 0.00648 0.01749 0.03527 0.05848 0.07929 0.09297 0.10150 0.10867 0.11680 0.11222 0.10655 0.10026 0.09137 0.07829 0.06912 
1986 0.00151 0.00625 0.01701 0.03261 0.05586 0.07405 0.08677 0.10078 0.10981 0.11207 0.11004 0.10685 0.09947 0.09013 0.07968 0.07066 
1987 0.00166 0.00644 0.01620 0.03138 0.04954 0.06747 0.08645 0.09372 0.10664 0.11169 0.11070 0.10423 0.10273 0.09033 0.08003 0.06996 
1988 0.00184 0.00616 0.01521 0.03044 0.05081 0.06688 0.08326 0.09601 0.10516 0.11095 0.11210 0.10804 0.10408 0.09120 0.08423 0.07417 
1989 0.00175 0.00703 0.01630 0.02825 0.04828 0.06512 0.07778 0.09163 0.10067 0.11141 0.11353 0.10895 0.10371 0.09416 0.08426 0.07560 
1990 0.00159 0.00718 0.01715 0.03005 0.04477 0.06322 0.07711 0.08605 0.09875 0.10709 0.11397 0.10943 0.10581 0.09698 0.08695 0.07758 
1991 0.00213 0.00684 0.01837 0.03200 0.04903 0.06548 0.07616 0.08761 0.09828 0.11283 0.11627 0.11516 0.10981 0.10136 0.08866 0.07919 
1992 0.00202 0.00713 0.01826 0.03133 0.05123 0.06404 0.07801 0.08812 0.09787 0.10569 0.11420 0.11272 0.10843 0.10243 0.09052 0.08050 
1993 0.00149 0.00704 0.01659 0.03066 0.05110 0.06444 0.07583 0.08819 0.09663 0.10492 0.11170 0.11101 0.11065 0.10249 0.09343 0.08143 
1994 0.00138 0.00581 0.01390 0.02732 0.04262 0.06147 0.07280 0.08142 0.09402 0.10182 0.10616 0.10953 0.10929 0.10350 0.09307 0.08349 
1995 0.00167 0.00500 0.01383 0.02360 0.04189 0.05368 0.06680 0.07701 0.08705 0.09542 0.10475 0.10757 0.10507 0.10032 0.09470 0.08478 
1996 0.00097 0.00480 0.01194 0.02244 0.03890 0.05254 0.06400 0.07781 0.08659 0.09891 0.10422 0.10758 0.10814 0.10184 0.09605 0.08812 
1997 0.00099 0.00416 0.01099 0.02192 0.03750 0.05007 0.06041 0.07234 0.08230 0.09023 0.10093 0.10285 0.10306 0.09741 0.09163 0.08467 
1998 0.00105 0.00382 0.01041 0.02133 0.03548 0.04707 0.05911 0.06818 0.07975 0.08783 0.09597 0.10148 0.10228 0.09834 0.09213 0.08645 
1999 0.00112 0.00353 0.01051 0.01879 0.03240 0.04693 0.05646 0.06632 0.07469 0.08853 0.09144 0.09645 0.09749 0.09588 0.09173 0.08285 
2000 0.00138 0.00401 0.01044 0.01891 0.03291 0.04493 0.05648 0.06629 0.07434 0.08576 0.09275 0.09721 0.10138 0.09712 0.09525 0.08689 
2001 0.00180 0.00491 0.01111 0.01982 0.02956 0.04290 0.05181 0.06187 0.06938 0.07796 0.08540 0.09442 0.09601 0.09504 0.09157 0.08684 
2002 0.00166 0.00549 0.01081 0.01939 0.03053 0.04214 0.05127 0.06139 0.07118 0.07918 0.08921 0.09241 0.09901 0.10052 0.09938 0.09202 
2003 0.00148 0.00507 0.01013 0.01909 0.02927 0.03861 0.04835 0.05733 0.06454 0.07765 0.08565 0.09162 0.09630 0.09963 0.09743 0.09383 
2004 0.00165 0.00484 0.01075 0.01889 0.03172 0.03932 0.04855 0.05796 0.06668 0.07782 0.08600 0.09070 0.09927 0.09970 0.10111 0.09789 
2005 0.00134 0.00410 0.00961 0.01929 0.02970 0.03766 0.04564 0.05261 0.06473 0.07337 0.08496 0.09065 0.09458 0.09841 0.10063 0.09451 
2006 0.00142 0.00440 0.00886 0.01608 0.02893 0.03795 0.04516 0.05153 0.06090 0.07003 0.07816 0.08550 0.09598 0.10001 0.09814 0.09792 
2007 0.00131 0.00392 0.00852 0.01577 0.02633 0.03480 0.04250 0.05077 0.05976 0.06553 0.07537 0.08576 0.08969 0.09402 0.09676 0.09584 
2008 0.00142 0.00390 0.00889 0.01628 0.02552 0.03638 0.04326 0.04877 0.05883 0.06633 0.07543 0.08489 0.09023 0.09923 0.09755 0.09582 
2009 0.00105 0.00381 0.00769 0.01438 0.02446 0.03281 0.04039 0.04759 0.05676 0.06500 0.07230 0.08018 0.08575 0.09250 0.09886 0.09867 
2010 0.00125 0.00359 0.00850 0.01254 0.02390 0.03170 0.04039 0.04788 0.05629 0.06449 0.07388 0.08280 0.08575 0.09752 0.10161 0.09947 
2011 0.00313 0.00662 0.01171 0.01679 0.02598 0.02975 0.03573 0.04121 0.04586 0.04987 0.05717 0.06600 0.07425 0.08429 0.09018 0.09371 
2012 0.00269 0.00646 0.01043 0.01606 0.02334 0.02797 0.03205 0.03706 0.04262 0.04818 0.05404 0.06340 0.07177 0.07793 0.08630 0.09090 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XII 
 
Table A.8. (Continued)Age Specific fertility rates between ages 31 to 49, in years 1960 to 2012, for France 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
1960 0.11265 0.10015 0.08796 0.07784 0.06721 0.05930 0.05039 0.04247 0.03421 0.02833 0.02041 0.01513 0.00936 0.00548 0.00280 0.00127 0.00060 0.00026 0.00014 
1961 0.11669 0.10262 0.09044 0.07819 0.06858 0.05939 0.05227 0.04298 0.03451 0.02727 0.02130 0.01445 0.00966 0.00573 0.00312 0.00125 0.00051 0.00024 0.00008 
1962 0.11472 0.10085 0.08781 0.07677 0.06742 0.05775 0.04923 0.04127 0.03374 0.02620 0.01899 0.01430 0.00933 0.00557 0.00295 0.00138 0.00060 0.00022 0.00008 
1963 0.11760 0.10454 0.09142 0.08025 0.06912 0.05889 0.05020 0.04135 0.03407 0.02614 0.01983 0.01353 0.00923 0.00518 0.00285 0.00147 0.00063 0.00025 0.00011 
1964 0.11902 0.10339 0.09162 0.07918 0.06931 0.05917 0.04982 0.04168 0.03379 0.02657 0.01958 0.01368 0.00852 0.00527 0.00288 0.00144 0.00058 0.00023 0.00012 
1965 0.11384 0.10068 0.08805 0.07777 0.06733 0.05689 0.04769 0.03980 0.03194 0.02494 0.01889 0.01285 0.00819 0.00490 0.00294 0.00130 0.00061 0.00030 0.00009 
1966 0.11395 0.10013 0.08748 0.07649 0.06639 0.05628 0.04686 0.03884 0.03173 0.02496 0.01806 0.01280 0.00837 0.00467 0.00259 0.00125 0.00041 0.00027 0.00011 
1967 0.10857 0.09461 0.08353 0.07324 0.06302 0.05410 0.04570 0.03746 0.03013 0.02317 0.01694 0.01159 0.00791 0.00465 0.00231 0.00111 0.00053 0.00019 0.00006 
1968 0.10418 0.09231 0.08052 0.07062 0.06087 0.05194 0.04416 0.03634 0.02912 0.02232 0.01656 0.01158 0.00748 0.00446 0.00235 0.00101 0.00045 0.00022 0.00008 
1969 0.10331 0.08974 0.07963 0.06820 0.05930 0.05062 0.04280 0.03562 0.02848 0.02200 0.01602 0.01101 0.00730 0.00426 0.00243 0.00116 0.00047 0.00017 0.00011 
1970 0.09916 0.08671 0.07494 0.06609 0.05730 0.04877 0.04132 0.03305 0.02704 0.02097 0.01511 0.01029 0.00673 0.00396 0.00211 0.00100 0.00049 0.00020 0.00009 
1971 0.09835 0.08656 0.07550 0.06481 0.05706 0.04891 0.04102 0.03313 0.02655 0.02061 0.01548 0.01038 0.00673 0.00379 0.00227 0.00100 0.00045 0.00017 0.00009 
1972 0.09379 0.08119 0.07168 0.06054 0.05358 0.04538 0.03828 0.03148 0.02563 0.01935 0.01426 0.01016 0.00640 0.00368 0.00194 0.00089 0.00043 0.00017 0.00009 
1973 0.08553 0.07725 0.06680 0.05759 0.05012 0.04209 0.03515 0.02859 0.02327 0.01819 0.01301 0.00913 0.00581 0.00329 0.00170 0.00077 0.00040 0.00019 0.00009 
1974 0.07706 0.06742 0.05933 0.05165 0.04364 0.03686 0.03049 0.02540 0.02016 0.01545 0.01149 0.00791 0.00526 0.00292 0.00159 0.00079 0.00030 0.00013 0.00007 
1975 0.07031 0.06035 0.05184 0.04504 0.03814 0.03162 0.02571 0.02079 0.01711 0.01267 0.00881 0.00658 0.00413 0.00232 0.00125 0.00057 0.00030 0.00011 0.00005 
1976 0.06701 0.05604 0.04664 0.03969 0.03364 0.02755 0.02194 0.01744 0.01369 0.01043 0.00732 0.00514 0.00336 0.00178 0.00101 0.00055 0.00020 0.00010 0.00006 
1977 0.06795 0.05730 0.04737 0.03913 0.03176 0.02743 0.02099 0.01610 0.01259 0.00957 0.00662 0.00452 0.00297 0.00173 0.00097 0.00049 0.00024 0.00008 0.00004 
1978 0.06925 0.05677 0.04640 0.03926 0.03104 0.02506 0.02036 0.01566 0.01170 0.00882 0.00599 0.00415 0.00269 0.00154 0.00090 0.00049 0.00020 0.00011 0.00003 
1979 0.07359 0.06026 0.04908 0.04015 0.03256 0.02528 0.01993 0.01650 0.01171 0.00832 0.00604 0.00383 0.00249 0.00150 0.00075 0.00040 0.00016 0.00011 0.00006 
1980 0.07970 0.06597 0.05321 0.04373 0.03461 0.02774 0.02148 0.01624 0.01263 0.00878 0.00589 0.00373 0.00240 0.00153 0.00071 0.00039 0.00018 0.00009 0.00008 
1981 0.08254 0.06838 0.05678 0.04548 0.03637 0.02950 0.02311 0.01688 0.01266 0.00943 0.00637 0.00370 0.00224 0.00137 0.00079 0.00039 0.00021 0.00013 0.00005 
1982 0.08215 0.06868 0.05595 0.04593 0.03669 0.02854 0.02248 0.01707 0.01248 0.00900 0.00669 0.00430 0.00239 0.00144 0.00074 0.00042 0.00024 0.00011 0.00006 
1983 0.07809 0.06413 0.05326 0.04265 0.03492 0.02672 0.02089 0.01630 0.01182 0.00847 0.00578 0.00387 0.00259 0.00136 0.00074 0.00031 0.00023 0.00009 0.00007 
1984 0.08032 0.06705 0.05522 0.04545 0.03582 0.02894 0.02147 0.01623 0.01253 0.00884 0.00591 0.00410 0.00255 0.00148 0.00073 0.00041 0.00021 0.00010 0.00007 
1985 0.08427 0.07141 0.05933 0.04862 0.03916 0.03009 0.02360 0.01692 0.01271 0.00926 0.00642 0.00396 0.00249 0.00166 0.00077 0.00035 0.00019 0.00009 0.00005 
1986 0.08925 0.07472 0.06208 0.05195 0.04149 0.03246 0.02429 0.01895 0.01356 0.00962 0.00646 0.00407 0.00252 0.00147 0.00076 0.00045 0.00023 0.00012 0.00008 
1987 0.09066 0.07663 0.06472 0.05346 0.04388 0.03479 0.02627 0.01943 0.01454 0.01009 0.00650 0.00442 0.00259 0.00155 0.00066 0.00043 0.00023 0.00010 0.00007 
1988 0.09425 0.08040 0.06738 0.05645 0.04575 0.03723 0.02817 0.02115 0.01513 0.01042 0.00701 0.00438 0.00261 0.00134 0.00070 0.00034 0.00024 0.00014 0.00006 
1989 0.09560 0.08117 0.06890 0.05768 0.04763 0.03819 0.02963 0.02265 0.01626 0.01134 0.00757 0.00450 0.00271 0.00145 0.00073 0.00043 0.00019 0.00014 0.00008 
1990 0.09698 0.08267 0.07014 0.05924 0.04885 0.03949 0.03022 0.02329 0.01726 0.01189 0.00778 0.00497 0.00275 0.00152 0.00081 0.00037 0.00017 0.00014 0.00009 
1991 0.09769 0.08357 0.07070 0.05954 0.05010 0.03986 0.03169 0.02403 0.01775 0.01241 0.00783 0.00482 0.00287 0.00150 0.00078 0.00043 0.00023 0.00012 0.00006 
1992 0.09830 0.08453 0.07082 0.06054 0.04986 0.04056 0.03188 0.02475 0.01848 0.01281 0.00837 0.00492 0.00284 0.00154 0.00078 0.00037 0.00019 0.00007 0.00006 
1993 0.09652 0.08284 0.07077 0.05855 0.04899 0.03963 0.03073 0.02395 0.01833 0.01271 0.00858 0.00525 0.00291 0.00157 0.00069 0.00036 0.00014 0.00009 0.00004 
1994 0.09997 0.08523 0.07258 0.06175 0.05087 0.04111 0.03194 0.02462 0.01840 0.01312 0.00867 0.00541 0.00292 0.00155 0.00080 0.00035 0.00012 0.00009 0.00005 
1995 0.10783 0.09234 0.07753 0.06554 0.05460 0.04353 0.03353 0.02602 0.01937 0.01371 0.00904 0.00545 0.00317 0.00162 0.00084 0.00030 0.00017 0.00008 0.00005 
1996 0.11150 0.09600 0.08117 0.06814 0.05687 0.04608 0.03597 0.02726 0.02030 0.01432 0.00950 0.00572 0.00340 0.00161 0.00087 0.00036 0.00012 0.00007 0.00005 
1997 0.11239 0.09732 0.08272 0.06958 0.05784 0.04690 0.03715 0.02818 0.02124 0.01492 0.00966 0.00606 0.00342 0.00184 0.00089 0.00037 0.00015 0.00004 0.00003 
1998 0.11706 0.10112 0.08658 0.07386 0.06158 0.04915 0.03887 0.02984 0.02261 0.01563 0.01049 0.00652 0.00362 0.00196 0.00084 0.00037 0.00016 0.00008 0.00002 
1999 0.11986 0.10484 0.08919 0.07671 0.06372 0.05148 0.03988 0.03128 0.02359 0.01642 0.01081 0.00670 0.00368 0.00188 0.00099 0.00039 0.00020 0.00008 0.00006 
2000 0.12432 0.10979 0.09444 0.08011 0.06695 0.05480 0.04282 0.03310 0.02539 0.01784 0.01194 0.00711 0.00423 0.00211 0.00089 0.00035 0.00016 0.00008 0.00003 
2001 0.12565 0.10973 0.09548 0.08120 0.06874 0.05509 0.04458 0.03414 0.02548 0.01816 0.01233 0.00782 0.00432 0.00222 0.00100 0.00046 0.00017 0.00010 0.00004 
2002 0.12617 0.10963 0.09434 0.08208 0.06835 0.05660 0.04545 0.03467 0.02631 0.01871 0.01229 0.00788 0.00448 0.00227 0.00100 0.00049 0.00021 0.00007 0.00006 
 XIII 
2003 0.12691 0.11277 0.09793 0.08332 0.07046 0.05747 0.04525 0.03554 0.02701 0.01960 0.01293 0.00769 0.00471 0.00243 0.00113 0.00050 0.00023 0.00011 0.00006 
2004 0.12985 0.11593 0.09938 0.08556 0.07225 0.05943 0.04657 0.03675 0.02824 0.02025 0.01317 0.00836 0.00483 0.00256 0.00122 0.00060 0.00027 0.00014 0.00006 
2005 0.13270 0.11865 0.10405 0.08920 0.07505 0.06083 0.04931 0.03828 0.02874 0.02141 0.01416 0.00865 0.00504 0.00260 0.00134 0.00064 0.00031 0.00012 0.00007 
2006 0.13778 0.12344 0.10856 0.09393 0.07936 0.06556 0.05173 0.04034 0.03086 0.02212 0.01481 0.00913 0.00534 0.00257 0.00126 0.00060 0.00030 0.00015 0.00012 
2007 0.13619 0.12383 0.10797 0.09437 0.08017 0.06583 0.05224 0.04101 0.03109 0.02277 0.01538 0.00925 0.00558 0.00279 0.00137 0.00062 0.00028 0.00014 0.00013 
2008 0.14001 0.12700 0.11008 0.09590 0.08194 0.06804 0.05350 0.04218 0.03282 0.02306 0.01558 0.01016 0.00593 0.00300 0.00147 0.00070 0.00033 0.00022 0.00012 
2009 0.14079 0.12743 0.11215 0.09770 0.08319 0.06890 0.05474 0.04288 0.03298 0.02354 0.01607 0.01008 0.00597 0.00309 0.00148 0.00077 0.00033 0.00017 0.00012 
2010 0.14242 0.12990 0.11583 0.10073 0.08612 0.07091 0.05600 0.04416 0.03404 0.02483 0.01644 0.01050 0.00622 0.00327 0.00171 0.00088 0.00042 0.00020 0.00014 
2011 0.13957 0.12953 0.11579 0.10107 0.08755 0.07138 0.05721 0.04473 0.03487 0.02533 0.01749 0.01073 0.00648 0.00367 0.00172 0.00081 0.00042 0.00023 0.00013 
2012 0.13911 0.12972 0.11561 0.10176 0.08804 0.07330 0.05825 0.04613 0.03545 0.02521 0.01736 0.01108 0.00680 0.00359 0.00189 0.00084 0.00037 0.00028 0.00014 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table A.9: Age Specific fertility rates between ages 15 to 30, in years 1960 to 2009 for Hungary 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1960 0.00417 0.01589 0.04083 0.08122 0.12320 0.15372 0.16969 0.16794 0.15965 0.14813 0.13275 0.12019 0.10399 0.09039 0.08167 0.06905 
1961 0.00427 0.01413 0.03902 0.07830 0.12222 0.14697 0.16528 0.16136 0.15355 0.14394 0.13061 0.11256 0.10092 0.08791 0.07549 0.06555 
1962 0.00330 0.01153 0.03529 0.06968 0.10966 0.13756 0.14771 0.15433 0.14326 0.13432 0.12231 0.10753 0.09267 0.08427 0.07061 0.06311 
1963 0.00331 0.01021 0.03086 0.06445 0.10769 0.14028 0.14749 0.15060 0.14926 0.13598 0.12639 0.11318 0.09960 0.08841 0.07685 0.06638 
1964 0.00366 0.01177 0.03076 0.06731 0.10602 0.13973 0.14995 0.15382 0.14535 0.13848 0.12626 0.11582 0.10187 0.08820 0.07577 0.06583 
1965 0.00385 0.01215 0.03331 0.06553 0.11337 0.14010 0.15692 0.15591 0.14979 0.13616 0.12687 0.11123 0.10101 0.08953 0.07687 0.06693 
1966 0.00389 0.01384 0.03472 0.07068 0.11540 0.14784 0.16245 0.16368 0.15178 0.14343 0.13047 0.11908 0.10566 0.09001 0.08064 0.06657 
1967 0.00457 0.01357 0.03690 0.07584 0.12698 0.15561 0.16817 0.16856 0.16727 0.15215 0.14069 0.12673 0.11309 0.09752 0.08650 0.07513 
1968 0.00430 0.01405 0.03831 0.07990 0.12855 0.16276 0.17289 0.17293 0.16600 0.15696 0.14393 0.13205 0.11703 0.10316 0.08989 0.07529 
1969 0.00417 0.01363 0.03674 0.08020 0.13664 0.16372 0.17214 0.16871 0.16359 0.15122 0.14146 0.12542 0.11159 0.10052 0.08696 0.07417 
1970 0.00496 0.01303 0.03748 0.07937 0.12890 0.16324 0.16873 0.16708 0.15582 0.14684 0.13652 0.12364 0.11039 0.09598 0.08147 0.06983 
1971 0.00571 0.01578 0.03700 0.07705 0.12852 0.16056 0.16839 0.16545 0.15304 0.14219 0.13007 0.11604 0.10652 0.09298 0.07844 0.06706 
1972 0.00656 0.01718 0.03988 0.07351 0.12736 0.15819 0.16838 0.16648 0.15635 0.14530 0.13387 0.11803 0.10640 0.09265 0.07876 0.06605 
1973 0.00702 0.01838 0.04152 0.07928 0.12214 0.15106 0.16737 0.16705 0.15830 0.14823 0.13451 0.11746 0.10675 0.08908 0.08004 0.06682 
1974 0.00781 0.02162 0.04891 0.08854 0.14006 0.16775 0.18602 0.19571 0.18680 0.17456 0.16349 0.14470 0.12929 0.11261 0.09576 0.08236 
1975 0.00927 0.02448 0.05551 0.10181 0.14541 0.17465 0.18433 0.19214 0.19274 0.18009 0.16845 0.15180 0.13316 0.11451 0.10196 0.08546 
1976 0.00945 0.02796 0.05967 0.10654 0.15119 0.17495 0.18591 0.18503 0.17843 0.17041 0.15381 0.13790 0.12099 0.10611 0.09103 0.07701 
1977 0.01041 0.02795 0.06407 0.10338 0.14673 0.17435 0.18002 0.18026 0.17292 0.15891 0.15038 0.13090 0.11525 0.10022 0.08324 0.07236 
1978 0.01067 0.02986 0.06301 0.10469 0.14450 0.17181 0.17976 0.17677 0.16750 0.15565 0.13964 0.12321 0.10684 0.09085 0.07665 0.06746 
1979 0.00993 0.02928 0.06476 0.10436 0.14500 0.16902 0.17577 0.17391 0.16479 0.15148 0.13806 0.12047 0.10199 0.08771 0.07416 0.06079 
1980 0.00992 0.02892 0.06051 0.10073 0.13624 0.15875 0.16830 0.16566 0.15864 0.14652 0.12758 0.11435 0.09669 0.08342 0.07078 0.05633 
1981 0.00921 0.02631 0.05640 0.09181 0.13203 0.15284 0.16341 0.16310 0.15733 0.14639 0.13172 0.11533 0.09946 0.08390 0.06992 0.05775 
1982 0.00927 0.02481 0.05292 0.08784 0.12577 0.14672 0.15360 0.15690 0.14994 0.14299 0.12810 0.11120 0.09547 0.08199 0.06703 0.05664 
1983 0.00934 0.02408 0.04733 0.08099 0.11665 0.13899 0.15317 0.14985 0.15010 0.14120 0.12898 0.11307 0.09573 0.07945 0.06783 0.05466 
1984 0.00919 0.02585 0.04774 0.07876 0.11305 0.13869 0.15039 0.15682 0.15064 0.14285 0.12927 0.11528 0.09753 0.08057 0.06789 0.05633 
1985 0.00976 0.02444 0.04702 0.07684 0.11162 0.13889 0.15599 0.16466 0.16075 0.15462 0.14090 0.12360 0.10606 0.08854 0.07391 0.06087 
1986 0.00887 0.02157 0.04158 0.07098 0.10739 0.13405 0.15111 0.15750 0.15896 0.15577 0.14233 0.12688 0.11104 0.09330 0.07768 0.06372 
1987 0.00817 0.02089 0.03928 0.06823 0.10089 0.12711 0.14624 0.15757 0.16048 0.15534 0.14383 0.12451 0.11015 0.09491 0.07673 0.06639 
1988 0.00704 0.01950 0.03768 0.06133 0.09847 0.12439 0.14296 0.15701 0.15979 0.15270 0.14570 0.13051 0.11437 0.09514 0.07960 0.06717 
1989 0.00710 0.01805 0.03445 0.05899 0.09305 0.11961 0.13870 0.15439 0.15942 0.15669 0.14644 0.13253 0.11519 0.09874 0.07930 0.06772 
 XIV 
1990 0.00636 0.01801 0.03394 0.05939 0.09469 0.12338 0.14169 0.15320 0.15943 0.15909 0.14967 0.13368 0.11511 0.10009 0.08140 0.07015 
1991 0.00710 0.01670 0.03329 0.05781 0.09141 0.11877 0.13853 0.15349 0.16122 0.15741 0.15249 0.13253 0.11726 0.09924 0.08395 0.07291 
1992 0.00666 0.01543 0.02806 0.05406 0.08468 0.11209 0.12942 0.14176 0.14793 0.14855 0.14300 0.12792 0.11338 0.09678 0.08155 0.07063 
1993 0.00642 0.01538 0.02713 0.04657 0.07683 0.10058 0.11461 0.13087 0.13428 0.13695 0.13441 0.12481 0.11277 0.09804 0.08202 0.06968 
1994 0.00682 0.01558 0.02716 0.04520 0.06756 0.09103 0.10714 0.12005 0.12823 0.13089 0.13246 0.12206 0.10916 0.09661 0.08098 0.06987 
1995 0.00656 0.01591 0.02560 0.04167 0.06168 0.08000 0.09744 0.11067 0.11931 0.12502 0.12492 0.12077 0.11048 0.09515 0.08244 0.07019 
1996 0.00622 0.01407 0.02541 0.03933 0.05601 0.07032 0.08589 0.09861 0.10881 0.11338 0.11236 0.11036 0.10093 0.09168 0.07959 0.06895 
1997 0.00600 0.01435 0.02354 0.03590 0.05139 0.06390 0.07762 0.08610 0.09765 0.10434 0.10587 0.10338 0.09909 0.08876 0.07786 0.06564 
1998 0.00516 0.01285 0.02207 0.03506 0.04750 0.05692 0.07062 0.07895 0.08842 0.09737 0.10088 0.10330 0.09606 0.08864 0.07786 0.06802 
1999 0.00537 0.01205 0.02028 0.03208 0.04174 0.05487 0.06308 0.07326 0.08158 0.09034 0.09645 0.09639 0.09568 0.08864 0.07901 0.06886 
2000 0.00519 0.01210 0.02031 0.03228 0.04362 0.05152 0.06091 0.06962 0.07859 0.08726 0.09348 0.10076 0.09890 0.09390 0.08628 0.07387 
2001 0.00553 0.01193 0.02022 0.03084 0.03988 0.04779 0.05525 0.06390 0.07379 0.08105 0.09103 0.09480 0.09735 0.09353 0.08601 0.07826 
2002 0.00514 0.01232 0.02086 0.02994 0.03822 0.04734 0.05123 0.05820 0.06738 0.07650 0.08466 0.09375 0.09594 0.09595 0.09100 0.08244 
2003 0.00525 0.01253 0.01872 0.02816 0.03733 0.04357 0.04886 0.05516 0.06197 0.07020 0.07921 0.08759 0.09293 0.09308 0.08978 0.08140 
2004 0.00609 0.01220 0.01999 0.02709 0.03666 0.03941 0.04482 0.04919 0.05625 0.06649 0.07532 0.08602 0.09059 0.09625 0.09100 0.08757 
2005 0.00557 0.01261 0.02001 0.02687 0.03339 0.03945 0.04237 0.04833 0.05536 0.06323 0.07340 0.08370 0.09209 0.09796 0.09695 0.09054 
2006 0.00532 0.01191 0.01997 0.02745 0.03386 0.03888 0.04083 0.04621 0.05285 0.06215 0.07179 0.08332 0.09410 0.09690 0.09882 0.09482 
2007 0.00489 0.01193 0.01963 0.02689 0.03344 0.03632 0.03832 0.04513 0.04933 0.05759 0.06665 0.07849 0.08703 0.09510 0.09742 0.09426 
2008 0.00536 0.01268 0.01976 0.02795 0.03376 0.03896 0.04113 0.04411 0.05041 0.05569 0.06676 0.07812 0.08735 0.09368 0.09798 0.09661 
2009 0.00566 0.01251 0.01866 0.02631 0.03262 0.03591 0.04034 0.04276 0.04857 0.05336 0.06285 0.07063 0.08272 0.09217 0.09499 0.09290 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table A.9. (Continued)Age Specific fertility rates between ages 31 to 49, in years 1960 to 2009, for Hungary 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
1960 0.05917 0.05291 0.04503 0.03939 0.03529 0.03052 0.02367 0.02018 0.01640 0.01283 0.00891 0.00640 0.00478 0.00231 0.00133 0.00066 0.00029 0.00020 0.00004 
1961 0.05726 0.04869 0.04335 0.03618 0.03159 0.02566 0.02441 0.01850 0.01510 0.01135 0.00903 0.00639 0.00378 0.00259 0.00122 0.00057 0.00032 0.00008 0.00011 
1962 0.05433 0.04523 0.03926 0.03369 0.02790 0.02334 0.02087 0.01633 0.01339 0.01031 0.00852 0.00567 0.00402 0.00209 0.00103 0.00054 0.00014 0.00005 0.00007 
1963 0.05639 0.04695 0.03952 0.03442 0.02943 0.02489 0.02041 0.01770 0.01339 0.01016 0.00738 0.00532 0.00372 0.00141 0.00058 0.00052 0.00028 0.00006 0.00001 
1964 0.05708 0.04570 0.03950 0.03353 0.02744 0.02275 0.01918 0.01448 0.01238 0.00936 0.00693 0.00488 0.00319 0.00177 0.00097 0.00045 0.00013 0.00007 0.00005 
1965 0.05521 0.04642 0.03862 0.03283 0.02690 0.02129 0.01746 0.01480 0.01130 0.00904 0.00630 0.00412 0.00270 0.00184 0.00097 0.00040 0.00003 0.00008 0.00000 
1966 0.05767 0.04681 0.03956 0.03448 0.02724 0.02271 0.01793 0.01485 0.01111 0.00851 0.00629 0.00418 0.00284 0.00176 0.00110 0.00034 0.00004 0.00003 0.00011 
1967 0.06261 0.05177 0.04306 0.03508 0.02955 0.02326 0.01954 0.01490 0.01190 0.00851 0.00578 0.00413 0.00293 0.00180 0.00084 0.00037 0.00017 0.00008 0.00003 
1968 0.06469 0.05341 0.04346 0.03658 0.02923 0.02407 0.01941 0.01514 0.01161 0.00866 0.00632 0.00390 0.00226 0.00134 0.00083 0.00028 0.00016 0.00005 0.00006 
1969 0.06278 0.05409 0.04338 0.03557 0.02961 0.02336 0.01950 0.01473 0.01186 0.00883 0.00585 0.00430 0.00228 0.00142 0.00091 0.00027 0.00015 0.00008 0.00004 
1970 0.06127 0.05044 0.04129 0.03505 0.02736 0.02156 0.01837 0.01410 0.01116 0.00798 0.00541 0.00418 0.00266 0.00129 0.00075 0.00033 0.00012 0.00007 0.00004 
1971 0.05819 0.04930 0.04049 0.03388 0.02661 0.02275 0.01625 0.01377 0.01103 0.00787 0.00536 0.00329 0.00247 0.00131 0.00068 0.00024 0.00017 0.00004 0.00004 
1972 0.05539 0.04723 0.03918 0.03078 0.02548 0.02135 0.01692 0.01405 0.01007 0.00800 0.00539 0.00379 0.00229 0.00120 0.00072 0.00044 0.00015 0.00011 0.00003 
1973 0.05615 0.04668 0.03956 0.03190 0.02698 0.02177 0.01801 0.01312 0.00996 0.00712 0.00525 0.00368 0.00243 0.00130 0.00055 0.00035 0.00014 0.00004 0.00003 
1974 0.06925 0.05929 0.04627 0.04087 0.03039 0.02406 0.01915 0.01536 0.01153 0.00839 0.00631 0.00386 0.00230 0.00152 0.00052 0.00032 0.00012 0.00003 0.00008 
1975 0.07328 0.06120 0.05035 0.03855 0.03168 0.02507 0.01881 0.01486 0.01086 0.00852 0.00567 0.00387 0.00189 0.00126 0.00075 0.00016 0.00006 0.00005 0.00001 
1976 0.06373 0.05511 0.04415 0.03586 0.02746 0.02236 0.01757 0.01417 0.01012 0.00764 0.00486 0.00359 0.00196 0.00122 0.00054 0.00023 0.00012 0.00003 0.00000 
1977 0.06145 0.05043 0.04063 0.03429 0.02800 0.02078 0.01571 0.01272 0.00934 0.00713 0.00522 0.00373 0.00228 0.00138 0.00048 0.00038 0.00012 0.00003 0.00000 
1978 0.05642 0.04617 0.03734 0.03071 0.02371 0.01971 0.01430 0.01167 0.00894 0.00595 0.00470 0.00329 0.00194 0.00090 0.00043 0.00023 0.00012 0.00004 0.00000 
 XV 
1979 0.05066 0.04087 0.03459 0.02681 0.02354 0.01770 0.01399 0.01053 0.00780 0.00580 0.00407 0.00304 0.00152 0.00135 0.00050 0.00027 0.00010 0.00005 0.00000 
1980 0.04682 0.03987 0.03172 0.02654 0.02099 0.01658 0.01274 0.00980 0.00736 0.00552 0.00392 0.00257 0.00155 0.00093 0.00041 0.00019 0.00007 0.00007 0.00000 
1981 0.04678 0.03964 0.03151 0.02451 0.02019 0.01569 0.01251 0.00902 0.00764 0.00521 0.00382 0.00270 0.00159 0.00088 0.00044 0.00015 0.00006 0.00001 0.00000 
1982 0.04460 0.03616 0.02982 0.02586 0.01960 0.01488 0.01142 0.00882 0.00704 0.00489 0.00317 0.00238 0.00147 0.00089 0.00045 0.00015 0.00006 0.00001 0.00001 
1983 0.04535 0.03603 0.02900 0.02379 0.01868 0.01483 0.01161 0.00832 0.00640 0.00467 0.00335 0.00258 0.00127 0.00074 0.00036 0.00014 0.00009 0.00001 0.00000 
1984 0.04642 0.03737 0.03014 0.02446 0.01902 0.01486 0.01089 0.00858 0.00635 0.00444 0.00333 0.00197 0.00143 0.00065 0.00036 0.00012 0.00006 0.00005 0.00000 
1985 0.04892 0.04160 0.03466 0.02740 0.02142 0.01689 0.01234 0.00920 0.00696 0.00490 0.00366 0.00208 0.00128 0.00078 0.00031 0.00017 0.00003 0.00002 0.00000 
1986 0.05273 0.04183 0.03435 0.02798 0.02247 0.01807 0.01421 0.01014 0.00724 0.00535 0.00374 0.00227 0.00120 0.00076 0.00031 0.00025 0.00008 0.00003 0.00000 
1987 0.05365 0.04309 0.03497 0.02983 0.02302 0.01798 0.01436 0.01088 0.00823 0.00544 0.00414 0.00229 0.00151 0.00063 0.00035 0.00015 0.00001 0.00005 0.00000 
1988 0.05374 0.04324 0.03507 0.02890 0.02308 0.01869 0.01368 0.01087 0.00814 0.00559 0.00369 0.00236 0.00139 0.00081 0.00040 0.00020 0.00004 0.00000 0.00000 
1989 0.05435 0.04425 0.03609 0.02955 0.02427 0.01888 0.01440 0.01115 0.00785 0.00612 0.00372 0.00251 0.00158 0.00063 0.00034 0.00004 0.00003 0.00001 0.00002 
1990 0.05683 0.04644 0.03774 0.02971 0.02457 0.02011 0.01524 0.01159 0.00858 0.00582 0.00393 0.00253 0.00144 0.00078 0.00034 0.00008 0.00010 0.00001 0.00000 
1991 0.05977 0.04834 0.03944 0.03196 0.02557 0.01992 0.01524 0.01276 0.00941 0.00630 0.00389 0.00300 0.00163 0.00078 0.00035 0.00013 0.00007 0.00000 0.00000 
1992 0.05567 0.04660 0.03833 0.03111 0.02657 0.01984 0.01556 0.01219 0.00902 0.00633 0.00410 0.00305 0.00134 0.00078 0.00030 0.00022 0.00007 0.00000 0.00000 
1993 0.05603 0.04678 0.03845 0.03157 0.02593 0.02044 0.01550 0.01179 0.00883 0.00683 0.00465 0.00274 0.00142 0.00081 0.00047 0.00024 0.00006 0.00003 0.00003 
1994 0.05719 0.04937 0.04169 0.03326 0.02764 0.02219 0.01736 0.01243 0.00932 0.00696 0.00459 0.00283 0.00169 0.00087 0.00036 0.00013 0.00003 0.00006 0.00001 
1995 0.05733 0.04791 0.03959 0.03251 0.02658 0.02162 0.01687 0.01255 0.00871 0.00666 0.00456 0.00291 0.00181 0.00065 0.00044 0.00014 0.00001 0.00009 0.00002 
1996 0.05557 0.04509 0.03858 0.03274 0.02681 0.02103 0.01591 0.01193 0.00932 0.00638 0.00421 0.00306 0.00180 0.00082 0.00035 0.00020 0.00004 0.00003 0.00001 
1997 0.05620 0.04512 0.03833 0.03114 0.02744 0.02082 0.01570 0.01210 0.00978 0.00662 0.00449 0.00277 0.00158 0.00093 0.00028 0.00024 0.00010 0.00003 0.00001 
1998 0.05596 0.04744 0.03811 0.03162 0.02585 0.02078 0.01578 0.01323 0.00931 0.00693 0.00424 0.00253 0.00161 0.00061 0.00043 0.00022 0.00004 0.00001 0.00004 
1999 0.05651 0.04891 0.04023 0.03333 0.02597 0.02177 0.01704 0.01268 0.00955 0.00679 0.00441 0.00297 0.00143 0.00058 0.00037 0.00023 0.00009 0.00001 0.00000 
2000 0.06276 0.05311 0.04364 0.03567 0.03046 0.02330 0.01843 0.01435 0.01060 0.00792 0.00452 0.00344 0.00136 0.00069 0.00038 0.00018 0.00008 0.00005 0.00006 
2001 0.06739 0.05737 0.04730 0.03971 0.03239 0.02565 0.02037 0.01532 0.01168 0.00783 0.00537 0.00329 0.00188 0.00105 0.00047 0.00019 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 
2002 0.06951 0.05884 0.04935 0.04110 0.03423 0.02618 0.02097 0.01698 0.01199 0.00913 0.00579 0.00338 0.00178 0.00105 0.00046 0.00010 0.00009 0.00006 0.00000 
2003 0.07071 0.06046 0.05388 0.04443 0.03587 0.02784 0.02184 0.01626 0.01194 0.00882 0.00544 0.00350 0.00200 0.00097 0.00043 0.00017 0.00005 0.00002 0.00000 
2004 0.07603 0.06707 0.05439 0.04621 0.03844 0.03076 0.02289 0.01756 0.01335 0.00965 0.00614 0.00358 0.00212 0.00091 0.00052 0.00019 0.00004 0.00000 0.00004 
2005 0.08114 0.07066 0.05987 0.05257 0.04169 0.03250 0.02617 0.01932 0.01407 0.01020 0.00692 0.00396 0.00208 0.00093 0.00046 0.00026 0.00010 0.00005 0.00004 
2006 0.08806 0.07822 0.06754 0.05598 0.04458 0.03705 0.02692 0.02107 0.01492 0.01063 0.00634 0.00403 0.00229 0.00103 0.00060 0.00030 0.00004 0.00001 0.00001 
2007 0.08971 0.07856 0.06789 0.05834 0.04587 0.03667 0.02935 0.02141 0.01552 0.01178 0.00719 0.00453 0.00309 0.00113 0.00046 0.00031 0.00012 0.00004 0.00001 
2008 0.09044 0.08195 0.07059 0.06180 0.04810 0.04033 0.03115 0.02366 0.01756 0.01177 0.00803 0.00529 0.00264 0.00141 0.00066 0.00036 0.00008 0.00003 0.00003 
2009 0.09008 0.08288 0.07271 0.06131 0.05306 0.04042 0.03227 0.02411 0.01815 0.01241 0.00827 0.00565 0.00274 0.00150 0.00063 0.00042 0.00021 0.00005 0.00003 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table A.10: Age Specific fertility rates between ages 15 to 30, in years 1960 to 2012, in Portugal 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1960 0.00164 0.00722 0.02096 0.04186 0.06743 0.10179 0.12812 0.16203 0.17851 0.18651 0.19226 0.18821 0.18072 0.17282 0.15852 0.15679 
1961 0.00195 0.00786 0.02076 0.04185 0.06669 0.10768 0.12797 0.16420 0.17991 0.19073 0.19273 0.18846 0.18375 0.17634 0.16438 0.16244 
1962 0.00203 0.00798 0.01919 0.04501 0.07214 0.11191 0.13446 0.16658 0.18945 0.19412 0.19857 0.19439 0.18907 0.18015 0.16387 0.16490 
1963 0.00244 0.00757 0.02026 0.04244 0.06908 0.10503 0.12719 0.15683 0.17276 0.19236 0.19367 0.19125 0.18430 0.17503 0.16601 0.16144 
1964 0.00283 0.00884 0.02073 0.04378 0.06911 0.11052 0.13345 0.16551 0.18255 0.19914 0.20459 0.19993 0.19231 0.18136 0.16723 0.16665 
1965 0.00233 0.00867 0.02176 0.04285 0.06748 0.10814 0.13373 0.16251 0.18478 0.19561 0.19914 0.20407 0.19099 0.17891 0.16414 0.16201 
1966 0.00234 0.00919 0.02328 0.04453 0.07198 0.10650 0.13461 0.17049 0.18256 0.19599 0.19848 0.19387 0.19678 0.18486 0.16368 0.16191 
1967 0.00286 0.01012 0.02431 0.04755 0.07254 0.10724 0.13369 0.16776 0.19109 0.19598 0.20143 0.19360 0.18686 0.18406 0.16235 0.16022 
1968 0.00307 0.01058 0.02453 0.04702 0.07263 0.10564 0.13346 0.16240 0.18644 0.19988 0.19687 0.19207 0.17687 0.17553 0.16739 0.15625 
1969 0.00326 0.01064 0.02534 0.04592 0.07056 0.10687 0.12839 0.16275 0.18332 0.19760 0.20662 0.18706 0.18502 0.16736 0.15620 0.16151 
 XVI 
1970 0.00369 0.01124 0.02500 0.04445 0.07007 0.09761 0.12867 0.15679 0.18526 0.19668 0.19802 0.19358 0.17402 0.16352 0.14946 0.14327 
1971 0.00356 0.01133 0.02602 0.04636 0.07015 0.09999 0.12452 0.15610 0.18260 0.19799 0.19996 0.19305 0.18598 0.16298 0.15356 0.13391 
1972 0.00353 0.01225 0.02649 0.04879 0.07203 0.09819 0.12343 0.14675 0.17093 0.17982 0.19340 0.18301 0.17068 0.16141 0.14120 0.13528 
1973 0.00397 0.01256 0.02924 0.04823 0.07246 0.09917 0.12304 0.14246 0.16294 0.17155 0.17915 0.17513 0.16555 0.15209 0.14107 0.12809 
1974 0.00431 0.01462 0.03044 0.05316 0.07544 0.10344 0.12207 0.14684 0.15982 0.16927 0.17524 0.17005 0.16186 0.14873 0.13506 0.13171 
1975 0.00499 0.01693 0.03516 0.05925 0.08742 0.11839 0.14235 0.15948 0.17376 0.18421 0.17922 0.17107 0.16178 0.14822 0.13747 0.12846 
1976 0.00691 0.02123 0.04407 0.07588 0.11049 0.14924 0.16775 0.18315 0.19044 0.19171 0.18039 0.17112 0.15060 0.14140 0.12669 0.11945 
1977 0.00691 0.02051 0.04394 0.07696 0.11024 0.14380 0.16827 0.18199 0.18597 0.18000 0.17529 0.16204 0.14712 0.13564 0.12201 0.11246 
1978 0.00625 0.01742 0.04006 0.06916 0.10270 0.13360 0.15209 0.17201 0.16974 0.16872 0.15752 0.15013 0.13859 0.12694 0.11269 0.10286 
1979 0.00510 0.01712 0.03608 0.06424 0.09236 0.12459 0.14587 0.16019 0.16065 0.16147 0.15232 0.14495 0.13515 0.12265 0.10691 0.10033 
1980 0.00583 0.01677 0.03701 0.06332 0.09053 0.12233 0.14232 0.15261 0.15706 0.15957 0.15211 0.14095 0.12906 0.12019 0.10939 0.09940 
1981 0.00583 0.01639 0.03419 0.05780 0.08512 0.10842 0.12784 0.14275 0.15050 0.14837 0.14497 0.13903 0.12615 0.11722 0.10839 0.09892 
1982 0.00613 0.01527 0.03497 0.05733 0.08427 0.10912 0.12585 0.14048 0.14496 0.14445 0.14305 0.13991 0.12385 0.11481 0.10569 0.09697 
1983 0.00566 0.01540 0.03360 0.05473 0.08051 0.10355 0.11846 0.13202 0.13562 0.13742 0.13681 0.12923 0.12127 0.10904 0.09771 0.09063 
1984 0.00541 0.01525 0.03306 0.05443 0.07967 0.10263 0.11663 0.12745 0.13621 0.13531 0.13244 0.12675 0.11652 0.11022 0.09838 0.08750 
1985 0.00412 0.01352 0.02884 0.05011 0.07153 0.09197 0.10398 0.11401 0.12012 0.12275 0.12114 0.11498 0.11149 0.09874 0.09147 0.08046 
1986 0.00454 0.01217 0.02765 0.04534 0.06803 0.08662 0.10088 0.11084 0.11886 0.11924 0.11679 0.11629 0.10617 0.09951 0.08873 0.08067 
1987 0.00419 0.01131 0.02545 0.04220 0.06412 0.08276 0.09399 0.10383 0.10961 0.11639 0.11533 0.11047 0.10554 0.09871 0.09075 0.08133 
1988 0.00413 0.01134 0.02327 0.03961 0.06087 0.07783 0.09140 0.10313 0.10826 0.11451 0.11545 0.11420 0.10733 0.10353 0.09350 0.08120 
1989 0.00427 0.01108 0.02261 0.03767 0.05627 0.07234 0.08609 0.09826 0.10492 0.10944 0.11103 0.11178 0.10813 0.09891 0.09264 0.08359 
1990 0.00395 0.01029 0.02165 0.03450 0.05088 0.06443 0.08001 0.09142 0.10206 0.10934 0.11251 0.11208 0.11065 0.10365 0.09435 0.08383 
1991 0.00406 0.01059 0.02177 0.03303 0.04818 0.06039 0.07540 0.08800 0.09771 0.10504 0.11086 0.11701 0.11094 0.10568 0.09787 0.08664 
1992 0.00385 0.00968 0.01979 0.03276 0.04620 0.05867 0.06907 0.08121 0.09317 0.10000 0.10946 0.11458 0.11122 0.10750 0.10089 0.09067 
1993 0.00426 0.01098 0.02128 0.03096 0.04370 0.05795 0.06527 0.07668 0.08835 0.09735 0.10497 0.11094 0.10993 0.10575 0.09866 0.09222 
1994 0.00420 0.00999 0.01969 0.02983 0.03925 0.05230 0.06210 0.06925 0.07884 0.08989 0.09766 0.10373 0.10571 0.10315 0.09765 0.08727 
1995 0.00393 0.00972 0.01829 0.02861 0.03790 0.04717 0.05688 0.06512 0.07363 0.08292 0.09154 0.09969 0.10064 0.10203 0.09789 0.09133 
1996 0.00416 0.00960 0.01844 0.02816 0.03946 0.04667 0.05486 0.06427 0.07354 0.08181 0.09212 0.09978 0.10498 0.10304 0.09921 0.09458 
1997 0.00444 0.01025 0.01997 0.02896 0.03787 0.04848 0.05452 0.06334 0.07140 0.08033 0.09187 0.09833 0.10465 0.10529 0.10414 0.09918 
1998 0.00447 0.00993 0.01923 0.02890 0.03770 0.04543 0.05403 0.06088 0.06833 0.07741 0.08854 0.09503 0.10016 0.10407 0.10483 0.10002 
1999 0.00470 0.01053 0.01869 0.02855 0.03898 0.04469 0.05207 0.06123 0.06905 0.07840 0.08909 0.09721 0.10401 0.10607 0.10258 0.10109 
2000 0.00504 0.01146 0.02034 0.02916 0.03876 0.04745 0.05402 0.06041 0.06966 0.07867 0.08932 0.09664 0.10479 0.10839 0.10590 0.10286 
2001 0.00445 0.01102 0.01923 0.02706 0.03697 0.04111 0.05041 0.05516 0.06251 0.07029 0.07980 0.08815 0.09536 0.09884 0.10165 0.10036 
2002 0.00468 0.01153 0.02065 0.02737 0.03642 0.04170 0.04747 0.05305 0.06139 0.06789 0.07785 0.08665 0.09596 0.09947 0.10393 0.10135 
2003 0.00468 0.01069 0.01951 0.02718 0.03423 0.03996 0.04534 0.04863 0.05643 0.06620 0.07331 0.08230 0.09272 0.09792 0.10039 0.10296 
2004 0.00427 0.01119 0.01923 0.02670 0.03382 0.03748 0.04355 0.04824 0.05330 0.06069 0.06869 0.07859 0.08791 0.09297 0.09679 0.09674 
2005 0.00452 0.01029 0.01794 0.02615 0.03455 0.03779 0.04360 0.04863 0.05338 0.05801 0.06660 0.07602 0.08616 0.09548 0.09673 0.10164 
2006 0.00362 0.01001 0.01486 0.02410 0.03162 0.03758 0.04190 0.04594 0.05095 0.05586 0.06431 0.07385 0.08109 0.08979 0.09365 0.09587 
2007 0.00401 0.00927 0.01529 0.02454 0.03088 0.03672 0.04099 0.04543 0.04794 0.05420 0.06333 0.07106 0.07742 0.08479 0.09303 0.09415 
2008 0.00369 0.00818 0.01496 0.02224 0.03020 0.03774 0.04194 0.04740 0.05208 0.05602 0.06379 0.07058 0.07993 0.08926 0.09308 0.09647 
2009 0.00337 0.00862 0.01335 0.02117 0.02864 0.03552 0.03941 0.04573 0.04855 0.05520 0.06178 0.06803 0.07521 0.08324 0.09022 0.09238 
2010 0.00323 0.00819 0.01315 0.01905 0.02678 0.03317 0.03982 0.04457 0.05246 0.05709 0.06174 0.07026 0.07897 0.08723 0.09139 0.09606 
2011 0.00313 0.00662 0.01171 0.01679 0.02598 0.02975 0.03573 0.04121 0.04586 0.04987 0.05717 0.06600 0.07425 0.08429 0.09018 0.09371 
2012 0.00269 0.00646 0.01043 0.01606 0.02334 0.02797 0.03205 0.03706 0.04262 0.04818 0.05404 0.06340 0.07177 0.07793 0.08630 0.09090 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table A.10. (Continued)Age Specific fertility rates between ages 31 to 49, in years 1960 to 2012, in Portugal 
 XVII 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
1960 0.13463 0.12954 0.12525 0.11499 0.11149 0.10617 0.09247 0.08838 0.07322 0.06524 0.05204 0.04365 0.03227 0.02345 0.01028 0.00561 0.00255 0.00139 0.00045 
1961 0.13743 0.13926 0.12770 0.12268 0.11402 0.10721 0.09633 0.09057 0.07669 0.06839 0.04771 0.04570 0.03050 0.02285 0.00989 0.00492 0.00243 0.00115 0.00045 
1962 0.14257 0.13812 0.13139 0.11895 0.11716 0.10642 0.09417 0.09022 0.07768 0.06818 0.05006 0.04300 0.03401 0.02090 0.01016 0.00530 0.00236 0.00095 0.00030 
1963 0.14413 0.13788 0.12600 0.12176 0.10877 0.10342 0.09453 0.08514 0.07749 0.06637 0.04903 0.04184 0.02981 0.02351 0.00909 0.00484 0.00241 0.00112 0.00043 
1964 0.14355 0.14493 0.13094 0.12002 0.11717 0.10458 0.09729 0.08975 0.07796 0.06827 0.05018 0.04335 0.03046 0.02143 0.00953 0.00500 0.00251 0.00103 0.00033 
1965 0.14211 0.13906 0.13140 0.11866 0.10652 0.10336 0.09267 0.08689 0.07489 0.06434 0.04671 0.04253 0.02966 0.02013 0.00927 0.00480 0.00253 0.00117 0.00052 
1966 0.14003 0.13691 0.12676 0.11796 0.10709 0.09711 0.09590 0.08538 0.07306 0.06114 0.04626 0.04262 0.02903 0.01996 0.00960 0.00528 0.00216 0.00108 0.00027 
1967 0.13524 0.13320 0.12596 0.11390 0.10806 0.09576 0.08836 0.08273 0.07161 0.06196 0.04558 0.03993 0.02820 0.02009 0.00935 0.00551 0.00228 0.00121 0.00048 
1968 0.13433 0.12914 0.12088 0.11358 0.10240 0.09615 0.08658 0.07675 0.07190 0.05728 0.04466 0.03749 0.02776 0.01870 0.00908 0.00494 0.00166 0.00097 0.00053 
1969 0.13614 0.12874 0.11584 0.10688 0.10441 0.09299 0.08641 0.07431 0.06561 0.05971 0.04274 0.03765 0.02588 0.01760 0.00849 0.00456 0.00203 0.00099 0.00042 
1970 0.13929 0.12339 0.11274 0.10366 0.09379 0.09150 0.07850 0.07391 0.06120 0.05050 0.04168 0.03388 0.02354 0.01551 0.00770 0.00422 0.00219 0.00137 0.00029 
1971 0.13039 0.12951 0.11343 0.10264 0.09913 0.08592 0.07683 0.07022 0.06181 0.04935 0.03927 0.03449 0.02548 0.01631 0.00819 0.00412 0.00177 0.00126 0.00046 
1972 0.11912 0.11314 0.10714 0.09599 0.08947 0.07926 0.07117 0.06629 0.05819 0.04870 0.03773 0.02875 0.02309 0.01398 0.00775 0.00403 0.00155 0.00091 0.00061 
1973 0.11483 0.10651 0.10149 0.09872 0.08579 0.07743 0.06995 0.06218 0.05473 0.04846 0.03711 0.02932 0.02122 0.01524 0.00778 0.00465 0.00189 0.00116 0.00073 
1974 0.10974 0.10231 0.09224 0.08825 0.08477 0.07645 0.06739 0.05976 0.05345 0.04501 0.03473 0.02937 0.01810 0.01328 0.00759 0.00342 0.00190 0.00063 0.00035 
1975 0.11205 0.10105 0.08990 0.08176 0.07672 0.07132 0.06242 0.05625 0.04930 0.04185 0.03318 0.02579 0.01979 0.01180 0.00641 0.00336 0.00154 0.00086 0.00037 
1976 0.10109 0.09401 0.08130 0.07398 0.06673 0.06481 0.05687 0.05188 0.04548 0.03778 0.02866 0.02416 0.01714 0.01104 0.00593 0.00361 0.00151 0.00066 0.00031 
1977 0.09845 0.08777 0.07876 0.06503 0.06124 0.05575 0.04846 0.04687 0.04084 0.03313 0.02634 0.02036 0.01563 0.00992 0.00632 0.00378 0.00158 0.00078 0.00032 
1978 0.08689 0.07911 0.07141 0.06284 0.05469 0.04897 0.04164 0.03825 0.03480 0.02982 0.02290 0.01764 0.01316 0.00904 0.00531 0.00310 0.00145 0.00067 0.00035 
1979 0.08602 0.07629 0.06696 0.05815 0.05332 0.04472 0.03824 0.03489 0.03076 0.02668 0.02038 0.01572 0.01140 0.00800 0.00478 0.00285 0.00139 0.00069 0.00041 
1980 0.08624 0.07330 0.06336 0.05601 0.04923 0.04352 0.03587 0.03152 0.02725 0.02445 0.01952 0.01501 0.01016 0.00733 0.00428 0.00272 0.00105 0.00073 0.00050 
1981 0.08512 0.07383 0.06108 0.05203 0.04702 0.04008 0.03447 0.02861 0.02454 0.02149 0.01742 0.01320 0.00989 0.00574 0.00391 0.00184 0.00132 0.00073 0.00047 
1982 0.08282 0.07190 0.05972 0.05351 0.04463 0.03883 0.03208 0.02845 0.02360 0.01808 0.01495 0.01135 0.00861 0.00524 0.00372 0.00184 0.00109 0.00041 0.00040 
1983 0.07912 0.06641 0.05909 0.04906 0.04226 0.03536 0.03112 0.02546 0.02052 0.01744 0.01352 0.01002 0.00746 0.00568 0.00318 0.00174 0.00083 0.00039 0.00026 
1984 0.07706 0.06768 0.05596 0.04811 0.04154 0.03394 0.03036 0.02414 0.02008 0.01640 0.01179 0.00951 0.00619 0.00384 0.00274 0.00166 0.00074 0.00024 0.00025 
1985 0.06884 0.06120 0.05281 0.04490 0.03890 0.03153 0.02652 0.02186 0.01896 0.01469 0.01104 0.00819 0.00589 0.00380 0.00233 0.00118 0.00070 0.00031 0.00024 
1986 0.06710 0.05936 0.05023 0.04342 0.03663 0.02981 0.02513 0.02005 0.01646 0.01364 0.00991 0.00758 0.00569 0.00304 0.00228 0.00119 0.00062 0.00037 0.00018 
1987 0.06779 0.05858 0.05021 0.04470 0.03776 0.03145 0.02451 0.01963 0.01558 0.01233 0.00973 0.00681 0.00487 0.00268 0.00159 0.00089 0.00072 0.00026 0.00023 
1988 0.06945 0.05942 0.05001 0.04255 0.03558 0.02973 0.02429 0.01851 0.01396 0.01144 0.00868 0.00636 0.00442 0.00298 0.00153 0.00076 0.00059 0.00026 0.00007 
1989 0.07032 0.05809 0.04941 0.04315 0.03471 0.02930 0.02371 0.01873 0.01374 0.01093 0.00726 0.00520 0.00394 0.00267 0.00117 0.00096 0.00031 0.00021 0.00010 
1990 0.07164 0.06026 0.04948 0.04240 0.03364 0.02857 0.02245 0.01783 0.01349 0.01017 0.00742 0.00528 0.00326 0.00211 0.00102 0.00059 0.00032 0.00018 0.00016 
1991 0.07492 0.06243 0.05307 0.04418 0.03624 0.02954 0.02304 0.01719 0.01394 0.01065 0.00777 0.00502 0.00284 0.00193 0.00097 0.00050 0.00033 0.00022 0.00014 
1992 0.07608 0.06515 0.05490 0.04483 0.03766 0.02916 0.02196 0.01710 0.01276 0.01014 0.00752 0.00460 0.00352 0.00164 0.00085 0.00043 0.00020 0.00015 0.00005 
1993 0.07925 0.06864 0.05494 0.04606 0.03746 0.02959 0.02285 0.01715 0.01315 0.00989 0.00721 0.00462 0.00322 0.00178 0.00089 0.00050 0.00012 0.00022 0.00003 
1994 0.07724 0.06721 0.05551 0.04641 0.03751 0.02933 0.02278 0.01802 0.01270 0.01013 0.00698 0.00442 0.00249 0.00199 0.00085 0.00038 0.00021 0.00006 0.00016 
1995 0.07825 0.06847 0.05627 0.04765 0.03852 0.03017 0.02353 0.01752 0.01360 0.00993 0.00673 0.00458 0.00286 0.00168 0.00101 0.00044 0.00026 0.00011 0.00008 
1996 0.08318 0.07248 0.06129 0.05162 0.04198 0.03370 0.02446 0.01844 0.01355 0.00983 0.00718 0.00452 0.00275 0.00155 0.00077 0.00039 0.00024 0.00009 0.00005 
1997 0.08766 0.07434 0.06349 0.05349 0.04413 0.03542 0.02640 0.01996 0.01460 0.01075 0.00666 0.00482 0.00287 0.00208 0.00086 0.00057 0.00021 0.00010 0.00006 
1998 0.09268 0.07787 0.06714 0.05820 0.04813 0.03597 0.02778 0.02157 0.01593 0.01023 0.00683 0.00506 0.00287 0.00178 0.00077 0.00032 0.00023 0.00006 0.00004 
1999 0.08960 0.08162 0.06847 0.05903 0.04978 0.04000 0.03298 0.02369 0.01676 0.01184 0.00789 0.00514 0.00358 0.00165 0.00097 0.00039 0.00026 0.00001 0.00006 
2000 0.09593 0.08599 0.07370 0.06295 0.05280 0.04206 0.03223 0.02531 0.01830 0.01304 0.00848 0.00558 0.00323 0.00221 0.00093 0.00069 0.00037 0.00014 0.00010 
2001 0.09106 0.07965 0.07138 0.06136 0.05170 0.04140 0.03258 0.02467 0.01751 0.01315 0.00896 0.00547 0.00291 0.00186 0.00098 0.00056 0.00023 0.00013 0.00014 
2002 0.09376 0.08350 0.07393 0.06329 0.05392 0.04369 0.03373 0.02450 0.01967 0.01369 0.00858 0.00594 0.00319 0.00209 0.00095 0.00057 0.00034 0.00016 0.00011 
2003 0.09380 0.08454 0.07476 0.06555 0.05549 0.04408 0.03449 0.02569 0.01964 0.01413 0.01000 0.00570 0.00360 0.00181 0.00100 0.00049 0.00029 0.00013 0.00009 
2004 0.09291 0.08559 0.07720 0.06590 0.05595 0.04359 0.03439 0.02703 0.02073 0.01365 0.00995 0.00679 0.00393 0.00209 0.00119 0.00059 0.00032 0.00026 0.00021 
2005 0.09181 0.08790 0.07701 0.06962 0.05844 0.04592 0.03579 0.02845 0.02085 0.01489 0.00993 0.00582 0.00403 0.00230 0.00119 0.00047 0.00018 0.00014 0.00014 
2006 0.09310 0.08639 0.07691 0.06745 0.05903 0.04716 0.03730 0.02812 0.02098 0.01558 0.01006 0.00653 0.00370 0.00245 0.00119 0.00050 0.00021 0.00009 0.00000 
 XVIII 
2007 0.09114 0.08322 0.07576 0.06934 0.05843 0.04968 0.03754 0.02948 0.02118 0.01529 0.01052 0.00552 0.00384 0.00205 0.00086 0.00039 0.00012 0.00005 0.00008 
2008 0.09486 0.08607 0.08101 0.07198 0.06252 0.05101 0.03969 0.03139 0.02364 0.01598 0.01073 0.00666 0.00397 0.00204 0.00114 0.00057 0.00019 0.00008 0.00007 
2009 0.08993 0.08604 0.07795 0.07001 0.06143 0.05049 0.03892 0.03160 0.02331 0.01657 0.01015 0.00738 0.00397 0.00219 0.00120 0.00060 0.00026 0.00011 0.00005 
2010 0.09601 0.08988 0.08173 0.07206 0.06417 0.05428 0.04178 0.03320 0.02519 0.01929 0.01192 0.00726 0.00442 0.00240 0.00110 0.00062 0.00018 0.00019 0.00006 
2011 0.09283 0.08991 0.08193 0.07535 0.06601 0.05607 0.04415 0.03431 0.02498 0.01905 0.01229 0.00840 0.00418 0.00228 0.00109 0.00055 0.00025 0.00013 0.00004 
2012 0.08879 0.08427 0.07975 0.07279 0.06222 0.05274 0.04218 0.03386 0.02505 0.01832 0.01193 0.00712 0.00443 0.00254 0.00133 0.00073 0.00016 0.00016 0.00015 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table A.11: Age Specific fertility rates between ages 15 to 30, in years 1960 to 2012, in Spain 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1960 0.00099 0.00295 0.00686 0.01371 0.02609 0.04344 0.07020 0.10269 0.13574 0.16239 0.18360 0.18951 0.18925 0.18676 0.18491 0.17182 
1961 0.00110 0.00318 0.00716 0.01398 0.02648 0.04461 0.07240 0.10631 0.14057 0.16710 0.18143 0.18581 0.18489 0.18291 0.18263 0.17137 
1962 0.00401 0.00696 0.00998 0.01446 0.02535 0.04687 0.07560 0.11230 0.14977 0.17508 0.18316 0.18788 0.18726 0.18488 0.18314 0.17073 
1963 0.00094 0.00288 0.00687 0.01392 0.02644 0.04823 0.07697 0.11134 0.14635 0.17581 0.18853 0.19496 0.19521 0.19326 0.19191 0.17929 
1964 0.00112 0.00334 0.00774 0.01532 0.02875 0.05168 0.08188 0.11772 0.15385 0.18372 0.19736 0.20355 0.20318 0.20029 0.19783 0.18389 
1965 0.00097 0.00309 0.00763 0.01573 0.02946 0.05188 0.08018 0.11268 0.14548 0.17485 0.18987 0.19755 0.19838 0.19578 0.19246 0.17813 
1966 0.00128 0.00372 0.00839 0.01620 0.02975 0.05280 0.08160 0.11498 0.14861 0.17767 0.19078 0.19776 0.19794 0.19477 0.19093 0.17605 
1967 0.00134 0.00379 0.00835 0.01578 0.02861 0.05071 0.07757 0.10871 0.14063 0.16960 0.18922 0.19874 0.20105 0.19906 0.19533 0.18121 
1968 0.00162 0.00448 0.00963 0.01792 0.03236 0.05674 0.08689 0.12120 0.15449 0.18111 0.19432 0.19782 0.19527 0.19050 0.18614 0.17285 
1969 0.00165 0.00457 0.00983 0.01832 0.03328 0.05770 0.08893 0.12460 0.15897 0.18566 0.19747 0.20013 0.19629 0.18990 0.18371 0.16962 
1970 0.00145 0.00436 0.01013 0.01981 0.03593 0.06000 0.09004 0.12309 0.15510 0.18271 0.19875 0.20323 0.19988 0.19218 0.18298 0.16514 
1971 0.00161 0.00482 0.01110 0.02154 0.03895 0.06477 0.09694 0.13183 0.16462 0.19128 0.20478 0.20617 0.20041 0.19141 0.18203 0.16319 
1972 0.00186 0.00531 0.01175 0.02222 0.04012 0.06704 0.10140 0.13868 0.17221 0.19574 0.20583 0.20307 0.19454 0.18461 0.17597 0.15809 
1973 0.00205 0.00585 0.01285 0.02408 0.04297 0.07016 0.10416 0.14045 0.17342 0.19844 0.20968 0.20815 0.19952 0.18793 0.17625 0.15453 
1974 0.00229 0.00697 0.01615 0.03082 0.05301 0.08086 0.11242 0.14321 0.17110 0.19640 0.20956 0.20841 0.20119 0.19149 0.18168 0.16211 
1975 0.00321 0.00934 0.02012 0.03562 0.05686 0.07923 0.11020 0.14596 0.17772 0.19390 0.20111 0.20216 0.19401 0.17182 0.17440 0.15513 
1976 0.00316 0.00961 0.02074 0.03745 0.05710 0.08520 0.11378 0.14710 0.18167 0.19957 0.20132 0.19635 0.19423 0.17913 0.16499 0.15432 
1977 0.00318 0.00967 0.02119 0.03787 0.05908 0.08590 0.11264 0.14222 0.17132 0.19103 0.19432 0.18402 0.17559 0.17070 0.16194 0.14423 
1978 0.00355 0.01021 0.02170 0.03881 0.05909 0.08374 0.10901 0.13789 0.16072 0.17761 0.18597 0.18221 0.16699 0.15679 0.15466 0.14380 
1979 0.00396 0.01091 0.02229 0.03829 0.05946 0.08038 0.10487 0.13032 0.14875 0.16140 0.16807 0.17042 0.16139 0.14461 0.13882 0.13245 
1980 0.00403 0.01126 0.02217 0.03684 0.05529 0.07810 0.09666 0.12165 0.13962 0.15120 0.15552 0.15529 0.15224 0.13999 0.12636 0.11991 
1981 0.00346 0.01016 0.01995 0.03215 0.04858 0.06843 0.08778 0.10762 0.12874 0.14013 0.14429 0.14386 0.13985 0.13292 0.12426 0.11281 
1982 0.00300 0.00910 0.01882 0.03137 0.04478 0.06183 0.07834 0.09952 0.11844 0.13167 0.13990 0.13821 0.13209 0.12570 0.12354 0.11534 
1983 0.00288 0.00837 0.01754 0.02905 0.04273 0.05528 0.06785 0.08773 0.10622 0.11896 0.13071 0.12980 0.12616 0.12069 0.11396 0.10576 
1984 0.00288 0.00826 0.01714 0.02711 0.03994 0.05323 0.06425 0.07911 0.09644 0.11310 0.12164 0.12902 0.12405 0.11734 0.11050 0.10470 
1985 0.00259 0.00803 0.01660 0.02660 0.03760 0.04958 0.05995 0.07205 0.08618 0.10290 0.11617 0.12197 0.12345 0.11611 0.10820 0.09781 
1986 0.00215 0.00650 0.01460 0.02451 0.03527 0.04378 0.05477 0.06699 0.07848 0.09320 0.10699 0.11762 0.11752 0.11543 0.10929 0.09923 
1987 0.00200 0.00623 0.01357 0.02324 0.03403 0.04204 0.04984 0.06184 0.07494 0.08631 0.10050 0.10960 0.11546 0.11306 0.10946 0.09866 
1988 0.00203 0.00598 0.01321 0.02292 0.03204 0.04062 0.04716 0.05645 0.06919 0.08395 0.09642 0.10519 0.11211 0.11222 0.10773 0.09880 
1989 0.00178 0.00547 0.01164 0.01898 0.02819 0.03618 0.04315 0.05214 0.06272 0.07888 0.09240 0.10118 0.10820 0.10998 0.10906 0.09934 
1990 0.00163 0.00503 0.01033 0.01730 0.02497 0.03188 0.03978 0.04892 0.05949 0.07128 0.08776 0.10045 0.10531 0.10747 0.10729 0.10085 
1991 0.00169 0.00464 0.00982 0.01606 0.02235 0.02853 0.03510 0.04382 0.05494 0.06706 0.08147 0.09600 0.10449 0.10603 0.10558 0.10223 
1992 0.00163 0.00425 0.00916 0.01424 0.02051 0.02544 0.03218 0.04015 0.04929 0.06299 0.07718 0.09067 0.10221 0.10982 0.10778 0.10284 
 XIX 
1993 0.00139 0.00391 0.00800 0.01312 0.01875 0.02246 0.02790 0.03422 0.04428 0.05618 0.07080 0.08469 0.09436 0.10503 0.10956 0.10367 
1994 0.00138 0.00376 0.00715 0.01188 0.01612 0.01986 0.02391 0.02964 0.03800 0.04903 0.06074 0.07701 0.08788 0.09633 0.10419 0.10347 
1995 0.00145 0.00366 0.00719 0.01063 0.01451 0.01797 0.02135 0.02582 0.03308 0.04330 0.05583 0.06931 0.08293 0.09382 0.09934 0.10288 
1996 0.00123 0.00359 0.00697 0.01029 0.01358 0.01683 0.01955 0.02420 0.03005 0.03865 0.05018 0.06482 0.07798 0.09095 0.09956 0.10018 
1997 0.00136 0.00350 0.00723 0.01085 0.01432 0.01709 0.01992 0.02253 0.02860 0.03614 0.04675 0.06032 0.07381 0.08717 0.09911 0.10401 
1998 0.00139 0.00353 0.00699 0.01097 0.01449 0.01659 0.01857 0.02207 0.02708 0.03399 0.04354 0.05503 0.06934 0.08214 0.09348 0.09965 
1999 0.00161 0.00384 0.00751 0.01178 0.01574 0.01788 0.02003 0.02277 0.02709 0.03342 0.04260 0.05385 0.06699 0.08105 0.09363 0.10116 
2000 0.00176 0.00427 0.00774 0.01206 0.01646 0.01921 0.02164 0.02456 0.02760 0.03349 0.04228 0.05312 0.06703 0.08127 0.09509 0.10196 
2001 0.00191 0.00465 0.00850 0.01356 0.01771 0.02077 0.02294 0.02554 0.02848 0.03372 0.04165 0.05120 0.06401 0.07779 0.09064 0.10011 
2002 0.00185 0.00507 0.00884 0.01349 0.01821 0.02192 0.02388 0.02717 0.02977 0.03439 0.04156 0.05010 0.06221 0.07622 0.08811 0.09878 
2003 0.00213 0.00499 0.00933 0.01495 0.01961 0.02250 0.02519 0.02771 0.03147 0.03564 0.04270 0.05061 0.06273 0.07559 0.08932 0.09952 
2004 0.00194 0.00524 0.00972 0.01501 0.02019 0.02407 0.02699 0.02927 0.03204 0.03750 0.04356 0.05070 0.06117 0.07444 0.08543 0.09841 
2005 0.00220 0.00538 0.01033 0.01617 0.02135 0.02448 0.02689 0.02959 0.03321 0.03712 0.04367 0.05110 0.06146 0.07155 0.08464 0.09636 
2006 0.00215 0.00596 0.01087 0.01707 0.02247 0.02691 0.02911 0.03157 0.03434 0.03909 0.04530 0.05346 0.06087 0.07329 0.08466 0.09551 
2007 0.00240 0.00605 0.01203 0.01772 0.02459 0.02859 0.03154 0.03411 0.03695 0.04088 0.04687 0.05359 0.06188 0.07166 0.08266 0.09336 
2008 0.00247 0.00609 0.01140 0.01901 0.02601 0.03135 0.03437 0.03752 0.04034 0.04479 0.05002 0.05789 0.06499 0.07488 0.08422 0.09556 
2009 0.00219 0.00552 0.01022 0.01652 0.02345 0.02833 0.03186 0.03475 0.03696 0.04133 0.04673 0.05200 0.06041 0.07082 0.08119 0.08883 
2010 0.00189 0.00481 0.00904 0.01542 0.02060 0.02714 0.02966 0.03299 0.03729 0.04082 0.04592 0.05105 0.05926 0.06929 0.07859 0.08915 
2011 0.00201 0.00453 0.00841 0.01307 0.01836 0.02315 0.02664 0.02996 0.03391 0.03862 0.04310 0.04915 0.05648 0.06666 0.07825 0.08563 
2012 0.00181 0.00435 0.00814 0.01264 0.01719 0.02167 0.02548 0.02917 0.03288 0.03635 0.04219 0.04895 0.05588 0.06464 0.07437 0.08454 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table A.11. (Continued)Age Specific fertility rates between ages 31 to 49, in years 1960 to 2012, in Spain 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
1960 0.15110 0.13658 0.12758 0.12217 0.11051 0.09488 0.08227 0.07123 0.06071 0.05139 0.04035 0.02775 0.01744 0.01035 0.00605 0.00374 0.00257 0.00187 0.00136 
1961 0.15188 0.13732 0.12723 0.12008 0.10683 0.09044 0.07849 0.06879 0.05965 0.05088 0.04011 0.02711 0.01655 0.00949 0.00549 0.00333 0.00223 0.00157 0.00110 
1962 0.15087 0.13625 0.12624 0.11922 0.10620 0.09012 0.07808 0.06811 0.05869 0.05005 0.03943 0.02636 0.01585 0.00893 0.00509 0.00309 0.00217 0.00168 0.00131 
1963 0.15834 0.14254 0.13141 0.12338 0.10901 0.09182 0.07945 0.06958 0.06039 0.05126 0.04042 0.02747 0.01691 0.00978 0.00569 0.00346 0.00228 0.00157 0.00107 
1964 0.16162 0.14571 0.13541 0.12878 0.11533 0.09824 0.08525 0.07432 0.06393 0.05549 0.04369 0.02893 0.01716 0.00951 0.00523 0.00317 0.00227 0.00184 0.00152 
1965 0.15622 0.14093 0.13147 0.12585 0.11387 0.09805 0.08475 0.07289 0.06167 0.05291 0.04188 0.02863 0.01779 0.01038 0.00576 0.00357 0.00270 0.00238 0.00216 
1966 0.15391 0.13858 0.12915 0.12354 0.11124 0.09544 0.08249 0.07104 0.06016 0.05183 0.04064 0.02740 0.01674 0.00962 0.00524 0.00322 0.00234 0.00190 0.00158 
1967 0.15928 0.14375 0.13398 0.12812 0.11630 0.10069 0.08681 0.07417 0.06237 0.05292 0.04225 0.03042 0.02038 0.01299 0.00765 0.00493 0.00383 0.00338 0.00301 
1968 0.15081 0.13551 0.12593 0.12000 0.10718 0.09186 0.07935 0.06835 0.05790 0.04943 0.03877 0.02658 0.01666 0.00986 0.00551 0.00341 0.00239 0.00179 0.00135 
1969 0.14650 0.13113 0.12218 0.11726 0.10489 0.09016 0.07799 0.06709 0.05660 0.04789 0.03721 0.02504 0.01532 0.00884 0.00492 0.00300 0.00203 0.00146 0.00105 
1970 0.14122 0.12558 0.11672 0.11220 0.10188 0.08776 0.07593 0.06531 0.05513 0.04684 0.03675 0.02490 0.01533 0.00888 0.00497 0.00306 0.00220 0.00175 0.00141 
1971 0.13933 0.12344 0.11395 0.10850 0.09809 0.08355 0.07235 0.06277 0.05357 0.04593 0.03584 0.02366 0.01403 0.00780 0.00429 0.00258 0.00174 0.00127 0.00093 
1972 0.13506 0.11987 0.11094 0.10589 0.09653 0.08262 0.07159 0.06196 0.05267 0.04473 0.03492 0.02330 0.01404 0.00795 0.00442 0.00268 0.00180 0.00129 0.00092 
1973 0.13036 0.11481 0.10596 0.10121 0.09349 0.07995 0.06883 0.05892 0.04942 0.04164 0.03223 0.02108 0.01240 0.00684 0.00370 0.00224 0.00157 0.00123 0.00098 
1974 0.13916 0.12215 0.10994 0.10087 0.08934 0.07395 0.06370 0.05602 0.04903 0.04253 0.03362 0.02252 0.01353 0.00761 0.00420 0.00251 0.00159 0.00103 0.00067 
1975 0.13130 0.11405 0.09583 0.08963 0.08271 0.06657 0.06152 0.05612 0.04744 0.03779 0.02731 0.02010 0.01350 0.00870 0.00459 0.00222 0.00097 0.00058 0.00043 
1976 0.13042 0.11663 0.10183 0.08370 0.07963 0.07352 0.05480 0.05010 0.04589 0.03858 0.02671 0.02016 0.01314 0.00815 0.00452 0.00238 0.00112 0.00057 0.00031 
1977 0.12184 0.11083 0.09889 0.08571 0.06929 0.06607 0.05993 0.04452 0.04021 0.03519 0.02591 0.01857 0.01235 0.00754 0.00445 0.00237 0.00102 0.00051 0.00025 
1978 0.11273 0.10254 0.09311 0.08316 0.07172 0.05839 0.05376 0.04807 0.03421 0.03138 0.02376 0.01759 0.01106 0.00685 0.00382 0.00201 0.00111 0.00047 0.00022 
1979 0.11111 0.09085 0.08290 0.07542 0.06655 0.05736 0.04590 0.04258 0.03643 0.02537 0.01930 0.01606 0.01012 0.00626 0.00345 0.00167 0.00095 0.00053 0.00026 
1980 0.10272 0.09109 0.07486 0.06890 0.06208 0.05411 0.04455 0.03456 0.03311 0.02887 0.01598 0.01361 0.00950 0.00588 0.00339 0.00158 0.00082 0.00044 0.00032 
 XX 
1981 0.09210 0.08401 0.07311 0.06039 0.05489 0.04945 0.04205 0.03439 0.02663 0.02464 0.01804 0.01124 0.00763 0.00504 0.00274 0.00130 0.00075 0.00034 0.00021 
1982 0.08868 0.07742 0.07214 0.06249 0.05141 0.04662 0.04032 0.03365 0.02712 0.02152 0.01699 0.01238 0.00674 0.00451 0.00270 0.00155 0.00074 0.00029 0.00022 
1983 0.08861 0.07297 0.06416 0.06013 0.05082 0.04147 0.03629 0.03153 0.02613 0.02032 0.01360 0.01058 0.00714 0.00373 0.00235 0.00132 0.00069 0.00028 0.00018 
1984 0.08788 0.07562 0.06183 0.05421 0.05055 0.04293 0.03313 0.02903 0.02425 0.01970 0.01382 0.00854 0.00667 0.00437 0.00205 0.00112 0.00066 0.00034 0.00022 
1985 0.08416 0.07462 0.06289 0.05189 0.04537 0.04068 0.03420 0.02592 0.02174 0.01766 0.01299 0.00869 0.00552 0.00349 0.00212 0.00090 0.00056 0.00031 0.00031 
1986 0.08192 0.07071 0.06187 0.05224 0.04267 0.03636 0.03222 0.02580 0.01930 0.01594 0.01139 0.00808 0.00512 0.00277 0.00175 0.00095 0.00039 0.00023 0.00018 
1987 0.08099 0.06990 0.05956 0.05130 0.04333 0.03502 0.02856 0.02431 0.01958 0.01390 0.00986 0.00737 0.00460 0.00276 0.00138 0.00078 0.00039 0.00018 0.00013 
1988 0.08356 0.07049 0.05904 0.04929 0.04236 0.03462 0.02619 0.02199 0.01733 0.01385 0.00836 0.00638 0.00408 0.00247 0.00131 0.00058 0.00033 0.00017 0.00007 
1989 0.08558 0.07224 0.05932 0.04912 0.04122 0.03324 0.02690 0.01997 0.01592 0.01270 0.00864 0.00562 0.00362 0.00235 0.00116 0.00048 0.00027 0.00013 0.00008 
1990 0.08701 0.07512 0.06135 0.04955 0.04118 0.03324 0.02666 0.02069 0.01484 0.01081 0.00821 0.00506 0.00329 0.00188 0.00106 0.00052 0.00023 0.00011 0.00010 
1991 0.08910 0.07579 0.06406 0.05281 0.04198 0.03253 0.02633 0.02026 0.01504 0.01087 0.00770 0.00514 0.00324 0.00156 0.00093 0.00046 0.00021 0.00009 0.00007 
1992 0.09216 0.08076 0.06659 0.05564 0.04477 0.03435 0.02641 0.02007 0.01567 0.01131 0.00721 0.00453 0.00305 0.00163 0.00081 0.00039 0.00023 0.00007 0.00006 
1993 0.09193 0.08076 0.06907 0.05522 0.04594 0.03560 0.02607 0.01996 0.01556 0.01070 0.00685 0.00442 0.00271 0.00151 0.00075 0.00031 0.00017 0.00013 0.00004 
1994 0.09161 0.08052 0.06879 0.05792 0.04623 0.03712 0.02758 0.02034 0.01507 0.01041 0.00708 0.00414 0.00247 0.00139 0.00076 0.00027 0.00017 0.00007 0.00006 
1995 0.09600 0.08359 0.07194 0.05987 0.04947 0.03826 0.02880 0.02137 0.01422 0.01044 0.00660 0.00420 0.00246 0.00120 0.00075 0.00031 0.00012 0.00004 0.00004 
1996 0.09767 0.08892 0.07506 0.06298 0.05106 0.04079 0.03022 0.02233 0.01537 0.01057 0.00678 0.00418 0.00246 0.00131 0.00062 0.00026 0.00016 0.00007 0.00002 
1997 0.09839 0.09117 0.08194 0.06808 0.05501 0.04364 0.03289 0.02340 0.01736 0.01166 0.00720 0.00433 0.00251 0.00129 0.00072 0.00029 0.00012 0.00006 0.00004 
1998 0.09706 0.09033 0.08348 0.07373 0.05740 0.04550 0.03415 0.02536 0.01801 0.01193 0.00747 0.00462 0.00242 0.00132 0.00061 0.00032 0.00015 0.00007 0.00003 
1999 0.10116 0.09531 0.08586 0.07646 0.06454 0.04929 0.03701 0.02752 0.02019 0.01309 0.00855 0.00492 0.00296 0.00144 0.00071 0.00031 0.00021 0.00012 0.00006 
2000 0.10275 0.09998 0.09116 0.07976 0.06769 0.05495 0.04009 0.02916 0.02119 0.01435 0.00854 0.00525 0.00301 0.00160 0.00084 0.00039 0.00021 0.00008 0.00007 
2001 0.10158 0.09864 0.09289 0.08131 0.07037 0.05683 0.04266 0.03118 0.02207 0.01519 0.00956 0.00571 0.00323 0.00175 0.00090 0.00043 0.00021 0.00011 0.00011 
2002 0.10147 0.10071 0.09307 0.08363 0.07226 0.05770 0.04451 0.03347 0.02348 0.01603 0.01002 0.00639 0.00311 0.00187 0.00101 0.00039 0.00023 0.00017 0.00008 
2003 0.10406 0.10297 0.09693 0.08803 0.07550 0.06190 0.04742 0.03563 0.02602 0.01730 0.01108 0.00655 0.00375 0.00201 0.00107 0.00041 0.00026 0.00017 0.00010 
2004 0.10305 0.10371 0.09803 0.09163 0.07781 0.06393 0.04913 0.03719 0.02734 0.01850 0.01139 0.00681 0.00397 0.00212 0.00101 0.00055 0.00026 0.00012 0.00011 
2005 0.10379 0.10453 0.09985 0.09234 0.08112 0.06555 0.05110 0.03864 0.02829 0.01897 0.01257 0.00752 0.00409 0.00238 0.00123 0.00055 0.00025 0.00018 0.00009 
2006 0.10176 0.10383 0.10045 0.09421 0.08378 0.06909 0.05313 0.04053 0.02986 0.02053 0.01265 0.00804 0.00482 0.00261 0.00155 0.00091 0.00035 0.00025 0.00014 
2007 0.09894 0.10093 0.09882 0.09293 0.08494 0.07235 0.05531 0.04113 0.03080 0.02141 0.01358 0.00829 0.00491 0.00298 0.00177 0.00093 0.00050 0.00024 0.00013 
2008 0.10091 0.10314 0.10123 0.09720 0.08769 0.07467 0.06059 0.04546 0.03320 0.02304 0.01502 0.00953 0.00523 0.00335 0.00158 0.00095 0.00054 0.00032 0.00019 
2009 0.09618 0.09736 0.09740 0.09335 0.08493 0.07302 0.06067 0.04717 0.03514 0.02346 0.01578 0.00948 0.00579 0.00328 0.00197 0.00102 0.00062 0.00040 0.00021 
2010 0.09384 0.09842 0.09635 0.09406 0.08564 0.07529 0.06049 0.04819 0.03741 0.02601 0.01593 0.00983 0.00601 0.00341 0.00201 0.00109 0.00054 0.00034 0.00027 
2011 0.09409 0.09663 0.09687 0.09360 0.08704 0.07587 0.06314 0.04915 0.03793 0.02747 0.01755 0.01067 0.00603 0.00342 0.00185 0.00105 0.00059 0.00030 0.00026 
2012 0.09143 0.09600 0.09420 0.09211 0.08644 0.07485 0.06244 0.05039 0.03786 0.02852 0.01905 0.01193 0.00641 0.00386 0.00214 0.00118 0.00056 0.00033 0.00024 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration 
 
 
 
Table A.12: Age Specific fertility rates between ages 15 to 30, in years 1960 to 2012, for Sweden 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
1960 0.00232 0.01281 0.03201 0.05828 0.08317 0.10318 0.11785 0.13484 0.14191 0.14804 0.15209 0.14706 0.14087 0.13040 0.11654 0.10239 
1961 0.00214 0.01314 0.03453 0.05776 0.08389 0.10284 0.12103 0.13399 0.14540 0.15545 0.15387 0.15122 0.14479 0.13112 0.12041 0.10832 
1962 0.00248 0.01440 0.03536 0.06351 0.08490 0.10687 0.12482 0.13642 0.14681 0.15747 0.15700 0.15381 0.14528 0.13094 0.12105 0.10846 
1963 0.00282 0.01439 0.03768 0.06380 0.08838 0.10636 0.12422 0.14266 0.15329 0.16046 0.16575 0.15840 0.15104 0.14046 0.12842 0.11168 
1964 0.00333 0.01661 0.04186 0.07070 0.09640 0.11450 0.13018 0.14934 0.15876 0.17167 0.17556 0.16962 0.16033 0.14948 0.13535 0.12308 
1965 0.00282 0.01838 0.04390 0.07320 0.09572 0.11473 0.13397 0.14378 0.15753 0.16288 0.17118 0.16191 0.15794 0.14451 0.12928 0.11572 
1966 0.00314 0.01793 0.04477 0.07482 0.09924 0.11551 0.12854 0.14389 0.14732 0.16250 0.16715 0.16411 0.15230 0.13785 0.12860 0.11175 
1967 0.00282 0.01606 0.04251 0.07224 0.09499 0.11330 0.12483 0.13803 0.14823 0.15241 0.16312 0.15462 0.15083 0.13704 0.12214 0.10337 
 XXI 
1968 0.00243 0.01370 0.03714 0.06067 0.08375 0.09879 0.11361 0.12832 0.13597 0.14402 0.14813 0.14613 0.13838 0.12703 0.11242 0.09944 
1969 0.00215 0.01071 0.02988 0.05264 0.07308 0.08981 0.10628 0.12016 0.12962 0.13566 0.14280 0.13450 0.13013 0.12218 0.10836 0.09270 
1970 0.00268 0.01288 0.02980 0.05040 0.06982 0.08936 0.10714 0.12316 0.13633 0.14076 0.14228 0.14060 0.13258 0.11879 0.10480 0.09497 
1971 0.00252 0.01239 0.03068 0.05046 0.07373 0.09451 0.11404 0.12880 0.14066 0.14642 0.15154 0.13993 0.13571 0.12046 0.10766 0.09596 
1972 0.00257 0.01204 0.02957 0.04833 0.07285 0.09082 0.11224 0.12905 0.13748 0.14700 0.14503 0.14204 0.13124 0.12056 0.10816 0.09287 
1973 0.00256 0.01008 0.02757 0.04548 0.06864 0.09149 0.11177 0.12529 0.13660 0.13981 0.14572 0.14078 0.13000 0.11907 0.10612 0.09161 
1974 0.00193 0.00950 0.02550 0.04709 0.07484 0.09263 0.11059 0.12653 0.13818 0.14335 0.14505 0.14092 0.13193 0.12076 0.10393 0.08865 
1975 0.00229 0.00814 0.02247 0.04182 0.06722 0.08546 0.10466 0.11769 0.12974 0.13661 0.14274 0.13531 0.12491 0.11404 0.10178 0.08654 
1976 0.00141 0.00666 0.01923 0.03638 0.05912 0.08184 0.09347 0.11090 0.11887 0.12928 0.13509 0.13333 0.12149 0.11028 0.09763 0.08273 
1977 0.00170 0.00565 0.01548 0.03135 0.05511 0.07505 0.09283 0.10591 0.11506 0.12769 0.13188 0.12917 0.12156 0.11238 0.09968 0.08597 
1978 0.00111 0.00460 0.01301 0.02853 0.04916 0.06647 0.08696 0.10021 0.11003 0.12155 0.12753 0.12539 0.11768 0.11166 0.10121 0.08569 
1979 0.00118 0.00364 0.01295 0.02571 0.04557 0.06346 0.08211 0.09521 0.11162 0.12448 0.12937 0.13068 0.12788 0.12024 0.10776 0.09195 
1980 0.00094 0.00373 0.01109 0.02346 0.04318 0.06372 0.08167 0.09585 0.11103 0.12374 0.12884 0.13166 0.12943 0.12378 0.10969 0.09699 
1981 0.00087 0.00317 0.00983 0.02215 0.03959 0.05768 0.07538 0.09168 0.10764 0.11744 0.12450 0.12615 0.12581 0.11801 0.10945 0.09798 
1982 0.00060 0.00293 0.00870 0.01830 0.03793 0.05459 0.07285 0.08729 0.10122 0.11505 0.12497 0.12620 0.12384 0.12186 0.10950 0.09884 
1983 0.00063 0.00239 0.00657 0.01678 0.03218 0.05076 0.06761 0.08491 0.09959 0.11364 0.12383 0.12541 0.12457 0.12139 0.11289 0.10007 
1984 0.00061 0.00135 0.00607 0.01382 0.02987 0.04651 0.06824 0.08029 0.09740 0.11393 0.12536 0.13187 0.12978 0.12603 0.11626 0.10903 
1985 0.00045 0.00198 0.00611 0.01423 0.02978 0.04842 0.06506 0.08255 0.10047 0.11923 0.12964 0.13509 0.13728 0.13372 0.12360 0.11339 
1986 0.00060 0.00210 0.00619 0.01510 0.02979 0.04906 0.06681 0.08577 0.10112 0.11999 0.13281 0.14121 0.14064 0.13923 0.12816 0.11856 
1987 0.00043 0.00238 0.00614 0.01480 0.02948 0.04752 0.06625 0.08709 0.10437 0.11954 0.12980 0.14077 0.14297 0.14469 0.13537 0.12439 
1988 0.00067 0.00247 0.00681 0.01557 0.03157 0.05056 0.07095 0.09229 0.11040 0.12737 0.14178 0.14999 0.15255 0.14968 0.14451 0.13319 
1989 0.00069 0.00288 0.00769 0.01703 0.03567 0.05240 0.07276 0.09229 0.11091 0.12998 0.14320 0.14938 0.15333 0.15533 0.14700 0.13459 
1990 0.00078 0.00295 0.00820 0.01886 0.03802 0.05657 0.07637 0.09858 0.11869 0.13658 0.14933 0.15839 0.16223 0.15884 0.15252 0.14176 
1991 0.00075 0.00267 0.00778 0.01795 0.03403 0.05466 0.07195 0.09242 0.11424 0.12979 0.14661 0.15432 0.16108 0.15956 0.14985 0.14274 
1992 0.00053 0.00259 0.00738 0.01425 0.03012 0.04937 0.06876 0.08971 0.10731 0.12984 0.14165 0.15196 0.15489 0.15413 0.15108 0.14019 
1993 0.00057 0.00235 0.00623 0.01447 0.02757 0.04438 0.06288 0.08043 0.10005 0.11933 0.13553 0.14478 0.14811 0.14967 0.14463 0.13588 
1994 0.00050 0.00225 0.00574 0.01247 0.02476 0.03885 0.05515 0.07300 0.09067 0.11100 0.12625 0.13611 0.14220 0.14675 0.13982 0.12881 
1995 0.00064 0.00214 0.00578 0.01133 0.02205 0.03573 0.05045 0.06660 0.07972 0.09635 0.11410 0.12347 0.13096 0.13361 0.12651 0.11999 
1996 0.00057 0.00210 0.00538 0.00997 0.02043 0.03262 0.04454 0.05655 0.07144 0.08411 0.10286 0.11314 0.11924 0.12087 0.12003 0.11484 
1997 0.00056 0.00215 0.00528 0.00900 0.01925 0.02812 0.04013 0.05418 0.06498 0.08120 0.09219 0.10377 0.11510 0.12030 0.11489 0.11064 
1998 0.00067 0.00156 0.00453 0.00947 0.01691 0.02566 0.03821 0.04959 0.06130 0.07348 0.08697 0.10053 0.10974 0.11390 0.11828 0.11180 
1999 0.00041 0.00206 0.00412 0.01007 0.01756 0.02690 0.03812 0.04662 0.05805 0.07084 0.08305 0.09777 0.10804 0.11631 0.11726 0.11384 
2000 0.00052 0.00187 0.00559 0.00936 0.01861 0.02782 0.03885 0.04513 0.05699 0.07002 0.08400 0.10004 0.10963 0.12043 0.12161 0.11954 
2001 0.00067 0.00208 0.00453 0.00901 0.01801 0.02641 0.03626 0.04578 0.05802 0.07050 0.08271 0.09708 0.10562 0.11683 0.12022 0.12158 
2002 0.00039 0.00211 0.00536 0.01014 0.01732 0.02741 0.03777 0.04722 0.05961 0.07005 0.08564 0.09764 0.11320 0.12123 0.12904 0.13288 
2003 0.00055 0.00188 0.00531 0.00889 0.01572 0.02748 0.03853 0.04814 0.05529 0.06962 0.08525 0.09759 0.11411 0.12598 0.13545 0.13812 
2004 0.00051 0.00200 0.00445 0.00827 0.01629 0.02764 0.03765 0.04678 0.05469 0.07139 0.08557 0.09809 0.11187 0.12883 0.13750 0.13886 
2005 0.00060 0.00170 0.00423 0.00809 0.01698 0.02610 0.03661 0.04738 0.05744 0.06969 0.08159 0.09877 0.10981 0.12985 0.13416 0.14282 
2006 0.00043 0.00171 0.00477 0.00794 0.01702 0.02684 0.03778 0.04950 0.05818 0.07080 0.08505 0.09886 0.11619 0.13224 0.14070 0.14545 
2007 0.00058 0.00180 0.00408 0.00774 0.01691 0.02687 0.03994 0.04954 0.06107 0.07517 0.08459 0.10110 0.11348 0.12670 0.14067 0.14497 
2008 0.00049 0.00130 0.00407 0.00773 0.01686 0.02843 0.04087 0.05168 0.06229 0.07692 0.08891 0.09887 0.11419 0.13050 0.14266 0.14703 
2009 0.00058 0.00141 0.00407 0.00703 0.01593 0.02859 0.03883 0.05143 0.06279 0.07401 0.08806 0.10246 0.11689 0.12779 0.14022 0.14798 
2010 0.00041 0.00155 0.00367 0.00741 0.01530 0.02696 0.03902 0.04985 0.06368 0.07788 0.09100 0.10507 0.11897 0.13237 0.14477 0.14631 
2011 0.00039 0.00166 0.00334 0.00715 0.01495 0.02404 0.03520 0.04712 0.05956 0.07647 0.08572 0.09918 0.11381 0.12734 0.13476 0.13893 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
Table A.12. (Continued)Age Specific fertility rates between ages 31 to 49, in years 1960 to 2012, for Sweden 
 XXII 
 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 
1960 0.09642 0.08320 0.07138 0.06306 0.05445 0.04583 0.03816 0.03205 0.02699 0.02086 0.01498 0.01186 0.00721 0.00468 0.00241 0.00112 0.00054 0.00013 0.00000 
1961 0.09344 0.08344 0.07225 0.06180 0.05407 0.04711 0.03894 0.03151 0.02691 0.02004 0.01434 0.00991 0.00732 0.00346 0.00231 0.00124 0.00068 0.00013 0.00007 
1962 0.09394 0.08325 0.07336 0.06402 0.05380 0.04487 0.03813 0.03144 0.02502 0.01932 0.01385 0.00993 0.00619 0.00415 0.00189 0.00084 0.00048 0.00024 0.00006 
1963 0.09984 0.08706 0.07556 0.06331 0.05562 0.04777 0.03815 0.03146 0.02472 0.01991 0.01470 0.00887 0.00622 0.00385 0.00203 0.00099 0.00067 0.00006 0.00006 
1964 0.10438 0.09433 0.08028 0.06711 0.05855 0.04765 0.04038 0.03251 0.02579 0.01962 0.01446 0.01017 0.00589 0.00377 0.00181 0.00073 0.00027 0.00016 0.00004 
1965 0.09965 0.09022 0.07545 0.06720 0.05604 0.04695 0.03995 0.03070 0.02433 0.01889 0.01301 0.00962 0.00550 0.00390 0.00205 0.00077 0.00032 0.00016 0.00010 
1966 0.09879 0.08632 0.07231 0.06437 0.05355 0.04556 0.03680 0.02985 0.02397 0.01776 0.01193 0.00850 0.00499 0.00312 0.00190 0.00080 0.00022 0.00014 0.00006 
1967 0.09521 0.08123 0.07017 0.05894 0.05185 0.04163 0.03437 0.02766 0.02238 0.01674 0.01141 0.00764 0.00532 0.00288 0.00165 0.00067 0.00038 0.00012 0.00004 
1968 0.08700 0.07278 0.06458 0.05433 0.04585 0.03869 0.03162 0.02520 0.01929 0.01392 0.01012 0.00646 0.00351 0.00259 0.00092 0.00043 0.00017 0.00009 0.00008 
1969 0.08197 0.07056 0.05831 0.05086 0.04015 0.03390 0.02919 0.02197 0.01697 0.01336 0.00995 0.00543 0.00388 0.00258 0.00112 0.00058 0.00023 0.00012 0.00003 
1970 0.07815 0.06851 0.05545 0.04878 0.03985 0.03413 0.02655 0.02144 0.01604 0.01171 0.00835 0.00569 0.00335 0.00195 0.00109 0.00052 0.00023 0.00014 0.00002 
1971 0.07970 0.06902 0.05679 0.04740 0.03930 0.03306 0.02421 0.01976 0.01558 0.01098 0.00706 0.00539 0.00359 0.00194 0.00083 0.00036 0.00012 0.00010 0.00002 
1972 0.07961 0.06482 0.05345 0.04382 0.03582 0.02898 0.02412 0.01848 0.01421 0.01006 0.00719 0.00501 0.00273 0.00133 0.00075 0.00022 0.00020 0.00008 0.00000 
1973 0.07557 0.06359 0.05180 0.04405 0.03696 0.02812 0.02121 0.01728 0.01226 0.00877 0.00585 0.00374 0.00250 0.00129 0.00082 0.00050 0.00016 0.00010 0.00002 
1974 0.07704 0.06590 0.05348 0.04162 0.03503 0.02766 0.02108 0.01679 0.01247 0.00956 0.00581 0.00373 0.00204 0.00114 0.00048 0.00045 0.00002 0.00004 0.00000 
1975 0.07359 0.06026 0.05034 0.04181 0.03246 0.02533 0.01889 0.01429 0.01092 0.00737 0.00518 0.00308 0.00225 0.00102 0.00037 0.00022 0.00015 0.00006 0.00002 
1976 0.07210 0.05945 0.04858 0.04269 0.03121 0.02593 0.01953 0.01432 0.01113 0.00712 0.00464 0.00344 0.00186 0.00104 0.00054 0.00031 0.00015 0.00000 0.00004 
1977 0.07041 0.05794 0.04865 0.04077 0.03200 0.02562 0.01922 0.01433 0.01122 0.00711 0.00455 0.00327 0.00198 0.00077 0.00072 0.00015 0.00011 0.00002 0.00000 
1978 0.07420 0.06159 0.04853 0.04112 0.03260 0.02717 0.02005 0.01420 0.01073 0.00768 0.00487 0.00298 0.00156 0.00094 0.00039 0.00016 0.00017 0.00004 0.00000 
1979 0.08054 0.06636 0.05435 0.04355 0.03717 0.02944 0.02129 0.01702 0.01241 0.00841 0.00555 0.00405 0.00207 0.00086 0.00047 0.00023 0.00005 0.00002 0.00000 
1980 0.08327 0.07019 0.05930 0.04689 0.03605 0.03039 0.02319 0.01724 0.01317 0.00827 0.00610 0.00313 0.00209 0.00112 0.00047 0.00014 0.00009 0.00002 0.00000 
1981 0.08549 0.07054 0.05833 0.05112 0.03730 0.03004 0.02356 0.01758 0.01195 0.00880 0.00570 0.00431 0.00199 0.00103 0.00041 0.00021 0.00007 0.00007 0.00000 
1982 0.08714 0.07405 0.06132 0.05025 0.04056 0.03114 0.02359 0.01778 0.01267 0.00920 0.00591 0.00356 0.00234 0.00134 0.00040 0.00025 0.00016 0.00005 0.00002 
1983 0.08919 0.07424 0.06207 0.05184 0.04176 0.03314 0.02355 0.01823 0.01367 0.00934 0.00588 0.00344 0.00272 0.00123 0.00048 0.00031 0.00002 0.00000 0.00002 
1984 0.09417 0.08031 0.06541 0.05380 0.04475 0.03500 0.02729 0.01971 0.01440 0.01039 0.00697 0.00422 0.00254 0.00135 0.00052 0.00037 0.00011 0.00005 0.00000 
1985 0.10107 0.08615 0.07201 0.05954 0.04892 0.03780 0.02839 0.02182 0.01608 0.01053 0.00721 0.00453 0.00266 0.00136 0.00078 0.00019 0.00007 0.00007 0.00000 
1986 0.10406 0.08870 0.07640 0.06274 0.05264 0.04080 0.03104 0.02187 0.01641 0.01109 0.00692 0.00469 0.00291 0.00142 0.00067 0.00023 0.00004 0.00000 0.00002 
1987 0.11107 0.09515 0.07973 0.06571 0.05221 0.04280 0.03110 0.02377 0.01751 0.01140 0.00740 0.00459 0.00295 0.00178 0.00060 0.00036 0.00008 0.00000 0.00002 
1988 0.11621 0.10002 0.08462 0.06965 0.05722 0.04567 0.03567 0.02677 0.01934 0.01247 0.00839 0.00482 0.00271 0.00162 0.00080 0.00022 0.00010 0.00004 0.00000 
1989 0.11850 0.10376 0.08996 0.07276 0.06141 0.04930 0.03574 0.02924 0.02046 0.01367 0.00872 0.00582 0.00278 0.00111 0.00082 0.00039 0.00015 0.00000 0.00000 
1990 0.13090 0.11077 0.09352 0.07930 0.06703 0.05123 0.03946 0.03036 0.02169 0.01485 0.01014 0.00580 0.00341 0.00163 0.00055 0.00036 0.00014 0.00007 0.00000 
1991 0.13012 0.11262 0.09609 0.08070 0.06576 0.05336 0.04170 0.03141 0.02253 0.01570 0.00976 0.00630 0.00370 0.00160 0.00091 0.00023 0.00014 0.00002 0.00004 
1992 0.12719 0.11441 0.09904 0.08194 0.06819 0.05445 0.04279 0.03274 0.02269 0.01558 0.01051 0.00643 0.00345 0.00202 0.00079 0.00036 0.00024 0.00003 0.00002 
1993 0.12324 0.11179 0.09404 0.08033 0.06665 0.05427 0.04025 0.03235 0.02273 0.01668 0.01017 0.00650 0.00341 0.00162 0.00063 0.00037 0.00006 0.00003 0.00000 
1994 0.11971 0.10544 0.08979 0.07864 0.06625 0.05429 0.04056 0.03162 0.02324 0.01565 0.01045 0.00618 0.00373 0.00154 0.00085 0.00035 0.00010 0.00003 0.00003 
1995 0.10974 0.10046 0.08601 0.07418 0.06327 0.04922 0.04048 0.02941 0.02160 0.01549 0.00922 0.00608 0.00321 0.00178 0.00073 0.00033 0.00011 0.00005 0.00005 
1996 0.10512 0.09315 0.08171 0.06944 0.05825 0.04951 0.03776 0.02869 0.02122 0.01470 0.00933 0.00625 0.00325 0.00177 0.00088 0.00034 0.00014 0.00003 0.00000 
1997 0.10152 0.09086 0.07768 0.07011 0.05547 0.04707 0.03788 0.02813 0.02033 0.01477 0.00965 0.00604 0.00328 0.00164 0.00071 0.00037 0.00016 0.00003 0.00003 
1998 0.10809 0.09361 0.08180 0.07098 0.06044 0.05102 0.03851 0.02993 0.02231 0.01540 0.00949 0.00605 0.00375 0.00195 0.00082 0.00042 0.00019 0.00002 0.00002 
1999 0.10585 0.09582 0.08198 0.07270 0.06216 0.05040 0.04032 0.02935 0.02347 0.01548 0.01033 0.00624 0.00378 0.00186 0.00083 0.00046 0.00005 0.00009 0.00003 
2000 0.10951 0.09938 0.09068 0.07514 0.06464 0.05121 0.04138 0.03238 0.02360 0.01641 0.01001 0.00635 0.00423 0.00188 0.00091 0.00049 0.00014 0.00012 0.00007 
2001 0.11873 0.10514 0.09349 0.07895 0.06930 0.05512 0.04319 0.03237 0.02497 0.01659 0.01224 0.00714 0.00386 0.00201 0.00081 0.00039 0.00014 0.00010 0.00007 
2002 0.12695 0.11336 0.09881 0.08717 0.07037 0.05904 0.04459 0.03474 0.02642 0.01834 0.01254 0.00736 0.00418 0.00230 0.00100 0.00041 0.00018 0.00010 0.00003 
2003 0.13222 0.12527 0.10648 0.09236 0.07705 0.06156 0.05136 0.03765 0.02908 0.01992 0.01338 0.00756 0.00458 0.00216 0.00109 0.00065 0.00012 0.00011 0.00003 
2004 0.13642 0.12866 0.11403 0.09797 0.07936 0.06697 0.05182 0.04059 0.03031 0.02163 0.01423 0.00867 0.00533 0.00288 0.00091 0.00048 0.00024 0.00005 0.00004 
2005 0.13874 0.13126 0.11465 0.10015 0.08553 0.07075 0.05298 0.04144 0.03138 0.02131 0.01372 0.00912 0.00506 0.00260 0.00152 0.00061 0.00019 0.00014 0.00005 
2006 0.14631 0.13646 0.12257 0.10967 0.09113 0.07432 0.05959 0.04403 0.03281 0.02314 0.01516 0.00913 0.00583 0.00290 0.00094 0.00093 0.00037 0.00016 0.00003 
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2007 0.14538 0.13891 0.12543 0.10945 0.09319 0.07806 0.06073 0.04688 0.03501 0.02438 0.01651 0.01052 0.00605 0.00305 0.00146 0.00073 0.00051 0.00014 0.00009 
2008 0.14697 0.13717 0.12536 0.11090 0.09456 0.07837 0.06078 0.04931 0.03684 0.02477 0.01712 0.01025 0.00568 0.00301 0.00155 0.00090 0.00030 0.00017 0.00007 
2009 0.14702 0.13959 0.12501 0.11509 0.10061 0.08002 0.06552 0.05052 0.03699 0.02646 0.01829 0.01037 0.00671 0.00331 0.00181 0.00082 0.00030 0.00028 0.00016 
2010 0.15244 0.14489 0.12960 0.11682 0.10019 0.08601 0.06697 0.05178 0.04130 0.02777 0.01866 0.01189 0.00632 0.00376 0.00200 0.00091 0.00044 0.00012 0.00019 
2011 0.14209 0.13421 0.12751 0.11538 0.09583 0.08449 0.06856 0.05028 0.03911 0.02898 0.01880 0.01117 0.00662 0.00323 0.00181 0.00089 0.00032 0.00016 0.00017 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration.  
 
 
Table A.13: Age that 50% first and second births occurred, from 1991 to the last year available for Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden  
  Austria Hungary Portugal Sweden 
1991 
 
1º birth 25 23 25 26 
2º birth 28 28 29 29 
2000 1º birth 27 28 27 29 2º birth 29 29 31 31 
Last year 
available 
 
1º birth 29 29 30 29 
2º birth 31 31 33 32 
Average Differences - From 1º to 2º birth 2.3 2.7 3.7 2.7 
 Notes: The last year available: 2010 for Austria. 2009 for Hungary. 2012 for Portugal and 2011 for Sweden 
 Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.14: TFR and MAC evolution between 1960 and 2012 for selected countries 
 Austria France Hungary Portugal  Spain Sweden 
 TFR MAC TFR MAC TFR MAC TFR MAC TFR MAC TFR MAC 
1960 2.70 27.58 2.74 27.60 2.02 25.77 3.16 29.55 2.79 30.09 2.20 27.47 
1961 2.79 27.52 2.83 27.55 1.94 25.70 3.22 29.56 2.77 29.98 2.23 27.41 
1962 2.80 27.47 2.80 27.49 1.80 25.72 3.29 29.48 2.81 29.83 2.25 27.31 
1963 2.82 27.41 2.90 27.42 1.82 25.81 3.20 29.53 2.88 29.93 2.33 27.31 
1964 2.79 27.38 2.91 27.36 1.82 25.71 3.31 29.47 3.01 29.93 2.48 27.25 
1965 2.70 27.26 2.85 27.29 1.83 25.60 3.25 29.40 2.93 29.98 2.41 27.15 
1966 2.66 27.11 2.80 27.31 1.90 25.55 3.24 29.32 2.91 29.86 2.36 27.06 
1967 2.62 26.97 2.67 27.32 2.03 25.55 3.21 29.24 2.96 30.13 2.27 27.01 
1968 2.59 26.85 2.59 27.30 2.08 25.53 3.15 29.17 2.90 29.69 2.07 27.02 
1969 2.49 26.76 2.53 27.28 2.05 25.50 3.11 29.12 2.88 29.56 1.92 27.08 
1970 2.29 26.67 2.48 27.17 1.99 25.43 3.00 29.01 2.86 29.50 1.92 26.97 
1971 2.20 26.67 2.50 27.11 1.94 25.36 3.00 28.97 2.87 29.27 1.96 26.84 
1972 2.09 26.53 2.42 26.98 1.94 25.31 2.84 28.85 2.85 29.16 1.91 26.76 
1973 1.94 26.41 2.31 26.87 1.94 25.31 2.75 28.84 2.84 28.97 1.87 26.73 
1974 1.91 26.31 2.11 26.79 2.29 25.40 2.69 28.65 2.90 28.84 1.88 26.69 
1975 1.83 26.27 1.93 26.67 2.37 25.34 2.76 28.23 2.79 28.61 1.77 26.70 
1976 1.69 26.24 1.83 26.56 2.25 25.09 2.80 27.57 2.80 28.51 1.68 26.87 
1977 1.63 26.27 1.86 26.52 2.17 25.00 2.68 27.37 2.67 28.43 1.65 26.98 
1978 1.60 26.25 1.82 26.59 2.08 24.81 2.44 27.28 2.55 28.35 1.60 27.18 
1979 1.60 26.27 1.86 26.71 2.02 24.68 2.31 27.26 2.37 28.24 1.66 27.45 
1980 1.65 26.27 1.95 26.82 1.91 24.65 2.25 27.17 2.21 28.20 1.68 27.56 
1981 1.67 26.33 1.95 26.99 1.88 24.73 2.14 27.21 2.04 28.22 1.64 27.72 
1982 1.66 26.35 1.91 27.06 1.81 24.74 2.09 27.11 1.94 28.32 1.63 27.88 
1983 1.56 26.47 1.78 27.12 1.76 24.81 1.97 27.06 1.80 28.37 1.61 28.04 
1984 1.52 26.56 1.80 27.26 1.77 24.83 1.93 26.99 1.73 28.42 1.66 28.25 
1985 1.47 26.68 1.81 27.48 1.87 25.00 1.75 27.06 1.64 28.45 1.74 28.36 
1986 1.45 26.77 1.83 27.66 1.87 25.20 1.70 27.03 1.56 28.53 1.80 28.41 
1987 1.43 26.91 1.80 27.87 1.85 25.32 1.65 27.14 1.50 28.56 1.84 28.50 
1988 1.45 26.95 1.81 28.04 1.85 25.41 1.63 27.15 1.45 28.57 1.97 28.52 
1989 1.45 27.07 1.79 28.20 1.84 25.52 1.58 27.21 1.40 28.72 2.02 28.56 
1990 1.46 27.21 1.78 28.32 1.87 25.56 1.56 27.32 1.36 28.86 2.14 28.58 
1991 1.51 27.22 1.77 28.41 1.88 25.67 1.56 27.47 1.33 29.04 2.11 28.72 
1992 1.50 27.26 1.73 28.55 1.78 25.78 1.54 27.59 1.32 29.25 2.08 28.87 
1993 1.50 27.31 1.66 28.67 1.69 25.98 1.52 27.68 1.27 29.46 1.98 28.98 
1994 1.47 27.50 1.66 28.83 1.64 26.18 1.45 27.83 1.20 29.72 1.88 29.13 
1995 1.42 27.66 1.71 28.98 1.57 26.32 1.41 28.02 1.17 29.96 1.73 29.22 
1996 1.45 27.81 1.73 29.11 1.46 26.46 1.44 28.14 1.16 30.19 1.60 29.36 
1997 1.39 27.93 1.73 29.20 1.38 26.63 1.47 28.25 1.17 30.38 1.53 29.47 
1998 1.37 28.01 1.76 29.31 1.33 26.81 1.47 28.41 1.15 30.54 1.52 29.71 
1999 1.34 28.15 1.79 29.35 1.28 27.04 1.50 28.53 1.19 30.66 1.51 29.78 
2000 1.36 28.22 1.87 29.38 1.32 27.28 1.55 28.61 1.23 30.72 1.56 29.85 
2001 1.33 28.39 1.88 29.40 1.31 27.57 1.45 28.75 1.24 30.76 1.58 30.00 
2002 1.39 28.57 1.86 29.47 1.30 27.77 1.46 28.86 1.25 30.80 1.67 30.07 
2003 1.38 28.76 1.87 29.55 1.27 27.95 1.44 29.03 1.30 30.85 1.73 30.25 
2004 1.42 28.84 1.90 29.61 1.28 28.21 1.40 29.16 1.31 30.88 1.77 30.37 
2005 1.41 29.03 1.92 29.71 1.31 28.45 1.41 29.25 1.33 30.91 1.79 30.45 
2006 1.40 29.21 1.98 29.78 1.34 28.65 1.37 29.40 1.36 30.90 1.87 30.54 
2007 1.38 29.37 1.96 29.85 1.32 28.83 1.35 29.45 1.38 30.84 1.89 30.59 
2008 1.41 29.48 1.99 29.89 1.35 28.91 1.39 29.56 1.45 30.83 1.92 30.58 
2009 1.39 29.67 1.99 29.96 1.32 29.08 1.34 29.65 1.38 31.04 1.94 30.68 
2010 1.44 29.82 2.01 30.03 - - 1.39 29.82 1.37 31.20 1.99 30.74 
2011 - - 2.00 30.10 - - 1.35 30.09 1.34 31.44 1.90 30.82 
2012 - - 2.00 - - - 1.28 - 1.32 - - - 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.15: Differences between the total mean age at birth and the mean age at first birth. 
for selected years and for Austria.,Hungary, Portugal and Sweden (Table 2.3 in the chapter - 
Full Table) 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Sweden 
1960  -2.91 -4.28  
1961  -2.86 -4.33  
1962  -2.81 -4.31  
1963  -2.80 -4.29  
1964  -2.75 -4.32  
1965  -2.66 -4.29  
1966  -2.66 -4.37  
1967  -2.68 -4.32  
1968  -2.69 -4.32  
1969  -2.68 -4.29  
1970  -2.61 -4.22 -2.75 
1971  -2.62 -4.17 -2.67 
1972  -2.59 -4.14 -2.62 
1973  -2.60 -4.22 -2.57 
1974  -2.73 -4.13 -2.51 
1975  -2.81 -3.93 -2.37 
1976  -2.67 -3.59 -2.33 
1977  -2.57 -3.41 -2.29 
1978  -2.38 -3.30 -2.30 
1979  -2.26 -3.25 -2.37 
1980  -2.21 -3.15 -2.34 
1981  -2.18 -3.23 -2.38 
1982  -2.17 -3.20 -2.38 
1983  -2.15 -3.22 -2.32 
1984 -2.46 -2.12 -3.06 -2.32 
1985 -2.36 -2.20 -2.97 -2.34 
1986 -2.36 -2.33 -2.88 -2.31 
1987 -2.28 -2.37 -2.83 -2.31 
1988 -2.23 -2.35 -2.64 -2.32 
1989 -2.25 -2.42 -2.56 -2.30 
1990 -2.24 -2.47 -2.43 -2.31 
1991 -2.27 -2.48 -2.40 -2.26 
1992 -2.22 -2.47 -2.35 -2.16 
1993 -2.17 -2.57 -2.30 -2.06 
1994 -2.09 -2.62 -2.28 -2.04 
1995 -2.01 -2.54 -2.28 -2.02 
1996 -1.90 -2.42 -2.26 -1.98 
1997 -1.93 -2.40 -2.28 -1.97 
1998 -1.86 -2.28 -2.28 -1.96 
1999 -1.84 -2.18 -2.14 -1.91 
2000 -1.83 -2.18 -2.14 -1.98 
2001 -1.85 -2.25 -2.11 -1.87 
2002 -1.81 -2.17 -2.07 -1.85 
2003 -1.83 -2.03 -1.98 -1.80 
2004 -1.79 -1.93 -2.03 -1.76 
2005 -1.77 -1.82 -1.96 -1.79 
2006 -1.73 -1.75 -1.92 -1.79 
2007 -1.72 -1.73 -1.90 -1.84 
2008 -1.72 -1.71 -1.87 -1.83 
2009 -1.71 -1.71 -1.77 -1.81 
2010 -1.60  -1.70 -1.83 
2011   -1.67 -1.82 
2012   -1.56  
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.16: Birth order contribution to the TFR in Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Sweden 
 TFR1 TFR2 TFR3 TFR4+ TFR1 TFR2 TFR3 TFR4+ TFR1 TFR2 TFR3 TFR4+ TFR1 TFR2 TFR3 TFR4+ 
1959 - - - - 0.90 0.60 0.26 0.28 0.99 0.63 0.45 1.09 - - - - 
1960 - - - - 0.88 0.57 0.24 0.26 1.01 0.64 0.43 1.07 - - - - 
1961 - - - - 0.82 0.52 0.22 0.24 1.01 0.66 0.44 1.11 - - - - 
1962 - - - - 0.82 0.56 0.21 0.24 1.03 0.69 0.45 1.12 - - - - 
1963 - - - - 0.86 0.55 0.20 0.22 0.97 0.69 0.46 1.08 - - - - 
1964 - - - - 0.89 0.55 0.19 0.21 1.01 0.70 0.46 1.13 - - - - 
1965 - - - - 0.92 0.60 0.18 0.20 1.02 0.69 0.45 1.08 - - - - 
1966 - - - - 0.97 0.67 0.19 0.20 1.00 0.72 0.45 1.07 - - - - 
1967 - - - - 0.98 0.71 0.19 0.19 1.03 0.72 0.43 1.03 - - - - 
1968 - - - - 0.98 0.70 0.19 0.18 1.03 0.72 0.42 0.99 - - - - 
1969 - - - - 0.95 0.69 0.18 0.17 1.01 0.74 0.41 0.95 - - - - 
1970 - - - - 0.92 0.67 0.18 0.17 1.01 0.73 0.39 0.88 0.81 0.68 0.29 0.15 
1971 - - - - 0.91 0.69 0.18 0.16 1.03 0.75 0.39 0.84 0.85 0.69 0.28 0.14 
1972 - - - - 0.90 0.69 0.20 0.16 0.99 0.72 0.37 0.76 0.84 0.68 0.27 0.12 
1973 - - - - 0.97 0.89 0.26 0.17 0.97 0.70 0.36 0.72 0.83 0.66 0.26 0.12 
1974 - - - - 0.99 0.95 0.27 0.16 0.98 0.70 0.35 0.66 0.84 0.68 0.25 0.11 
1975 - - - - 1.00 0.87 0.24 0.14 1.07 0.75 0.34 0.60 0.80 0.65 0.23 0.09 
1976 - - - - 0.97 0.83 0.23 0.13 1.24 0.72 0.31 0.53 0.75 0.64 0.21 0.08 
1977 - - - - 0.96 0.79 0.21 0.12 1.21 0.74 0.29 0.45 0.72 0.64 0.21 0.08 
1978 - - - - 0.95 0.76 0.20 0.11 1.08 0.73 0.26 0.38 0.68 0.63 0.22 0.08 
1979 - - - - 0.91 0.72 0.19 0.10 0.98 0.73 0.26 0.34 0.70 0.63 0.24 0.09 
1980 - - - - 0.89 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.97 0.71 0.26 0.31 0.72 0.63 0.25 0.09 
1981 - - - - 0.86 0.66 0.19 0.09 0.90 0.71 0.25 0.28 0.69 0.61 0.25 0.09 
1982 - - - - 0.85 0.65 0.18 0.09 0.89 0.69 0.25 0.26 0.68 0.60 0.26 0.09 
1983 - - - - 0.87 0.64 0.17 0.09 0.85 0.64 0.24 0.24 0.67 0.59 0.26 0.09 
1984 0.69 0.51 0.21 0.12 0.88 0.69 0.20 0.10 0.86 0.62 0.23 0.23 0.67 0.61 0.28 0.10 
1985 0.67 0.50 0.20 0.11 0.85 0.70 0.21 0.11 0.79 0.56 0.21 0.20 0.71 0.62 0.30 0.11 
1986 0.66 0.49 0.19 0.11 0.84 0.69 0.21 0.11 0.78 0.54 0.20 0.18 0.75 0.63 0.30 0.12 
1987 0.66 0.48 0.19 0.10 0.83 0.68 0.22 0.11 0.77 0.53 0.19 0.17 0.77 0.65 0.30 0.12 
1988 0.68 0.48 0.19 0.10 0.81 0.68 0.23 0.11 0.80 0.52 0.17 0.15 0.82 0.70 0.32 0.13 
1989 0.67 0.49 0.19 0.10 0.82 0.68 0.25 0.12 0.79 0.50 0.16 0.13 0.85 0.70 0.33 0.14 
1990 0.67 0.50 0.20 0.09 0.83 0.68 0.24 0.13 0.79 0.50 0.16 0.12 0.90 0.74 0.35 0.16 
1991 0.71 0.51 0.20 0.09 0.77 0.64 0.24 0.13 0.79 0.50 0.15 0.11 0.87 0.74 0.35 0.16 
1992 0.71 0.51 0.20 0.09 0.71 0.60 0.24 0.13 0.79 0.50 0.15 0.10 0.83 0.75 0.34 0.16 
1993 0.70 0.52 0.19 0.09 0.68 0.57 0.26 0.14 0.79 0.49 0.14 0.10 0.79 0.72 0.32 0.15 
1994 0.67 0.52 0.19 0.08 0.65 0.55 0.24 0.13 0.75 0.47 0.14 0.09 0.75 0.70 0.30 0.14 
1995 0.66 0.50 0.18 0.08 0.62 0.50 0.21 0.13 0.74 0.46 0.13 0.08 0.70 0.64 0.27 0.12 
1996 0.67 0.52 0.18 0.08 0.59 0.46 0.20 0.13 0.75 0.48 0.13 0.08 0.67 0.59 0.24 0.11 
1997 0.66 0.49 0.18 0.07 0.58 0.44 0.19 0.12 0.77 0.49 0.14 0.08 0.64 0.57 0.22 0.10 
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1998 0.65 0.49 0.17 0.07 0.57 0.42 0.18 0.12 0.77 0.50 0.14 0.07 0.64 0.56 0.22 0.10 
1999 0.64 0.47 0.17 0.07 0.58 0.43 0.19 0.12 0.81 0.50 0.13 0.06 0.65 0.55 0.22 0.10 
2000 0.65 0.48 0.16 0.07 0.57 0.42 0.20 0.12 0.84 0.52 0.13 0.06 0.70 0.54 0.22 0.10 
2001 0.64 0.46 0.16 0.07 0.58 0.42 0.18 0.12 0.77 0.50 0.13 0.06 0.72 0.55 0.21 0.10 
2002 0.66 0.48 0.17 0.07 0.58 0.41 0.18 0.11 0.80 0.49 0.13 0.06 0.77 0.58 0.22 0.10 
2003 0.66 0.48 0.17 0.07 0.60 0.40 0.17 0.11 0.79 0.48 0.12 0.05 0.79 0.61 0.23 0.10 
2004 0.68 0.49 0.18 0.08 0.61 0.42 0.17 0.11 0.76 0.47 0.12 0.05 0.81 0.64 0.23 0.10 
2005 0.67 0.49 0.18 0.07 0.62 0.44 0.18 0.11 0.77 0.47 0.12 0.05 0.81 0.65 0.23 0.10 
2006 0.67 0.49 0.17 0.08 0.62 0.43 0.17 0.11 0.75 0.46 0.11 0.04 0.85 0.68 0.24 0.10 
2007 0.65 0.48 0.17 0.07 0.64 0.43 0.17 0.11 0.74 0.46 0.11 0.04 0.86 0.68 0.25 0.10 
2008 0.67 0.49 0.17 0.07 0.63 0.43 0.16 0.10 0.76 0.47 0.12 0.04 0.88 0.69 0.25 0.10 
2009 0.67 0.48 0.17 0.07 - - - - 0.75 0.45 0.11 0.04 0.88 0.71 0.25 0.10 
2010 0.69 0.50 0.17 0.07 - - - - 0.76 0.47 0.11 0.04 0.89 0.73 0.26 0.11 
2011 - - - - - - - - 0.75 0.46 0.11 0.04 0.84 0.71 0.25 0.11 
2012 - - - - - - - - 0.73 0.42 0.10 0.04 - - - - 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
Table A.17: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the first child in Austria, between 1991 and 2010  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
15 5 4 4 5 3 2 3 3 2 1 2 3 3 4 1 4 1 1 3 4 
16 26 24 19 18 19 12 12 13 13 15 20 19 18 19 14 18 14 16 14 16 
17 91 90 85 74 68 58 52 50 47 53 68 73 65 67 53 61 52 53 50 51 
18 262 258 236 205 197 167 154 148 147 153 173 176 161 168 145 145 132 139 123 130 
19 555 536 510 444 407 366 356 343 319 324 355 350 333 335 321 290 275 287 254 242 
20 978 974 940 810 767 699 683 650 602 613 617 613 587 611 571 537 502 509 466 450 
21 1501 1477 1452 1297 1191 1115 1082 1022 973 981 961 950 894 927 875 842 781 804 729 711 
22 2062 2049 1994 1818 1672 1579 1518 1449 1386 1392 1341 1327 1262 1277 1215 1176 1097 1122 1034 1010 
23 2647 2630 2572 2347 2168 2080 2004 1903 1826 1830 1757 1748 1656 1664 1569 1524 1439 1453 1360 1331 
24 3258 3229 3161 2916 2705 2607 2519 2405 2291 2282 2200 2186 2063 2088 1980 1895 1820 1816 1727 1685 
25 3913 3832 3742 3496 3255 3177 3062 2913 2815 2776 2672 2648 2516 2543 2412 2321 2199 2214 2117 2072 
26 4544 4452 4326 4072 3852 3756 3644 3461 3344 3299 3156 3127 3008 3022 2895 2773 2631 2633 2537 2501 
27 5119 5007 4872 4642 4421 4340 4205 4004 3877 3828 3687 3624 3502 3512 3391 3243 3105 3097 2990 2968 
28 5634 5506 5391 5162 4944 4887 4754 4541 4405 4367 4194 4143 4016 4029 3887 3738 3579 3580 3454 3428 
29 6066 5960 5839 5625 5419 5365 5227 5026 4889 4855 4671 4652 4513 4513 4377 4251 4058 4092 3943 3934 
30 6417 6334 6219 6019 5840 5811 5659 5485 5348 5324 5123 5132 4985 4989 4867 4737 4529 4581 4448 4445 
31 6723 6645 6532 6353 6197 6195 6044 5887 5739 5729 5547 5563 5439 5450 5318 5219 5006 5036 4941 4935 
32 6956 6894 6787 6622 6494 6509 6373 6213 6084 6071 5909 5939 5830 5857 5736 5667 5447 5479 5367 5399 
33 7146 7083 6986 6831 6715 6759 6627 6488 6357 6358 6204 6270 6154 6195 6083 6047 5826 5869 5760 5801 
34 7302 7241 7141 7011 6911 6949 6834 6702 6583 6590 6451 6529 6405 6461 6386 6346 6152 6204 6091 6148 
35 7420 7365 7271 7147 7049 7106 6991 6867 6766 6780 6660 6738 6631 6694 6629 6604 6425 6485 6376 6454 
36 7514 7470 7376 7260 7170 7232 7122 6995 6912 6927 6820 6912 6813 6891 6829 6818 6643 6725 6628 6711 
37 7589 7553 7451 7348 7258 7325 7218 7099 7022 7044 6950 7046 6965 7040 6991 6978 6835 6913 6830 6924 
 XXVIII 
38 7643 7606 7513 7408 7322 7392 7296 7187 7112 7137 7045 7143 7078 7155 7114 7110 6987 7056 6972 7086 
39 7684 7644 7554 7455 7378 7441 7352 7249 7175 7202 7114 7224 7161 7244 7207 7201 7081 7161 7087 7216 
40 7708 7667 7583 7483 7415 7480 7393 7295 7219 7247 7165 7286 7222 7310 7270 7273 7159 7236 7171 7312 
41 7725 7683 7606 7506 7439 7507 7420 7323 7254 7279 7202 7326 7263 7350 7316 7327 7214 7293 7236 7374 
42 7738 7693 7619 7521 7451 7526 7437 7339 7277 7296 7228 7346 7293 7376 7345 7356 7247 7323 7272 7415 
43 7743 7701 7629 7531 7462 7535 7445 7348 7288 7308 7242 7361 7309 7393 7362 7371 7268 7345 7297 7439 
44 7744 7705 7633 7536 7468 7539 7448 7353 7296 7313 7250 7369 7316 7401 7369 7382 7278 7356 7310 7452 
45 7746 7708 7635 7539 7470 7542 7451 7355 7298 7317 7254 7373 7321 7405 7373 7388 7281 7362 7315 7460 
46 7746 7709 7637 7539 7471 7543 7451 7357 7298 7317 7256 7374 7321 7407 7376 7390 7283 7365 7318 7463 
47 7746 7709 7637 7540 7471 7543 7451 7357 7299 7319 7256 7376 7322 7407 7376 7390 7284 7366 7319 7464 
48 7746 7709 7638 7540 7471 7543 7451 7357 7299 7319 7257 7376 7322 7408 7377 7391 7285 7367 7321 7466 
49 7746 7709 7638 7540 7471 7543 7451 7357 7299 7319 7257 7376 7322 7409 7378 7391 7285 7368 7322 7466 
50 7746 7709 7638 7540 7471 7543 7451 7357 7299 7319 7257 7376 7322 7409 7378 7391 7285 7369 7322 7467 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
Table A.18: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the second child in Austria, between 1991 and 2010  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 3 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 
18 14 18 17 9 10 10 9 7 7 7 8 7 9 7 5 5 6 5 5 7 
19 38 48 45 37 34 31 24 25 22 25 25 27 27 29 20 19 19 19 17 19 
20 100 117 117 89 84 79 68 68 60 63 57 66 63 68 62 57 52 50 45 45 
21 224 241 236 195 181 175 156 154 147 137 134 144 134 139 126 118 110 111 99 95 
22 406 424 425 372 332 320 300 293 273 269 256 265 236 258 226 217 200 211 178 183 
23 657 683 690 606 554 541 499 479 455 464 425 429 389 426 366 358 337 338 297 310 
24 976 1003 1008 910 825 815 749 715 681 704 637 649 585 625 559 547 511 517 459 473 
25 1366 1369 1387 1263 1148 1146 1036 1008 962 984 882 910 840 881 795 763 728 730 662 671 
26 1802 1782 1800 1645 1508 1516 1385 1331 1258 1287 1172 1227 1124 1175 1082 1015 972 991 897 908 
27 2253 2222 2232 2057 1907 1896 1761 1702 1592 1629 1496 1540 1446 1489 1389 1301 1251 1280 1164 1184 
28 2702 2661 2665 2497 2317 2306 2149 2088 1949 1999 1849 1889 1781 1836 1721 1655 1567 1595 1456 1483 
29 3128 3078 3080 2925 2727 2721 2549 2475 2324 2374 2217 2259 2159 2204 2091 2008 1899 1948 1784 1828 
30 3510 3451 3461 3303 3125 3122 2931 2831 2680 2744 2579 2641 2535 2589 2469 2366 2263 2302 2140 2199 
31 3844 3792 3798 3646 3471 3483 3278 3192 3025 3099 2926 3004 2897 2971 2826 2736 2619 2665 2515 2571 
32 4133 4077 4082 3938 3769 3802 3603 3507 3330 3421 3256 3347 3230 3327 3181 3095 2971 3021 2893 2954 
33 4361 4319 4323 4182 4020 4066 3878 3782 3614 3700 3545 3644 3543 3639 3516 3444 3310 3368 3246 3323 
34 4558 4520 4511 4383 4229 4287 4106 4007 3848 3944 3796 3904 3808 3909 3816 3752 3621 3671 3571 3671 
35 4712 4682 4661 4544 4388 4459 4273 4182 4043 4142 4000 4123 4039 4142 4070 4026 3878 3964 3855 3992 
36 4827 4801 4787 4671 4514 4595 4414 4325 4195 4293 4163 4301 4231 4333 4272 4236 4091 4198 4114 4252 
37 4925 4891 4882 4764 4615 4699 4528 4434 4313 4406 4285 4433 4373 4494 4436 4408 4272 4384 4310 4464 
38 4996 4959 4942 4834 4684 4780 4609 4514 4400 4497 4375 4541 4480 4610 4558 4535 4408 4532 4469 4631 
39 5040 5005 4991 4884 4739 4830 4670 4574 4466 4566 4448 4622 4555 4697 4651 4633 4502 4639 4585 4756 
40 5068 5036 5022 4915 4776 4869 4705 4616 4514 4612 4499 4678 4609 4761 4717 4705 4574 4719 4667 4840 
41 5085 5057 5045 4936 4799 4891 4733 4646 4550 4646 4531 4716 4647 4801 4761 4755 4629 4775 4728 4900 
 XXIX 
42 5098 5071 5057 4951 4809 4910 4750 4664 4568 4664 4552 4740 4670 4825 4785 4787 4660 4807 4762 4934 
43 5102 5077 5064 4958 4816 4918 4761 4675 4577 4674 4563 4752 4686 4842 4802 4806 4677 4825 4782 4957 
44 5105 5081 5069 4962 4821 4924 4766 4679 4584 4679 4570 4758 4692 4851 4810 4814 4686 4838 4794 4968 
45 5106 5083 5071 4964 4823 4926 4769 4683 4587 4683 4574 4761 4696 4854 4814 4819 4691 4842 4798 4974 
46 5108 5084 5071 4965 4824 4927 4770 4683 4588 4684 4574 4763 4697 4855 4816 4821 4693 4844 4799 4977 
47 5109 5084 5071 4965 4824 4928 4770 4684 4588 4685 4575 4764 4698 4856 4817 4822 4694 4846 4801 4978 
48 5109 5084 5071 4965 4824 4928 4770 4684 4588 4685 4575 4764 4698 4856 4817 4822 4694 4846 4801 4979 
49 5109 5084 5071 4965 4825 4928 4770 4684 4588 4685 4575 4764 4698 4856 4817 4822 4694 4847 4801 4979 
50 5109 5084 5071 4965 4825 4928 4770 4684 4588 4685 4575 4764 4698 4856 4817 4822 4694 4848 4801 4980 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table A.19: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the first child in Hungary, between 1991 and 2009 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
15 24 25 25 27 24 24 22 20 16 15 16 15 20 15 20 15 18 18 17 
16 91 86 85 89 86 81 76 68 65 62 70 65 70 74 72 64 64 70 72 
17 241 225 221 226 226 205 202 181 169 170 175 174 180 179 181 167 169 182 182 
18 524 467 448 455 439 409 392 364 332 334 336 345 332 345 344 325 329 338 333 
19 1008 905 837 823 773 724 672 638 575 581 573 574 536 542 544 521 524 540 529 
20 1751 1584 1456 1364 1254 1152 1059 987 883 890 862 846 799 796 768 748 741 758 744 
21 2648 2425 2217 2040 1847 1667 1516 1380 1261 1232 1179 1164 1082 1052 1011 982 966 1000 960 
22 3608 3320 3010 2774 2506 2259 2044 1854 1681 1623 1532 1484 1382 1329 1263 1215 1185 1236 1191 
23 4546 4214 3838 3525 3182 2887 2582 2352 2135 2057 1918 1837 1703 1624 1544 1478 1434 1486 1436 
24 5434 5046 4609 4262 3863 3537 3166 2886 2639 2528 2361 2252 2074 1951 1868 1779 1723 1767 1708 
25 6220 5821 5345 4971 4544 4197 3787 3454 3196 3054 2846 2702 2495 2357 2243 2146 2063 2083 2019 
26 6885 6482 6010 5635 5215 4825 4390 4050 3761 3622 3392 3206 2976 2823 2694 2578 2455 2473 2387 
27 7386 7015 6571 6214 5810 5418 4973 4658 4332 4217 3951 3771 3505 3364 3212 3078 2947 2954 2813 
28 7766 7426 7025 6681 6331 5945 5533 5197 4904 4796 4506 4330 4062 3934 3781 3652 3485 3487 3322 
29 8047 7748 7377 7059 6749 6408 6008 5718 5418 5334 5030 4889 4621 4526 4379 4247 4065 4047 3876 
30 8278 7999 7648 7373 7094 6782 6416 6145 5875 5815 5502 5387 5149 5064 4958 4826 4647 4618 4435 
31 8456 8215 7873 7608 7351 7104 6756 6513 6267 6212 5929 5826 5593 5566 5487 5362 5198 5158 4970 
32 8581 8359 8039 7805 7557 7339 7022 6803 6581 6546 6295 6193 5958 5977 5922 5827 5679 5643 5449 
33 8681 8470 8161 7960 7730 7517 7229 7030 6848 6822 6594 6486 6283 6333 6278 6219 6085 6049 5871 
34 8759 8564 8265 8082 7854 7671 7383 7209 7054 7036 6833 6739 6574 6614 6579 6541 6407 6384 6230 
35 8819 8630 8349 8174 7971 7800 7512 7351 7209 7196 7035 6965 6802 6848 6844 6813 6683 6673 6532 
36 8860 8683 8408 8247 8057 7898 7634 7479 7330 7343 7180 7138 6993 7047 7067 7027 6911 6895 6773 
37 8893 8720 8456 8298 8127 7978 7717 7570 7436 7444 7284 7245 7146 7209 7227 7212 7096 7077 6960 
38 8918 8752 8489 8340 8182 8034 7776 7635 7512 7530 7379 7352 7267 7328 7367 7344 7234 7221 7107 
39 8938 8773 8519 8372 8216 8069 7820 7692 7571 7597 7446 7428 7351 7418 7477 7447 7343 7338 7216 
40 8954 8787 8535 8392 8239 8103 7852 7726 7618 7649 7508 7489 7412 7485 7544 7519 7423 7427 7299 
41 8963 8798 8550 8406 8254 8121 7874 7756 7651 7683 7540 7531 7460 7522 7591 7567 7489 7484 7358 
42 8967 8806 8558 8414 8267 8134 7885 7770 7670 7697 7563 7560 7477 7549 7623 7591 7521 7525 7398 
43 8972 8810 8563 8423 8273 8144 7892 7776 7684 7711 7577 7579 7490 7565 7639 7616 7541 7554 7427 
44 8975 8812 8566 8426 8277 8149 7897 7781 7690 7715 7583 7586 7500 7572 7645 7626 7554 7565 7443 
45 8975 8813 8568 8427 8278 8151 7899 7784 7692 7717 7585 7588 7504 7576 7646 7631 7560 7569 7447 
46 8976 8813 8568 8428 8278 8151 7900 7785 7693 7718 7586 7590 7505 7579 7649 7632 7563 7571 7450 
47 8976 8814 8569 8429 8278 8152 7900 7786 7694 7719 7587 7590 7506 7580 7650 7633 7564 7571 7452 
 XXX 
48 8976 8814 8569 8429 8278 8152 7901 7786 7695 7719 7587 7590 7506 7580 7651 7633 7565 7571 7454 
49 8976 8814 8569 8430 8279 8152 7901 7786 7695 7720 7587 7591 7506 7580 7651 7633 7565 7571 7455 
50 8976 8814 8570 8430 8279 8152 7901 7786 7695 7720 7587 7591 7506 7580 7651 7633 7566 7571 7455 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table A.20: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the second child in Hungary, between 1991 and 2009  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 5 7 5 6 5 7 6 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 
17 22 21 22 25 23 22 22 17 19 17 17 16 19 19 21 18 17 18 17 
18 67 55 61 64 60 63 61 51 53 50 54 52 52 51 55 56 50 55 51 
19 148 141 124 134 131 127 122 111 113 112 112 113 113 114 115 122 111 120 108 
20 295 276 244 241 235 226 216 203 188 204 194 195 196 201 200 205 200 213 196 
21 543 504 439 418 393 364 343 326 298 322 300 299 296 292 303 306 295 317 294 
22 902 833 718 670 626 558 511 482 432 460 426 420 416 398 409 413 396 425 397 
23 1398 1266 1106 1011 939 817 732 675 606 624 577 562 554 511 522 524 510 540 503 
24 1992 1807 1559 1431 1317 1136 1002 907 810 824 751 720 699 649 657 656 626 668 632 
25 2638 2394 2081 1902 1742 1506 1297 1183 1048 1047 958 913 866 803 802 802 760 805 759 
26 3332 3027 2651 2416 2199 1901 1638 1479 1331 1297 1201 1134 1058 983 975 967 921 967 918 
27 3998 3637 3228 2943 2692 2331 2012 1822 1635 1600 1474 1391 1292 1204 1186 1180 1108 1146 1091 
28 4596 4212 3773 3448 3181 2764 2405 2184 1965 1926 1785 1691 1563 1454 1438 1431 1337 1371 1300 
29 5100 4696 4274 3912 3625 3189 2790 2543 2311 2276 2117 2021 1861 1752 1729 1714 1613 1642 1564 
30 5514 5101 4690 4292 4023 3582 3146 2897 2641 2629 2440 2363 2183 2069 2048 2035 1920 1950 1862 
31 5860 5426 5022 4616 4359 3918 3456 3227 2958 2953 2751 2707 2506 2411 2379 2377 2242 2281 2174 
32 6127 5683 5282 4879 4619 4191 3738 3494 3227 3242 3054 2995 2807 2734 2715 2729 2593 2613 2516 
33 6321 5887 5480 5097 4825 4400 3954 3728 3462 3491 3312 3264 3065 3025 3024 3053 2921 2950 2848 
34 6471 6044 5635 5265 4994 4579 4133 3905 3655 3702 3527 3489 3300 3271 3284 3337 3223 3253 3154 
35 6583 6161 5762 5390 5118 4721 4268 4046 3813 3869 3704 3669 3499 3483 3514 3578 3482 3515 3410 
36 6671 6253 5850 5492 5225 4827 4380 4162 3930 4004 3845 3813 3653 3653 3695 3766 3673 3722 3640 
37 6729 6316 5920 5569 5301 4907 4468 4252 4022 4102 3949 3921 3768 3791 3844 3919 3834 3883 3810 
38 6773 6361 5972 5621 5355 4964 4529 4320 4087 4172 4029 4004 3859 3886 3946 4035 3958 4010 3943 
39 6806 6394 6006 5658 5394 5000 4568 4372 4132 4225 4086 4073 3926 3954 4017 4121 4041 4100 4043 
40 6830 6418 6032 5686 5422 5026 4597 4407 4163 4257 4128 4117 3967 4005 4068 4180 4101 4165 4110 
41 6845 6433 6047 5704 5440 5045 4617 4431 4188 4285 4152 4152 4002 4044 4103 4219 4140 4206 4154 
42 6850 6443 6059 5717 5451 5056 4630 4445 4201 4299 4170 4169 4018 4065 4126 4242 4164 4233 4180 
43 6857 6447 6063 5724 5458 5065 4636 4455 4208 4312 4180 4175 4030 4079 4139 4254 4177 4248 4199 
44 6860 6451 6065 5728 5461 5068 4639 4459 4212 4314 4183 4180 4036 4083 4145 4260 4186 4255 4208 
45 6861 6452 6067 5730 5462 5068 4641 4461 4214 4315 4185 4182 4039 4086 4148 4262 4190 4260 4211 
46 6862 6453 6068 5731 5463 5070 4642 4463 4215 4316 4186 4183 4041 4089 4149 4263 4191 4261 4213 
47 6862 6454 6068 5731 5464 5070 4643 4463 4215 4317 4186 4183 4041 4089 4150 4264 4192 4262 4213 
48 6862 6454 6068 5731 5464 5070 4643 4463 4215 4318 4186 4183 4041 4090 4150 4264 4193 4262 4214 
49 6862 6454 6069 5731 5464 5070 4643 4463 4215 4318 4186 4184 4041 4090 4150 4264 4193 4262 4214 
50 6862 6454 6069 5731 5464 5070 4643 4464 4215 4318 4186 4184 4041 4090 4151 4264 4193 4263 4215 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.21: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the first child in Portugal, between 1991 and 2012 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
15 13 14 10 13 11 14 15 15 17 19 16 16 13 12 13 13 12 14 12 10 10 10 
16 53 51 51 53 50 54 58 58 63 69 59 62 59 54 57 48 52 50 45 42 41 37 
17 155 144 157 149 143 145 155 153 164 180 164 172 161 162 157 145 141 130 127 121 104 97 
18 358 331 361 335 315 318 342 333 340 371 340 364 345 343 323 284 284 271 252 241 216 195 
19 655 631 641 605 577 571 600 594 601 635 582 611 589 579 556 500 503 470 443 409 366 337 
20 1073 1034 1027 952 907 917 931 917 940 971 894 923 882 864 854 774 766 732 689 634 592 534 
21 1572 1524 1510 1394 1306 1313 1334 1288 1307 1364 1227 1260 1204 1170 1155 1077 1064 1037 980 899 830 760 
22 2169 2073 2034 1897 1769 1759 1771 1718 1719 1791 1621 1629 1550 1510 1486 1397 1375 1359 1283 1202 1107 1011 
23 2847 2695 2613 2434 2280 2259 2258 2191 2195 2251 2039 2030 1918 1871 1844 1736 1711 1711 1623 1532 1407 1289 
24 3552 3381 3264 3017 2845 2807 2788 2697 2717 2759 2495 2484 2329 2248 2228 2113 2054 2083 1973 1896 1729 1592 
25 4252 4078 3955 3672 3455 3410 3364 3247 3281 3334 3006 2975 2802 2682 2640 2507 2437 2465 2362 2289 2075 1935 
26 4957 4794 4660 4370 4099 4060 4005 3875 3910 3955 3576 3528 3327 3167 3107 2966 2877 2893 2789 2707 2481 2320 
27 5660 5494 5364 5059 4798 4742 4669 4522 4574 4612 4194 4138 3920 3732 3641 3478 3369 3372 3254 3187 2947 2777 
28 6253 6126 6017 5710 5464 5424 5347 5170 5264 5294 4840 4798 4576 4347 4244 4046 3908 3915 3769 3724 3472 3300 
29 6767 6673 6584 6318 6091 6053 5988 5821 5915 5951 5497 5467 5250 4998 4912 4681 4505 4522 4346 4312 4067 3866 
30 7197 7137 7064 6829 6649 6612 6571 6436 6515 6541 6126 6134 5915 5657 5579 5352 5160 5138 4961 4920 4696 4499 
31 7531 7495 7465 7234 7103 7079 7080 6952 7044 7079 6701 6731 6568 6282 6234 5999 5811 5781 5568 5541 5331 5155 
32 7790 7760 7759 7552 7440 7442 7469 7378 7459 7526 7180 7225 7098 6856 6777 6575 6403 6388 6142 6125 5921 5745 
33 7983 7972 7985 7803 7707 7715 7750 7695 7800 7880 7542 7608 7524 7314 7272 7077 6897 6883 6669 6649 6459 6277 
34 8135 8122 8155 7990 7893 7931 7954 7932 8054 8148 7846 7913 7857 7689 7658 7505 7303 7311 7126 7102 6928 6760 
35 8253 8247 8280 8136 8044 8090 8115 8116 8249 8351 8084 8159 8131 7974 7981 7835 7677 7674 7495 7490 7336 7161 
36 8350 8352 8381 8250 8166 8217 8253 8254 8401 8515 8269 8357 8348 8202 8224 8108 7958 7971 7820 7799 7682 7516 
37 8422 8427 8459 8335 8256 8315 8354 8353 8522 8632 8403 8512 8516 8369 8399 8306 8189 8207 8082 8063 7956 7807 
38 8485 8488 8517 8401 8325 8382 8422 8424 8617 8720 8501 8608 8629 8491 8531 8452 8342 8380 8278 8269 8175 8027 
39 8535 8528 8558 8444 8376 8437 8477 8480 8686 8784 8577 8681 8707 8586 8628 8560 8461 8510 8420 8424 8351 8199 
40 8569 8561 8594 8479 8414 8475 8516 8520 8734 8832 8629 8737 8763 8654 8699 8638 8552 8600 8522 8542 8475 8342 
41 8595 8587 8616 8504 8440 8503 8546 8552 8767 8862 8669 8774 8806 8694 8751 8696 8611 8668 8602 8623 8564 8447 
42 8610 8604 8631 8518 8459 8523 8563 8566 8785 8882 8694 8796 8832 8728 8781 8727 8654 8708 8648 8673 8621 8512 
43 8620 8614 8641 8532 8469 8534 8574 8578 8798 8898 8710 8812 8847 8748 8796 8748 8674 8729 8681 8705 8663 8546 
44 8626 8621 8645 8536 8474 8540 8581 8586 8807 8905 8719 8820 8856 8759 8809 8760 8690 8742 8696 8722 8683 8568 
45 8630 8625 8648 8541 8480 8545 8586 8591 8811 8911 8726 8824 8861 8764 8816 8767 8696 8747 8703 8736 8696 8582 
46 8633 8626 8649 8542 8483 8547 8587 8594 8813 8914 8728 8826 8865 8767 8818 8770 8700 8751 8708 8739 8700 8589 
47 8634 8627 8649 8543 8483 8548 8590 8595 8813 8916 8731 8828 8866 8770 8820 8771 8701 8753 8710 8742 8702 8593 
48 8635 8627 8650 8543 8484 8549 8591 8595 8815 8918 8732 8829 8868 8772 8821 8772 8701 8754 8711 8744 8703 8594 
49 8636 8627 8650 8544 8484 8549 8592 8595 8815 8919 8733 8830 8868 8773 8821 8772 8702 8754 8712 8745 8704 8595 
50 8636 8627 8650 8545 8484 8549 8592 8596 8815 8919 8733 8830 8868 8774 8822 8772 8702 8755 8712 8745 8704 8596 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration 
 
 
 
 XXXII 
Table A.22: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the second child in Portugal, between 1991 and 2012 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 
17 4 4 3 4 4 7 8 6 6 4 5 6 6 5 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 
18 20 15 12 13 12 18 20 17 15 17 21 20 16 16 17 13 14 12 13 14 9 10 
19 55 41 41 40 34 42 49 44 38 43 46 44 43 44 43 35 38 33 31 35 25 26 
20 117 98 90 81 77 85 91 92 83 91 97 92 87 91 85 69 79 71 67 71 54 56 
21 215 186 178 153 141 147 159 163 153 160 164 162 154 150 149 131 137 132 122 125 102 98 
22 351 314 293 256 232 237 252 254 245 253 255 252 243 227 238 212 218 213 197 202 165 150 
23 527 476 457 389 350 357 373 362 356 374 362 356 338 325 341 311 313 310 290 293 252 218 
24 756 686 657 561 497 514 526 512 495 527 492 483 455 448 459 415 420 428 394 414 352 308 
25 1047 950 900 774 685 697 716 695 679 700 645 635 601 580 591 542 542 568 518 547 466 407 
26 1392 1281 1204 1028 928 930 949 911 901 927 835 820 765 737 748 685 689 726 668 697 588 525 
27 1803 1674 1567 1350 1214 1217 1225 1174 1164 1193 1059 1036 959 916 928 866 864 903 839 868 738 661 
28 2256 2101 1973 1730 1551 1563 1554 1487 1476 1511 1332 1300 1203 1146 1145 1070 1060 1105 1028 1064 918 820 
29 2728 2573 2420 2145 1943 1945 1940 1850 1845 1887 1653 1601 1488 1408 1408 1314 1281 1340 1242 1297 1129 1009 
30 3212 3057 2879 2593 2368 2376 2371 2271 2250 2299 2025 1960 1827 1711 1698 1587 1549 1611 1493 1555 1367 1224 
31 3663 3534 3355 3030 2819 2842 2840 2740 2709 2748 2438 2367 2213 2063 2058 1913 1847 1913 1790 1849 1651 1469 
32 4067 3955 3792 3455 3255 3286 3295 3212 3168 3223 2870 2785 2625 2444 2441 2281 2189 2250 2115 2187 1973 1768 
33 4422 4317 4187 3834 3655 3703 3718 3638 3621 3681 3289 3214 3035 2855 2841 2670 2547 2614 2461 2543 2328 2085 
34 4716 4634 4493 4156 3994 4057 4094 4020 4013 4100 3685 3620 3441 3246 3234 3042 2923 2996 2811 2898 2681 2421 
35 4952 4881 4756 4417 4279 4362 4416 4365 4357 4468 4043 3990 3815 3617 3603 3402 3282 3359 3155 3230 3038 2768 
36 5126 5073 4956 4625 4494 4591 4655 4646 4646 4762 4353 4310 4139 3940 3928 3723 3600 3689 3471 3548 3369 3070 
37 5270 5211 5109 4784 4658 4775 4847 4848 4864 5003 4592 4562 4391 4193 4192 3998 3875 3961 3739 3822 3662 3336 
38 5362 5299 5218 4892 4770 4904 4983 5000 5042 5172 4781 4759 4590 4391 4394 4214 4093 4171 3945 4037 3892 3560 
39 5426 5371 5291 4973 4851 4989 5077 5102 5158 5300 4911 4887 4735 4538 4555 4373 4256 4341 4123 4212 4072 3746 
40 5475 5416 5340 5024 4913 5041 5137 5173 5232 5385 4999 4986 4840 4643 4664 4491 4367 4470 4251 4341 4203 3875 
41 5512 5450 5375 5064 4949 5079 5179 5209 5281 5445 5062 5057 4905 4708 4740 4572 4446 4547 4334 4436 4302 3965 
42 5538 5471 5398 5085 4971 5103 5200 5237 5312 5479 5102 5099 4954 4758 4789 4621 4500 4600 4387 4493 4360 4026 
43 5552 5484 5412 5097 4986 5117 5216 5252 5330 5498 5125 5124 4978 4790 4816 4651 4529 4630 4425 4528 4396 4061 
44 5557 5492 5421 5105 4996 5126 5227 5262 5343 5508 5136 5133 4992 4806 4831 4664 4548 4647 4446 4549 4414 4082 
45 5560 5495 5425 5110 5000 5132 5232 5266 5348 5513 5141 5142 4998 4815 4839 4673 4556 4655 4458 4557 4424 4092 
46 5561 5498 5428 5113 5002 5135 5234 5267 5351 5515 5143 5146 5002 4820 4846 4679 4559 4660 4463 4562 4431 4098 
47 5562 5498 5429 5114 5004 5136 5236 5269 5352 5517 5144 5148 5003 4821 4847 4681 4561 4662 4466 4564 4433 4101 
48 5563 5498 5429 5115 5005 5136 5236 5269 5353 5518 5144 5150 5005 4822 4848 4681 4562 4663 4468 4564 4434 4101 
49 5563 5498 5430 5115 5005 5136 5236 5269 5353 5518 5144 5150 5006 4823 4848 4682 4562 4663 4469 4565 4435 4102 
50 5564 5498 5430 5115 5005 5136 5236 5269 5353 5519 5145 5150 5007 4825 4848 4682 4562 4663 4469 4565 4435 4102 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.23: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the first child in Sweden, between 1991 and 2011 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
15 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
16 9 7 7 6 8 7 6 7 6 7 8 5 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 5 
17 34 32 30 28 29 26 27 23 25 25 28 26 25 26 23 23 24 18 20 21 21 
18 108 102 90 82 85 78 76 66 65 79 72 78 76 69 63 68 63 56 59 57 53 
19 273 231 222 194 185 170 158 154 158 165 155 171 159 142 137 139 135 128 124 124 119 
20 572 493 462 412 376 353 326 304 313 333 317 329 300 290 289 293 282 278 267 264 252 
21 1015 887 817 725 669 625 562 519 540 572 537 563 530 522 508 522 512 525 509 495 452 
22 1550 1384 1269 1133 1040 960 863 813 837 881 821 865 832 819 795 818 827 846 816 800 725 
23 2165 1973 1784 1613 1481 1346 1245 1157 1160 1206 1146 1205 1169 1149 1137 1177 1176 1223 1192 1157 1062 
24 2865 2607 2368 2158 1967 1793 1654 1540 1525 1587 1535 1600 1536 1507 1508 1562 1591 1635 1605 1578 1454 
25 3571 3307 3034 2767 2520 2291 2146 1986 1959 2008 1967 2042 1965 1942 1939 1997 2057 2115 2061 2059 1928 
26 4305 4022 3733 3439 3155 2880 2683 2497 2443 2502 2461 2550 2473 2459 2429 2495 2562 2642 2584 2608 2434 
27 5002 4728 4431 4125 3805 3517 3265 3067 2986 3086 3015 3100 3032 3019 2985 3065 3140 3211 3167 3203 3006 
28 5649 5388 5099 4795 4469 4146 3886 3669 3578 3690 3602 3715 3658 3638 3593 3703 3769 3825 3816 3845 3618 
29 6235 5972 5709 5426 5094 4754 4519 4272 4192 4328 4237 4370 4329 4314 4280 4389 4435 4508 4484 4520 4309 
30 6720 6499 6263 5998 5643 5350 5097 4885 4798 4957 4884 5020 5030 5005 4959 5095 5128 5210 5187 5235 4993 
31 7146 6945 6726 6502 6148 5870 5646 5444 5372 5552 5488 5674 5701 5671 5646 5772 5800 5891 5883 5889 5642 
32 7491 7311 7112 6916 6573 6324 6103 5959 5886 6069 6052 6253 6284 6267 6238 6380 6414 6485 6486 6498 6247 
33 7760 7605 7430 7238 6932 6688 6488 6372 6308 6503 6511 6724 6786 6772 6746 6885 6926 6986 6997 7017 6746 
34 7981 7839 7679 7495 7211 6988 6799 6700 6661 6855 6895 7105 7170 7205 7151 7290 7342 7373 7389 7414 7170 
35 8149 8026 7884 7701 7432 7236 7063 6980 6957 7128 7187 7418 7486 7524 7485 7628 7666 7701 7722 7734 7525 
36 8288 8178 8054 7879 7628 7436 7249 7201 7192 7357 7435 7642 7739 7774 7753 7897 7927 7956 7993 8002 7802 
37 8391 8291 8171 8021 7773 7595 7418 7369 7374 7538 7612 7827 7911 7977 7961 8109 8130 8168 8191 8211 8027 
38 8467 8372 8268 8127 7893 7725 7544 7497 7519 7668 7751 7954 8061 8125 8108 8269 8283 8327 8352 8364 8204 
39 8525 8439 8338 8206 7976 7819 7638 7598 7621 7765 7851 8054 8163 8232 8221 8383 8401 8443 8473 8488 8337 
40 8564 8484 8392 8257 8042 7882 7705 7678 7701 7835 7925 8126 8238 8313 8305 8462 8487 8533 8564 8589 8436 
41 8591 8517 8429 8294 8081 7924 7758 7732 7753 7882 7982 8182 8289 8368 8359 8515 8545 8591 8624 8655 8515 
42 8611 8539 8450 8319 8102 7953 7789 7765 7786 7913 8021 8216 8320 8409 8395 8551 8584 8631 8668 8700 8566 
43 8622 8554 8465 8334 8121 7969 7806 7784 7811 7933 8045 8236 8340 8431 8416 8572 8605 8652 8690 8728 8593 
44 8628 8560 8472 8341 8131 7979 7817 7796 7823 7943 8054 8245 8350 8441 8429 8584 8617 8664 8706 8741 8608 
45 8631 8565 8475 8344 8136 7984 7824 7803 7830 7948 8061 8251 8357 8447 8434 8592 8624 8672 8713 8749 8614 
46 8632 8566 8476 8346 8137 7987 7827 7804 7833 - 8063 8253 8362 8450 8439 8594 8627 8675 8717 8753 8619 
47 8633 8567 8477 8346 8137 7988 7828 7806 7835 - - 8254 8364 8451 8441 8597 8629 8677 8719 8755 8621 
48 8633 8567 8478 8346 8138 7988 7829 7806 7835 - - - 8364 8452 8441 8598 8630 8678 8720 8756 8622 
49 8633 8567 8478 8346 8138 7988 7829 7806 7835 - - - - 8452 8442 8598 8631 8678 8721 8757 8623 
50 8633 8567 8478 8347 8138 7988 7829 7806 7836 - - - - - 8442 8599 8631 8679 8722 8757 8623 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration 
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Table A.24: Cumulative births (Sbi) in the transition to the second child in Sweden, between 1991 and 2011 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
18 6 4 3 4 2 4 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 2 1 2 
19 18 17 14 15 14 11 12 8 9 10 9 9 8 11 9 11 8 8 7 7 7 
20 58 51 45 41 40 30 34 26 28 27 26 24 23 24 26 25 27 25 22 19 23 
21 152 137 122 106 96 79 75 62 67 64 67 62 63 65 63 62 62 60 61 56 58 
22 319 300 271 226 208 174 159 137 145 139 137 134 134 134 135 136 140 142 135 131 125 
23 594 554 505 431 385 323 287 261 269 252 258 253 260 255 253 256 269 267 257 254 235 
24 969 904 828 720 629 533 477 440 443 422 420 436 420 414 424 429 437 453 440 435 400 
25 1455 1368 1233 1109 950 800 727 662 654 649 642 654 641 641 642 665 682 696 680 683 631 
26 2020 1893 1720 1550 1341 1152 1030 944 920 932 912 946 922 906 902 953 965 991 972 974 907 
27 2627 2472 2271 2064 1791 1547 1398 1289 1255 1262 1240 1296 1251 1236 1242 1282 1312 1318 1310 1331 1228 
28 3281 3085 2845 2621 2298 2006 1832 1688 1653 1664 1612 1698 1652 1625 1614 1680 1701 1733 1713 1744 1623 
29 3923 3712 3452 3205 2858 2509 2316 2143 2100 2131 2045 2135 2107 2096 2085 2170 2151 2197 2172 2228 2063 
30 4525 4312 4032 3788 3408 3037 2811 2621 2576 2621 2513 2647 2623 2625 2601 2694 2677 2734 2691 2756 2561 
31 5077 4872 4594 4327 3929 3568 3311 3126 3073 3138 3033 3199 3179 3181 3170 3269 3244 3298 3263 3320 3103 
32 5563 5373 5092 4843 4417 4067 3803 3644 3546 3638 3576 3767 3769 3778 3768 3898 3859 3910 3878 3964 3701 
33 5967 5809 5545 5291 4858 4523 4253 4110 4020 4116 4091 4298 4363 4380 4364 4520 4490 4521 4503 4591 4289 
34 6283 6157 5896 5661 5242 4918 4637 4520 4422 4577 4553 4780 4880 4910 4912 5088 5067 5113 5089 5173 4872 
35 6536 6427 6175 5962 5562 5238 4983 4871 4784 4951 4961 5214 5324 5388 5377 5581 5573 5606 5621 5703 5401 
36 6725 6630 6394 6201 5814 5499 5263 5171 5084 5266 5301 5564 5692 5754 5778 5985 5986 6018 6062 6124 5820 
37 6878 6788 6575 6389 6010 5721 5475 5413 5333 5499 5569 5843 5977 6060 6089 6302 6320 6338 6403 6481 6192 
38 6989 6905 6691 6520 6161 5877 5646 5589 5523 5697 5770 6061 6202 6286 6328 6542 6572 6590 6672 6745 6472 
39 7061 6982 6786 6614 6270 5987 5776 5716 5663 5835 5921 6222 6362 6460 6497 6716 6752 6790 6866 6935 6674 
40 7110 7037 6845 6683 6343 6068 5865 5805 5767 5936 6027 6329 6484 6577 6628 6842 6879 6925 6997 7084 6822 
41 7145 7066 6884 6725 6395 6123 5921 5863 5829 6002 6100 6398 6562 6665 6707 6928 6974 7013 7091 7179 6929 
42 7165 7088 6909 6749 6422 6154 5957 5897 5872 6041 6145 6446 6614 6715 6756 6978 7030 7075 7154 7244 6992 
43 7177 7102 6923 6763 6436 6170 5975 5917 5893 6063 6168 6474 6638 6747 6789 7007 7064 7112 7187 7279 7030 
44 7184 7109 6930 6773 6445 6179 5985 5930 5903 6075 6180 6489 6652 6765 6803 7026 7084 7133 7209 7298 7054 
45 7186 7114 6933 6776 6449 6185 5990 5934 5909 6081 6187 6496 6658 6774 6810 7034 7094 7141 7218 7309 7064 
46 7188 7116 6934 6779 6451 6186 5992 5937 5912 - 6190 6499 6661 6776 6814 7038 7098 7145 7223 7313 7068 
47 7188 7116 6935 6780 6451 6187 5993 5938 5913 - - 6499 6662 6777 6815 7040 7100 7148 7225 7316 7071 
48 7188 7117 6935 6780 6451 6187 5993 5938 5913 - - - 6662 6777 6815 7041 7101 7149 7226 7318 7072 
49 7188 7117 6935 6780 6452 6187 5993 5938 5913 - - - - 6777 6816 7041 7102 7150 7227 7318 7073 
50 7188 7117 6935 6780 6452 6187 5993 5938 5913 - - - - - 6816 7041 7102 7150 7227 7319 7073 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table A.25: TFR, PATFR and Adjusted TFRs, on the past decade in Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Sweden.  
 Austria Hungary Portugal Sweden 
 TFR PATFR TFR* TFR** TFRp* TFR PATFR TFR* TFR** TFRp* TFR PATFR TFR* TFR** TFRp* TFR PATFR TFR* TFR** TFRp* 
1990 1.46 - 1.61 1.61 - 1.87 1.92 2.00 1.98 - 1.56 - 1.93 1.92 - 2.14 2.13 2.25 2.26 - 
1991 1.51 1.52 1.58 1.57 1.63 1.88 1.92 2.03 2.02 1.98 1.56 1.61 1.90 1.89 1.82 2.11 2.11 2.39 2.40 2.11 
1992 1.50 1.52 1.60 1.60 1.63 1.78 1.84 1.93 1.93 1.93 1.54 1.59 1.83 1.81 1.78 2.08 2.07 2.36 2.36 2.11 
1993 1.50 1.51 1.72 1.72 1.67 1.69 1.76 1.90 1.90 1.94 1.52 1.58 1.82 1.78 1.76 1.98 1.98 2.31 2.29 2.12 
1994 1.47 1.47 1.80 1.79 1.71 1.64 1.72 1.89 1.87 1.92 1.45 1.52 1.77 1.76 1.74 1.88 1.90 2.22 2.21 2.10 
1995 1.42 1.44 1.74 1.73 1.68 1.57 1.64 1.88 1.88 1.91 1.41 1.49 1.72 1.71 1.72 1.73 1.78 2.09 2.08 2.05 
1996 1.45 1.46 1.73 1.72 1.70 1.46 1.55 1.74 1.75 1.82 1.44 1.52 1.67 1.66 1.69 1.60 1.68 1.93 1.91 1.96 
1997 1.39 1.41 1.58 1.58 1.61 1.38 1.46 1.70 1.69 1.78 1.47 1.54 1.73 1.72 1.72 1.53 1.61 1.86 1.85 1.92 
1998 1.37 1.39 1.56 1.57 1.58 1.33 1.41 1.76 1.73 1.80 1.47 1.54 1.86 1.84 1.78 1.52 1.60 1.83 1.81 1.90 
1999 1.34 1.37 1.52 1.52 1.56 1.28 1.37 1.71 1.69 1.78 1.50 1.57 1.83 1.81 1.76 1.51 1.60 1.70 1.69 1.83 
2000 1.36 1.38 1.59 1.59 1.60 1.32 1.40 1.76 1.75 1.82 1.55 1.60 1.73 1.73 1.69 1.56 1.65 1.84 1.82 1.88 
2001 1.33 1.36 1.61 1.61 1.60 1.31 1.38 1.75 1.74 1.80 1.45 1.53 1.67 1.67 1.67 1.58 1.67 1.88 1.86 1.89 
2002 1.39 1.41 1.68 1.67 1.64 1.30 1.37 1.72 1.71 1.74 1.46 1.54 1.78 1.78 1.70 1.67 1.74 1.94 1.94 1.90 
2003 1.38 1.40 1.58 1.58 1.59 1.27 1.34 1.76 1.74 1.75 1.44 1.52 1.68 1.69 1.67 1.73 1.79 2.04 2.03 1.93 
2004 1.42 1.44 1.64 1.64 1.61 1.28 1.35 1.81 1.79 1.76 1.40 1.49 1.59 1.58 1.64 1.77 1.82 1.98 1.97 1.92 
2005 1.41 1.43 1.73 1.72 1.66 1.31 1.37 1.71 1.71 1.69 1.41 1.50 1.66 1.65 1.65 1.79 1.83 1.96 1.95 1.92 
2006 1.40 1.43 1.69 1.67 1.64 1.34 1.40 1.70 1.69 1.70 1.37 1.47 1.55 1.55 1.60 1.87 1.89 2.02 2.01 1.95 
2007 1.38 1.40 1.60 1.59 1.60 1.32 1.37 1.56 1.55 1.61 1.35 1.44 1.48 1.48 1.56 1.89 1.91 1.94 1.94 1.90 
2008 1.41 1.43 1.68 1.68 1.64 1.35 1.40 1.57 1.58 1.61 1.39 1.47 1.59 1.60 1.60 1.92 1.93 2.02 2.02 1.93 
2009 1.39 1.41 1.70 1.70 1.63 1.32 1.37 NA NA - 1.34 1.43 1.57 1.57 1.56 1.94 1.94 2.08 2.08 1.95 
2010 1.44 1.45 - - - - - - - - 1.39 1.46 1.77 1.76 1.64 1.99 1.98 2.07 2.08 1.96 
2011 - - - - - - - - - - 1.35 1.43 1.71 1.71 1.64 1.90 1.91 - - - 
2012 - - - - - - - - - - 1.28 1.37 - - - - - - - - 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Appendix B   
 
To Chapter 3 – Parenthood transition: from Individualization to family formation 
 
 
Table B. 1: Covariates, recorded number of events, median and respective confidence 
interval and p-value 
 records n.max n.start events median 0.95 LCL 0.95 UCL p-value 
Sex         
  Male 1324 1216 1216 562 31 31 32 *** 
  Female 3143 1266 1266 730 28 28 29 
Nationality         
  Portuguese 3971 2221 2221 1120 30 29 30 .   Other 496 260 260 171 29 28 31 
Educational Level         
  Higher Education 1165 615 615 298 33 32 33 *** 
  Until Upper Secondary level 3302 1866 1866 994 28 28 29 
Father Educational Level         
  Lower than Sec. Educ. 3666 1964 1964 1093 29 29 30 .   Upper Sec. & Higher Education 679 441 441 162 32 31 33 
Mother Educational Level         
  Lower than Sec 3707 1990 1990 1122 29 29 30 *** 
  Upper Sec. & Higher Education 716 468 468 151 33 32 33 
Ideal number of children for a family         
  Until 1 2901 1618 1618 751 30 30 31 .   2 or more 1503 835 835 522 29 28 29 
Desired number of children         
  Max of 2 2985 1659 1659 822 30 30 31 *** 
  More than 2 1451 802 802 461 29 28 29 
Age at first job         
  After age 18 1748 916 916 461 32 31 32 ** 
  Not work./Never work/ Before age 18 2719 1566 1566 831 28 28 29 
Age at first cohabitation         
  After age 22 1755 939 939 689 31 30 31 *** 
  Before age 22/Not before 2712 1542 1542 603 28 27 29 
Age of leaving parental household         
  After age 21 1849 982 982 726 30 30 31 .   Until age 21 1185 563 563 406 25 25 26 
  Never leaved 1337 889 889 136 NA 36 NA 
Siblings          
  Until 1 2288 1396 1396 626 31 30 31 *** 
  2 or more 2179 1086 1086 666 28 27 28 
Cohort          
  Before April 25th 812 391 391 358 28 28 29 ** 
  After April 25th 3655 2090 2090 934 30 30 31 
Parent’s divorce         
  Never 693 390 390 168 30 29 31 .   Divorced 3582 1988 1988 1068 30 29 30 
  Never lived together 45 23 23 9 28 26 NA 
  Other 147 80 80 47 28 25 30 
Maternal Conciliation         
  Working  3721 2075 2075 1015 30 30 31 *** 
  Not working 736 398 398 273 28 27 28 
Paternal Conciliation         
  Working  2843 1551 1551 822 29 29 30 .   Not working 1616 924 924 465 31 30 31 
Maternal Presence         
  Agree 1674 940 940 527 29 28 29 *** 
  Disagree 2783 1532 1532 759 30 30 31 
Paternal Presence         
  Agree 708 435 435 216 30 29 31 *** 
  Disagree 3753 2042 2042 1073 30 29 30 
Female autonomy          
  Entirely agree 2577 1375 1375 676 30 30 31 . 
 XXXVII 
Notes: ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1  
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration. 
 
Figure B. 1: Adjusted Model 3 to the Extreme-values, Gompertz, Weibull and Piece-
wise (pch) distributions 
Extreme-Values Gompertz 
  
Weibull Piece-wise (pch) 
  
Source: 2013 PFS. Own elaboration. 
 
  Partially disagree 1890 1106 1106 616 29 28 29 
Postponement         
  Entirely agree 3393 1893 1893 1005 30 29 30 .   Partially disagree 1069 584 584 283 30 29 31 
 
Family significance         
  Agree 3069 1712 1712 981 29 29 30 *** 
  Disagree 1378 757 757 304 31 31 33 
Personal fulfilment         
  Entirely agree 1847 1029 1029 623 29 28 29 *** 
  Partially disagree 2601 1440 1440 661 31 30 31 
Offspring balance         
  Agree 2594 1478 1478 665 30 30 31 *** 
  Disagree 1847 987 987 620 29 28 29 
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Appendix C   
To Chapter 4 – The impact of women’s education in the transition to motherhood: a 
cohort perspective 
 
Table C.1: Fertility table for the first birth for the 1950 cohort for Austria 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 3 4761 0.001 100000 63 99968 0.001 
16 11 4758 0.002 99937 231 99821 0.003 
17 42 4747 0.009 99706 882 99265 0.012 
18 129 4705 0.027 98824 2710 97469 0.039 
19 259 4576 0.057 96114 5440 93394 0.093 
20 322 4317 0.075 90674 6763 87293 0.161 
21 409 3995 0.102 83911 8591 79616 0.247 
22 432 3586 0.120 75320 9074 70783 0.338 
23 359 3154 0.114 66247 7540 62476 0.413 
24 354 2795 0.127 58706 7435 54988 0.487 
25 276 2441 0.113 51271 5797 48372 0.545 
26 235 2165 0.109 45474 4936 43006 0.595 
27 191 1930 0.099 40538 4012 38532 0.635 
28 158 1739 0.091 36526 3319 34867 0.668 
29 156 1581 0.099 33207 3277 31569 0.701 
30 107 1425 0.075 29931 2247 28807 0.723 
31 95 1318 0.072 27683 1995 26686 0.743 
32 69 1223 0.056 25688 1449 24963 0.758 
33 72 1154 0.062 24239 1512 23482 0.773 
34 54 1082 0.050 22726 1134 22159 0.784 
35 33 1028 0.032 21592 693 21246 0.791 
36 27 995 0.027 20899 567 20615 0.797 
37 20 968 0.021 20332 420 20122 0.801 
38 13 948 0.014 19912 273 19775 0.804 
39 24 935 0.026 19639 504 19387 0.809 
40 14 911 0.015 19135 294 18988 0.812 
41 5 897 0.006 18841 105 18841 0.813 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
Table C.2: Fertility table for the first birth for the 1960 cohort for Austria 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 2 5872 0.000 100000 34 99983 0.000 
16 12 5870 0.002 99966 204 99864 0.002 
17 38 5858 0.006 99762 647 99438 0.009 
18 81 5820 0.014 99114 1379 98425 0.023 
19 145 5739 0.025 97735 2469 96500 0.047 
20 210 5594 0.038 95266 3576 93478 0.083 
21 327 5384 0.061 91689 5569 88905 0.139 
22 381 5057 0.075 86121 6488 82876 0.204 
23 415 4676 0.089 79632 7067 76098 0.274 
24 402 4261 0.094 72565 6846 69142 0.343 
25 384 3859 0.100 65719 6540 62449 0.408 
26 337 3475 0.097 59179 5739 56310 0.466 
27 291 3138 0.093 53440 4956 50962 0.515 
28 277 2847 0.097 48484 4717 46126 0.562 
29 222 2570 0.086 43767 3781 41877 0.600 
30 225 2348 0.096 39986 3832 38071 0.638 
31 180 2123 0.085 36155 3065 34622 0.669 
32 164 1943 0.084 33089 2793 31693 0.697 
33 119 1779 0.067 30296 2027 29283 0.717 
34 102 1660 0.061 28270 1737 27401 0.735 
35 106 1558 0.068 26533 1805 25630 0.753 
36 58 1452 0.040 24728 988 24234 0.763 
37 54 1394 0.039 23740 920 23280 0.772 
38 39 1340 0.029 22820 664 22488 0.778 
39 39 1301 0.030 22156 664 21824 0.785 
40 28 1262 0.022 21492 477 21253 0.790 
41 13 1234 0.011 21015 221 21015 0.792 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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Table C.3: Fertility table for the first birth for the 1950 cohort for Hungary 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 6 3721 0.002 100000 161 99919 0.002 
16 7 3715 0.002 99839 188 99745 0.003 
17 19 3708 0.005 99651 511 99395 0.009 
18 64 3689 0.017 99140 1720 98280 0.026 
19 129 3625 0.036 97420 3467 95687 0.060 
20 268 3496 0.077 93953 7202 90352 0.132 
21 344 3228 0.107 86751 9245 82128 0.225 
22 339 2884 0.118 77506 9110 72951 0.316 
23 325 2545 0.128 68396 8734 64028 0.403 
24 303 2220 0.136 59661 8143 55590 0.485 
25 264 1917 0.138 51518 7095 47971 0.556 
26 253 1653 0.153 44424 6799 41024 0.624 
27 226 1400 0.161 37624 6074 34587 0.684 
28 168 1174 0.143 31551 4515 29293 0.730 
29 137 1006 0.136 27036 3682 25195 0.766 
30 89 869 0.102 23354 2392 22158 0.790 
31 52 780 0.067 20962 1397 20263 0.804 
32 62 728 0.085 19565 1666 18732 0.821 
33 37 666 0.056 17898 994 17401 0.831 
34 28 629 0.045 16904 752 16528 0.838 
35 28 601 0.047 16152 752 15775 0.846 
36 19 573 0.033 15399 511 15144 0.851 
37 18 554 0.032 14888 484 14647 0.856 
38 20 536 0.037 14405 537 14136 0.861 
39 11 516 0.021 13867 296 13719 0.864 
40 4 505 0.008 13572 107 13518 0.865 
41  501 0.000 13464 0 13464 0.865 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
Table C.4: Fertility table for the first birth for the 1960 cohort for Hungary 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 5 3204 0.002 100000 156 99922 0.002 
16 6 3199 0.002 99844 187 99750 0.003 
17 36 3193 0.011 99657 1124 99095 0.015 
18 78 3157 0.025 98533 2434 97316 0.039 
19 155 3079 0.050 96099 4838 93680 0.087 
20 230 2924 0.079 91261 7179 87672 0.159 
21 243 2694 0.090 84082 7584 80290 0.235 
22 276 2451 0.113 76498 8614 72191 0.321 
23 230 2175 0.106 67884 7179 64295 0.393 
24 244 1945 0.125 60705 7615 56898 0.469 
25 234 1701 0.138 53090 7303 49438 0.542 
26 212 1467 0.145 45787 6617 42478 0.608 
27 167 1255 0.133 39170 5212 36564 0.660 
28 131 1088 0.120 33958 4089 31913 0.701 
29 124 957 0.130 29869 3870 27934 0.740 
30 90 833 0.108 25999 2809 24594 0.768 
31 62 743 0.083 23190 1935 22222 0.787 
32 58 681 0.085 21255 1810 20350 0.806 
33 44 623 0.071 19444 1373 18758 0.819 
34 40 579 0.069 18071 1248 17447 0.832 
35 30 539 0.056 16823 936 16355 0.841 
36 22 509 0.043 15886 687 15543 0.848 
37 24 487 0.049 15200 749 14825 0.855 
38 17 463 0.037 14451 531 14185 0.861 
39 7 446 0.016 13920 218 13811 0.863 
40 11 439 0.025 13702 343 13530 0.866 
41 9 428 0.021 13358 281 13358 0.869 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
 
 
Table C.5: Fertility table for the first birth for the 1950 cohort for Portugal 
 XL 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 4 3001 0.001 100000 133 99933 0.001 
16 8 2997 0.003 99867 267 99733 0.004 
17 13 2989 0.004 99600 433 99384 0.008 
18 44 2976 0.015 99167 1466 98434 0.023 
19 81 2932 0.028 97701 2699 96351 0.050 
20 133 2851 0.047 95002 4432 92786 0.094 
21 162 2718 0.060 90570 5398 87871 0.148 
22 261 2556 0.102 85172 8697 80823 0.235 
23 272 2295 0.119 76475 9064 71943 0.326 
24 312 2023 0.154 67411 10397 62213 0.430 
25 294 1711 0.172 57014 9797 52116 0.528 
26 272 1417 0.192 47218 9064 42686 0.618 
27 210 1145 0.183 38154 6998 34655 0.688 
28 163 935 0.174 31156 5432 28441 0.743 
29 127 772 0.165 25725 4232 23609 0.785 
30 84 645 0.130 21493 2799 20093 0.813 
31 62 561 0.111 18694 2066 17661 0.834 
32 49 499 0.098 16628 1633 15811 0.850 
33 34 450 0.076 14995 1133 14429 0.861 
34 26 416 0.063 13862 866 13429 0.870 
35 26 390 0.067 12996 866 12562 0.879 
36 20 364 0.055 12129 666 11796 0.885 
37 9 344 0.026 11463 300 11313 0.888 
38 16 335 0.048 11163 533 10896 0.894 
39 5 319 0.016 10630 167 10546 0.895 
40 10 314 0.032 10463 333 10297 0.899 
41 9 304 0.030 10130 300 10130 0.902 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
Table C.6:  Fertility table for the first birth for the 1950 cohort for Spain 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 13 11091 0.001 100000 117 99941 0.001 
16 24 11078 0.002 99883 216 99775 0.003 
17 47 11054 0.004 99666 424 99455 0.008 
18 93 11007 0.008 99243 839 98823 0.016 
19 196 10914 0.018 98404 1767 97521 0.034 
20 363 10718 0.034 96637 3273 95000 0.066 
21 626 10355 0.060 93364 5644 90542 0.123 
22 921 9729 0.095 87720 8304 83568 0.206 
23 1195 8808 0.136 79416 10775 74028 0.314 
24 1286 7613 0.169 68641 11595 62844 0.430 
25 1303 6327 0.206 57046 11748 51172 0.547 
26 1140 5024 0.227 45298 10279 40159 0.650 
27 853 3884 0.220 35019 7691 31174 0.727 
28 575 3031 0.190 27328 5184 24736 0.779 
29 436 2456 0.178 22144 3931 20179 0.818 
30 319 2020 0.158 18213 2876 16775 0.847 
31 228 1701 0.134 15337 2056 14309 0.867 
32 194 1473 0.132 13281 1749 12406 0.885 
33 139 1279 0.109 11532 1253 10905 0.897 
34 90 1140 0.079 10279 811 9873 0.905 
35 90 1050 0.086 9467 811 9061 0.913 
36 63 960 0.066 8656 568 8372 0.919 
37 36 897 0.040 8088 325 7925 0.922 
38 37 861 0.043 7763 334 7596 0.926 
39 32 824 0.039 7429 289 7285 0.929 
40 19 792 0.024 7141 171 7055 0.930 
41 19 773 0.025 6970 171 6970 0.932 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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Table C.7:  Fertility table for the first birth for the 1960 cohort for Spain 
Age B1(x) E0(x) q1(x) l0(x) b1(x) L1(x) z1(x) 
15 9 14116 0.001 100000 64 99968 0.001 
16 28 14107 0.002 99936 198 99837 0.003 
17 86 14079 0.006 99738 609 99433 0.009 
18 174 13993 0.012 99129 1233 98512 0.021 
19 317 13819 0.023 97896 2246 96773 0.043 
20 531 13502 0.039 95650 3762 93769 0.081 
21 678 12971 0.052 91889 4803 89487 0.129 
22 790 12293 0.064 87086 5596 84287 0.185 
23 882 11503 0.077 81489 6248 78365 0.248 
24 833 10621 0.078 75241 5901 72290 0.307 
25 793 9788 0.081 69340 5618 66531 0.363 
26 832 8995 0.092 63722 5894 60775 0.422 
27 813 8163 0.100 57828 5759 54948 0.479 
28 774 7350 0.105 52069 5483 49327 0.534 
29 735 6576 0.112 46585 5207 43982 0.586 
30 702 5841 0.120 41379 4973 38892 0.636 
31 641 5139 0.125 36405 4541 34135 0.681 
32 542 4498 0.120 31865 3840 29945 0.720 
33 463 3956 0.117 28025 3280 26385 0.753 
34 425 3493 0.122 24745 3011 23240 0.783 
35 357 3068 0.116 21734 2529 20470 0.808 
36 295 2711 0.109 19205 2090 18160 0.829 
37 222 2416 0.092 17115 1573 16329 0.845 
38 188 2194 0.086 15543 1332 14877 0.858 
39 144 2006 0.072 14211 1020 13701 0.868 
40 126 1862 0.068 13191 893 12744 0.877 
41 85 1736 0.049 12298 602 12298 0.883 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 XLII 
 
Table C.8: Estimated probabilities to become a mother by age and educational level, for Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain in the 1950 cohort 
 Less than primary Primary Upper Secondary University Completed 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Spain Austria Hungary Portugal Spain Austria Hungary Portugal Spain Austria Hungary Portugal Spain 
15 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
16 - 1 0.99810 0.99814 0.99894 0.99652 1 0.99873 0.99963 0.99952 1 1 1 1 1 1 
17 - 0.98592 0.99430 0.99207 0.99469 0.99374 1 0.99718 0.99851 0.99855 1 1 1 1 1 1 
18 - 0.95775 0.98812 0.98368 0.97930 0.98679 1 0.99336 0.99367 0.99515 0.99905 0.99905 1 1 1 0.99877 
19 - 0.92958 0.97007 0.96690 0.94268 0.95828 0.99239 0.98602 0.97134 0.98497 0.99432 0.99432 1 1 0.99422 0.99877 
20 - 0.87324 0.93539 0.93660 0.87155 0.90056 0.97462 0.96864 0.92520 0.96508 0.98674 0.98674 0.99474 0.99333 0.98844 0.99877 
21 - 0.78873 0.88266 0.87692 0.79512 0.80946 0.94416 0.93955 0.85969 0.90155 0.96591 0.96591 0.98421 0.99333 0.98266 0.99012 
22 - 0.71831 0.82090 0.79534 0.69851 0.69263 0.90863 0.88178 0.77633 0.81911 0.94034 0.94034 0.96842 0.98667 0.97110 0.97160 
23 - 0.56338 0.72114 0.69138 0.59236 0.59249 0.85025 0.79506 0.69036 0.73327 0.88447 0.88447 0.96316 0.94000 0.92486 0.94074 
24 - 0.47887 0.61948 0.56317 0.51486 0.50348 0.78426 0.68263 0.61258 0.64258 0.80682 0.80682 0.94211 0.91333 0.86127 0.88889 
25 - 0.35211 0.51639 0.44009 0.45011 0.43046 0.65228 0.55805 0.53145 0.55577 0.72254 0.72254 0.86842 0.84667 0.81503 0.82593 
26 - 0.33803 0.41663 0.33939 0.39597 0.38387 0.55838 0.43107 0.46855 0.46945 0.61837 0.61837 0.84211 0.72667 0.72254 0.72963 
27 - 0.26761 0.33064 0.25221 0.35350 0.33032 0.46954 0.32260 0.41682 0.39234 0.51799 0.51799 0.75789 0.64667 0.63584 0.63210 
28 - 0.22535 0.26508 0.19301 0.31953 0.28164 0.40102 0.24266 0.37253 0.32347 0.43087 0.43087 0.71579 0.57333 0.56647 0.54815 
29 - 0.18310 0.21805 0.14965 0.29087 0.24409 0.32741 0.19435 0.34016 0.27401 0.36174 0.36174 0.62632 0.51333 0.45665 0.46543 
30 - 0.15493 0.18052 0.11795 0.26964 0.21836 0.27665 0.15692 0.30145 0.23327 0.31629 0.31629 0.56316 0.42000 0.39306 0.39753 
31 - 0.14085 0.15487 0.09977 0.25372 0.20097 0.24873 0.13107 0.27503 0.20514 0.27462 0.27462 0.53158 0.38667 0.35260 0.33210 
32 - 0.11268 0.13682 0.08112 0.24045 0.19193 0.23350 0.11243 0.25121 0.19011 0.24716 0.24716 0.50000 0.34667 0.31214 0.29877 
33 - 0.09859 0.12162 0.06900 0.23248 0.17803 0.21066 0.09675 0.23372 0.17362 0.22064 0.22064 0.46316 0.30000 0.30636 0.26296 
34 - 0.09859 0.11069 0.06107 0.21868 0.17177 0.19543 0.08559 0.21846 0.16198 0.19981 0.19981 0.43684 0.27333 0.28324 0.23704 
35 - 0.09859 0.10071 0.05641 0.21072 0.16203 0.19543 0.07839 0.20692 0.15664 0.18561 0.18561 0.39474 0.25333 0.26012 0.21975 
36 - 0.09859 0.09359 0.05082 0.20594 0.15090 0.17513 0.07076 0.19836 0.15276 0.17614 0.17614 0.38947 0.22667 0.25434 0.20247 
37 - 0.08451 0.08789 0.04709 0.20223 0.14882 0.16244 0.06540 0.19204 0.14646 0.16572 0.16572 0.37368 0.21333 0.24855 0.19506 
38 - 0.07042 0.08504 0.04476 0.19639 0.14534 0.16244 0.06243 0.18869 0.14161 0.16098 0.16098 0.37368 0.20000 0.24855 0.18889 
39 - 0.07042 0.08171 0.04382 0.19480 0.14186 0.15736 0.05960 0.18608 0.13482 0.15625 0.15625 0.35789 0.19333 0.23121 0.17654 
40 - 0.07042 0.07933 0.04196 0.19108 0.13839 0.15736 0.05720 0.18124 0.13240 0.15057 0.15057 0.33684 0.18667 0.23121 0.17037 
41 - 0.07042 0.07601 0.04149 0.18843 0.13769 0.15482 0.05551 0.17827 0.13143 0.14678 0.14678 0.33158 0.18000 0.21965 0.16790 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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Table C.9: Estimated probabilities to become a mother by age and educational level, for Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Spain in the 1960 cohort 
 Less than primary Primary Upper Secondary University Completed 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Spain Austria Hungary Portugal Spain Austria Hungary Portugal Spain Austria Hungary Portugal Spain 
15 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
16 - 0.97727 0.99658 0.99866 1 0.99656 0.99907 0.99935 1 1 1 0.99866 0.99866 0.99935 0.99977 0.99843 
17 - 0.96591 0.98975 0.99199 0.99879 0.99313 0.99445 0.99727 0.99921 0.99882 0.99573 0.99199 0.99199 0.99727 0.99840 0.99765 
18 - 0.93182 0.97539 0.97997 0.99333 0.96907 0.98612 0.98871 0.99580 0.99177 0.99359 0.97997 0.97997 0.98871 0.99590 0.99765 
19 - 0.89773 0.94258 0.95995 0.97818 0.92440 0.95282 0.97119 0.98452 0.97180 0.98932 0.95995 0.95282 0.98291 1.00000 0.99530 
20 - 0.84091 0.89337 0.91188 0.95576 0.85911 0.91304 0.94315 0.96143 0.92009 0.98291 0.91188 0.99757 0.99630 0.99256 0.99373 
21 - 0.76136 0.83732 0.83845 0.92182 0.76289 0.85384 0.89384 0.92600 0.84371 0.96795 0.83845 0.99513 0.98706 0.97519 0.98589 
22 - 0.70455 0.74846 0.76769 0.87697 0.67354 0.76688 0.83063 0.87038 0.75617 0.93162 0.76769 0.99270 0.97043 0.95285 0.97806 
23 - 0.63636 0.64730 0.69559 0.80909 0.58648 0.67068 0.75496 0.80609 0.65864 0.88675 0.69559 0.98540 0.95009 0.91563 0.97257 
24 - 0.60227 0.55639 0.60748 0.73030 0.53150 0.58094 0.67670 0.73708 0.57756 0.82479 0.60748 0.97080 0.89834 0.87097 0.96160 
25 - 0.55682 0.45660 0.54072 0.64121 0.46163 0.48936 0.60688 0.66597 0.49765 0.74573 0.54072 0.95864 0.82255 0.84119 0.93809 
26 - 0.53409 0.39234 0.48331 0.57030 0.41123 0.40703 0.53965 0.59328 0.42127 0.68162 0.48331 0.92457 0.74307 0.79404 0.92085 
27 - 0.51136 0.34313 0.42190 0.51030 0.35166 0.34690 0.47463 0.52821 0.35899 0.60684 0.42190 0.90511 0.63586 0.76427 0.88323 
28 - 0.45455 0.29187 0.36582 0.46545 0.32073 0.30805 0.41428 0.47179 0.30729 0.53205 0.36582 0.86861 0.53974 0.69231 0.84561 
29 - 0.42045 0.25154 0.33645 0.43030 0.28179 0.25902 0.36288 0.41905 0.27908 0.46795 0.33645 0.82482 0.45287 0.62035 0.79702 
30 - 0.37500 0.21463 0.30040 0.39273 0.25659 0.22109 0.31343 0.38153 0.24148 0.41667 0.30040 0.79075 0.36784 0.56079 0.73746 
31 - 0.37500 0.18524 0.26969 0.36061 0.23940 0.19704 0.26879 0.34086 0.21093 0.37393 0.26969 0.72749 0.30499 0.50372 0.67868 
32 - 0.34091 0.17020 0.23498 0.33636 0.22566 0.17391 0.22946 0.31199 0.18978 0.33120 0.23498 0.65450 0.26248 0.45658 0.61912 
33 - 0.30682 0.15448 0.20828 0.31212 0.20848 0.16096 0.19676 0.28575 0.17509 0.29060 0.20828 0.58151 0.24214 0.42184 0.56191 
34 - 0.29545 0.14149 0.18558 0.28667 0.19473 0.14431 0.17300 0.26686 0.16099 0.26282 0.18558 0.52798 0.21442 0.37469 0.50235 
35 - 0.29545 0.12919 0.16422 0.26727 0.18328 0.13136 0.14848 0.24954 0.14982 0.23504 0.16422 0.49148 0.20148 0.34739 0.45611 
36 - 0.26136 0.11620 0.15354 0.25636 0.17526 0.12118 0.12927 0.23327 0.14277 0.20727 0.15354 0.44769 0.18115 0.32010 0.41144 
37 - 0.26136 0.10731 0.13885 0.24364 0.17068 0.11193 0.11538 0.22461 0.13631 0.18376 0.13885 0.39173 0.16636 0.28536 0.36599 
38 - 0.25000 0.09911 0.13084 0.23455 0.16266 0.10361 0.10409 0.21727 0.12867 0.16667 0.13084 0.36740 0.15342 0.25806 0.33542 
39 - 0.25000 0.09364 0.12150 0.22667 0.15693 0.09528 0.09513 0.21176 0.12280 0.14957 0.12150 0.33577 0.14787 0.22829 0.30486 
40 - 0.25000 0.08612 0.10948 0.22061 0.15349 0.08881 0.08799 0.20546 0.12103 0.14316 0.10948 0.31630 0.14418 0.20844 0.28370 
41 - 0.23864 0.08339 0.10547 0.21636 0.14891 0.08603 0.08267 0.20257 0.11810 0.12607 0.10547 0.29684 0.14233 0.20099 0.26254 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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Table C.10: Average age at childbearing by marital status and educational level for the 
selected countries in 1950 and 1960 cohorts 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Spain 
 1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
1950 
Cohort 
1960 
Cohort 
Less than Primary 
        Single/never married - - 25.8 28.5 27.3 27.3 26.7 27.6 
Married/in union - - 26.4 26.7 26.9 26.1 26.3 26.6 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed - - 24.6 27.8 26.1 24.8 26.5 24.9 
Primary 
        Single/never married 26.8 28.2 25.2 27.2 31 27.5 28.8 29.4 
Married/in union 26.0 26.3 25.3 25.4 27.3 26.2 27.5 27 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed 25.1 26.8 25.0 25.2 24.9 25.6 26.3 26 
Upper Secondary  
        Single/never married 28.1 29.2 30.3 30.7 38 24.5 30.3 31.4 
Married/in union 26.6 27.2 26.0 25.7 27.7 28.2 28.5 29.3 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed 25.4 27.1 25.9 25.6 26.2 28.8 26.3 27.7 
University completed 
        Single/never married 34.4 33.1 32.0 28.7 - 36.3 30.7 33.8 
Married/in union 30.2 31.7 28.6 28 29.2 30.6 29.6 31.6 
Separated/divorced/spouse absent/Widowed 28.6 30.3 29.0 27.3 26.1 28.5 27.3 30.8 
Notes: For Austria there is no data for the educational level less than primary 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
 
 
 
Table C.11: Average age at childbearing by employment and educational level for the 
selected countries in 1950 and 1960 cohorts 
 Austria Hungary Portugal Spain 
 1950  
Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
1950  
Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
1950 
 Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
1950  
Cohort 
1960  
Cohort 
Less than Primary - - 26.5 22.6 26.7 25.6 26.9 26.1 
Employed - - - 27.2 26.6 26.0 26.9 26.0 
Unemployed - - - - 27 26.5 27.3 26.8 
Homemakers - - 25.4 27.5 27.1 26.9 26.7 27.2 
Others 
        Primary 25.0 26.0 24.9 24.3 27.1 26.3 27.4 26.7 
Employed 26.4 26.9 26.3 26.4 27.9 26.2 27.7 27.3 
Unemployed 26.1 27.3 - - 27.3 25.9 27.4 27.2 
Homemakers 26.5 29.1 26.8 27.8 27.9 25.7 27.1 26.8 
Others 
        Upper Secondary  26.1 27.0 25.9 25.2 27.5 28.1 28.5 29.4 
Employed 27.1 28.4 24.9 27.2 27.8 27 28.4 29.4 
Unemployed 27.1 27.9 - - 27.7 29.1 28.3 28.8 
Homemakers 26.9 27.7 28.4 27.5 27 26.7 27.8 29.1 
Others 
        University Completed 30 31.6 28.5 27.7 28.9 30.5 29.5 31.7 
Employed 28 34.1 - 27.1 - 30.8 28.4 31.2 
Unemployed 30.1 32 - - 27.9 31.9 29.5 31.6 
Homemakers 28.4 31.8 36 30.6 38 28.9 29.5 31.7 
Others - - 26.5 22.6 26.7 25.6 26.9 26.1 
Notes: 1) For Austria there is no data for the educational level less than primary; 2)The Hungarian data had no 
information to the employment category Homemakers. 2)At the covariate employment status the category Others 
include students. pension or capital income recipients and unemployed that never worked before.  
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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Table C.12: Sample distribution of women exposed to transition to motherhood by 
educational level, in the selected countries in 1950 and 1960 cohorts 
 Less than primary  Primary  Upper Secondary  University Completed 
Austria cohort  50 - 40.0 56.0 4.0 
Austria cohort  60 - 28.0 65.0 7.0 
Hungary cohort  50 1.9 38.6 55.4 4.0 
Hungary cohort  60 2.7 27.2 53.1 16.9 
Portugal cohort  50 70.1 13.1 11.0 5.8 
Portugal cohort  60 42.8 31.7 13.7 11.8 
Spain cohort  50 19.3 63.8 9.5 7.3 
Spain cohort  60 5.3 54.6 31.1 9.0 
Source: Own elaboration; IPUMS 
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Appendix D   
 
To Chapter 5 – The interplay of employment and economic instability and its impact 
on fertility decline  
 
Table D.1: Average total fertility rates by decades 
 Austria France Hungary Portugal Spain Sweden 
1960s 2.7 2.8 1.9 3.2 2.9 2.3 
1970s 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.7 2.8 1.8 
1980s 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.8 
1990s 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.2 1.8 
2000s 1.4 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.8 
                   Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table D.2: Change in the total fertility rate between decades 
 Austria France Hungary Portugal Spain Sweden 
60s-70s -30.4 -23.5 8.7 -15.1 -4.7 -20.6 
70s-80s -18.4 -12.7 -12.2 -31.4 -37.3 -1.7 
80s-90s -5.9 -6.0 -13.9 -20.2 -28.6 2.8 
90s-00s -3.4 12.0 -17.3 -6.2 7.6 -0.5 
                   Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table D.3: Change in the fertility rate by age between 2008 and 2012, in Portugal (as 
benchmark country), France, Spain and Sweden 
Age France Portugal Sweden Spain 
15 14.46 -27.30 -21.31 -26.85 
16 8.09 -21.05 27.62 -28.61 
17 -1.21 -30.27 -17.89 -28.61 
18 -10.07 -27.78 -7.61 -33.53 
19 -7.95 -22.72 -11.29 -33.89 
20 -7.95 -25.88 -15.46 -30.88 
21 -10.15 -23.59 -13.87 -25.88 
22 -6.72 -21.82 -8.82 -22.24 
23 -5.98 -18.16 -4.38 -18.50 
24 -2.27 -13.99 -0.59 -18.84 
25 -1.75 -15.28 -3.59 -15.66 
26 -3.63 -10.17 0.32 -15.44 
27 -2.94 -10.21 -0.34 -14.02 
28 -2.68 -12.70 -2.42 -13.68 
29 -1.49 -7.28 -5.54 -11.69 
30 -0.17 -5.78 -5.51 -11.53 
31 -0.64 -6.40 -3.32 -9.40 
32 2.15 -2.10 -2.16 -6.92 
33 5.03 -1.56 1.72 -6.95 
34 6.11 1.12 4.04 -5.24 
35 7.45 -0.49 1.35 -1.43 
36 7.74 3.38 7.82 0.24 
37 8.88 6.28 12.81 3.04 
38 9.38 7.88 1.98 10.86 
39 8.01 5.93 6.17 14.04 
40 9.36 14.66 16.97 23.80 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
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Table D.4: Women employment rate by educational level at the age group 20-24 for the selected countries, between 1992 and 2013 
 ISCED level 0-2 ISCED level 3-4 ISCED level 5-8 
 Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden 
1992 43.3 - - - 70.7 - 23.6 - - - 35.9 - 53.6 - - - 63.7 - 
1993 38.7 40.3 - - 66.1 - 23.5 44.3 - - 33.1 - 34.4 45.5 - - 51.3 - 
1994 40.3 37.4 - - 62.6 - 21.5 41.5 - - 32.1 - 32.8 40.5 - - 61.5 - 
1995 42.6 34.6 - 66.6 62.7 46.2 20.8 41.1 - 71.5 26.9 54.2 33.0 41.5 - 84.3 63.5 62.9 
1996 42.9 32.0 - 63.9 62.7 33.4 19.0 40.2 - 70.6 27.5 51.4 34.1 46.4 - 80.9 56.7 50.0 
1997 45.5 28.8 30.9 54.5 63.4 - 19.8 38.3 44.2 71.8 31.4 50.1 36.5 49.6 80.9 - 62.5 44.3 
1998 47.5 35.0 26.8 59.6 69.4 - 22.4 41.1 49.5 72.6 33.7 52.9 34.9 41.6 71.8 88.5 77.5 44.6 
1999 52.6 35.1 29.2 54.6 63.5 36.7 23.0 42.5 48.9 70.2 35.2 57.2 41.5 42.8 79.6 74.6 74.3 42.7 
2000 54.9 36.1 28.1 48.4 64.1 43.2 28.5 44.8 45.1 67.9 34.0 57.1 42.8 48.0 77.9 71.9 78.1 49.4 
2001 56.5 35.2 31.5 48.3 69.2 56.2 29.0 44.9 42.0 65.1 32.2 63.9 46.1 48.3 78.0 72.2 71.7 62.2 
2002 53.6 35.0 31.5 46.9 67.0 52.6 31.0 46.3 42.9 66.2 38.1 63.8 48.5 47.6 75.6 72.5 72.1 57.1 
2003 54.1 39.8 20.9 49.8 65.2 51.0 33.0 48.0 42.5 65.4 36.6 63.0 49.9 49.6 68.3 70.9 70.4 58.7 
2004 53.3 37.5 25.1 47.7 63.8 42.5 35.6 46.5 35.4 66.8 31.7 59.3 50.6 48.7 66.3 57.1 67.1 58.1 
2005 57.0 36.5 20.8 45.6 63.6 42.2 40.5 45.6 33.4 67.9 29.9 61.5 54.6 49.8 69.7 74.0 59.8 53.7 
2006 61.3 38.7 22.5 51.1 65.9 41.7 43.1 43.8 32.3 67.3 32.4 61.7 55.9 48.8 67.8 68.3 54.2 56.3 
2007 58.6 36.9 20.8 56.9 62.2 47.0 42.3 47.0 30.2 66.9 35.6 64.3 56.9 52.9 72.1 71.6 57.0 59.4 
2008 56.6 38.6 20.8 54.7 64.9 40.1 42.3 45.0 29.4 68.3 36.3 64.2 56.0 56.4 67.3 70.5 59.4 58.0 
2009 45.5 37.9 17.3 51.9 59.8 31.8 37.1 45.0 29.2 69.5 38.0 59.8 50.0 55.9 60.3 58.6 57.1 57.2 
2010 42.3 34.4 20.0 50.9 54.1 34.8 34.4 43.5 28.8 68.0 35.4 59.0 47.3 53.9 60.4 60.2 51.0 59.6 
2011 39.9 37.1 17.3 52.2 50.6 34.7 29.9 42.6 28.8 68.3 34.1 61.3 43.0 51.6 59.1 66.2 52.0 61.9 
2012 32.7 37.7 16.8 46.7 45.1 35.7 25.5 41.6 30.6 68.0 32.5 61.2 38.6 50.6 57.1 69.9 40.4 57.9 
2013 28.5 33.7 15.3 48.9 43.0 30.2 22.4 41.3 30.1 69.0 29.9 63.0 37.5 50.9 53.6 68.7 39.6 59.0 
Notes: The ISCED educational levels 0-2 refer to “Less than primary. primary and lower secondary education”; ISCED levels 3-4 refer to “Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education”; and ISCED levels 5-6 refer to “Tertiary education”. 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D.5: Women employment rate by educational level at the age group 25-29 for the selected countries, between 1992 and 2013 
 XLVIII 
 ISCED level 0-2 ISCED level 3-4 ISCED level 5-8 
 Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden 
1992 37.0 - - - 70.0 - 45.9 - - - 73.9 - 66.1 - - - 91.3 - 
1993 33.1 46.0 - - 69.6 - 51.1 69.7 - - 69.1 - 57.0 78.8 - - 87.8 - 
1994 33.7 45.2 - - 65.5 - 50.1 68.6 - - 64.1 - 53.8 78.8 - - 89.4 - 
1995 36.1 48.2 - 65.7 70.1 41.3 48.3 67.1 - 77.2 63.5 78.0 53.8 77.3 - 87.2 83.7 80.6 
1996 37.2 46.7 - 67.9 70.8 52.6 51.7 67.0 - 78.9 69.2 71.4 56.8 76.3 - 83.0 85.1 78.9 
1997 41.0 45.8 28.6 60.8 69.3 51.3 50.6 66.4 49.6 78.5 67.2 71.1 59.1 76.4 67.5 88.6 87.8 76.0 
1998 41.5 43.7 34.5 62.6 74.7 48.8 53.1 66.2 53.9 78.9 68.4 67.1 59.0 76.7 67.2 88.6 85.3 69.9 
1999 46.4 43.0 31.7 62.9 72.1 49.4 56.4 67.4 56.2 80.3 70.2 70.4 62.2 78.4 72.6 87.8 87.6 77.7 
2000 48.8 41.8 32.6 63.4 75.8 53.4 61.8 70.4 57.9 76.3 78.0 78.7 68.4 81.5 75.2 88.5 86.4 70.7 
2001 49.3 42.2 33.4 61.1 75.1 60.0 59.4 69.0 59.8 79.0 74.3 75.8 71.0 81.8 76.6 85.8 85.4 81.1 
2002 52.3 44.3 33.0 59.5 75.8 59.8 61.8 70.2 60.9 78.0 71.8 75.2 70.6 83.2 74.3 88.8 87.0 80.0 
2003 54.9 47.2 35.8 52.9 74.3 54.7 63.8 67.8 60.1 78.3 76.7 75.9 72.8 82.8 74.6 84.9 83.2 82.4 
2004 57.6 48.3 29.2 55.1 72.3 50.3 65.9 69.2 59.0 77.2 72.8 73.1 74.1 82.7 80.5 83.1 85.7 80.0 
2005 57.7 42.1 26.3 48.5 71.6 52.3 69.7 70.4 59.3 78.0 69.6 74.9 77.3 82.5 78.9 83.0 82.9 78.6 
2006 59.2 44.7 27.2 50.3 70.5 54.0 71.2 71.0 60.1 77.3 68.5 75.9 78.4 82.6 78.8 84.2 82.3 79.8 
2007 60.5 43.8 29.9 56.0 69.1 51.5 73.7 70.8 59.3 74.5 70.1 77.4 80.6 82.9 76.5 84.0 79.1 81.7 
2008 59.6 44.2 28.2 47.6 67.9 52.2 73.7 70.5 58.2 77.1 75.6 76.9 79.7 85.0 78.8 82.7 79.8 82.7 
2009 53.7 45.6 27.3 46.9 68.4 50.6 67.3 69.9 55.9 78.9 71.3 73.8 76.4 82.5 77.6 81.5 85.1 80.2 
2010 53.8 44.1 24.6 46.4 60.8 44.5 64.4 68.7 57.2 79.9 73.1 71.9 73.1 84.2 73.5 81.6 82.6 79.9 
2011 50.8 42.9 22.2 49.0 61.2 45.1 62.6 67.0 55.5 80.3 77.1 75.6 71.0 82.9 74.9 81.7 77.5 81.2 
2012 45.7 38.9 22.1 52.8 61.9 41.3 60.2 66.5 58.0 82.0 75.0 74.3 68.4 82.8 74.5 83.0 73.4 82.1 
2013 44.8 37.4 23.2 51.5 55.6 40.9 57.9 65.9 59.5 81.7 71.3 74.9 65.7 82.7 78.8 84.2 71.5 82.3 
Notes: The ISCED educational levels 0-2 refer to “Less than primary. primary and lower secondary education”; ISCED levels 3-4 refer to “Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education”; and ISCED levels 5-6 refer to “Tertiary education”. 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D.6: Women employment rate by educational level at the age group 30-34 for the selected countries, between 1992 and 2013 
 XLIX 
 ISCED level 0-2 ISCED level 3-4 ISCED level 5-8 
 Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden 
1992 32.1 - - - 66.5 - 55.1 - - - 80.7 - 73.9 - - - 94.4 - 
1993 32.7 49.1 - - 67.3 - 50.4 70.4 - - 81.5 - 70.4 80.8 - - 93.1 - 
1994 31.6 49.0 - - 66.8 - 46.8 68.2 - - 77.9 - 68.7 81.1 - - 93.5 - 
1995 32.5 49.4 - 64.5 67.6 68.0 49.9 70.9 - 74.7 73.0 76.0 67.6 80.4 - 93.4 93.8 85.3 
1996 31.4 51.6 - 64.0 66.7 63.3 49.7 69.4 - 73.7 84.3 77.7 67.6 81.3 - 92.0 93.0 85.3 
1997 32.6 50.0 36.3 60.7 69.7 51.7 51.8 68.2 61.7 72.9 82.3 76.7 67.9 80.7 65.2 87.7 95.8 81.9 
1998 35.0 48.9 40.1 57.3 71.6 53.5 53.2 67.4 65.7 76.7 82.4 74.9 69.1 81.2 80.1 91.4 93.5 83.4 
1999 38.0 48.9 35.7 56.3 72.0 48.9 56.6 67.6 66.5 75.7 89.4 80.3 73.4 82.2 76.3 87.3 95.8 82.7 
2000 39.2 49.1 42.3 59.3 72.1 53.3 60.2 68.9 65.0 78.7 84.3 80.6 76.0 83.6 70.9 91.1 95.8 87.8 
2001 42.8 48.3 41.4 63.0 72.2 64.0 61.0 70.9 67.7 76.8 92.0 78.9 74.7 84.4 67.4 87.4 95.7 88.3 
2002 48.8 47.2 40.5 58.1 75.9 61.2 63.3 69.4 64.3 78.9 86.1 82.5 76.3 83.7 73.5 89.7 89.1 87.8 
2003 47.2 54.3 38.9 62.3 75.2 57.0 66.5 70.2 64.4 79.8 85.1 79.7 78.1 86.3 72.7 87.8 91.0 86.3 
2004 47.9 52.3 40.8 56.1 73.2 58.3 68.5 69.5 63.2 79.6 85.8 77.8 78.9 80.4 66.6 84.9 92.5 85.6 
2005 51.2 49.4 39.1 51.3 74.6 52.3 69.5 71.0 63.2 75.2 86.2 78.1 80.3 83.5 72.4 83.3 92.5 84.0 
2006 53.8 42.5 31.9 54.0 74.5 57.2 69.6 68.6 65.3 75.4 84.4 81.5 82.4 83.8 76.8 83.8 88.7 87.1 
2007 56.5 45.9 35.6 56.2 72.8 55.9 70.7 72.6 65.6 75.6 84.9 83.2 83.0 85.2 71.6 84.8 89.3 88.9 
2008 56.0 47.3 34.2 52.7 74.5 56.6 71.3 75.4 62.0 79.8 84.2 83.0 82.7 87.1 70.3 86.9 89.6 90.0 
2009 50.9 45.3 34.6 54.4 69.2 51.5 68.6 70.8 59.0 81.1 84.3 81.3 80.5 85.2 67.4 84.1 87.6 88.4 
2010 50.6 43.0 29.9 53.7 67.6 49.8 65.4 71.2 60.0 80.2 80.4 81.3 80.1 85.9 68.3 82.2 89.2 86.8 
2011 51.2 43.5 28.0 54.3 70.3 52.4 63.8 70.8 60.1 80.5 80.7 82.9 78.8 85.5 69.1 86.0 88.7 87.7 
2012 51.4 43.8 32.9 56.8 67.7 50.2 61.9 71.1 62.8 81.4 73.5 80.9 75.6 85.4 66.8 86.4 83.9 87.7 
2013 49.3 44.7 33.6 53.8 69.5 43.8 61.1 70.5 64.8 79.8 77.5 80.4 75.0 86.3 67.9 83.2 78.9 87.4 
Notes: The ISCED educational levels 0-2 refer to “Less than primary. primary and lower secondary education”; ISCED levels 3-4 refer to “Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education”; and ISCED levels 5-6 refer to “Tertiary education”. 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D.7: Women employment rate by educational level at the age group 35-39 for the selected countries, between 1992 and 201 
 L 
 ISCED level 0-2 ISCED level 3-4 ISCED level 5-8 
 Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden 
1992 32.0 - - - 67.0 - 57.8 - - - 86.8 - 79.3 - - - 97.3 - 
1993 33.2 56.8 - - 70.3 - 55.7 75.8 - - 88.3 - 77.7 82.6 - - 94.0 - 
1994 34.5 54.7 - - 68.3 - 49.5 73.9 - - 85.3 - 75.9 81.6 - - 95.2 - 
1995 32.8 54.7 - 64.5 68.3 70.9 46.4 74.9 - 74.2 82.0 84.8 75.7 82.5 - 88.8 97.0 88.3 
1996 35.9 55.7 - 65.6 70.1 66.0 49.6 73.4 - 74.4 83.0 82.8 73.9 83.2 - 86.4 91.8 86.0 
1997 34.7 54.5 51.3 64.3 68.4 67.8 52.8 71.9 73.7 75.6 80.3 79.1 74.5 82.8 85.5 82.7 96.7 82.8 
1998 34.8 55.2 49.5 64.4 70.2 64.0 51.0 73.0 72.2 75.0 86.9 79.2 71.2 81.9 86.1 87.3 93.2 85.1 
1999 38.0 56.9 44.3 63.6 71.3 64.7 54.1 72.5 76.4 76.7 80.2 82.3 73.8 81.6 87.6 83.8 94.8 90.6 
2000 39.1 56.3 45.2 65.9 75.0 66.5 55.8 74.6 76.6 79.2 93.8 83.0 75.7 83.0 88.4 84.2 97.6 88.7 
2001 40.9 56.9 48.2 64.5 73.7 71.0 59.0 75.6 75.9 77.7 88.6 84.2 76.2 82.9 86.3 92.6 95.9 89.5 
2002 42.4 57.7 49.3 69.6 70.6 66.2 59.4 75.9 74.4 79.0 88.7 84.4 76.2 83.8 89.3 88.9 95.3 90.8 
2003 43.5 59.6 48.8 67.5 73.8 61.6 62.1 78.9 76.1 80.7 84.1 82.1 78.8 83.9 87.1 88.3 95.6 89.9 
2004 46.1 61.3 47.2 64.9 73.5 62.6 63.6 75.4 73.0 76.1 84.9 83.0 79.5 83.8 84.6 84.5 94.9 87.9 
2005 48.0 55.8 46.0 61.2 70.5 59.9 65.4 77.4 72.3 79.6 86.4 83.5 80.5 83.9 85.5 86.8 92.1 87.6 
2006 50.3 58.8 43.8 64.7 74.8 61.8 70.3 78.0 71.9 80.8 89.1 83.4 81.7 83.4 83.6 82.2 92.3 88.9 
2007 52.0 63.3 45.5 67.9 74.5 66.8 70.6 77.0 72.0 81.7 88.2 85.1 82.1 84.4 78.9 83.3 89.2 90.5 
2008 53.3 60.4 42.9 64.6 75.8 63.2 70.3 78.6 72.1 82.7 86.1 87.1 81.8 87.8 82.4 85.1 92.3 91.5 
2009 51.3 58.7 41.0 62.5 70.4 56.5 66.8 78.4 72.8 82.8 88.5 84.1 80.2 87.2 78.4 88.0 93.1 90.6 
2010 49.2 55.8 41.4 64.7 70.5 54.3 65.3 78.5 70.7 83.6 85.6 83.0 78.4 87.6 77.6 83.8 91.8 90.1 
2011 50.6 52.2 36.6 65.1 69.2 51.9 64.1 77.1 69.5 84.0 84.3 82.9 79.0 87.2 77.1 84.6 91.5 90.1 
2012 48.5 48.0 38.7 63.0 67.7 58.1 66.0 77.4 70.9 84.2 78.6 83.9 76.3 87.8 76.5 86.2 87.0 90.8 
2013 47.7 46.5 43.0 58.0 68.3 57.6 62.7 77.4 71.2 84.2 78.5 86.3 75.4 87.2 74.7 85.8 84.1 91.5 
Notes: The ISCED educational levels 0-2 refer to “Less than primary. primary and lower secondary education”; ISCED levels 3-4 refer to “Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education”; and ISCED levels 5-6 refer to “Tertiary education”. 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table D.8: Women employment rate by educational level at the age group 40-44 for the selected countries, between 1992 and 201 
 ISCED level 0-2 ISCED level 3-4 ISCED level 5-8 
 Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden Spain France Hungary Austria Portugal Sweden 
1992 31.6 - - - 63.2 - 55.2 - - - 84.2 - 81.6 - - - 92.7 - 
1993 30.8 61.2 - - 63.8 - 54.3 75.5 - - 89.3 - 80.9 85.1 - - 95.1 - 
1994 31.9 60.8 - - 64.6 - 51.7 74.8 - - 85.3 - 77.0 83.7 - - 95.9 - 
1995 32.6 61.5 - 68.3 65.7 82.5 54.6 76.7 - 73.8 82.0 90.2 79.9 83.7 - 81.5 95.7 93.6 
1996 32.4 60.3 - 62.8 67.6 70.5 58.5 78.0 - 75.4 78.8 83.8 78.3 84.1 - 85.9 94.9 92.5 
1997 33.9 60.7 57.8 69.1 69.9 65.7 55.8 78.4 79.0 76.6 84.8 83.5 81.2 83.6 86.6 87.9 94.7 92.6 
1998 37.1 62.7 58.2 62.3 68.3 67.0 58.7 77.8 78.8 77.7 91.0 82.5 79.8 83.6 91.0 90.5 97.7 88.2 
1999 38.7 61.1 54.9 66.8 70.9 70.4 56.2 78.1 79.6 75.4 85.0 85.7 79.0 84.6 90.7 88.2 92.7 91.6 
2000 42.0 60.7 54.6 64.5 71.8 67.0 59.5 78.0 80.4 76.8 82.5 85.8 78.6 85.3 92.3 84.0 90.5 92.0 
2001 42.3 62.0 57.7 66.5 72.4 72.0 60.3 79.7 81.2 77.3 85.0 87.0 77.4 84.6 89.8 85.4 93.7 92.2 
2002 45.1 63.1 54.4 71.3 70.6 75.8 61.4 80.2 80.2 77.7 85.1 85.4 78.8 85.3 93.6 90.3 95.4 91.5 
2003 45.4 65.7 51.6 70.4 69.8 76.0 61.6 82.7 79.8 80.7 86.9 84.1 81.3 82.7 94.0 92.3 92.1 91.0 
2004 45.8 67.0 47.2 65.9 74.2 69.4 64.0 80.2 79.8 80.3 87.2 84.1 78.9 83.3 94.4 92.4 92.7 89.8 
2005 49.2 65.4 45.6 65.4 71.6 67.2 68.3 79.7 79.7 80.3 84.2 84.0 79.4 84.5 90.6 89.2 93.8 90.7 
2006 51.3 67.2 47.8 66.0 70.7 65.7 68.5 81.1 76.7 82.8 85.6 85.1 80.2 84.1 91.0 89.0 91.8 89.2 
2007 53.8 68.1 49.2 67.2 73.4 62.9 70.2 83.2 78.2 84.6 84.2 87.0 81.2 84.8 89.6 87.9 93.3 91.5 
2008 53.4 67.2 47.0 68.6 72.9 67.4 68.6 82.0 80.4 84.5 80.3 87.5 80.9 86.8 89.9 90.7 91.0 91.7 
2009 50.8 65.2 42.8 67.6 72.5 63.5 69.4 81.4 79.6 85.3 82.6 87.6 80.6 88.2 90.8 90.9 94.0 91.9 
2010 51.0 65.8 46.2 69.4 70.5 59.5 65.1 80.7 77.9 85.9 77.1 85.3 79.0 86.7 90.9 87.6 93.2 91.4 
2011 49.2 63.9 46.6 68.6 70.0 63.7 64.2 80.7 77.8 86.6 80.7 87.2 78.9 88.5 87.6 87.5 90.3 91.2 
2012 48.2 60.7 49.3 69.4 68.4 60.3 62.7 81.4 80.1 84.8 78.0 88.3 77.4 88.6 89.5 88.5 92.6 92.1 
2013 48.8 56.5 48.8 67.1 67.7 59.2 63.4 81.3 80.1 85.4 77.2 87.3 74.9 89.3 84.6 90.3 86.2 92.7 
Notes: The ISCED educational levels 0-2 refer to “Less than primary. primary and lower secondary education”; ISCED levels 3-4 refer to “Upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education”; and ISCED levels 5-6 refer to “Tertiary education”. 
Source: Eurostat 
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Appendix E   
 
To Chapter 6 – Prospective Total Fertility Rates: a robust forecast of past tendencies.  
 
Table E. 1: Forecasted age-specific fertility rates in Austria, between 2011 and 2020 
Age 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
15 0.00117 0.00115 0.00110 0.00106 0.00102 0.00099 0.00095 0.00092 0.00088 0.00085 
16 0.00377 0.00352 0.00347 0.00333 0.00324 0.00313 0.00304 0.00294 0.00284 0.00275 
17 0.00783 0.00759 0.00729 0.00704 0.00678 0.00654 0.00629 0.00605 0.00582 0.00559 
18 0.01439 0.01407 0.01352 0.01306 0.01257 0.01212 0.01166 0.01122 0.01079 0.01037 
19 0.02289 0.02230 0.02158 0.02080 0.02008 0.01936 0.01866 0.01797 0.01730 0.01664 
20 0.03079 0.02988 0.02878 0.02771 0.02667 0.02565 0.02465 0.02368 0.02273 0.02180 
21 0.03794 0.03669 0.03521 0.03394 0.03262 0.03137 0.03013 0.02893 0.02775 0.02661 
22 0.04557 0.04389 0.04227 0.04080 0.03930 0.03786 0.03644 0.03506 0.03371 0.03240 
23 0.05335 0.05126 0.04955 0.04782 0.04616 0.04452 0.04292 0.04135 0.03982 0.03833 
24 0.06171 0.05953 0.05773 0.05589 0.05412 0.05237 0.05067 0.04899 0.04735 0.04574 
25 0.07017 0.06845 0.06655 0.06484 0.06307 0.06138 0.05969 0.05804 0.05641 0.05481 
26 0.07877 0.07775 0.07595 0.07456 0.07299 0.07154 0.07005 0.06861 0.06718 0.06577 
27 0.08758 0.08702 0.08578 0.08484 0.08376 0.08275 0.08172 0.08072 0.07971 0.07872 
28 0.09528 0.09501 0.09462 0.09423 0.09385 0.09346 0.09308 0.09270 0.09231 0.09193 
29 0.10077 0.10076 0.10138 0.10172 0.10222 0.10263 0.10309 0.10352 0.10397 0.10442 
30 0.10293 0.10361 0.10529 0.10654 0.10803 0.10942 0.11087 0.11231 0.11377 0.11524 
31 0.10015 0.10228 0.10461 0.10677 0.10907 0.11134 0.11366 0.11600 0.11837 0.12077 
32 0.09392 0.09721 0.10001 0.10288 0.10579 0.10875 0.11176 0.11482 0.11793 0.12109 
33 0.08582 0.08933 0.09246 0.09570 0.09898 0.10234 0.10576 0.10926 0.11281 0.11644 
34 0.07615 0.07927 0.08237 0.08560 0.08887 0.09223 0.09566 0.09917 0.10276 0.10642 
35 0.06569 0.06835 0.07133 0.07439 0.07753 0.08075 0.08405 0.08742 0.09088 0.09441 
36 0.05480 0.05724 0.06000 0.06283 0.06574 0.06873 0.07181 0.07496 0.07819 0.08151 
37 0.04389 0.04606 0.04837 0.05078 0.05324 0.05579 0.05840 0.06109 0.06384 0.06667 
38 0.03380 0.03556 0.03731 0.03919 0.04109 0.04306 0.04508 0.04716 0.04929 0.05148 
39 0.02478 0.02613 0.02734 0.02869 0.03002 0.03143 0.03285 0.03432 0.03583 0.03737 
40 0.01727 0.01830 0.01913 0.02007 0.02099 0.02196 0.02294 0.02395 0.02499 0.02606 
41 0.01158 0.01225 0.01284 0.01350 0.01415 0.01484 0.01553 0.01625 0.01699 0.01775 
42 0.00722 0.00758 0.00798 0.00841 0.00884 0.00928 0.00974 0.01022 0.01070 0.01120 
43 0.00403 0.00423 0.00446 0.00469 0.00493 0.00518 0.00543 0.00570 0.00597 0.00625 
44 0.00208 0.00221 0.00232 0.00244 0.00256 0.00269 0.00282 0.00296 0.00310 0.00324 
45 0.00105 0.00113 0.00119 0.00126 0.00132 0.00139 0.00147 0.00154 0.00162 0.00169 
46 0.00053 0.00058 0.00061 0.00066 0.00069 0.00074 0.00078 0.00082 0.00087 0.00092 
47 0.00027 0.00030 0.00032 0.00034 0.00036 0.00039 0.00042 0.00045 0.00048 0.00051 
48 0.00012 0.00013 0.00014 0.00016 0.00017 0.00018 0.00020 0.00021 0.00023 0.00025 
49 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 0.00006 0.00006 0.00007 0.00008 0.00008 0.00009 0.00010 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table E. 2: Forecasted age-specific fertility rates in France, between 2013 and 2020 
Age 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
15 0.00099 0.00099 0.00100 0.00101 0.00101 0.00102 0.00102 0.00103 
16 0.00293 0.00296 0.00299 0.00301 0.00303 0.00305 0.00306 0.00308 
17 0.00642 0.00649 0.00654 0.00659 0.00662 0.00665 0.00666 0.00668 
18 0.01290 0.01306 0.01319 0.01328 0.01335 0.01340 0.01343 0.01345 
19 0.02272 0.02302 0.02325 0.02343 0.02357 0.02367 0.02374 0.02379 
20 0.03341 0.03380 0.03412 0.03437 0.03457 0.03472 0.03484 0.03493 
21 0.04421 0.04462 0.04495 0.04521 0.04543 0.04560 0.04574 0.04585 
22 0.05685 0.05716 0.05741 0.05760 0.05775 0.05786 0.05794 0.05800 
23 0.07152 0.07157 0.07157 0.07155 0.07149 0.07141 0.07132 0.07121 
24 0.08797 0.08767 0.08736 0.08704 0.08672 0.08639 0.08605 0.08571 
25 0.10499 0.10451 0.10401 0.10351 0.10300 0.10248 0.10196 0.10144 
26 0.12144 0.12104 0.12060 0.12013 0.11965 0.11914 0.11862 0.11809 
27 0.13599 0.13599 0.13594 0.13584 0.13571 0.13554 0.13535 0.13514 
28 0.14661 0.14728 0.14788 0.14841 0.14890 0.14934 0.14976 0.15015 
29 0.15138 0.15280 0.15414 0.15541 0.15662 0.15778 0.15891 0.16002 
30 0.15047 0.15256 0.15457 0.15653 0.15843 0.16030 0.16214 0.16397 
31 0.14470 0.14723 0.14972 0.15218 0.15462 0.15706 0.15950 0.16193 
32 0.13346 0.13616 0.13886 0.14157 0.14429 0.14703 0.14978 0.15256 
33 0.11921 0.12188 0.12457 0.12729 0.13003 0.13280 0.13560 0.13842 
34 0.10503 0.10753 0.11008 0.11266 0.11527 0.11793 0.12062 0.12335 
35 0.09003 0.09229 0.09459 0.09694 0.09932 0.10174 0.10420 0.10670 
36 0.07404 0.07601 0.07802 0.08006 0.08213 0.08423 0.08637 0.08855 
37 0.05938 0.06105 0.06275 0.06448 0.06624 0.06802 0.06983 0.07167 
38 0.04717 0.04858 0.05001 0.05146 0.05294 0.05444 0.05597 0.05752 
39 0.03618 0.03731 0.03845 0.03962 0.04081 0.04202 0.04325 0.04450 
40 0.02613 0.02695 0.02780 0.02866 0.02954 0.03044 0.03136 0.03230 
 LIII 
41 0.01786 0.01846 0.01908 0.01971 0.02035 0.02100 0.02167 0.02236 
42 0.01141 0.01181 0.01223 0.01265 0.01309 0.01353 0.01399 0.01445 
43 0.00666 0.00688 0.00711 0.00735 0.00760 0.00786 0.00812 0.00839 
44 0.00360 0.00371 0.00383 0.00396 0.00409 0.00423 0.00437 0.00452 
45 0.00183 0.00189 0.00195 0.00202 0.00209 0.00216 0.00224 0.00232 
46 0.00091 0.00094 0.00097 0.00101 0.00104 0.00109 0.00113 0.00117 
47 0.00045 0.00046 0.00048 0.00050 0.00053 0.00055 0.00058 0.00060 
48 0.00019 0.00020 0.00021 0.00022 0.00023 0.00024 0.00025 0.00026 
49 0.00006 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00008 0.00008 0.00009 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table E. 3: Forecasted age-specific fertility rates in Hungary, between 2010 and 2020 
Age 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
15 0.00545 0.00547 0.00548 0.00549 0.00551 0.00552 0.00553 0.00554 0.00556 0.00557 0.00558 
16 0.01236 0.01240 0.01244 0.01247 0.01251 0.01254 0.01258 0.01262 0.01265 0.01269 0.01272 
17 0.01965 0.01969 0.01965 0.01963 0.01960 0.01957 0.01954 0.01952 0.01949 0.01946 0.01943 
18 0.02518 0.02484 0.02431 0.02389 0.02341 0.02297 0.02251 0.02208 0.02164 0.02121 0.02078 
19 0.02868 0.02777 0.02654 0.02556 0.02446 0.02348 0.02247 0.02152 0.02057 0.01966 0.01876 
20 0.03234 0.03106 0.02935 0.02801 0.02651 0.02517 0.02381 0.02254 0.02128 0.02008 0.01891 
21 0.03638 0.03490 0.03290 0.03132 0.02957 0.02801 0.02642 0.02494 0.02347 0.02208 0.02073 
22 0.04100 0.03932 0.03700 0.03517 0.03315 0.03136 0.02953 0.02782 0.02614 0.02454 0.02299 
23 0.04638 0.04448 0.04184 0.03976 0.03746 0.03541 0.03333 0.03138 0.02947 0.02765 0.02589 
24 0.05290 0.05082 0.04793 0.04565 0.04312 0.04087 0.03858 0.03643 0.03432 0.03230 0.03035 
25 0.06088 0.05874 0.05578 0.05345 0.05084 0.04852 0.04613 0.04389 0.04167 0.03955 0.03748 
26 0.07065 0.06873 0.06609 0.06399 0.06164 0.05952 0.05733 0.05526 0.05319 0.05120 0.04923 
27 0.08258 0.08136 0.07969 0.07835 0.07683 0.07545 0.07400 0.07263 0.07123 0.06987 0.06852 
28 0.09393 0.09385 0.09374 0.09364 0.09354 0.09344 0.09334 0.09324 0.09314 0.09304 0.09294 
29 0.10018 0.10134 0.10293 0.10423 0.10574 0.10713 0.10862 0.11006 0.11155 0.11303 0.11454 
30 0.10059 0.10277 0.10582 0.10833 0.11126 0.11400 0.11693 0.11980 0.12278 0.12576 0.12882 
31 0.09602 0.09880 0.10282 0.10616 0.11008 0.11374 0.11769 0.12159 0.12565 0.12973 0.13393 
32 0.08766 0.09063 0.09505 0.09873 0.10305 0.10712 0.11153 0.11588 0.12044 0.12504 0.12979 
33 0.07699 0.07984 0.08412 0.08770 0.09192 0.09590 0.10021 0.10449 0.10897 0.11350 0.11819 
34 0.06521 0.06775 0.07153 0.07468 0.07841 0.08192 0.08574 0.08952 0.09350 0.09751 0.10167 
35 0.05350 0.05563 0.05874 0.06134 0.06440 0.06730 0.07044 0.07356 0.07683 0.08014 0.08356 
36 0.04278 0.04450 0.04696 0.04902 0.05145 0.05375 0.05624 0.05871 0.06130 0.06392 0.06664 
37 0.03320 0.03451 0.03637 0.03792 0.03976 0.04148 0.04336 0.04521 0.04716 0.04913 0.05116 
38 0.02487 0.02581 0.02711 0.02819 0.02947 0.03067 0.03198 0.03326 0.03461 0.03598 0.03738 
39 0.01799 0.01863 0.01949 0.02020 0.02103 0.02181 0.02266 0.02350 0.02437 0.02525 0.02616 
40 0.01253 0.01297 0.01351 0.01396 0.01448 0.01498 0.01551 0.01603 0.01658 0.01713 0.01769 
41 0.00840 0.00867 0.00903 0.00933 0.00969 0.01002 0.01037 0.01073 0.01109 0.01146 0.01184 
42 0.00521 0.00535 0.00558 0.00577 0.00599 0.00620 0.00643 0.00665 0.00689 0.00712 0.00736 
43 0.00288 0.00294 0.00305 0.00315 0.00326 0.00337 0.00348 0.00359 0.00371 0.00382 0.00394 
44 0.00148 0.00151 0.00156 0.00160 0.00165 0.00170 0.00175 0.00180 0.00186 0.00191 0.00196 
45 0.00074 0.00075 0.00077 0.00079 0.00082 0.00084 0.00087 0.00089 0.00091 0.00094 0.00096 
46 0.00033 0.00034 0.00034 0.00035 0.00036 0.00036 0.00037 0.00038 0.00039 0.00039 0.00040 
47 0.00013 0.00013 0.00013 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 0.00012 
48 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 
49 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table E. 4: Forecasted age-specific fertility rates in Portugal, between 2013 and 2020 
Age 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
15 0.00273 0.00258 0.00243 0.00229 0.00215 0.00201 0.00189 0.00176 
16 0.00651 0.00613 0.00577 0.00542 0.00509 0.00476 0.00445 0.00416 
17 0.01040 0.00969 0.00901 0.00836 0.00774 0.00714 0.00658 0.00604 
18 0.01612 0.01516 0.01424 0.01335 0.01249 0.01167 0.01089 0.01013 
19 0.02293 0.02188 0.02086 0.01988 0.01892 0.01799 0.01708 0.01621 
20 0.02846 0.02731 0.02619 0.02509 0.02403 0.02299 0.02198 0.02099 
21 0.03276 0.03147 0.03020 0.02897 0.02777 0.02659 0.02545 0.02434 
22 0.03715 0.03570 0.03427 0.03289 0.03153 0.03021 0.02893 0.02768 
23 0.04172 0.04008 0.03848 0.03692 0.03540 0.03391 0.03246 0.03105 
24 0.04679 0.04494 0.04313 0.04137 0.03966 0.03798 0.03635 0.03476 
25 0.05252 0.05045 0.04842 0.04645 0.04452 0.04264 0.04082 0.03904 
26 0.05922 0.05697 0.05478 0.05264 0.05055 0.04850 0.04651 0.04457 
27 0.06731 0.06504 0.06282 0.06065 0.05852 0.05643 0.05440 0.05240 
28 0.07620 0.07414 0.07212 0.07013 0.06818 0.06626 0.06437 0.06252 
29 0.08488 0.08334 0.08183 0.08033 0.07884 0.07737 0.07592 0.07449 
30 0.09078 0.08993 0.08908 0.08824 0.08740 0.08657 0.08574 0.08491 
31 0.09112 0.09086 0.09060 0.09034 0.09008 0.08982 0.08956 0.08930 
32 0.08771 0.08802 0.08832 0.08863 0.08894 0.08925 0.08955 0.08986 
33 0.08262 0.08346 0.08429 0.08514 0.08599 0.08684 0.08770 0.08856 
34 0.07612 0.07732 0.07852 0.07973 0.08095 0.08219 0.08344 0.08469 
35 0.06737 0.06873 0.07011 0.07151 0.07292 0.07435 0.07579 0.07726 
 LIV 
36 0.05621 0.05756 0.05892 0.06031 0.06171 0.06313 0.06457 0.06604 
37 0.04502 0.04623 0.04745 0.04869 0.04996 0.05124 0.05254 0.05386 
38 0.03524 0.03625 0.03728 0.03832 0.03938 0.04046 0.04156 0.04267 
39 0.02658 0.02736 0.02817 0.02898 0.02981 0.03066 0.03151 0.03239 
40 0.01903 0.01960 0.02017 0.02076 0.02136 0.02197 0.02258 0.02321 
41 0.01269 0.01306 0.01344 0.01383 0.01423 0.01463 0.01504 0.01545 
42 0.00785 0.00808 0.00831 0.00854 0.00878 0.00902 0.00927 0.00952 
43 0.00458 0.00471 0.00483 0.00496 0.00509 0.00523 0.00536 0.00550 
44 0.00248 0.00253 0.00259 0.00265 0.00270 0.00276 0.00282 0.00288 
45 0.00121 0.00123 0.00124 0.00126 0.00127 0.00129 0.00130 0.00132 
46 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 0.00057 
47 0.00027 0.00026 0.00026 0.00026 0.00026 0.00026 0.00026 0.00025 
48 0.00009 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008 0.00008 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 
49 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table E. 5: Forecasted age-specific fertility rates in Spain, between 2013 and 2020 
Age 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
15 0.00110 0.00106 0.00102 0.00099 0.00095 0.00092 0.00088 0.00085 
16 0.00347 0.00333 0.00324 0.00313 0.00304 0.00294 0.00284 0.00275 
17 0.00729 0.00704 0.00678 0.00654 0.00629 0.00605 0.00582 0.00559 
18 0.01352 0.01306 0.01257 0.01212 0.01166 0.01122 0.01079 0.01037 
19 0.02158 0.02080 0.02008 0.01936 0.01866 0.01797 0.01730 0.01664 
20 0.02878 0.02771 0.02667 0.02565 0.02465 0.02368 0.02273 0.02180 
21 0.03521 0.03394 0.03262 0.03137 0.03013 0.02893 0.02775 0.02661 
22 0.04227 0.04080 0.03930 0.03786 0.03644 0.03506 0.03371 0.03240 
23 0.04955 0.04782 0.04616 0.04452 0.04292 0.04135 0.03982 0.03833 
24 0.05773 0.05589 0.05412 0.05237 0.05067 0.04899 0.04735 0.04574 
25 0.06655 0.06484 0.06307 0.06138 0.05969 0.05804 0.05641 0.05481 
26 0.07595 0.07456 0.07299 0.07154 0.07005 0.06861 0.06718 0.06577 
27 0.08578 0.08484 0.08376 0.08275 0.08172 0.08072 0.07971 0.07872 
28 0.09462 0.09423 0.09385 0.09346 0.09308 0.09270 0.09231 0.09193 
29 0.10138 0.10172 0.10222 0.10263 0.10309 0.10352 0.10397 0.10442 
30 0.10529 0.10654 0.10803 0.10942 0.11087 0.11231 0.11377 0.11524 
31 0.10461 0.10677 0.10907 0.11134 0.11366 0.11600 0.11837 0.12077 
32 0.10001 0.10288 0.10579 0.10875 0.11176 0.11482 0.11793 0.12109 
33 0.09246 0.09570 0.09898 0.10234 0.10576 0.10926 0.11281 0.11644 
34 0.08237 0.08560 0.08887 0.09223 0.09566 0.09917 0.10276 0.10642 
35 0.07133 0.07439 0.07753 0.08075 0.08405 0.08742 0.09088 0.09441 
36 0.06000 0.06283 0.06574 0.06873 0.07181 0.07496 0.07819 0.08151 
37 0.04837 0.05078 0.05324 0.05579 0.05840 0.06109 0.06384 0.06667 
38 0.03731 0.03919 0.04109 0.04306 0.04508 0.04716 0.04929 0.05148 
39 0.02734 0.02869 0.03002 0.03143 0.03285 0.03432 0.03583 0.03737 
40 0.01913 0.02007 0.02099 0.02196 0.02294 0.02395 0.02499 0.02606 
41 0.01284 0.01350 0.01415 0.01484 0.01553 0.01625 0.01699 0.01775 
42 0.00798 0.00841 0.00884 0.00928 0.00974 0.01022 0.01070 0.01120 
43 0.00446 0.00469 0.00493 0.00518 0.00543 0.00570 0.00597 0.00625 
44 0.00232 0.00244 0.00256 0.00269 0.00282 0.00296 0.00310 0.00324 
45 0.00119 0.00126 0.00132 0.00139 0.00147 0.00154 0.00162 0.00169 
46 0.00061 0.00066 0.00069 0.00074 0.00078 0.00082 0.00087 0.00092 
47 0.00032 0.00034 0.00036 0.00039 0.00042 0.00045 0.00048 0.00051 
48 0.00014 0.00016 0.00017 0.00018 0.00020 0.00021 0.00023 0.00025 
49 0.00005 0.00006 0.00006 0.00007 0.00008 0.00008 0.00009 0.00010 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
Table E. 6: Forecasted age-specific fertility rates in Sweden, between 2012 and 2020 
Age 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
15 0.00047 0.00046 0.00046 0.00046 0.00045 0.00045 0.00044 0.00044 0.00043 
16 0.00146 0.00144 0.00143 0.00140 0.00138 0.00136 0.00133 0.00130 0.00128 
17 0.00319 0.00320 0.00319 0.00316 0.00313 0.00308 0.00303 0.00298 0.00292 
18 0.00726 0.00727 0.00724 0.00720 0.00714 0.00706 0.00697 0.00687 0.00677 
19 0.01518 0.01513 0.01506 0.01498 0.01489 0.01479 0.01468 0.01457 0.01445 
20 0.02587 0.02588 0.02588 0.02587 0.02586 0.02584 0.02581 0.02578 0.02574 
21 0.03790 0.03809 0.03827 0.03843 0.03858 0.03872 0.03885 0.03898 0.03910 
22 0.05023 0.05041 0.05060 0.05079 0.05098 0.05117 0.05137 0.05157 0.05176 
23 0.06272 0.06274 0.06280 0.06291 0.06304 0.06320 0.06338 0.06357 0.06378 
24 0.07613 0.07604 0.07603 0.07608 0.07618 0.07632 0.07649 0.07668 0.07690 
25 0.08898 0.08888 0.08885 0.08888 0.08895 0.08906 0.08920 0.08936 0.08955 
26 0.10177 0.10188 0.10203 0.10220 0.10239 0.10260 0.10282 0.10305 0.10329 
27 0.11577 0.11649 0.11718 0.11786 0.11852 0.11917 0.11980 0.12043 0.12106 
28 0.12920 0.13086 0.13244 0.13395 0.13540 0.13680 0.13818 0.13952 0.14085 
 LV 
29 0.13948 0.14224 0.14486 0.14737 0.14978 0.15213 0.15442 0.15667 0.15888 
30 0.14578 0.14960 0.15326 0.15679 0.16022 0.16357 0.16686 0.17011 0.17333 
31 0.14754 0.15219 0.15671 0.16112 0.16546 0.16973 0.17397 0.17819 0.18241 
32 0.14199 0.14692 0.15176 0.15655 0.16131 0.16605 0.17080 0.17555 0.18033 
33 0.13073 0.13536 0.13997 0.14459 0.14922 0.15387 0.15856 0.16330 0.16808 
34 0.11792 0.12198 0.12609 0.13026 0.13449 0.13878 0.14314 0.14756 0.15206 
35 0.10309 0.10647 0.10995 0.11353 0.11721 0.12097 0.12482 0.12875 0.13278 
36 0.08642 0.08913 0.09197 0.09492 0.09798 0.10115 0.10441 0.10776 0.11120 
37 0.06951 0.07163 0.07387 0.07623 0.07869 0.08124 0.08388 0.08660 0.08941 
38 0.05368 0.05533 0.05707 0.05890 0.06080 0.06278 0.06482 0.06693 0.06909 
39 0.03987 0.04112 0.04244 0.04382 0.04526 0.04674 0.04827 0.04985 0.05147 
40 0.02852 0.02944 0.03041 0.03143 0.03248 0.03357 0.03470 0.03587 0.03706 
41 0.01908 0.01970 0.02036 0.02105 0.02177 0.02252 0.02329 0.02409 0.02491 
42 0.01174 0.01212 0.01253 0.01296 0.01341 0.01387 0.01436 0.01486 0.01538 
43 0.00673 0.00695 0.00719 0.00744 0.00770 0.00798 0.00826 0.00856 0.00886 
44 0.00366 0.00378 0.00391 0.00405 0.00419 0.00435 0.00451 0.00467 0.00485 
45 0.00192 0.00198 0.00205 0.00212 0.00220 0.00228 0.00236 0.00245 0.00255 
46 0.00094 0.00098 0.00102 0.00106 0.00110 0.00115 0.00120 0.00125 0.00131 
47 0.00042 0.00044 0.00047 0.00050 0.00053 0.00056 0.00059 0.00062 0.00065 
48 0.00017 0.00018 0.00019 0.00020 0.00022 0.00023 0.00024 0.00026 0.00027 
49 0.00006 0.00006 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00008 0.00008 0.00009 0.00009 
Source: Human Fertility Database. Own elaboration. 
 
